Miller: States, Nations and the Great Powers

Miller, Benjamin. 2007. States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace. Cambridge studies in international relations 104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

“”I argue that if we approach the question of war and peace from the regional perspective, we may gain new insights which are otherwise obscured. The new theory developed here thus offers an explanation of the variations between war and peace within and among regions. It explains why some regions are particularly war-prone , while others are so peaceful that war among the regional states has become practically unthinkable” (1).

“What I call the ‘state-to-nation-balance’ is the key underlying cause that affects the disposition of a region toward war…The state-to-nation balance refers to the degree of congruence between the division of the region into territorial states and the national aspirations and political identifications of the region’s peoples. This balance also refers to the prevalence of strong versus weak states in the region. There is a nation-to-state imbalance when there is a lack of congruence between states and national identifications and at least some of the regional states are weak states” (2).

“…I argue that the old and apparently irreconcilable divide between systemic and regional/domestic explanations of state behavior may be bridged, and this books offers a theoretical synthesis that shows how a fruitful and compelling theoretical coexistence may be created within different schools of IR scholarship, and between IR scholarship and comparative politics” (3).

Both regional and global drivers explain the occurrence of international conflict. “Regional/domestic factors are responsible for hot outcomes; global factors are responsible for cold outcomes” (13).

Argues that there are “outside-in” and “inside-out” explanations for the cause of international conflict. The main drawback of these accounts is that they don’t take each other into consideration.

The author argues that most previous theory has treated the causes of war and peace as being separate. Instead, we should be looking at why certain regions are more or less war-prone than others, which takes into consideration both drivers of peace and war.

Freeman: Single Peaked Vs. Diversified Capitalism

FREEMAN, RB. 2000. Single Peaked Vs. Diversified Capitalism: The Relation Between Economic Institutions and Outcomes. NBER Working Paper.

From the abstract: "Capitalist countries have historically had quite different labour market institutions and social policies. Do these differences produce sufficiently different economic outcomes to identify a single peak set of institutions? This paper shows that: 1. Labour market institutions have large effects on distribution, but modest hard-to-uncover effects on efficiency. 2. Institutional diversity is increasing among advanced countries, as measured by the percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining. 3. The case for the US having the institutions for peak economy status rests on its 1990s full employment experience, which arguably counter balances its high level of economic inequality. The historical pattern whereby some capitalist countries do better than others in some periods...then run into problems is more consonant with the view that capitalism permits national differences in institutions to persist than with the view that all economies must converge to a single institutional structure" (abstract).

"The labour market is potentially the most idiosyncratic market in advanced capitalism" (1).

The single peaked model of capitalism would argue that it would be possible for the US to achieve a full employment status with the right kind of labor market institution. A Diverse Capitalism approach would understand this to be problematic. In a diverse capitalism approach, "To move from one peak to a higher one or to the global optimum req1uires that the economy descend from the local peak before it ascends the higher one" (3). "The expense of changing institutions permits variety in the institutional environment" (3). There are a variety of different "landscapes", ie., the relationship between a kind of institutional labor market relationship and a certain kind of desired output. These provide an opportunity for comparative analysis. There is also a normative element to this analysis: it is possible to analyze the variety among countries by different metrics, with obviously different results.

There is then a various analysis of different forms in which a capitalist economy can form, as well as an exploration of whether or not the US represents a "Peak Economy".

The paper ends with three questions posed. As a summary:

Do different labor institutions and organization affect economic performance in different ways? Yes. Not in an absolute deterministic way, but yes.

Will distinct characteristics between institutions continue as the global economy becomes more integrated? Yes. Because institutions become embedded, because values differ and because different institutions do not preclude the same output.

Does the US represent a "peak economy"? No.

UPDATE:

There is a great variety in different capitalist countries in their institutional structure and consistency. From the US to Japan to Germany, three very successful capitalist countries operate with three very different kinds of institutional milieus. This study examines the claim that there is only one form of institutional structure and consistency that is agreeable to the interests of global finance and capital. This is identified as the single peaked verses diverse capitalist thesis.

The reason that there can be a multitude of structures within capitalist organization is that there are large costs associated with transitioning from one institutional structure to another.

If the single-peaked hypothesis was correct, it would be possible to note a few things: firstly, there would be one clear set of institutions that could be emulated; these should persist over time; countries who fall around the peak should be able to conform to these institutions and achieve gains in growth, and there should be long-term global convergence towards homogenous institutions of capitalism.

Haggard: The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System

Haggard, S. 1986. The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System. World Politics 38, no. 2: 343-70.

"...what domestic political factors account for the different development trajectories of the East Asian and Latin American NICs?" (344).

"States respond differently to the constraints associated with economic interdependence. Dependency is too frequently portrayed as a determinant international structure rather than as a set of shifting constraints within which states seek to maneuver" (346).

