Van Evera: Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict

Van Evera, S., 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, Cornell University Press.

“What caused the great wars of modern times? Of those causes, which h were preventable? What are the likely causes of future wars, and how can those wars best be prevented?” (1).

Van Evera puts fourth 5 hypotheses that are followed up upon in distinct chapters:

“H1. War is more likely when states fall prey to false optimism about its outcome.
H2. War is more likely when the advantage lies with the first side to mobilize or attack.
H3. War is more likely when the relative power of states fluctuates sharply—that is, when windows of opportunity and vulnerability are large.
H4. War is more likely when resources are cumulative—that is, when control of resources enables a state to protect or acquire other resources.
H5. War is more likely when conquest is easy.” (4).

H1: “…war is more likely when governments exaggerate their own chances of winning crises and wars, or when they underestimate the cost of war. If the losing side could foresee the outcome, it would often decline to fight” (5).

H2: “…war is markedly more likely when the first side to mobilize or attack has the advantage…It leads states to launch preemptive attacks to prevent an opponent from getting in the first blow. It also leads states to conceal their capabilities and grievances, from fear that open displays of strength or grievance could trigger another’s preemptive attack” (5).

H3: “…fluctuations in the relative power of states…cause war by tempting states to launch preventative attack, by accelerating diplomacy to unsafe speeds, and by making agreements less valuable” (5).

H4: “…war is more likely when resources are cumulative…Some resources are highly cumulative…Others are less so…States must compete more fiercely for control of more cumulative resources, because their gain or loss spells further gains or losses. Hence the greater the cumulatively of conquerable resources, the greater the risk of war” (5).

H5: “…war is far more likely when conquest is easy” (5).

“How much war can these five hypotheses explain? I argue that the causes of war they identify are potent when presented, but four of the five [all except false optimism] are rather rare in the real world, especially in the modern world. Thus they explain only a moderate amount of history as such. They explain a great deal of history, however, if they are recast as hypotheses on the effects of false exceptions of the dangers they frame. In fact, these misperceptions are common: states often exaggerate the size of first-move advantages, the size of windows of opportunity and vulnerability, the degree of resource cumulatively, and the ease of conquest. They then adopt war causing policies in response to these illusions” (6).

The author then discusses the difference between gross power and fine-grained power.