Seidl, D, and KH Becker. 2005. Niklas Luhmann and organization studies. Liber.
Introduction: There are six things that separate Luhmann's work from others:
1. the distinction between psychic and social systems; they do not overlap; they represent environments for each other;
2. his constructivist epistemology, "in particular, it focuses on the schemes of meaning, or 'distinctions', that social (and psychic) systems employ to make sense of themselves and their surroundings" (9);
3. the theory is extensively applied to society (different kinds of system meaning are explained);
4. new insights on traditional dichotomies (agent/structure, structure/process, etc;
5. heavily contributes to organizational studies;
6. self-referentiality, "since the theory aims at including all aspects of the social, it consequently has to include also itself" (9-10)
Luhmann's work is separated into early and late Luhmann. The early work is a continuation of Parsons'. The late work takes place after the "autopoietic turn" (11). "An autopoietic system is a system that reproduces its own elements on the basis of its own elements" (11).
Luhmann's late work can also be separated into two: there is his theory on social systems generally, "in those works he elaborated the general notion of social systems as self-reproducing systems consisting of communications" (11).
:On the other hand, there are his theories that focus on the different types of social systems. In these works the general theory of social systems is specified with regard to the different types of system: society, interaction and organization" (12).
Chapter 1: The Basic Concepts of Luhmann's Theory of Social Systems
The theory of autopoiesis, or self-reproduction, came from Maturana and Varela, two biologists. They were trying to answer questions about what constitutes life. They determined that, "a living system reproduces itself" (22). "They defined the autopoietic systems as a system that recursively reproduces its elements through its own elements" (22).
The opposite of autopoietic systems are allopoietic systems. Autopoietic systems are operatively closed, as no outside operations enter the system. However, this does not mean that they are closed systems, but rather are operatively closed, but interactionally open: all systems exist with environment.
This directly relates to cognition; Maturana and Varela argued that all living systems are also cognitive systems. "In this sense, the operations of an autopoietic system are defined as its cognitions; life and cognitions are one and the same. Hence, everything that has been said about life applies equally to cognition: cognition is a self-referential, autopoietic process" (23).
Self-organization is the ability of a system to create internal structure, which is not predetermined. "The structures themselves, however, are not pre-given in any sense, as in structuralist theories, but are themselves the product of the autopoietic system. In other words, in its reproduction the system produces and reproduces its very own structures of reproduction. This aspect, i.e. the self-determination of its own structures, is referred to as self-organization. Thus, while autopoiesis refers to the reproduction of elements as such, self-organization refers to the determination of structures" (24).
"A central element with8in the theory of autopoiesis is the concept of structural coupling, whi8c h refers to the relation between systems and their environment. As explained above, environmental events can trigger internal processes in an autopoietic system but the concrete processes triggered...are determined by the structures of the system...A system is said to be structurally coupled to its environment...if its structures are in some way or other 'adjusted' to the structures of the environment...; in other words, if the structures of the system allow for reactions to 'important' environmental events. For example, animals living above ground are structurally adapted to a different environment from those living underground" (24).
Luhmann didn't take the concept of autopoiesis directly from biology, but adapted it, attempting to make a general, cross-discipline concept viable. "Luhmann suggests that we speak of autopoiesis whenever the elements of a system are reproduced by the elements of the system itself...Apart from living systems, Luhmann identifies two additional types of autopoietic systems: social systems and psychic systems. While living systems reproduce themselves on the basis of life, social systems reproduce themselves on the basis of communication, and psychic systems on the basis of consciousness or thoughts, their elements are not physical substances but elements of meaning" (25). Social systems are then broken down into either Interactions, Organizations or Societies.
The concept of element is also no longer ontologically privileged. Elements are produced by systems "as a result of being used" (27).
Social Systems
The tradition of sociology would imply that systems are made up of either agents or actions. Luhmann chose communication. Communication is understood as three components: information, utterance and understanding (28).
