S Gill and D Law, “Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital,” Global Governance: Critical Concepts in Political Science 33, no. 4 (2004): 475-499.
"In this chapter we distinguish between direct and structural forms of power. We relate these to the concepts of hegemony, historic bloc and the 'extended' state, in our analysis of present-day capitalism. In so doing we seek to meet two major challenges. The first is to integrate better 'domestic' and 'international' levels of analysis. The second, related challenge, is to theorize the complementary and contradictory relations between the power of states and the power of capital" (93).
The authors start by distinguishing between the realist concept of hegemony and the Gramscian concept. The former argues that there is direct control of one over another, typically one state over another. The later concept argues that there is a set of structural forces that can exist that can create order. "A hegemonic order was one where consent, rather than coercion, primarily characterized the relations between classes, and between the state and civil society" (93).
"Our contribution here mainly concerns the theory of power. We assume that theories of power and hegemony must subsume both normative and material, structural and existential...dimensions of social relations. Part of the richness of Gramschi's concepts is that they combine these elements. Because of this, they offer clues for overcoming the gulf between structure and agency. We believe a possible key to the resolution of the structure-action problem in social theory more generally, and international relations theory in particular may be through the development of mediating concepts such as structural power and historical bloc" (94).3
We may be moving towards a post-Fordian conception of production, which is obviously global. Therefore, we must look at hegemony, blocs and the state from the perspective of the global. This involves a revolution in the social forms of accumulation. This has been referred to as a regime of accumulation. "A regime therefore broadly encompasses the forms of socio-economic reproduction which together constitute the conditions of existence of economic development in a particular historical period of epoch. As such there may be different regimes of accumulation...coexisting at any point in time" (95).
The post-WWII regime of accumulation was very successful at promoting growth in industrialized countries for four reasons. Firstly, the core (the US) was stable and secure. Secondly, the US was able to sustain growth through demand created through deficits and militarism. Thirdly, the system was sustained through "embedded liberalism". Finally, inexpensive inputs, especially oil.
"In a structural sense, what was occurring in the post-war period was the emergence of a globally integrated economy whilst political regulation at the domestic level was becoming ever-more comprehensive" (97).
The authors put emphasis on the emergence of capital markets as a crucial aspect of the establishment of capitalism as a socio-economic system. They expand on this by offering myriad examples of the power of international oligopolistic capital.
"At the international level, the bargaining power of transnational corporations would be reduced if most national governments were able to co-ordinate their regulations and financial concessions. however, even supposedly like-minded, and wealthy countries...like the EC have not been able to seriously discuss, let alone achieve this goal" (106).
Showing posts with label Agent-Structure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Agent-Structure. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 26, 2008
Thursday, November 6, 2008
Kontopoulos: The Logics of Social Structure
Kontopoulos, K., 1993. The Logics of Social Structure, Cambridge University Press.
Ch. 1: Epistemic Strategies in Contemporary Science
The author identifies five distinct epistemic strategies:
“(1) We may define the strategy of reduction…as adhering to a strict microdeterminsim; that is, wholes are nothing more than their parts suitably combined to form a certain level of complexity and, thus, that higher levels of organization are determined and explained by their lower levels of organization, down to the most elementary level of quantum physics (2) In contrast, the strategy of construction or composition is rooted in a partial microdeterminsim, but also pays significant attention to relational-interactional and contextual-ecological variables. That is, this strategy considers the higher levels of organization as products not merely of the aggregation or integration of lower level parts, but of the interaction of these parts with the contextual-ecological ‘exigencies.’ The result is a constructionist, weak emergence of novel forms and properties practically irreducible to their constituent parts. (3) The strategy of heterarchy (moderate emergence), the newest and, admittedly, least developed, strategy, is defined as underdetermination of the macrostructure(s) by the given microparts and as semiautonomous emergence of higher-level phenomena out of lower level phenomena. Therefore it is a strate4gy that supports a nonreductivematerialist position, explaining the emergence of novelty and higher-level properties and laws without falling into untenable dualist or idealist traps. (4) Hierarchy (strong emergency), is a full-fledged hierarchical emergence of more robust macroentities and partial overdetermination of the microparts by the dominant, organizing principles of the new higher entities. Hierarchy is a modified, and clearly more defensible, substitute for holism. (5) Finally, the strategy of systemic transcendence (systemic functionalism, vitalism, holism) is defined as a downward, strong determination of the microparts by the macrosystem; the latter seen as an autonomous, higher entity superimposed on the lower systemic parts in a control-hierarchical manner that clearly supports the claims of a dualist metaphysics” (12-3).
Kontopoulos then goes on to highlight these different epistemic approaches.
“As a caveat, we must begin with the recognition that the concept of emergence is one of the most elusive, pluri-semantic, patently charged concepts in the current vocabulary of science and philosophy; the analytical eludication of the term is still in progress and the task now looks to be richer yet harder and more controversial than origicanlly thought” (20).
