Layne, C., 2007. Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.
Layne begins, as many do, by highlighting how deeply embedded the concept of the democratic peace has become in international politics and foreign policy. For example, he highlights Russett’s statement that it may actually be possible to overcome the traditional realist constraints of anarchy and a self-help international society through the democratic peace.
Layne explores whether or not realist theory or democratic peace theory is actually more able to describe and explain behavior. The author presents democratic peace as being either structural or normative. The structural account deals with, “…the restraining effects of public opinion, or of the checks and balances embedded in the democratic state’s domestic politics structure” (6). The account of the normative driver of democratic peace is also explored. This driver posits that, “…democratic norms and culture—a shared commitment to the peaceful adjudication of political disputes—that accounts for the absence of war between democratic states” (6). Layne argues that the structural account is weak, and that this puts the onus of explanation on the normative account.
“This article’s centerpiece is a test of the competing explanations of international outcomes offered by democratic peace theory and by realism. This test is based on case studies of four ‘near misses’—crises where two democratic states almost went to war with each other” (7).
“I conclude that realism is superior to democratic peace theory as a predictor of international outcomes. Indeed, democratic peace theory appears to have extremely little explanatory power in the cases studied…I conclude by discussing democratic peace theory’s troublesome implications for post-Cold War American foreign policy” (8).
The four case studies explored are those of near-misses among democratic great powers.
Showing posts with label Kant. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kant. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 8, 2008
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Doyle: Liberalism and World Politics
Doyle, M., 1986. Liberalism and World Politics. American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1151-1169.
Doyle explores three traditions of liberal theory: Schumpeter, Machiavelli and Kant. While there are some conflict within the liberal tradition, ie., a conflict between liberal imperialism and liberal pacifism, Doyle believes that there is a recurrent theme that can be found within liberal states. “Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. T hey are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace…and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression…” (1151).
“What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all” (1152).
Schumpeter’s liberalism is one that stands in contrast to imperialism. Democracies who are capitalistic will be peaceful. Democratic capitalist countries do not benefit from expansionist policies. Also, their citizens are gainfully employed and busy themselves producing, which implicitly keeps them away from jingoism.
Machiavelli has a different argument. He claims that republics are actually quite good and useful at pursuing expansionist policies. Machiavelli does not advocate radical democracy; that he believed would eventually digress into tyranny. He does, however, explore the relationship of citizens in a republic, which he finds to be quite satisfactory.
Machiavelli and Schumpeter stand in contrast. “We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism—pacifism and imperialism—indicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics” (1155).
“Kant’s citizens…are diverse in their goals and individualized and rationalized, but most importantly, they are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals and of treating other individuals as ends rather than as means” (1162).
Doyle explores three traditions of liberal theory: Schumpeter, Machiavelli and Kant. While there are some conflict within the liberal tradition, ie., a conflict between liberal imperialism and liberal pacifism, Doyle believes that there is a recurrent theme that can be found within liberal states. “Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. T hey are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace…and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression…” (1151).
“What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all” (1152).
Schumpeter’s liberalism is one that stands in contrast to imperialism. Democracies who are capitalistic will be peaceful. Democratic capitalist countries do not benefit from expansionist policies. Also, their citizens are gainfully employed and busy themselves producing, which implicitly keeps them away from jingoism.
Machiavelli has a different argument. He claims that republics are actually quite good and useful at pursuing expansionist policies. Machiavelli does not advocate radical democracy; that he believed would eventually digress into tyranny. He does, however, explore the relationship of citizens in a republic, which he finds to be quite satisfactory.
Machiavelli and Schumpeter stand in contrast. “We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism—pacifism and imperialism—indicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics” (1155).
“Kant’s citizens…are diverse in their goals and individualized and rationalized, but most importantly, they are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals and of treating other individuals as ends rather than as means” (1162).
Friday, November 16, 2007
Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals
Kant, I. and H. S. Reiss (1991). Kant : political writings. Cambridge [England] ; New York, Cambridge University Press.
Kant begins by exploring what constitutes a “Right”. It firstly applies to the relation between one person and another. Secondly, it concerns the will of both people in this relationship. Thirdly, the end that each will intends to achieve is explored. “Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right” (133). The Universal Law of Right: “let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (133).
This Right involves and legitimizes the use of coercion. Anyone who attempts to subvert this freedom can be coerced into conforming with the freedom. The governing authority is there to make sure that people conform to the freedom in question.