Information: a selection from a set of possibilities
Utterance: the why and how something is being communicated; the form a communication takes and the reason for the communication
Understanding: "...the distinction between information and utterance". The example given is the statement "I am tired". Taken as words, it is information. However, put in context, there is the utterance (the way it is said, the reason it is said). The understanding is the meaning derived from the distinction between the two (maybe the person who says this wants the other to leave them alone).
"...a communication is ultimately determined through the understanding" (29).
Understanding is only understood within the context of communication. So, when one comment is made, it is understood through the following comment. This following comment is understood by the next. This makes the theory dynamic.
Understanding is also not the end of the communication process. Luhmann argues that a decision must be made to either accept or reject the communication.
This explains how communications produce communications, but not what kinds of communications are produced. For that, one has to understand Luhmann's concept of expectations. If someone states that they are not feeling well, the expectation is that it will not be followed up with a statement about the local sports team. "Luhmann conceptualizes social structures as expectations" (31). Understanding is predicated on expectations. The topics that are germane for communication are relevant to expectations, and thus the structure of the system.
Humans in relation to Social Systems: Persons are constructions of social systems. Human beings are made up of psychic systems and organic systems. The two systems are operationally distinct, but functionally connected.
The psychic system and social system are connected because both are reproduced based on meaning, though differently. Social systems reproduce based on communication. Psychic systems are reproduced based on thoughts. Only thoughts can produce thoughts, as only communication can produce communication. Psychic systems are reproduced based on consciousness.
There are three forms of social systems: society, interaction and organization.
Society is the all-encompassing system outside of which communication does not exist. There have been three major changes within the structure of society historically: archaic times saw differentiation into subsystems (tribes, clans, families: segmented); later, there was differentiation between core and periphery (city/country: stratified); modernity brought about functional differentiation (law, art, etc) (36). Each primary differentiation can be secondarily broken down using a different categorization (stratified primary structure can be secondarily broken down segmentarily.
Functionally differentiated systems distinguish themselves by their "binary coding" (36). For the legal system, things are legal or illegal and cannot be understood otherwise. For economics, it is payment or non-payment. Science is truth/untruth. Only communication from one functionally differentiated system can produce that same system.
Systems can be functionally structurally connected. The example given is of a sales contract which couples economic and legal systems, though it produces very different meaning for both systems.
Interactions are the second form of social systems. These involve the binary present/absent. The structure of the communication determines what is considered communication.
Organization: These social systems are distinguished based on decisions. Decisions are "compact communications" that highlight that there was more than one thing that could have been chosen between (39). Decisions are paradoxical in that the more that the decision highlights that there are alternatives, the less it is likely to have authority as a decision.
"Because of their paradoxical nature, decision communications are subtly calling for their own deconstruction by ensuing communication" (40). How do organizations survive? Organizations close themselves operatively based on decisions. If a decision is destructed, that is also a decision. Secondly, decisions are made based on previous decisions, thus giving historic credibility.
One key aspect of Luhmann is that decisions cannot be made without absorbing uncertainty, as no decision rests on perfect information. "Uncertainty absorption now takes place in the connection between decisions" (41).
Spencer Brown's The Laws of Form was influential to Luhmann. This theory begins with observation as the most foundational concept. "Every observation is constructed from two components: a distinction and an indication" (47). An observer has to focus on one thing, and thus distinguishes between others and makes an indication. "We get a marked state and an unmarked state" (47).
The example of a circle drawn on a piece of paper is used.
The distinction between inside and outside of the circle both separates and unites the two sides.
"The central point in this concept of observation is that once you have drawn a distinction you cannot see the distinction that constitutes the observation - you can only see one side of it...this can be referred to as the 'blind spot' of observation. The complete distinction with both its sides (the inside and outside), can only be seen from outside; if you are inside the distinction you cannot see the distinction" (49).
This leads to two types of observations: first-order and second-order (49). "So far we have been explaining the operation of a first-order observer, who cannot observe the distinction he uses in order to observe. The second-order observer is an observer who observes another observer. He uses a different distinction from the first-order observer: in order to observe the observer, he has to draw a distinction that contains the distinction...of the first-order observer in his marked state. The second-order observer can see the blind spot - the distinction - of the first-order observer. He can see what the first-order observer cannot see and he can see that he cannot see. ...Since the second-order observer needs a distinction to ob serve the distinction of the first-order observer, he himself is a first-order observer, who could be observed by another second-order observer" (49).
