Van Evera, S., 1984. The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War. International Security, 9(1), 58-107.
“This article will argue that the cult of the offensive was a principal cause of the First World war, creating or magnifying many of the dangers which historians blame for causing the July crisis and rendering it uncontrollable. The following section will first outline the growth of the cult of the offensive in Europe in the years before the war, and then sketch the consequences which international relations theory suggests should follow from it. The second section will outline consequences which the cult produced in 1914 and the final section will suggest conclusions and implications for current American policy” (58).
When offensive is prioritized in military strategy, this can be problematic it does not conform to events on the ground. In the advent to WWI, the prevailing thinking was that offensive fighting would win the day, and that any battle would be over quickly as the invention of more and more brutal means of killing people had created an irrational exuberance about their deployment. This proved to be catastrophic, as long, trench-based battles emerged. The predicted short slot turned quickly into a muddy quagmire.
The remainder of the article supports the notion that the “cult of the offensive” was a clear driver of the brutal nature of WWI, which is in line with Jervis’ formulation concerning offensively minded worlds being more dangerous.
Showing posts with label WWI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label WWI. Show all posts
Friday, September 26, 2008
Saturday, September 20, 2008
Rowe: The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War
Rowe, D., 2005. The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War. Security Studies, 14(3), 407-447.
“Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace” (407). This study will use H-O models of trade to explore how increased economic interdependence does actually constrain the decision making capabilities of military. Also, it concludes that, far from being a driver of peace, liberalism was actually one of the main causes of WWI.
“This conclusion that globalization pacifies international relations is not just premature, it is wrong. It is premature because modern liberal scholarship suffers from two important shortcomings. First, the relationship between globalization…and international peace remains theoretically underdeveloped…Second, empirical studies of globalization and peace have been dominated by large-N statistical analysis. These analyses cannot, by themselves, establish causation. They need to be complemented by qualitative studies that trace the causal processes imputed by liberal theory to the outcomes it predicts. By and large, however, these qualitative studies have yet to be carried out” (408).
“Liberals identify at least three closely related means by which globalization pacifies society. First, globalization generates powerful new social classes with vested interests in peace…Second, globalization endows societies with pacific social and personal values that constrain the state’s ability to generate and wield military force…Third, globalization enhances the political importance of these pacific values by liberalizing and democratizing society” (410-1).
He draws from Rogowski’s Commerce and Coalitions, where an exploration of the relationship between domestic social groups and their response to changes in trade will depend on whether the country is more endowed with labor or land and whether it is capital rich or poor. “The more citizens can earn from using their resources elsewhere, the less willing they become to surrender these resources to the state; the greater their demands for compensation; and, by implication, the more constrained the state’s ability to generate force” (413). With more trade, people become more wealthy and expect higher returns on their work, and thus it is harder to generate an army. “Globalization will enhance the state’s ability to use the country’s scarce resources to build military power by lowering the domestic relative prices and incomes earned by the country’s scarce resources, but it will impede the state’s ability to use the country’s abundant resources to build military power by raising the domestic relative prices and incomes earned by the country’s abundant resources” (413).
The rest of the paper explores early 19th century globalization and how European governments were unduly constrained to build military forces and they should have to avoid the Great War.
“Liberalism’s logic linking globalization’s constraints against war to international peace suffers at least three significant flaws. First, it assumes that a state’s security is determined solely by its external environment…Second, the liberal argument implicitly assumes that constraining states from threatening or using military force always enhances international peace..Third, this article has thus far assumed that globalization constrains all states equally…however, these constraints should vary according to whether the state uses the country’s abundant or scarce economic resources to build military power…In sum, globalization’s tendency to generate systemic internal constraints on military force does not necessarily lead to a more stable and peaceful international system but can instead…generate systemic insecurity as all major powers become less able to mobilize their countries’ abundant resources…undermine the ability of powers to practice effective deterrence…magnify the importance of defensive alliances…magnify the threat posed by states that are at least constrained by deepening integration into the world economy” (431-3).
“Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace” (407). This study will use H-O models of trade to explore how increased economic interdependence does actually constrain the decision making capabilities of military. Also, it concludes that, far from being a driver of peace, liberalism was actually one of the main causes of WWI.
“This conclusion that globalization pacifies international relations is not just premature, it is wrong. It is premature because modern liberal scholarship suffers from two important shortcomings. First, the relationship between globalization…and international peace remains theoretically underdeveloped…Second, empirical studies of globalization and peace have been dominated by large-N statistical analysis. These analyses cannot, by themselves, establish causation. They need to be complemented by qualitative studies that trace the causal processes imputed by liberal theory to the outcomes it predicts. By and large, however, these qualitative studies have yet to be carried out” (408).
“Liberals identify at least three closely related means by which globalization pacifies society. First, globalization generates powerful new social classes with vested interests in peace…Second, globalization endows societies with pacific social and personal values that constrain the state’s ability to generate and wield military force…Third, globalization enhances the political importance of these pacific values by liberalizing and democratizing society” (410-1).
He draws from Rogowski’s Commerce and Coalitions, where an exploration of the relationship between domestic social groups and their response to changes in trade will depend on whether the country is more endowed with labor or land and whether it is capital rich or poor. “The more citizens can earn from using their resources elsewhere, the less willing they become to surrender these resources to the state; the greater their demands for compensation; and, by implication, the more constrained the state’s ability to generate force” (413). With more trade, people become more wealthy and expect higher returns on their work, and thus it is harder to generate an army. “Globalization will enhance the state’s ability to use the country’s scarce resources to build military power by lowering the domestic relative prices and incomes earned by the country’s scarce resources, but it will impede the state’s ability to use the country’s abundant resources to build military power by raising the domestic relative prices and incomes earned by the country’s abundant resources” (413).
The rest of the paper explores early 19th century globalization and how European governments were unduly constrained to build military forces and they should have to avoid the Great War.
“Liberalism’s logic linking globalization’s constraints against war to international peace suffers at least three significant flaws. First, it assumes that a state’s security is determined solely by its external environment…Second, the liberal argument implicitly assumes that constraining states from threatening or using military force always enhances international peace..Third, this article has thus far assumed that globalization constrains all states equally…however, these constraints should vary according to whether the state uses the country’s abundant or scarce economic resources to build military power…In sum, globalization’s tendency to generate systemic internal constraints on military force does not necessarily lead to a more stable and peaceful international system but can instead…generate systemic insecurity as all major powers become less able to mobilize their countries’ abundant resources…undermine the ability of powers to practice effective deterrence…magnify the importance of defensive alliances…magnify the threat posed by states that are at least constrained by deepening integration into the world economy” (431-3).
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