The State then fulfills an important role as the guarantor of the freedom that everyone has come to enjoy, and this involves the use of force and coercion to make sure that everyone remains free. “Experience teaches us the maxim that human beings act in a violent and malevolent manner, and that they tend to fight among themselves until an external coercive legislation supervenes” (137). This is because men will act independently, without a duty to anyone but themselves.
Citizens have three basic rights in this construction of the state and the individual: firstly, they have the freedom to obey only the laws of their own state and no other; secondly, they have civil equality in recognizing no one as being superior to themselves; and thirdly, they have civil independence to owe their freedom to no one other than everyone in the commonwealth. People who have a stake in the system should be given the right to vote and influence this commonwealth. Those who are not capable of such an important intervention should not be given this right (apprentices, servants, minors, women, etc.)
People in the State of Nature have an unbridled freedom, a freedom to do and act in any way that they see fit. However, Kant believes that this freedom is not accompanied with duty, and thus that people in nature only act in their self interest. He has a similar view to State of Nature issues as does Hobbes. Kant believes that people, “give up their external freedom in order to receive it back at once as members of a commonwealth” (140). The State of Nature freedom is basically swapped for a freedom in a commonwealth, which is an, “entire and unfinished freedom” (140).
The ruler is the sovereign, and that person is the director of the government. However, while they make the ultimate decision, they are still bound by the law. This leader can not themselves pass judgement, they are not a tyrant, but they can appoint judges to do this for them.
“There can be no rightful resistance on the part of the people to the legislative head of state” (144). “The reason why it is the duty of the people to tolerate even what is apparently the most intolerable misuse of supreme power is that it is impossible ever to conceive of their resistance to the supreme legislation as being anything other than unlawful and liable to nullify the entire legal constitution. For before such resistance could be authorized, there would have to be a public law which permitted the people to offer resistance.” (144-5) The people may, however, refuse to participate in the political process and thus negatively resist.
Then, Kant moves on to talk about an International Right and eventually a Cosmopolitan Right. This will not be looked at in this summary, though it will be noted that it does represent an interesting example of how history moves from a pre-Hegelian perspective: There are ruptures in order (in almost a post-structural sense), and this brings about new orders, or, in Kant’s terms, Rights.
Kant begins by exploring what constitutes a “Right”. It firstly applies to the relation between one person and another. Secondly, it concerns the will of both people in this relationship. Thirdly, the end that each will intends to achieve is explored. “Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right” (133). The Universal Law of Right: “let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (133).
This Right involves and legitimizes the use of coercion. Anyone who attempts to subvert this freedom can be coerced into conforming with the freedom. The governing authority is there to make sure that people conform to the freedom in question.
The State then fulfills an important role as the guarantor of the freedom that everyone has come to enjoy, and this involves the use of force and coercion to make sure that everyone remains free. “Experience teaches us the maxim that human beings act in a violent and malevolent manner, and that they tend to fight among themselves until an external coercive legislation supervenes” (137). This is because men will act independently, without a duty to anyone but themselves.
Citizens have three basic rights in this construction of the state and the individual: firstly, they have the freedom to obey only the laws of their own state and no other; secondly, they have civil equality in recognizing no one as being superior to themselves; and thirdly, they have civil independence to owe their freedom to no one other than everyone in the commonwealth. People who have a stake in the system should be given the right to vote and influence this commonwealth. Those who are not capable of such an important intervention should not be given this right (apprentices, servants, minors, women, etc.)
“This dependence upon the will of others and consequent inequality does not, however, in any way conflict with the freedom and equality of all men as human beings who together constitute a people. On the contrary, it is only by accepting these conditions that such a people can become a state and enter into a civil constitution…For from the fact that as passive members of the state, they can demand to be treated by all others in accordance with laws of natural freedom and equality, it does not follow that they also have a right to influence or organize the state itself as active members, or to cooperate in introducing particular laws. Instead, it only means that the positive laws to which the voters agree, of whatever sort they may be, must not be at variance with the natural laws of freedom and with the corresponding equality of all members of the people whereby they are allowed to work their way up from their passive condition to an active one” (140).
People in the State of Nature have an unbridled freedom, a freedom to do and act in any way that they see fit. However, Kant believes that this freedom is not accompanied with duty, and thus that people in nature only act in their self interest. He has a similar view to State of Nature issues as does Hobbes. Kant believes that people, “give up their external freedom in order to receive it back at once as members of a commonwealth” (140). The State of Nature freedom is basically swapped for a freedom in a commonwealth, which is an, “entire and unfinished freedom” (140).
The ruler is the sovereign, and that person is the director of the government. However, while they make the ultimate decision, they are still bound by the law. This leader can not themselves pass judgement, they are not a tyrant, but they can appoint judges to do this for them.