"Variation in the social organization of agriculture, the timing of labor mobilization, and the interests and strength of domestic entrepreneurs provide the permissive social conditions underlying the divergent development trajectories of Brazil, Mexico, Korea and Taiwan" (346).

This story is then told in great detail.

"As the foregoing analysis suggests, different national strategies result in different forms of 'dependence' on the world economy. Economic changes in the international system...have facilitated the growth of NICs, but created new bargaining and adjustment problems. The ability to manage these is a function of domestic structures and capacities, as is evidenced by the problems of managing expanded trade and foreign direct investment in manufacturing" (360).

There is much in this piece that I skimmed because there is much in this piece that focuses on comparative politics.

Pauly and Reich: National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behavior

LW Pauly and S Reich, “National structures and multinational corporate behavior: enduring differences in the age of globalization,” International Organization 51, no. 01 (2003): 1-30.

Many make the case that globalization is changing the world's political economy. If this is truly the case, one would expect to see a set of converging practices among leading multinational firms. However, this is not necessarily played out by prevailing evidence. "...this article shows that MNCs continue to diverge fairly systematically in their internal governance and long-term financing structures, in their approaches to research and development...as well as in the location of core R&D facilities, and in their overseas investment and intrafirm trading strategies" (1).

Standard arguments about firm convergence are explored.

"But we argue that the underlying nationality of the firm remains the vitally important determinant of the nature of its adaption...there remain systematic and important national differences in the operations of MNCs--in their internal governance and long-term financing, in their R&D activities, and in their intertwined investment and trading strategies" (4).

There is then much evidence provided to support this thesis.

Horowitz: Restarting Globalization after World War II

S Horowitz, “Restarting Globalization after World War II: Structure, Coalitions, and the Cold War,” Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 2 (2004): 127.

"The present period of economic globalization originated following World War II. Given the strongly protectionist tendencies prevailing at the time, how did this happen?" (127).

Trade protectionism is examined in the five largest trading countries.

"'Economic globalization' can be defined as an increase in the values of international trade and investment as a share of the value of total output over a given time period. It can be measured for the world economy as well as for individual national economies" (127; from Footnote 1).

"There are two basic explanatory approaches in the international trade policy literature. One emphasizes endogenous tariff formation in response to the changing relative size and political power of protectionist and free-trading interest groups...Another emphasizes how military externalities of trade can lead countries to modify trade policies in an effort to strengthen allies or to strengthen themselves relative to their enemies" (128).

How does a world war affect international patterns of trade? Firstly, and obviously, there is a decrease in trade among countries who are in contention with one another. This will bring about competition among sectors who previously competed with these exports to grow and the total amount of exports to contract. This will bring about a tendency towards protectionist measures. Additionally, foreign finance patterns will change.

"In the period after World War II per se, one would expect the structural effects through production- and trade-diversion and changes in foreign investment stocks to be relatively limited. This is because similar shocks due to World War I and the Depression had already pushed a once extensive international division of labor and investment network a long way back toward national self-sufficiency and exclusive trading blocs. On the other hand, the same reasoning implies that initial conditions should strongly favor protectionist sectoral coalitions. Given the postwar strength and scope of exchange and trade controls, exchange rate overvaluation and undervaluation would also be expected to have more limited impacts on sectoral competitiveness" (132). The above two paragraphs are summarized in Hypothesis 1.

The second and third hypotheses involve the relationship between military explanations and trade patterns. The second suggests that, if there is a positive relationship between military expenditures and free trade, this will further buttress policies after the war for expanded trade. Hypothesis 3 states the opposite: that if there are negative relationships between the military and trade, this will stifle trade, at least in the affected sectors.

"Some related features of the political mechanism and process should also be kept in mind. One is that coalitions will not necessarily form in a way that pits all protectionist industries against all free-trading industries" (134). This leads to the fourth hypothesis: "Coalitional side payments, economic ideologies, fragmentation of institutional power, and international economic institutions may have additional effects on the relative size and effectiveness of protectionist and free trading political forces" (136).

"The most important factors influencing post-World War II trade policy changes in the five large trading states can now be summarized. Beginning with World War I and continui9ng through the Depression and World War II, structural economic changes played a central role in reversing the pre-World War I tide of globalization. But these protectionist structural economic tendencies were least advanced in the most capital intensive economies of the United States and FRG. During and after World War II, the most important changes in the balance of power between protectionist and free-trading coalitions were produced not by uneven structural economic changes but rather by side payments to agriculture in the United States and the FRG. However, strong military interests in free trade with allies best explain the unilateral form of US and FRG trade policy liberalization" (146).

