Clemens, WC. 2002. “Complexity Theory as a Tool for Understanding and Coping with Ethnic Conflict and Development Issues in Post-Soviet Eurasia.” International Journal of Peace Studies 7(2): 1-16.
“This paper contends that movement toward or away from resolution of ethnic problems in newly independent states can be more fully explained [than does Snyder, 2000 and the focus on democratization] by concepts derived from complexity theory. These concepts do not contradict explanations rooted in democratization but enrich them and offer linkages to other fields of knowledge. They start with a wider lens than democratization but include it. The concept of societal fitness, a major concern of complexity theory, subsumes political, economic, and cultural strengths. The precise role played by each strength in shaping societal fitness becomes an important but secondary question” (2).
“Generated by scholars from various disciplines, complexity theory integrates concepts from many fields to produce a new slant on evolution. Its exponents seek a general theory able to explain many different types of phenomena” (2).
“The analysis here suggests that complexity theory can enhance our ability to describe and explain the past and present. But the theory has much less utility for projecting alternative futures or prescribing policy. Still, complexity theory can enlarge our vision and complement other approaches to social science” (2).
“Complexity theory is anchored in nine basic concepts: fitness, coevolution, emergence, agent-based systems, self-organization, self-organized criticality, punctuated equilibrium and fitness landscapes” (3).
Fitness: how well does a system deal with complexity? All systems are on a range from highly unstable to highly stable, where fitness is located in the middle.
Coevolution: Everything evolves together, and the more connections that there are, the more difficult it is to understand what is happening.
Emergence: Macro complexity arising from micro complexity.
Agent-Based Systems: Systems where emergence comes from the behavior of individual units.
Self-Organization: The system organizes to create fitness.
Self-Organized Criticality: Claimed to not be essential to complexity theory, but posits a system that exists directly between order and chaos, where it can slip into chaos quicly.
Punctuated Equilibrium: Tipping points, where extinctions happen, mutations etc.
Fitness Landscapes: Fitness of different groups as they coevolve. Thus, the fitness of one group can be negatively or positively impacted by actions taken by another group.
The paper argues that certain countries demonstrate high levels of fitness, as can be seen in HDI scores. Other countries had lower levels of fitness. These countries had different histories from the countries experiencing high levels of fitness, and dealt with minority groups less well. Self-organization takes in democratic politics, market economies and the media. Coevolution explains that countries close to the West evolve with them. Emergence is seen in agreements and regional groups. Agent-Based systems in the fit groups, agents are free. Self-organized Criticality: some countries might not be as stable as they appear! Punctuated equilibrium: don’t expect steady progress. Fitness Landscapes: it might be possible to say something here, maybe not.
“The fundamental insight of complexity theory is its prediction that fitness will be found along the middle range of a spectrum ranging from rigid order to the other extreme—chaos. This insight helps explain why Central Asia is frozen in time, why the Caucasus explodes and why Russia resorts to an iron fist to overcome chaos” (10).
Showing posts with label Conflict (Internal). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conflict (Internal). Show all posts
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Monday, January 25, 2010
Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict
Anon. 1999. Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict. London: Zed Books.
Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict
Lots of good things, especially chapter 5.
Chapter 1:
The standard account of conflict in Africa can be broken down into arguments about either blood or babies. By that, the author indicates conflict over either resources or ethnic tensions;. The author believes that these explanations are not as adequately descriptive as they could be. These explanations are not nuance3d, and much more is brought to bear on the cause of African conflict.
There is a very good overview of the history of the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis. The origins of this conflict is largely related to political situations (Belgium initially preferred the Tutsis, as they were more “European” looking, then preferred the Hutus. The Hutus then gained power, and, when there was the potential for power sharing situations, they quickly took out their frustrations on the Tutsis, eventually leading to genocide when the Hutu president’s plane was shot down.)
Models of agricultural production are also not adequately nuanced and do not take into perspective other options for production, such as organic production that does not overly rely on pesticides, etc. The future needs of global agricultural production are typically prescribed technocratic, top-down solutions, which are not sustainable.
Chapter 2:
There is a typology for African conflict:
1. Banditry
2. National conflict over Political Power
3. Regional conflict over domestic political power
4. Local conflict over renewable resources
The causes of increased violence in Africa are mai8nly Western. Tradi8tional differences between ethnic groups involved violent conflict, but not on the scale that mo9der weaponry affords. . Other causes include the lack of specialization within African countries relating to agricultural or economic production; the economies need to be3 more diversified. Explanations for the cause of conflict typically involve crass claims about e3thnic groups, and do not fully deal with the importance of resources.
