Jutila, Matti. Reconstructing Global Interconnectedness: The Complementary Roles of Philosophy and Social Sciences: A conversation with Roy Bhaskar and Keikki Patomaki.
Critical Realism has a unique genealogy that can be traced back through the works of Bhakshar and Harre, among many others. "In short, the content of CR is understood with the help of three philosophical theses: ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationalism. Ontological realism means that the world is not only real but it must also be differentiated, structured, layered and possess causal powers. This forms the basis for our knowledge of the different aspects of the world, but this knowledge is always socially produced, contextual and fallible...This interpretative pluralism does not mean that all knowledge claims are equally valid. According to judgmental rationalism, we can always compare various interpretations, explanations and models to make well-grounded and plausible judgments about their truth" (2).
The remainder of the piece is an interview with both Bhaskar and Patomaki regarding their positioning of critical theory within philosophy and social science.
Showing posts with label Scientific Realism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Scientific Realism. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 6, 2009
Patomaki: A Critical Realist Approach to Global Political Economy
Patomäki, H. 2003. A critical realist approach to global political economy. Critical realism (pp. 197Á220). London/New York: Routledge.
Cox wrote from a neo-Gramscian perspective about IPE. This derived from a critique of Wallenstein's approach to a global capitalist order, both as a critique and as an amendment. This was then built upon by Gill and Law. "...Gill and Law argued that a political economy analysis should not be narrowly limited to diplomatic relations between governments of modern nation-states, which are taken as given, and a few other actors such as NGOs and international organizations. The focus should not be on the actions of a few collective actors, particularly states, but rather on the underlying socio-economic processes and structures. Deeper and larger historical processes...determine, in part, forms of state and world orders. In contrast to Wallenstein, but in accordance with the rising literature on globalization, Gill and Law...also claimed that there is now a rather well integrated global political economy, 'whereas in the past, there was a less complex international political economy'" (2).
"GPE has opened a new perspective for fruitful studies of world politics and economy. It is the basic claim of this paper that critical realism can make a difference by enriching this approach in at least two crucial ways. Firstly, critical realism enables the building of bridges between heterodox economics and GEP...Secondly, CR can work as a philosophical 'underlabourer' for GPE by deepening basic ontological concepts such as causality, action, structure, power and open systems; by clarifying the epistemology of explanatory modeling and the role of explicitly hypotheses and empirical evidence; and by explicating the truly critical moment in social scientific explanations" (2-3).
"In the following, I make first an argument that the neo-Gramscian GPE fails to address the issues of economic theory and lacks adequate concepts of causality, explanation, hypothesis and empirical evidence. Second, I explain why the neo-classical orthodoxy in economics has become insulated from all other strands of social sciences, including political economy; and ask whether there are nay more open, pluralist and realist approaches in economics, which could enable the creation of bridges between GPE and economics. Third, in order to absent the absences of GPE, I introduce the critical realist notions of action, structure, causality and open systems; and the epistemological concepts of falsification, iconic model, existential and causal hypothesis, and evidence. I argue that these and related concepts provide a framework within which GPE can be made more systematic and open to falsification and revisions; and within which economics and political economy could be re-united. Fourth, by using explanations of the instability of global finance as an example, I take a few steps towards concretizing these suggestions in a pivotal contemporary context. Finally, I conclude by outlining briefly the relationship between causal explanations, social criticism, and transformative practice" (3-4).
Neo-classical economic theory has become separated from social science. The author traces the development of both neo-classical economic theory growth and the growth of heterodox approaches. A critical realist ontology also rejects the false method of looking at the world through closed systems in place of open systems.
Cox wrote from a neo-Gramscian perspective about IPE. This derived from a critique of Wallenstein's approach to a global capitalist order, both as a critique and as an amendment. This was then built upon by Gill and Law. "...Gill and Law argued that a political economy analysis should not be narrowly limited to diplomatic relations between governments of modern nation-states, which are taken as given, and a few other actors such as NGOs and international organizations. The focus should not be on the actions of a few collective actors, particularly states, but rather on the underlying socio-economic processes and structures. Deeper and larger historical processes...determine, in part, forms of state and world orders. In contrast to Wallenstein, but in accordance with the rising literature on globalization, Gill and Law...also claimed that there is now a rather well integrated global political economy, 'whereas in the past, there was a less complex international political economy'" (2).
"GPE has opened a new perspective for fruitful studies of world politics and economy. It is the basic claim of this paper that critical realism can make a difference by enriching this approach in at least two crucial ways. Firstly, critical realism enables the building of bridges between heterodox economics and GEP...Secondly, CR can work as a philosophical 'underlabourer' for GPE by deepening basic ontological concepts such as causality, action, structure, power and open systems; by clarifying the epistemology of explanatory modeling and the role of explicitly hypotheses and empirical evidence; and by explicating the truly critical moment in social scientific explanations" (2-3).