Autopoietic systems process distinctions, and this is how the boundary of the system is determined.
Showing posts with label Autopoiesis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Autopoiesis. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Rossbach: Corpus Mysticism
Rossbach, Stefan. (2004). ""Corpus Mysticum": Nicklas Luhmann's evocation of world society". In M. Albert & L. Hilkermeier (Eds.), Observing international relations : Niklas Luhmann and world politics (pp. xiv, 254 p.). London ; New York: Routledge.
The thrust of this chapter is that Luhmann’s creation of international society was through speculation, vision and mysticism. “I will argue that Luhmann is representative of a tradition of thought known as ‘contemplative gnosis’…I will argue that there is a fundamental flaw in Luhmann’s understanding of society because he failed to explain how the ‘totality of communication’ could possibly constitute a ‘system’” (44).
Rossbach looks at how Luhmann’s theory may have been heavily influenced by mystical thinkers, specifically Nicholas of Cusa. Luhmann’s thoughts vis-à-vis autopoiesis originated after his possible influence by this mystical thinker. Theories were meant to help people see the ‘blind spots’ in history. Cusa called the oneness of observer and observation God. Rossbach claims that Luhmann calls this “world” (47).
Rossbach claims that Luhmann himself understands that his approach is devoid of any foundation. He also claims that such universal theorizing has a long history in mysticism. He concludes by claiming that the theory is flawed, rooted in mysticism, though incredibly complex.
The thrust of this chapter is that Luhmann’s creation of international society was through speculation, vision and mysticism. “I will argue that Luhmann is representative of a tradition of thought known as ‘contemplative gnosis’…I will argue that there is a fundamental flaw in Luhmann’s understanding of society because he failed to explain how the ‘totality of communication’ could possibly constitute a ‘system’” (44).
Rossbach looks at how Luhmann’s theory may have been heavily influenced by mystical thinkers, specifically Nicholas of Cusa. Luhmann’s thoughts vis-à-vis autopoiesis originated after his possible influence by this mystical thinker. Theories were meant to help people see the ‘blind spots’ in history. Cusa called the oneness of observer and observation God. Rossbach claims that Luhmann calls this “world” (47).
Rossbach claims that Luhmann himself understands that his approach is devoid of any foundation. He also claims that such universal theorizing has a long history in mysticism. He concludes by claiming that the theory is flawed, rooted in mysticism, though incredibly complex.
Luisi: The Emergence of Life: Autopoiesis: The Logic of Cellular Life
Luisi, P. L. (2006). The emergence of life : from chemical origins to synthetic biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 8: Autopoiesis: The Logic of Cellular Life
Autopoiesis was coined by Varela and Maturana in the early 1970’s . It did not initially receive much attention, but slowly began to creep into scientific discourse. Probably most notably, it would used by Luhmann (1984) to describe social systems.
Initially, it was used as an analysis of cellular life. Cells are one of the basic building blocks of life on earth, and the simplest cells can be incredibly complex. On the outside of the cell lies the membrane, which is semi-permeable. “The notion of boundary is, in fact, one central concept in the theory of autopoiesis. Inside the boundary of a cell, many reactions and correspondingly many chemical transformations occur. However, despite all these chemical processes, the cell always maintains its own identity during its homeostasis period. This is because the cell…regenerates within its own boundary all those chemicals that are being destroyed or transformed…” (158). “The chain of processes occurring inside the boundary essentially serves the purpose of self-sustenance, or auto-maintenance. Of course, this takes pace at the expense of nutrients and energy coming from the medium. …the cell is a dissipative, open system” (158).