Chapter 5:
“A basic assumption of this chapter is that under certain conditions environmental degradation may cause violent conflict or war” (76).
“It is important to note the twin biases in the debate on environmental conflicts among scholars and experts. The first I call ‘the discovery of a new issue’ bias: whenever a new issue emerges, there is a tendency to ignore history. This leads to rather alarming statements about future events such as ‘water wars…The second bias is ‘environmental determinism’, which tends to overestimate the significance of geographical structures, demographic data and resource dependence at the expense of cultural, socioeconomic and political capacities or shortcomings, respectively, in order to deal with environmental degradation as well as discrimination…This chapter does not set out to provide an exhaustive survey of the growing literature dealing with environmental security in one form or another…It concentrates instead on: (1) an early contribution that conceptualized well the interrelationship between environmental transformation, underdevelopment and socio-political conflict…; (2) recent studies which focus on resource scarcity and environmental degradation as a major security issue or as a trigger of various types of serious conflicts” (77).
Then reviews different paths to conflict through environmental scarcity. Of particular use would be the review of three authors and their takes on the link (88). Wallensteen (92), Homer-Dixon (91, 94) and Baechler et al (96) are explored.
Overall, a very useful chapter.
Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict
Lots of good things, especially chapter 5.
Chapter 1:
The standard account of conflict in Africa can be broken down into arguments about either blood or babies. By that, the author indicates conflict over either resources or ethnic tensions;. The author believes that these explanations are not as adequately descriptive as they could be. These explanations are not nuance3d, and much more is brought to bear on the cause of African conflict.
There is a very good overview of the history of the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis. The origins of this conflict is largely related to political situations (Belgium initially preferred the Tutsis, as they were more “European” looking, then preferred the Hutus. The Hutus then gained power, and, when there was the potential for power sharing situations, they quickly took out their frustrations on the Tutsis, eventually leading to genocide when the Hutu president’s plane was shot down.)
Models of agricultural production are also not adequately nuanced and do not take into perspective other options for production, such as organic production that does not overly rely on pesticides, etc. The future needs of global agricultural production are typically prescribed technocratic, top-down solutions, which are not sustainable.
Chapter 2:
There is a typology for African conflict:
1. Banditry
2. National conflict over Political Power
3. Regional conflict over domestic political power
4. Local conflict over renewable resources
The causes of increased violence in Africa are mai8nly Western. Tradi8tional differences between ethnic groups involved violent conflict, but not on the scale that mo9der weaponry affords. . Other causes include the lack of specialization within African countries relating to agricultural or economic production; the economies need to be3 more diversified. Explanations for the cause of conflict typically involve crass claims about e3thnic groups, and do not fully deal with the importance of resources.
Chapter 5:
“A basic assumption of this chapter is that under certain conditions environmental degradation may cause violent conflict or war” (76).
“It is important to note the twin biases in the debate on environmental conflicts among scholars and experts. The first I call ‘the discovery of a new issue’ bias: whenever a new issue emerges, there is a tendency to ignore history. This leads to rather alarming statements about future events such as ‘water wars…The second bias is ‘environmental determinism’, which tends to overestimate the significance of geographical structures, demographic data and resource dependence at the expense of cultural, socioeconomic and political capacities or shortcomings, respectively, in order to deal with environmental degradation as well as discrimination…This chapter does not set out to provide an exhaustive survey of the growing literature dealing with environmental security in one form or another…It concentrates instead on: (1) an early contribution that conceptualized well the interrelationship between environmental transformation, underdevelopment and socio-political conflict…; (2) recent studies which focus on resource scarcity and environmental degradation as a major security issue or as a trigger of various types of serious conflicts” (77).
Then reviews different paths to conflict through environmental scarcity. Of particular use would be the review of three authors and their takes on the link (88). Wallensteen (92), Homer-Dixon (91, 94) and Baechler et al (96) are explored.
Overall, a very useful chapter.
Climate Change and Energy Insecurity
Anon. 2009. Climate Change and Energy Insecurity: The Challenge for Peace, Security and Development. London: Earthscan.
Edited volume of short chapters dealing with many aspects of climate change, clearly not just with energy insecurity.