"In the following, I make first an argument that the neo-Gramscian GPE fails to address the issues of economic theory and lacks adequate concepts of causality, explanation, hypothesis and empirical evidence. Second, I explain why the neo-classical orthodoxy in economics has become insulated from all other strands of social sciences, including political economy; and ask whether there are nay more open, pluralist and realist approaches in economics, which could enable the creation of bridges between GPE and economics. Third, in order to absent the absences of GPE, I introduce the critical realist notions of action, structure, causality and open systems; and the epistemological concepts of falsification, iconic model, existential and causal hypothesis, and evidence. I argue that these and related concepts provide a framework within which GPE can be made more systematic and open to falsification and revisions; and within which economics and political economy could be re-united. Fourth, by using explanations of the instability of global finance as an example, I take a few steps towards concretizing these suggestions in a pivotal contemporary context. Finally, I conclude by outlining briefly the relationship between causal explanations, social criticism, and transformative practice" (3-4).
Neo-classical economic theory has become separated from social science. The author traces the development of both neo-classical economic theory growth and the growth of heterodox approaches. A critical realist ontology also rejects the false method of looking at the world through closed systems in place of open systems.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Wight: Agents, Structures and International Relations
Wight, Colin. (2006). Agents, structures and international relations : politics as ontology. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
The agent-structure problem is the medium whereby Wight attempts to “unpack” his argument. He chooses this for three reasons: firstly, this problem is essentially ontological; secondly, every theoretical approach posits a solution to the agent-structure problem whether explicitly or tacitly; and thirdly, is the intersection of politics and ontology whereby the assumption is that the agent-structure problem is a part of social ontology. From later in the book, “If ever the agent-structure problem were solved, in the sense of requiring no further discussion, then social theoretic activity would come to an end, and along with it political, economic, cultural and ethical dispute. In this sense, the agent-structure problem is political” (63).
Wight also rejects the possibility that a general theory of IR is even achievable. “The attempt to construct a parsimonious theory of IR is not only flawed and doomed to failure, but also politically and ethically dangerous” (8).
In the second chapter, Wight situates his own political position vis-à-vis that of positivism. He claims that the current IR theoretical mess requires one to orient themselves with this hegemonic approach. “According to the positivist model of science, there is a general set of rules, procedures and axioms, which when taken together constitutes the ‘scientific method’” (19).
Wight rejects this positivism and instead embraces a scientific realism: “But it is not just the ‘covering law model’ which scientific realism rejects; it is the very attempt to demarcate a ‘scientific method’. For scientific realists there can be no single ‘scientific method’. Understood as the attempt to provide depth explanations of phenomena, it must be the case that differing phenomena will require differing modes of investigation and perhaps different models of explanation. Contra positivism, then, for scientific realists, the content of science is not the method” (19). “For scientific realists the productions of science are always open to revision and reformulation. The dialectic of science is never ending and no scientific discovery, or claim, is ever beyond critique” (24).
There is an account of the Kantian epistemological turn that arose from the catalyst that was David Hume. The scientific realists must always question epistemological claims and must revert back to ontology, though ontology will always require epistemology for further exploration.
He ontologically establishes three points about society: “First, societies are irreducible to people; social forms are a necessary condition for any intentional social act. Second, their pre-existence establishes their autonomy as possible objects of study. Third, their causal power establishes their reality” (46).
Wight then deploys the Bourdieu concept of habitus. He defines this as, “a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules” (49). Society and the individual interact thought the medium of the habitus.
The remainder of the second chapter is a relatively rushed sketch of different theories and Wight’s classification of their position vis-à-vis the agent-structure problem and the issues surrounding either ontology, epistemology or methodology. He looks at Webber, Wallerstein, Waltz, Wendt, Cox, Carr and many others.
The third chapter’s aim is to, “identify what lies at the heart of the agent-structure problem and disentangle this from the other issues that surfaced during the debate surrounding this issue within IR, but which are not an integral part of it” (90). This debate is problematic because there are so many different theoretical approaches that have been taken and that must be disentangled. There is the standard levels of analysis approach, the micro-macro approach and the two structures approach. All of these are problematic on certain levels for Wight if they do not involve an understanding of full interaction between agents and structure where structure operates at all levels. The third chapter also has relevant, interesting and important things to say about emergence and deserves a more thorough read.
This abstract will stop at this point and should be taken up later with chapter 4-the end.
UPDATE:
Conclusion:
The agent-structure debate has provided the following to IR: it has brought forward the impossibility of focusing only on the international while ignoring the domestic; it has also rejected structural monism; it has also problematized methodological individualism; finally, it brought forward the difficulty of operationalizing this approach.
“The ability to predict outcomes in open systems is beyond all science” (52).“There are simply no epistemological or methodological divides to accept, defend or bridge. …the argument advanced in this book promises nothing less than a comprehensive reassessment and restructuring of the theoretical cleavages that divide the discipline” (1). The theoretical divisions that are currently a very real trend in IR are not, Wight claims, epistemological or methodological, but they are rather ontological. Wight attempts to right this mess by focusing on the ontological arguments that have been overlooked by many in the discipline.