Kontopoulos lists different concepts of emergence:
“Level 0: the Democritean…notion of integration, subject to reduction
Level 1: two notions of weak emergence:
1.1: an ecological-contextual notion of emergence at the prebiotic levels
1.2: an evolutionist-selectionist…notion of emergence in the neo-Darwinian and post-=Darwinian sense
Level 2: a moderate notion of emergence of semi-autonomous macrostructures heterarchically related to the microparts and underdetermined by them
Level 3: the strong notion of emergence as a hierarchy based on applied constraints and a peculiar downward control
Level 4: a transcending notion—if the hypothesis of group and species selection…find strong support—emphasizing holism, strong macrodetermination of microparts, vitalism, and mentalism. The notion of dualist control also belongs here” (21).
What does emergence look like at the higher levels as defined above?: “Generally speaking, most of the significant contributors opt to explain emergence in terms of some particular notion of constraints superimposed on entities in a cumulative, successive mode…For the time being it suffices to point out that the talk of ‘constraints’ refers descriptively to the process of the restriction of a system’s ‘degrees of freedom’; the existence of such constraints appears as, at least, the necessary, if not sufficient, condition for robust emergence to occur” (22).
Ch. 1: Epistemic Strategies in Contemporary Science
The author identifies five distinct epistemic strategies:
“(1) We may define the strategy of reduction…as adhering to a strict microdeterminsim; that is, wholes are nothing more than their parts suitably combined to form a certain level of complexity and, thus, that higher levels of organization are determined and explained by their lower levels of organization, down to the most elementary level of quantum physics (2) In contrast, the strategy of construction or composition is rooted in a partial microdeterminsim, but also pays significant attention to relational-interactional and contextual-ecological variables. That is, this strategy considers the higher levels of organization as products not merely of the aggregation or integration of lower level parts, but of the interaction of these parts with the contextual-ecological ‘exigencies.’ The result is a constructionist, weak emergence of novel forms and properties practically irreducible to their constituent parts. (3) The strategy of heterarchy (moderate emergence), the newest and, admittedly, least developed, strategy, is defined as underdetermination of the macrostructure(s) by the given microparts and as semiautonomous emergence of higher-level phenomena out of lower level phenomena. Therefore it is a strate4gy that supports a nonreductivematerialist position, explaining the emergence of novelty and higher-level properties and laws without falling into untenable dualist or idealist traps. (4) Hierarchy (strong emergency), is a full-fledged hierarchical emergence of more robust macroentities and partial overdetermination of the microparts by the dominant, organizing principles of the new higher entities. Hierarchy is a modified, and clearly more defensible, substitute for holism. (5) Finally, the strategy of systemic transcendence (systemic functionalism, vitalism, holism) is defined as a downward, strong determination of the microparts by the macrosystem; the latter seen as an autonomous, higher entity superimposed on the lower systemic parts in a control-hierarchical manner that clearly supports the claims of a dualist metaphysics” (12-3).
Kontopoulos then goes on to highlight these different epistemic approaches.
“As a caveat, we must begin with the recognition that the concept of emergence is one of the most elusive, pluri-semantic, patently charged concepts in the current vocabulary of science and philosophy; the analytical eludication of the term is still in progress and the task now looks to be richer yet harder and more controversial than origicanlly thought” (20).
Kontopoulos lists different concepts of emergence:
“Level 0: the Democritean…notion of integration, subject to reduction
Level 1: two notions of weak emergence:
1.1: an ecological-contextual notion of emergence at the prebiotic levels
1.2: an evolutionist-selectionist…notion of emergence in the neo-Darwinian and post-=Darwinian sense
Level 2: a moderate notion of emergence of semi-autonomous macrostructures heterarchically related to the microparts and underdetermined by them
Level 3: the strong notion of emergence as a hierarchy based on applied constraints and a peculiar downward control
Level 4: a transcending notion—if the hypothesis of group and species selection…find strong support—emphasizing holism, strong macrodetermination of microparts, vitalism, and mentalism. The notion of dualist control also belongs here” (21).
What does emergence look like at the higher levels as defined above?: “Generally speaking, most of the significant contributors opt to explain emergence in terms of some particular notion of constraints superimposed on entities in a cumulative, successive mode…For the time being it suffices to point out that the talk of ‘constraints’ refers descriptively to the process of the restriction of a system’s ‘degrees of freedom’; the existence of such constraints appears as, at least, the necessary, if not sufficient, condition for robust emergence to occur” (22).
Thursday, August 7, 2008
Archer: Morphogenesis versus Structuration
Archer, M., 1982. Morphogenesis versus structuration: on combining structure and action. British Journal of Sociology, 33(4), 455-83.
“The fundamental problem of linking human agency and social structure stalks through the history of sociological theory. Basically it concerns how to develop an adequate theoretical account which deals simultaneously with men constituting society and the social formation of human agents” (455). Archer makes the claim that different approaches to this problem are shifting either more towards structure or more towards agency, which she believes is becoming more pronounced over time.