“An autopoietic unit is a system that is capable of sustaining itself due to an inner network of reaction that regenerate the system’s components” (158). A definition by Maturana: “When you regard a living system you always find a network of processes or molecules that interact in such a way as to produce the very network that produced them and that determine its boundary. Such a network I call autopoietic. Whenever you encounter a network whose operations eventually produce itself as a result, you are facing an autopoietic system. It produces itself. The system is open to the input of matter but closed with regard to the dynamics of the relations that generate it” (158).
Varela identifies three criterion for autopoietic systems: it must have a semi-permeable boundary, the boundary must have been produced by the system and that this boundary must encompass reactions, “that regenerate the components of the system” (159). This excludes viruses, for example, as being able to be defined as autopoietic, nor is a crystal.
There is then a discussion of autopoiesis and cognition/consciousness.
Social autopoiesis is then explored. “Consider, for example, a political party, or a family, whereby the rules that define a party o a family can be seen as a kind of boundary given by the social structure itself. The whole system enjoys a dynamic equilibrium, as certain members leave the structure, and new people come in, and are transformed into steady members by the binding rules of the party or of the family. There is a regeneration from within, there is the defense of the self-identity; the metaphor of the living cell applies. Also, in all these systems, certain characteristic features of biology can be recognized, such as the notion of emergence—the family being an emergent property arising from the organization of single individuals, etc” (175-6).
Chapter 8: Autopoiesis: The Logic of Cellular Life
Autopoiesis was coined by Varela and Maturana in the early 1970’s . It did not initially receive much attention, but slowly began to creep into scientific discourse. Probably most notably, it would used by Luhmann (1984) to describe social systems.
Initially, it was used as an analysis of cellular life. Cells are one of the basic building blocks of life on earth, and the simplest cells can be incredibly complex. On the outside of the cell lies the membrane, which is semi-permeable. “The notion of boundary is, in fact, one central concept in the theory of autopoiesis. Inside the boundary of a cell, many reactions and correspondingly many chemical transformations occur. However, despite all these chemical processes, the cell always maintains its own identity during its homeostasis period. This is because the cell…regenerates within its own boundary all those chemicals that are being destroyed or transformed…” (158). “The chain of processes occurring inside the boundary essentially serves the purpose of self-sustenance, or auto-maintenance. Of course, this takes pace at the expense of nutrients and energy coming from the medium. …the cell is a dissipative, open system” (158).
“An autopoietic unit is a system that is capable of sustaining itself due to an inner network of reaction that regenerate the system’s components” (158). A definition by Maturana: “When you regard a living system you always find a network of processes or molecules that interact in such a way as to produce the very network that produced them and that determine its boundary. Such a network I call autopoietic. Whenever you encounter a network whose operations eventually produce itself as a result, you are facing an autopoietic system. It produces itself. The system is open to the input of matter but closed with regard to the dynamics of the relations that generate it” (158).
Varela identifies three criterion for autopoietic systems: it must have a semi-permeable boundary, the boundary must have been produced by the system and that this boundary must encompass reactions, “that regenerate the components of the system” (159). This excludes viruses, for example, as being able to be defined as autopoietic, nor is a crystal.
There is then a discussion of autopoiesis and cognition/consciousness.
Social autopoiesis is then explored. “Consider, for example, a political party, or a family, whereby the rules that define a party o a family can be seen as a kind of boundary given by the social structure itself. The whole system enjoys a dynamic equilibrium, as certain members leave the structure, and new people come in, and are transformed into steady members by the binding rules of the party or of the family. There is a regeneration from within, there is the defense of the self-identity; the metaphor of the living cell applies. Also, in all these systems, certain characteristic features of biology can be recognized, such as the notion of emergence—the family being an emergent property arising from the organization of single individuals, etc” (175-6).
Luisi: The Emergence of Life: Chapter 6: The Notion of Emergence
Luisi, P. L. (2006). The emergence of life : from chemical origins to synthetic biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 6: The Notion of Emergence
This book attempts to make a bridge from chemistry to biology, and deploys the concept of emergence and self-organizing systems in that process.
“The term ‘emergence’ describes the onset of novel properties that arise when a higher level of complexity is formed from components of lower complexity, where those properties are not present. This is often summarized in the popular assertion that the ‘whole is more than the sum of the parts’, and/or with the vague term ‘holism’” (112).