Zysman: The Myth of a 'Global' Economy: Enduring National Foundations and Emerging Retional Realities

J Zysman, “The myth of a 'Global' economy: Enduring national foundations and emerging regional realities,” New Political Economy 1, no. 2 (1996): 157-184.

*Note: Pagination taken from Word document

Globalization is a label placed on a phenomena that no one understands. Those who say the nation-state will crumble have a very ahistorical view of the situation: governments' roles will change, governance will continue. However, while the state will not wither, this current trend is something that is relatively unique historically. Globalization is change; exactly what that means for who is not very well understood.

" Globalism is thus characterised by multiple government and industrial strategies to cope with the rapidly changing contours of competition" (3).

The world can be divided up into three economic geographies: North America, Asia and Europe. The nature of regional economic groups within these three geographies is explored. Development does not happen within these geographies, or from one region against another, uniformly but in stages.

The author argues that it seems likely that different regional dynamics will emerge from increased globalization.

The issue of convergence is examined: "... does the current period of adaptation and change produce national convergence or, alternatively, will-there be continued lines of parallel development in which particular national resolutions sustain enduring differences?" (8). Four factors are identified that could cause united policy outcomes that do not directly relate to more robust market connections: imitation, negotiations, political compulsion and market compulsion (8).

"In sum, distinct national technological communities do appear to continue in the face of the `globalisation' of markets. And, as important, there is a theoretical basis to belief that they will continue to endure. But the relationship between these technological communities is changing; the significant question simply has to be reposed" (13).

The article continues to asks whether globalization has caused financial systems to converge on a set of normative operating procedures. The conclusion is, in my estimation, a call for nuance.

Institutional Foundations and the Persistence of National Forms:

"Underpinning the analysis and interpretation here is a notion of how a political economy functions. It is worthwhile to make the notion explicit. I sketch here a four-step approach to link institutional and social contexts to the dynamics of national market systems" (19).

Step 1: Institutions that are created by the state define the boundaries in that markets can operate

Step 2: This institutional structure interacts with industrial organization to provide markets with choices.

Step 3: The "major players" are able to dictate the correct logic based on their interactions.

Step 4: Competition from trade is an example of the explication of these factors globally, thus highlighting different market structures in different regions.

And the last paragraph: "In the final analysis, it is the consequence of the endurance of national systems that must concern us. The debates will be about finding mechanisms of accommodating, as much as compressing, that national diversity. As always, marketplaces will rest on institutional foundations that politics create, and this time the politics will be driven by the interplay of national governments and national markets" (23).

Garrett: The Causes of Globalization

Garrett, Geoffrey, “The Causes of Globalization,” Comparative Political Studies 6-7, no. 22 (2000): 941.

"The most important causes of globalization differ among the three major components of international market integration: trade, multinational production, and international finance" (941).

This piece explores the drivers of globalization. The author argues that it is not problematic to claim that globalization is changing the world; the biggest issue becomes anything other than that platitude.

"Throughout, I define globalization somewhat narrowly as the international integration of markets in goods, services and capital" (942).

"I examine four contending perspectives on the big picture: What explains the rapid pace of international market integration in recent decades?" (942). The first point of view claims that this global integration is not unique or new, as current integration is finally catching up to levels before WWI. "I argue, however, that notwithstanding the aggregate similarities between the two periods, core features of the contemporary world economy are without historical precedent" (942).

The second point of view is that of technological determinism. "The case for technologically determined view of globalization is far stronger with respect to international finance than to multinational production or trade" (942).

The third perspective: the costs of government closure from international trade are exclusively high and this promotes countries to open their doors to the benefits to be gleaned from increased economic interdependence. However, the author argues, "It is hard to argue that increasing opportunity costs of closure provide a persuasive account of the globalization of finance" (943).

The fourth point of view: "The final big picture perspective on globalization also accepts the critical role of government policy, but argues that the phenomenon is essentially a political construct that does not improve the economic conditions of society as a whole" (943). Has there been an ideological driver (maybe Reagan/Thatcher?) that pushed us in this direction?

The details of these arguments I did not document.

"Figure 4 summarizes my assessment of the contending big picture arguments about the causes of globalization" (975).

(976)

Huntington: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century

Huntington, S., 1993. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press.

Ch. 1: What?

“The transitions to democracy between 1974 and 1990 are the subject of this book” (5).

Huntington posits that the third wave of democratization began with the military take-over of the Portuguese Caetano dictatorship in 1974.

First off, Huntington must explain what he means by democracy, as many studies of, say, democratic peace suffer from an ambiguous or overly rigid metric. “Serious problems of ambiguity and imprecision arise when democracy is defined in terms of either source or authority or purposes, and a procedural definition is used in this study” (6). The core of democracies is the fact that leaders are selected not through means of heredity or power, but rather through competitive elections of the subjects who are to be ruled over. This procedural definition is not, however a panacea. There are many problems with its operationalization, though these may be less acute than other democracy definitions (such as those that rely on concepts of will, for example). The “minimal” definition of democracy used by Huntington is also not useful when exploring political stability or competence.