Some chapters that may have limited use:
Oil: How Can Europe Kick the Habit of Dependence?
Derek Osborn
“Two critical factors will shape the future of oil production and consumption over the next decades. The first is accelerating climate change. The second is the increasing difficulty in finding secure sources of oil in the world. The interaction of these two factors is currently leading the world into a more and more unstable position” (18).
Localized Energy Conflicts in the Oil Sector
Nniimmo Bassey
Oil corrupts already corrupted states. Energy conflicts are not local, but are global (50). What about national peak oils, not just global peak oil (51).
Climate of Fear: Environment, Migration and Security
Devyani Gupta
This is a problem.
Edited volume of short chapters dealing with many aspects of climate change, clearly not just with energy insecurity.
Some chapters that may have limited use:
Oil: How Can Europe Kick the Habit of Dependence?
Derek Osborn
“Two critical factors will shape the future of oil production and consumption over the next decades. The first is accelerating climate change. The second is the increasing difficulty in finding secure sources of oil in the world. The interaction of these two factors is currently leading the world into a more and more unstable position” (18).
Localized Energy Conflicts in the Oil Sector
Nniimmo Bassey
Oil corrupts already corrupted states. Energy conflicts are not local, but are global (50). What about national peak oils, not just global peak oil (51).
Climate of Fear: Environment, Migration and Security
Devyani Gupta
This is a problem.
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Raleigh and Urdal: Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict
Raleigh, Clionadh, and Henrik Urdal. 2007. Climate change, environmental degradation and armed conflict. Political Geography 26, no. 6 (August): 674-694. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.005.
From Abstract: "Climate change is expected to bring about major change in freshwater availability, the productive capacity of soils, and in patterns of human settlement. However, considerable uncertainties exist with regard to the extent and geographical distribution of these changes...We argue that our best guess about the future has to be based on our knowledge about the relationship between demography, environment and violent conflict in the past...This article represents a new approach to assess the impact of environment on internal armed conflict by using georeferenced...data and small geographical, rather than political, units of analysis. It addresses some of the most important factors assumed to be strongly influenced by global warming: land degradation, freshwater availability, and population density and change. While population growth and density are associated with increased risks, the effects of land degradation and water scarcity are weak, negligible or insignificant. The results indicate that the effects of political and economic factors far outweigh those between local level demographic/environmental factors and conflict" (674).
"To address the issue of whether climate change poses a traditional security threat, we build on propositions from the environmental security literature, identifying potential links between natural resource scarcity and violent conflict. We combine these propositions with environmental change scenarios from...[IPCC]...and develop testable hypotheses about the expected relationships...If soil degradation, freshwater scarcity and population pressure have influenced the risk of conflict in the past, we assume that this may also inform us about likely security implications of climate change. Obvious limitations to such approach are the possibilities that climate change will bring about more severe and more abrupt forms of environmental change than we have experienced in the past" (675).
While the lion's share of studies on the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict focus on state-based units, this study will focus on 100 square kilometer blocks.
The existing literature on resource scarcity and conflict focuses on the following causal chains: "firstly, increasing temperatures, precipitation anomalies and extreme weather is expected to aggravate processes of resource degradation that is already underway" (676). "Secondly, significantly increasing sea levels as well as more extreme weather conditions will force millions of people to migrate, potentially leading to higher pressures on resources in areas of destination and subsequently to resource competition" (677).
Their soil data: "The measure of soil degradation throughout the world was commissioned by the International Soil Reference and Information Centre. The information...is based on questionnaire answers from numerous soil experts throughout the world" (683).
"It appears from this disaggregated analysis that demographic and environmental variables only have a very moderate effect on the risk of civil conflict" (689).
From Abstract: "Climate change is expected to bring about major change in freshwater availability, the productive capacity of soils, and in patterns of human settlement. However, considerable uncertainties exist with regard to the extent and geographical distribution of these changes...We argue that our best guess about the future has to be based on our knowledge about the relationship between demography, environment and violent conflict in the past...This article represents a new approach to assess the impact of environment on internal armed conflict by using georeferenced...data and small geographical, rather than political, units of analysis. It addresses some of the most important factors assumed to be strongly influenced by global warming: land degradation, freshwater availability, and population density and change. While population growth and density are associated with increased risks, the effects of land degradation and water scarcity are weak, negligible or insignificant. The results indicate that the effects of political and economic factors far outweigh those between local level demographic/environmental factors and conflict" (674).