The agent-structure problem is the medium whereby Wight attempts to “unpack” his argument. He chooses this for three reasons: firstly, this problem is essentially ontological; secondly, every theoretical approach posits a solution to the agent-structure problem whether explicitly or tacitly; and thirdly, is the intersection of politics and ontology whereby the assumption is that the agent-structure problem is a part of social ontology. From later in the book, “If ever the agent-structure problem were solved, in the sense of requiring no further discussion, then social theoretic activity would come to an end, and along with it political, economic, cultural and ethical dispute. In this sense, the agent-structure problem is political” (63).
Wight also rejects the possibility that a general theory of IR is even achievable. “The attempt to construct a parsimonious theory of IR is not only flawed and doomed to failure, but also politically and ethically dangerous” (8).
In the second chapter, Wight situates his own political position vis-à-vis that of positivism. He claims that the current IR theoretical mess requires one to orient themselves with this hegemonic approach. “According to the positivist model of science, there is a general set of rules, procedures and axioms, which when taken together constitutes the ‘scientific method’” (19).
“…positivism can be characterized in the following manner. (1) Phenomenalism: the doctrine that holds that we cannot get beyond the way things appear to us and thereby obtain reliable knowledge of reality—in other words, appearances, not realities are the only objects of knowledge. (2) Nominalism: the doctrine that there is no objective meaning to the words we use—words and concepts do not pick out any actual objects or universal aspects of reality, they are simply conventional symbols or names that we happen to use for our own convenience. (3) Cognitivism: the doctrine that holds that no cognitive value can be ascribed to value judgments and normative statements. (4) Naturalism: the belief that there is an essential unity of scientific method such that the social sciences can be studies in the same manner as natural science” (21).Positivists then use covering laws, instrumental treatments of theoretical terms, a Humean account of cause and an embrace of operationalism.
Wight rejects this positivism and instead embraces a scientific realism: “But it is not just the ‘covering law model’ which scientific realism rejects; it is the very attempt to demarcate a ‘scientific method’. For scientific realists there can be no single ‘scientific method’. Understood as the attempt to provide depth explanations of phenomena, it must be the case that differing phenomena will require differing modes of investigation and perhaps different models of explanation. Contra positivism, then, for scientific realists, the content of science is not the method” (19). “For scientific realists the productions of science are always open to revision and reformulation. The dialectic of science is never ending and no scientific discovery, or claim, is ever beyond critique” (24).
There is an account of the Kantian epistemological turn that arose from the catalyst that was David Hume. The scientific realists must always question epistemological claims and must revert back to ontology, though ontology will always require epistemology for further exploration.
“The empirical realist error is the conflation of three domains, or levels of realty, into one—that of the empirical. In contrast to this, scientific realists argue that in order to make sense of the scientific enterprise we need to distinguish between the domains of the empirical (experiences and impressions), the actual (events and states-of-affairs—i.e. the actual objects of potential direct experience) and the real or non-actual (the deep structures, mechanisms and tendencies)” (34-5).There is a continued critique of positivism in its many forms. The hope of Wight is the imposition of a science without positivist “residues”. For him, scientific realism is one way that this can become a reality.
He ontologically establishes three points about society: “First, societies are irreducible to people; social forms are a necessary condition for any intentional social act. Second, their pre-existence establishes their autonomy as possible objects of study. Third, their causal power establishes their reality” (46).
Wight then deploys the Bourdieu concept of habitus. He defines this as, “a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules” (49). Society and the individual interact thought the medium of the habitus.
The remainder of the second chapter is a relatively rushed sketch of different theories and Wight’s classification of their position vis-à-vis the agent-structure problem and the issues surrounding either ontology, epistemology or methodology. He looks at Webber, Wallerstein, Waltz, Wendt, Cox, Carr and many others.
The third chapter’s aim is to, “identify what lies at the heart of the agent-structure problem and disentangle this from the other issues that surfaced during the debate surrounding this issue within IR, but which are not an integral part of it” (90). This debate is problematic because there are so many different theoretical approaches that have been taken and that must be disentangled. There is the standard levels of analysis approach, the micro-macro approach and the two structures approach. All of these are problematic on certain levels for Wight if they do not involve an understanding of full interaction between agents and structure where structure operates at all levels. The third chapter also has relevant, interesting and important things to say about emergence and deserves a more thorough read.
This abstract will stop at this point and should be taken up later with chapter 4-the end.
UPDATE:
Conclusion:
The agent-structure debate has provided the following to IR: it has brought forward the impossibility of focusing only on the international while ignoring the domestic; it has also rejected structural monism; it has also problematized methodological individualism; finally, it brought forward the difficulty of operationalizing this approach.
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