Luisi then distinguishes between two forms of discussions relating to emergence: the ontic and the epistemological (113). He claims that his argument will deal with the epistemological argument, as it is more practical and applicable.
Luisi also approaches the concept of complexity theory. He also claims that he will not pursue this in much depth but does provide a simple definition: “…a complex system is seen as a hierarchic system, i.e., a system composed of subsystems, which in turn have their own subsystems, and so on” (113).
He then looks at the relationship between emergence and reductionism. Typically, “reductionism and emergence are presented as two opposite fronts: whereas emergence deals with the onset of novel properties, which are not present in the basic components, and as such has an upwards direction, reductionism generally looks down from a certain level of complexity claiming to explain each level on the basis of the lower ones” (116). “…the main point of opposition between emergence and reductionism concerns the problem of properties. There is nothing wrong, in principle, with reductionism when it stops at the level of structure: we can all agree that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen. The problem with reductionism is with the claim that the properties of water can be reduced to the properties of hydrogen and oxygen, and those to the properties of more elementary particles” (117).
Luisi then moves onto prediction: is it possible to foresee the emergence of water from hydrogen and oxygen either a priori or a posteriori? Some see the relationship between emergent properties and original properties as being unexplainable. This, Luisi calls either strong emergence or radical emergence (118). Weak emergence, on the other hand, “…the relationship between the whole and the parts may not be established because of technical difficulties, such as the lack of computational power or insufficient progress of our skills” (118). Some are critical of strong emergence because it seems to associate “magical” powers in the realm of causation between lower and upper levels of organization. Luisi chimes in: “Personally, I believe that the discrimination between a matter of principle (strong emergence), and a matter of practical difficulty (weak emergence), is not always possible—and perhaps it does not always make sense” (118). “…weak emergence si not distinguishable from strong emergence” (118-9). We can accept the premise of strong emergence and avoid the necessary reference to mysterious causality, if we address it in terms of our limited capabilities.
The discussion then moves to downward causation, which is seen as being the counterpart of emergence. “It is generally accepted that the development of emergent properties, which is an upward (or bottom-up) causality, is attended by a downward—or top-down—causality stream” (119). Some associate this with cyclical causality.
Non-linear systems of development are explored. Prigogine is said to present a system of development referred to as dissipative structures. These structures are understood as, “…an open system that is in itself far from equilibrium, maintaining, however, a form of stability…In more complex systems, depending on the initial conditions and fluctuations of the energy flow, the system in its dynamic behavior may encounter a point of instability—the bifurcation point—at which it can branch off with the emergence of new forms of structure and properties” (120).
In conclusion: “The reason why this [non-predictability] is important lies win the fact that novel, unpredicted properties can arise from the constitution of complexity. In other words, the fact that we cannot foresee novel emergent properties also means…that there might be a vast arsenal of unforeseeable properties that may arise from the intelligent or serendipitous assemblage of components” (125).
“We have looked previously at a rose, and claimed that one would learn nothing about a rose by saying that it is composed solely of atoms and molecules. A better approach to the essence of the rose, would be to describe at least the various levels of hierarchic structural complexity and the corresponding emergent properties—up to the various cells and cell organelles, up to the different tissues; and then add possibility the history of biological evolution. This is certainly a more complete view of a rose. It is a departure from the simplistic reductionistic approach to see all in terms of atoms—but is it enough to catch the essence of a rose? (126).
“Most of the cognitive scientists mentioned above would add that what is still missing is the ‘ovswerver0—the one who really gives meaning to the rose in terms of history, literature, poetry, …Obviously the notion of a rose is different depending on whether the observer is a Western educated in romantic literature or a Eskimo who has never seen a rose. Here is where the notion of emergence may become co-emergence between the object and the observer throughout his/her consciousness” (127).
Chapter 6: The Notion of Emergence
This book attempts to make a bridge from chemistry to biology, and deploys the concept of emergence and self-organizing systems in that process.