"To address the issue of whether climate change poses a traditional security threat, we build on propositions from the environmental security literature, identifying potential links between natural resource scarcity and violent conflict. We combine these propositions with environmental change scenarios from...[IPCC]...and develop testable hypotheses about the expected relationships...If soil degradation, freshwater scarcity and population pressure have influenced the risk of conflict in the past, we assume that this may also inform us about likely security implications of climate change. Obvious limitations to such approach are the possibilities that climate change will bring about more severe and more abrupt forms of environmental change than we have experienced in the past" (675).
While the lion's share of studies on the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict focus on state-based units, this study will focus on 100 square kilometer blocks.
The existing literature on resource scarcity and conflict focuses on the following causal chains: "firstly, increasing temperatures, precipitation anomalies and extreme weather is expected to aggravate processes of resource degradation that is already underway" (676). "Secondly, significantly increasing sea levels as well as more extreme weather conditions will force millions of people to migrate, potentially leading to higher pressures on resources in areas of destination and subsequently to resource competition" (677).
Their soil data: "The measure of soil degradation throughout the world was commissioned by the International Soil Reference and Information Centre. The information...is based on questionnaire answers from numerous soil experts throughout the world" (683).
"It appears from this disaggregated analysis that demographic and environmental variables only have a very moderate effect on the risk of civil conflict" (689).
Hendrix and Glaser: Trends and Triggers
Hendrix, Cullen S., and Sarah M. Glaser. 2007. Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political Geography 26, no. 6 (August): 695-715. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.006.
The Abstract: "The conventional discourse relating climate change to conflict focuses on long term trends in temperature and precipitation that define ecosystems and their subsequent impact on access to renewable resources. Because these changes occur over long time periods they may not capture the proximate factors that trigger conflict. We estimate the impact of both long term trends in climate and short term climatic triggers on civil conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that both operationalizations have a significant impact. Climates more suitable for Eurasian agriculture are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict, while freshwater resources per capita are positively associated with the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, positive changes in rainfall are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict in the following year. We also assess the outlook for the future by analyzing simulated changes in precipitation means and variability over the period 2000-2099. We find few statistically significant, positive trends in our measure of interannual variability, suggesting that it is unlikely to be affected dramatically by changes in climate" (695).
There has been much assumed about the link between climate change and conflict, though, "The causal link between climate change and threats to security...is not specified" (696).
One set of literature argues that a decrease in renewable resources will lead to conflict. Another argues that variation in climate will lead to conflict. "We investigate these arguments from two complementary perspectives. First, the effects of climate change on the onset of conflict must be conceived of as (1) long term trends that may lead to a higher baseline probability of conflict, and (2) short term triggers that affect the interannual variability in that probability" (696).
They explore changes in precipitation using the NCAR-PCM model.
"These findings point to two conclusions. The first is that the future for Africa is not necessarily one defined by increasing interannual variability in rainfall, the most significant climatic variable in our analysis of conflict onset. The second regards policy. Our findings suggest that reducing dependence on rainwater for agriculture may mitigate conflict, even as rainfall variability is not predicted to increase over time" (696-7).
Lit Review:
Good review of literature on water availability and conflict.
"Thus framed, we address two open questions in the literature. The first is how to combine stationary trend measures with temporally variant trigger measures in order to model the environmental conditions that lead to conflict. The second regards the neo-Malthusian tendency to assume (a) that resources are dwindling and (b) that fewer resources lead inexorably to conflict" (698).
"...we can generate hypotheses regarding the effects of land degradation, climatic conditions, and freshwater abundance on the likelihood of conflict. Land degradation refers to processes that negatively affect land productivity. If productivity is defined as the expected benefit per unit of effort, then we expect higher levels of land degradation to be associated with lower returns to agriculture and therefore to higher likelihood of conflict, ceterus paribus" (699).
They use PRIO/Uppsala data for their dependent variable.
"Land degradation is defined as the temporary or permanent reduction in the reproductive capacity of land as a result of human action" (701)
"Our findings suggest that interannual variability in rainfall is a more significant determinant of conflict than our measures of climate, land degradation, and freshwater resources. Admittedly, these results may be biased due to stationary in the trend measures, a problem addressed critically in section two but which ultimately proves insurmountable in our analysis due to constraints on available data" (710).