“There can be no rightful resistance on the part of the people to the legislative head of state” (144). “The reason why it is the duty of the people to tolerate even what is apparently the most intolerable misuse of supreme power is that it is impossible ever to conceive of their resistance to the supreme legislation as being anything other than unlawful and liable to nullify the entire legal constitution. For before such resistance could be authorized, there would have to be a public law which permitted the people to offer resistance.” (144-5) The people may, however, refuse to participate in the political process and thus negatively resist.
Then, Kant moves on to talk about an International Right and eventually a Cosmopolitan Right. This will not be looked at in this summary, though it will be noted that it does represent an interesting example of how history moves from a pre-Hegelian perspective: There are ruptures in order (in almost a post-structural sense), and this brings about new orders, or, in Kant’s terms, Rights.
Kant: The Contest of Faculties
Kant, I. and H. S. Reiss (1991). Kant : political writings. Cambridge [England] ; New York, Cambridge University Press.
Kant begins by making a distinction between the higher faculties, i.e. Theology, Law and Medicine with the lower faculties, i.e. Philosophy.
He then goes on to make one of his most important interventions: bridging the rationalist and the empiricist divide that had haunted philosophical debates for years (think Hume/Descarte). He does this by asking if the human race is continually improving and beginning to think about where he should go about finding such information. He claims that it is not possible to have simple, a priori history, for that would require a profit (177)
Kant then goes on to posit that there are three possibilities for the development of society: that we are regressing, progressing or standing still. He concludes that we are not regressing, that we are not progressing, and that if we are standing still, it would be a farce.
He claims that the problem of progress can not be fully explained through experience, but that we do have to start from the empirical position. Kant begins to search for an event that would show the emancipation of the human, the individual. “We are here concerned only with the attitude of the onlookers as it reveals itself in public while the drama of great political changes is taking place: for they openly express universal yet disinterested sympathy for one set of protagonists against their adversaries, even at the risk that their partiality could be of great disadvantage to themselves. Their reactions (because of its universality) proves that mankind as a whole shares a certain character in common, and it also proves (because of its disinterestedness) that man has a moral character, or at least the makings of one” (182).
This morality is comprised of two distinct elements: the, “right of every people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that it sees fit, without interference from other powers,” and, “once it is accepted that the only intrinsically rightful and morally good constitution which a people can have is by its very nature disposed to avoid wars of aggression…there is the aim, which is also a duty, of submitting to those conditio0ns by which war, the source of all evils and moral corruption, can be prevented” (182).
A legal framework that is derived from a constitution is what shall protect humans, and this will produce, “an increasing number of actions governed by duty” (187). How can this be achieved? By working from the top down: education is the key to making people more dutiful, and the authority of the state can provide this.
Kant begins by making a distinction between the higher faculties, i.e. Theology, Law and Medicine with the lower faculties, i.e. Philosophy.
He then goes on to make one of his most important interventions: bridging the rationalist and the empiricist divide that had haunted philosophical debates for years (think Hume/Descarte). He does this by asking if the human race is continually improving and beginning to think about where he should go about finding such information. He claims that it is not possible to have simple, a priori history, for that would require a profit (177)
Kant then goes on to posit that there are three possibilities for the development of society: that we are regressing, progressing or standing still. He concludes that we are not regressing, that we are not progressing, and that if we are standing still, it would be a farce.
He claims that the problem of progress can not be fully explained through experience, but that we do have to start from the empirical position. Kant begins to search for an event that would show the emancipation of the human, the individual. “We are here concerned only with the attitude of the onlookers as it reveals itself in public while the drama of great political changes is taking place: for they openly express universal yet disinterested sympathy for one set of protagonists against their adversaries, even at the risk that their partiality could be of great disadvantage to themselves. Their reactions (because of its universality) proves that mankind as a whole shares a certain character in common, and it also proves (because of its disinterestedness) that man has a moral character, or at least the makings of one” (182).
This morality is comprised of two distinct elements: the, “right of every people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that it sees fit, without interference from other powers,” and, “once it is accepted that the only intrinsically rightful and morally good constitution which a people can have is by its very nature disposed to avoid wars of aggression…there is the aim, which is also a duty, of submitting to those conditio0ns by which war, the source of all evils and moral corruption, can be prevented” (182).
A legal framework that is derived from a constitution is what shall protect humans, and this will produce, “an increasing number of actions governed by duty” (187). How can this be achieved? By working from the top down: education is the key to making people more dutiful, and the authority of the state can provide this.
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