“A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave also usually involves liberalization or partial democratization of political systems that do not become fully democratic. Three waves of democratization have occurred in the modern world” (15).

The first wave of democratization described by Huntington occurred in the 1800s and lasted until the end of the first world war. This is described as a “long wave”. The reasons for this wave were increased voter participation, a decrease in restrictions to the ballot box and a general trend against monarchic rule. This wave was halted during the rise of the second World War, which saw a general rise in fascism and communism. The second wave of democratization occurred directly after the end of WWII. This represented a marked rise in democracies that were previously fascist during the war. Eastern European countries, however, remained clearly authoritarian. There were signs of democratic growth in Latin America. This all turned around in the “second reverse wave” which, according to Huntington, lasted from 1958-75. There was a increase in authoritarianism and military coups through Latin America and Africa. However, Huntington sees this as being turned around, as noted at the beginning of this abstract, with the overthrow of the Portuguese government in 1974. This brought about a third long-wave of democratization that involved anti-colonial democratic and anti-authoritarian democratic movements throughout the world, eventually bridging with the fall of the USSR and the increased democratization of many of the former Eastern Bloc states.

Wallerstein: Antisystemic Movements: History and Dilemmas

Wallerstein, Immanuel. (1990). "Antisystemic Movements: History and Dilemmas". In S. Amin (Ed.), Transforming the revolution : social movements and the world-system (pp. 187 p.). New York: Monthly Review Press.

The Creation of Antisystemic Movements and the Debate about Strategy, 1789-1945:

Wallerstein attempts to highlight and put into historical context different social movements, and eventually prescribe a set of policies and ideals that should be adhered to by progressives in the future. “The post-1945 history of these movements can only be understood or appreciated in the context of their history as organized continuing movements. And this history must perforce start with the French Revolution” (13). This movement was the cornerstone of all successive movements, having put the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity on the global pedestal.

After the French revolution, he claims that other social movements were disorganized. For his example, he talks about the revolution of 1848. As this revolution was a broadly based proletarian uprising across Europe that was brutally crushes, Wallerstein takes the logical conclusion that social movements needed to become increasingly organized and coordinated. One could not overthrow a state without a structure to replace it. “…the primary lesson to be drawn from the experience of 1848 was the need for long-term political organization as the necessary tool with which their objectives might be achieved” (17).

Wallerstein then goes on to highlight revolutions and social movements that occurred after the revolution of 1848. These movements became increasingly socialist, though not uniformly. There were issues with the implementation of socialist movements globally, and there was specifically a rupture between socialist movements and nationalist movements. “The socialist movements were to be found largely in core countries, the nationalist movements largely in peripheral ones” (23).

Postwar Success of the Movements: Triumphs and Ambiguities:

“People resist exploitation. They resist as actively as they can, as passively as they must” (27).

He looks at the three “worlds” and claims that, in many ways, in and around the era of 1945, many antisystemic movements felt as if they had won. There had been large movements towards socialist governance throughout the globe. “…the period after 1945, in at least a majority of the countries of the world, representing at least three-quarters of the worlds’ population, the ostensible intermediate objective of nineteenth-century antisystemic movements—the coming to power either of a workers or of a popular movement—had in fact occurred” (33).

“To be antisystemic is to argue that neither liberty or equality is possible under the existing system and that both are possible only in a transformed world” (36).

“Let us therefore sum up the experience of the post-1945 coming to power of the movements. Each kind of movement put into effect some very great reforms which have earned them substantial popular support. There were some great changes of which the movements could boast and whose consequences were visible. At the same time, despite initial advances in social equality, political liberty, and international solidarity, in the long run, the movements disappointed, and disappointed greatly…” (38).

Forward to What? The Debate on Strategy Reopened:

He highlights some of the important movements post WWII that have shown themselves to be antisystemic, but wonders where we are really going. 1968 represented a year in which a new wave of antisystemic movements erupted. He posits that we need to think about both long-term and short-term strategies.

Agenda for the Movements:

“The lesson of 1848 was that spontaneous uprisings were not viable as a path of serious social or national revolution. Social transformation requires social organization. It was out of this lesson that the ‘old’ antisystemic movements were born. We have argued that 1968 marked the emergence of ‘new’ antisystemic movements that were protesting against the successes (that we see as failures) of the ‘old’ antisystemic movements” (48).

He sees four things that must happen: repolitization of the base, reconceptualization of the understanding of transformation in society, bring together diverse movements in a “family”, and, the “deghettoization” of social movements (48-53).