The authors find that the future of Sub-Saharan stability vis-à-vis climate change is relatively positive, as the forecasts to not show large amounts of variability interannual pattern changes. They argue that this is due to a regional bias.
One key take-away from my perspective is that we need to look at interannual variability in forecasts of precipitation.
The Abstract: "The conventional discourse relating climate change to conflict focuses on long term trends in temperature and precipitation that define ecosystems and their subsequent impact on access to renewable resources. Because these changes occur over long time periods they may not capture the proximate factors that trigger conflict. We estimate the impact of both long term trends in climate and short term climatic triggers on civil conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that both operationalizations have a significant impact. Climates more suitable for Eurasian agriculture are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict, while freshwater resources per capita are positively associated with the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, positive changes in rainfall are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict in the following year. We also assess the outlook for the future by analyzing simulated changes in precipitation means and variability over the period 2000-2099. We find few statistically significant, positive trends in our measure of interannual variability, suggesting that it is unlikely to be affected dramatically by changes in climate" (695).
There has been much assumed about the link between climate change and conflict, though, "The causal link between climate change and threats to security...is not specified" (696).
One set of literature argues that a decrease in renewable resources will lead to conflict. Another argues that variation in climate will lead to conflict. "We investigate these arguments from two complementary perspectives. First, the effects of climate change on the onset of conflict must be conceived of as (1) long term trends that may lead to a higher baseline probability of conflict, and (2) short term triggers that affect the interannual variability in that probability" (696).
They explore changes in precipitation using the NCAR-PCM model.
"These findings point to two conclusions. The first is that the future for Africa is not necessarily one defined by increasing interannual variability in rainfall, the most significant climatic variable in our analysis of conflict onset. The second regards policy. Our findings suggest that reducing dependence on rainwater for agriculture may mitigate conflict, even as rainfall variability is not predicted to increase over time" (696-7).
Lit Review:
Good review of literature on water availability and conflict.
"Thus framed, we address two open questions in the literature. The first is how to combine stationary trend measures with temporally variant trigger measures in order to model the environmental conditions that lead to conflict. The second regards the neo-Malthusian tendency to assume (a) that resources are dwindling and (b) that fewer resources lead inexorably to conflict" (698).
"...we can generate hypotheses regarding the effects of land degradation, climatic conditions, and freshwater abundance on the likelihood of conflict. Land degradation refers to processes that negatively affect land productivity. If productivity is defined as the expected benefit per unit of effort, then we expect higher levels of land degradation to be associated with lower returns to agriculture and therefore to higher likelihood of conflict, ceterus paribus" (699).
They use PRIO/Uppsala data for their dependent variable.
"Land degradation is defined as the temporary or permanent reduction in the reproductive capacity of land as a result of human action" (701)
"Our findings suggest that interannual variability in rainfall is a more significant determinant of conflict than our measures of climate, land degradation, and freshwater resources. Admittedly, these results may be biased due to stationary in the trend measures, a problem addressed critically in section two but which ultimately proves insurmountable in our analysis due to constraints on available data" (710).
The authors find that the future of Sub-Saharan stability vis-à-vis climate change is relatively positive, as the forecasts to not show large amounts of variability interannual pattern changes. They argue that this is due to a regional bias.
One key take-away from my perspective is that we need to look at interannual variability in forecasts of precipitation.
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Nordas and Gleditsch: Climate Change and Conflict
Nordås, Ragnhild, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2007. Climate change and conflict. Political Geography 26, no. 6 (August): 627-638. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.003.
There is a widening consensus that the impacts of climate change will change the terrain of conflict. This article begins by noting IPCC reports, along with governmental reports issued by US, German, NGO and IO sources.
The authors then review the academic literature on climate change and conflict. They find it generally wanting, as many sources are not peer-reviewed and the total scope of work is sparse. Additionally, much of the literature that does exist is contentious: do nations cooperate around water resource issues, or come to blows?
The authors highlight five articles that help to form a backbone of the study of the relationship between climate change and conflict.
"This literature outlines several possible causal chains from climate change to conflict. The starting-point for most of these is that climate change results in a reduction of essential resources for livelihood, such as food or water, which can have one of two consequences: those affected by the increasing scarcity may start fighting over the remaining resources. Alternatively, people may be forced to leave the area, adding to the number of international refugees or internally displaced persons. Fleeing environmental destruction is at the outset a less violent response to adverse conditions than armed conflict or genocide. But when the migrants encroach on the territory of other people who may also be resource-constrained, the potential for violence arises" (631).