“The term ‘emergence’ describes the onset of novel properties that arise when a higher level of complexity is formed from components of lower complexity, where those properties are not present. This is often summarized in the popular assertion that the ‘whole is more than the sum of the parts’, and/or with the vague term ‘holism’” (112).
Luisi then distinguishes between two forms of discussions relating to emergence: the ontic and the epistemological (113). He claims that his argument will deal with the epistemological argument, as it is more practical and applicable.
Luisi also approaches the concept of complexity theory. He also claims that he will not pursue this in much depth but does provide a simple definition: “…a complex system is seen as a hierarchic system, i.e., a system composed of subsystems, which in turn have their own subsystems, and so on” (113).
He then looks at the relationship between emergence and reductionism. Typically, “reductionism and emergence are presented as two opposite fronts: whereas emergence deals with the onset of novel properties, which are not present in the basic components, and as such has an upwards direction, reductionism generally looks down from a certain level of complexity claiming to explain each level on the basis of the lower ones” (116). “…the main point of opposition between emergence and reductionism concerns the problem of properties. There is nothing wrong, in principle, with reductionism when it stops at the level of structure: we can all agree that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen. The problem with reductionism is with the claim that the properties of water can be reduced to the properties of hydrogen and oxygen, and those to the properties of more elementary particles” (117).
Luisi then moves onto prediction: is it possible to foresee the emergence of water from hydrogen and oxygen either a priori or a posteriori? Some see the relationship between emergent properties and original properties as being unexplainable. This, Luisi calls either strong emergence or radical emergence (118). Weak emergence, on the other hand, “…the relationship between the whole and the parts may not be established because of technical difficulties, such as the lack of computational power or insufficient progress of our skills” (118). Some are critical of strong emergence because it seems to associate “magical” powers in the realm of causation between lower and upper levels of organization. Luisi chimes in: “Personally, I believe that the discrimination between a matter of principle (strong emergence), and a matter of practical difficulty (weak emergence), is not always possible—and perhaps it does not always make sense” (118). “…weak emergence si not distinguishable from strong emergence” (118-9). We can accept the premise of strong emergence and avoid the necessary reference to mysterious causality, if we address it in terms of our limited capabilities.
The discussion then moves to downward causation, which is seen as being the counterpart of emergence. “It is generally accepted that the development of emergent properties, which is an upward (or bottom-up) causality, is attended by a downward—or top-down—causality stream” (119). Some associate this with cyclical causality.
Non-linear systems of development are explored. Prigogine is said to present a system of development referred to as dissipative structures. These structures are understood as, “…an open system that is in itself far from equilibrium, maintaining, however, a form of stability…In more complex systems, depending on the initial conditions and fluctuations of the energy flow, the system in its dynamic behavior may encounter a point of instability—the bifurcation point—at which it can branch off with the emergence of new forms of structure and properties” (120).
In conclusion: “The reason why this [non-predictability] is important lies win the fact that novel, unpredicted properties can arise from the constitution of complexity. In other words, the fact that we cannot foresee novel emergent properties also means…that there might be a vast arsenal of unforeseeable properties that may arise from the intelligent or serendipitous assemblage of components” (125).
“We have looked previously at a rose, and claimed that one would learn nothing about a rose by saying that it is composed solely of atoms and molecules. A better approach to the essence of the rose, would be to describe at least the various levels of hierarchic structural complexity and the corresponding emergent properties—up to the various cells and cell organelles, up to the different tissues; and then add possibility the history of biological evolution. This is certainly a more complete view of a rose. It is a departure from the simplistic reductionistic approach to see all in terms of atoms—but is it enough to catch the essence of a rose? (126).
“Most of the cognitive scientists mentioned above would add that what is still missing is the ‘ovswerver0—the one who really gives meaning to the rose in terms of history, literature, poetry, …Obviously the notion of a rose is different depending on whether the observer is a Western educated in romantic literature or a Eskimo who has never seen a rose. Here is where the notion of emergence may become co-emergence between the object and the observer throughout his/her consciousness” (127).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