Drivers from climate change of conflict include changes in the availability of resources (food, fuel or water), forced migration, dramatic weather events, moves away from fossil fuels quickly, thus radically changing the price of oil and impacting dependent countries, or reduced economic output as a result of attempts to reduce carbon emissions.
They end with a focus on five points to improve analysis of this relationship: 1. conflict models and climate change models need to be synthesized; 2. what kinds of violence do we expect to emerge from climate change?; 3. there needs to be an accounting of both the positive and negative impacts of climate change; 4. the impacts of climate change need to be increasingly disaggregated; and 5. consequences should not focus on rich countries alone, but the globe.
There is a widening consensus that the impacts of climate change will change the terrain of conflict. This article begins by noting IPCC reports, along with governmental reports issued by US, German, NGO and IO sources.
The authors then review the academic literature on climate change and conflict. They find it generally wanting, as many sources are not peer-reviewed and the total scope of work is sparse. Additionally, much of the literature that does exist is contentious: do nations cooperate around water resource issues, or come to blows?
The authors highlight five articles that help to form a backbone of the study of the relationship between climate change and conflict.
"This literature outlines several possible causal chains from climate change to conflict. The starting-point for most of these is that climate change results in a reduction of essential resources for livelihood, such as food or water, which can have one of two consequences: those affected by the increasing scarcity may start fighting over the remaining resources. Alternatively, people may be forced to leave the area, adding to the number of international refugees or internally displaced persons. Fleeing environmental destruction is at the outset a less violent response to adverse conditions than armed conflict or genocide. But when the migrants encroach on the territory of other people who may also be resource-constrained, the potential for violence arises" (631).
Drivers from climate change of conflict include changes in the availability of resources (food, fuel or water), forced migration, dramatic weather events, moves away from fossil fuels quickly, thus radically changing the price of oil and impacting dependent countries, or reduced economic output as a result of attempts to reduce carbon emissions.
They end with a focus on five points to improve analysis of this relationship: 1. conflict models and climate change models need to be synthesized; 2. what kinds of violence do we expect to emerge from climate change?; 3. there needs to be an accounting of both the positive and negative impacts of climate change; 4. the impacts of climate change need to be increasingly disaggregated; and 5. consequences should not focus on rich countries alone, but the globe.
Monday, December 28, 2009
Lee: Climate Change and Armed Conflict
Lee, James R. 2009. Climate Change and Armed Conflict: Hot and Cold Wars. Routledge studies in peace and conflict resolution. London: Routledge.
There are two areas where conflict arising from climate change is likely: the Equatorial Tension Belt and the Polar Tension Belt. The ETB represents conflicts that will arise from the following causes: the age of the society and the overall environmental impact; the size of populations and the resource pressures implied; the kind of environment-desert or tropics-lend themselves to increased impact from climate change; historical legacy; and resource distribution (9-10). In the PTB, conflict will arise over the need to extract resources that become available due to receding ice stocks.
“Climate change will tend to make the existing Equatorial Tension Belt hotter and drier, and these twin conditions are likely to lead to greater conflict. Forecasts suggest that problems will intensify as demographic and socio-economic factors add further pressures on resources” (10).
The conceptualization of the relationship between climate change and conflict involves a framing of perspectives on the future: some are optimists, some are pessimists. These can be generally grouped into idealist and realist camps.
Some argue that climate change is not going to create substantial impetus for conflict. Others argue that conflict will emerge in certain zones, and not in others. These are referred to as “tame” zones and “untamed” zones (22).
The first tame zone is those that are interdependent because of trade. The second tame zone involve those who are democratic.
Chapter 2 reviews some historic instances of climate change and conflict.
Chapter 3 looks out at forecasts of climate change and conflict.
The beginning focuses on an overview of IPCC reports and findings.
Compares ACTOR forecasts for conflict with historic prevalence of conflict (from Uppsala) and then juxtaposes this with IPCC forecasts for low, intermediate and high temperature change. Again, forecasts of climate change are compared with Fund for Peace forecasts of state failure. IPCC regions are then each specifically explored.
Six scenarios are then deployed.
There are two areas where conflict arising from climate change is likely: the Equatorial Tension Belt and the Polar Tension Belt. The ETB represents conflicts that will arise from the following causes: the age of the society and the overall environmental impact; the size of populations and the resource pressures implied; the kind of environment-desert or tropics-lend themselves to increased impact from climate change; historical legacy; and resource distribution (9-10). In the PTB, conflict will arise over the need to extract resources that become available due to receding ice stocks.
“Climate change will tend to make the existing Equatorial Tension Belt hotter and drier, and these twin conditions are likely to lead to greater conflict. Forecasts suggest that problems will intensify as demographic and socio-economic factors add further pressures on resources” (10).
The conceptualization of the relationship between climate change and conflict involves a framing of perspectives on the future: some are optimists, some are pessimists. These can be generally grouped into idealist and realist camps.
Some argue that climate change is not going to create substantial impetus for conflict. Others argue that conflict will emerge in certain zones, and not in others. These are referred to as “tame” zones and “untamed” zones (22).
The first tame zone is those that are interdependent because of trade. The second tame zone involve those who are democratic.
Chapter 2 reviews some historic instances of climate change and conflict.
Chapter 3 looks out at forecasts of climate change and conflict.
The beginning focuses on an overview of IPCC reports and findings.
Compares ACTOR forecasts for conflict with historic prevalence of conflict (from Uppsala) and then juxtaposes this with IPCC forecasts for low, intermediate and high temperature change. Again, forecasts of climate change are compared with Fund for Peace forecasts of state failure. IPCC regions are then each specifically explored.
Six scenarios are then deployed.
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
O'Brien: Anticipating the Good, the Bad and the Ugly
O'Brien, S., 2002. Anticipating the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Early Warning Approach to Conflict and Instability Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(6), 791.
This study uses a statistical technique called fuzzy analysis of statistical evidence (FASE) to determine whether or not there are country-level, “macrostructural factors that can contribute to different kinds and levels of intensity of conflict and country instabilities” (791). O’Brien concludes that his method can forecast both the occurrence and intensity of conflicts for the following 5 years with 80% accuracy.
The paper begins by exploring the need for policy relevant scholarship, especially that exploring early-warning systems. The paper highlights a variety of studies that attempt to provide such scholarship. It then explores the State Failure Task Force (SFTF) and their four types of state failure: genocides/politicides, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and adverse/disruptive regime transitions (792).
The SFTF used a variety of methodological tools, including logistic regressions, neural networks and genetic algorithms to look at patterns in structural data. They found that their best model included only three variables: level of democracy, trade openness and infant mortality rate (793). They were about 66% effective with these variables historically. King and Zeng outperform the SFTF model by including legislative effectiveness and fraction of population in the military.
This study attempts to expand upon these earlier approaches.
He uses KOSIMO data
TRUNCATED HERE
This study uses a statistical technique called fuzzy analysis of statistical evidence (FASE) to determine whether or not there are country-level, “macrostructural factors that can contribute to different kinds and levels of intensity of conflict and country instabilities” (791). O’Brien concludes that his method can forecast both the occurrence and intensity of conflicts for the following 5 years with 80% accuracy.
The paper begins by exploring the need for policy relevant scholarship, especially that exploring early-warning systems. The paper highlights a variety of studies that attempt to provide such scholarship. It then explores the State Failure Task Force (SFTF) and their four types of state failure: genocides/politicides, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and adverse/disruptive regime transitions (792).
The SFTF used a variety of methodological tools, including logistic regressions, neural networks and genetic algorithms to look at patterns in structural data. They found that their best model included only three variables: level of democracy, trade openness and infant mortality rate (793). They were about 66% effective with these variables historically. King and Zeng outperform the SFTF model by including legislative effectiveness and fraction of population in the military.
This study attempts to expand upon these earlier approaches.
He uses KOSIMO data
TRUNCATED HERE
Thursday, January 10, 2008
Lenin: State and Revolution
Lenin, Vladimir Il Ich. (1935). State and revolution, Marxist teaching about the theory of the state and the tasks of the proletariat in the revolution. New York,: International publishers.
Originally written in 1917, this text has done much to formulate an orthodox Marxist interpretation of the state, and the transition from capitalist society to communist society. The text deals explicitly with Engle’s formulation of the “withering away of the state” and attempts to resuscitate its understanding from the jaws of critics of Marxism.
Firstly, Lenin must define and describe what characterizes a state. “The state is the product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises when, where, and to the extent that the class antagonisms cannot be objectively reconciled” (8 emphasis in original). The state is the mediator of class difference and class tension. In the bourgeois-democratic state of Lenin’s time, the state was also, “an organ of domination of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode” (9 emphasis in original).
The state must have a territory. It also must have an aspect of armed power. “Engles develops the conception of that ‘power’ which is termed the state—a power arising from society, but placing itself above it and becoming more and more separate from it. What does this power mainly consist of? It consists of special bodies of armed men who have at their disposal prisons, etc.” (10).
“In the Communist Manifesto are summed up the general lessons of history, which force us to see in the state the organ of class domination, and lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the proletariat cannot overthrow the bourgeoisie without first conquering political power, without obtaining political rule, without transforming the state into the ‘proletariat organized as the ruling class’; and that this proletarian state will begin to wither away immediately after its victory, because in a society without class antagonisms, the state is unnecessary and impossible” (25 emphasis in original).
“A Marxist is one who extends the acceptance of class struggle to the acceptance of the dictatorship of the proletariat” (30 emphasis in original).
“The forms of bourgeois states are exceedingly variegated, but their essence is the same: in one way or another, all these states are in the last analysis inevitably a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transition from capitalism to Communism will certainly bring a great variety and abundance of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be only one: the dictatorship of the proletariat” (31).
This transition is directly tied to the concept of democracy, which Lenin goes on to describe as true equality. “Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich—that is the democracy of capitalist society” (72). “Marx splendidly grasped the essence of capitalist democracy, when, in analyzing the experience of the Commune, he said that the oppressed were allowed, once every few years, to decide which particular representatives of the oppressing class should be in parliament to represent and repress them!” (73). It only becomes possible to truly address the concept of freedom in Lenin’s construction through the withering of the state.
“The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, i.e., of all states, is only possible through ‘withering away’ (20 emphasis in original).
The first phase of Communist society, a society that is described as “coming out of the womb of capitalism” (76), involves the transition of the means of production out of the hands of private interests and into the hands of the multitude. However, equality will be difficult to achieve, as different people produce differently and have different needs. “The state will wither away completely [and the higher phase of Communist society will be achieved] when society has realized the rule: ‘From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs’” (79). Socialism can be called the lower phase of development and Communism for the higher phase.
Monday, January 7, 2008
Campbell: National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia
Campbell, David. (1998). National deconstruction : violence, identity, and justice in Bosnia. Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press.
Though this book is not without its problems, it is an interesting and helpful application of deconstructivist reasoning and methodology in the field of international relations. The thesis is basically this: a positivist project of maps, census and history created a situation whereby the possibilities of responding to the tensions in the former
He begins by telling a couple of different stories from people after the break-up of the former
We are then taken through some of the criticism that has been piled onto the “post-structural” school of though by other IR theorists. This criticism tends to be silly at best, and clearly indicates the critic’s lack of familiarity with the text(s). Deconstructivism is seen as leading directly to nihilism, in that it makes the ability to take action impossible.
In contrast to instrumental rationality, which is seen as not being a sufficient barrier to guarantee against totalitarianism, Campbell’s method, “aims to demonstrate that the settled norms of international society—in particular, the idea that the national community requires the nexus of demarcated territory and fixed identity—were not only insufficient to enable a response to the Bosnian war, they ere complicit in and necessary for the conduct of the war itself” (13).
One important move that
Then, the concept of ontopology is deployed. This is used as a method for mapping out the narratives, the “enplotment”, according to Hayden White, vis-à-vis the history of the Balkans. He then outlines the history of the conflict in terms of conflicting narratives that all still highlight the entrenched nature of historical assumptions of sovereignty, ethnicity and conflict. This is where the “bad” occurred that leads to more death in the Bosnian war.
There is a discussion of ethics and Lévinas. “’responsibility [is] the essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity. For I describe subjectivity in ethical terms. Ethics…does not supplement a preceding existential base; the very note of the subjective is knotted in ethics understood as responsibility.’ Of these concepts, responsibility is perhaps the most important because, for Lévinas, being is a radically interdependent condition, a condition made possible only because of my responsibility to the other” (173).
He then goes over Derrida and moves towards a pursuit of democracy. This is where the methodology and the text run into themselves. If we are fighting against power structures, and critique the modern project of rationality because it can not guarantee against fascism, why would we want to throw up such an empty topic as democracy? How do we make this practical? If anything, democracy has lead to horrible crimes being committed as well as other systems of government.
The final chapter outlines ways in which the conflict in
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