This article explores two approaches to the agent-structure problem that attempt to find a more thorough balance between the two competing variables: the morphogenesis approach and the structuration approach. The former approach was most strongly advocated by Walter Buckley, and it traces its genealogy back to revisions in sociology, and can also be seen through cybernetics. The second approach is that of structuration, most clearly addressed by Anthony Giddens.
“Both the ‘morphogenetic’ and ‘structuration’ approaches concur that ‘action’ and ‘structure’ presuppose one another: structural patterning is inextricably grounded in practical interaction. Simultaneously both acknowledge that social practice is ineluctably shaped by the unacknowledged conditions of action and generates unintended consequences which form the context of subsequent interaction. The two perspectives thus endorse the credo that the ‘escape of human history from human intentions, and the return of the consequences of that escape as causal influences upon human action, is a chronic feature of social life’” (456).
For the discussion of structuration, Archer uses Giddens. “Giddens’s whole approach hinges on overcoming three dichotomies and it is these dualisms which he strips away from a variety of sources, then recombining their residues” (456). Firstly, he views human action as being deeply embedded within actions in society, transcending the dichotomy between voluntarism and determinism. Secondly, he promotes the subject’s knowledgeability in her creation of society, while also keeping in mind that the subject is aware that they employ societal processes in this process, thus transcending the subject/object dualism. Thirdly, he rejects theories that separate static and dynamic treatments of time, thus transcending the synchrony/diachrony dualism. Structuration is mainly concerned with, “…amalgamating the two sides of each divide” (457).
“’Morphogenesis’ is also a process, referring to the complex interchanges that produce change in a system’s given form, structure or state…, but it has an end-product, structural elaboration, which is quite different from Gidden's social system as merely a Visible pattern” (458).
“Emergent properties which characterize socio-cultural systems imply discontinuity between initial interactions and their product, the complex system. In turn this invites analytical dualism when dealing with structure and action” (458). There are infinite patterns of interaction between structural conditioning/social interactions/structural elaboration (458).
“Hence Giddnes’s whole approach turns on overcoming the dichotomies with the morphogenetic perspective retains and utilizes—between voluntarism and determinism, between synchrony and diachrony, and between individual and society” (458).
“The morphogenetic argument that structure and action operate over different time periods is based on two simple propositions:
-that structure logically predates the action(s) which transform it,
-that structural elaboration logically postdates those actions, which can be represented as shown in Figure 1” (468).
(468).
“The fundamental problem of linking human agency and social structure stalks through the history of sociological theory. Basically it concerns how to develop an adequate theoretical account which deals simultaneously with men constituting society and the social formation of human agents” (455). Archer makes the claim that different approaches to this problem are shifting either more towards structure or more towards agency, which she believes is becoming more pronounced over time.
This article explores two approaches to the agent-structure problem that attempt to find a more thorough balance between the two competing variables: the morphogenesis approach and the structuration approach. The former approach was most strongly advocated by Walter Buckley, and it traces its genealogy back to revisions in sociology, and can also be seen through cybernetics. The second approach is that of structuration, most clearly addressed by Anthony Giddens.
“Both the ‘morphogenetic’ and ‘structuration’ approaches concur that ‘action’ and ‘structure’ presuppose one another: structural patterning is inextricably grounded in practical interaction. Simultaneously both acknowledge that social practice is ineluctably shaped by the unacknowledged conditions of action and generates unintended consequences which form the context of subsequent interaction. The two perspectives thus endorse the credo that the ‘escape of human history from human intentions, and the return of the consequences of that escape as causal influences upon human action, is a chronic feature of social life’” (456).
For the discussion of structuration, Archer uses Giddens. “Giddens’s whole approach hinges on overcoming three dichotomies and it is these dualisms which he strips away from a variety of sources, then recombining their residues” (456). Firstly, he views human action as being deeply embedded within actions in society, transcending the dichotomy between voluntarism and determinism. Secondly, he promotes the subject’s knowledgeability in her creation of society, while also keeping in mind that the subject is aware that they employ societal processes in this process, thus transcending the subject/object dualism. Thirdly, he rejects theories that separate static and dynamic treatments of time, thus transcending the synchrony/diachrony dualism. Structuration is mainly concerned with, “…amalgamating the two sides of each divide” (457).
“’Morphogenesis’ is also a process, referring to the complex interchanges that produce change in a system’s given form, structure or state…, but it has an end-product, structural elaboration, which is quite different from Gidden's social system as merely a Visible pattern” (458).
“Emergent properties which characterize socio-cultural systems imply discontinuity between initial interactions and their product, the complex system. In turn this invites analytical dualism when dealing with structure and action” (458). There are infinite patterns of interaction between structural conditioning/social interactions/structural elaboration (458).
“Hence Giddnes’s whole approach turns on overcoming the dichotomies with the morphogenetic perspective retains and utilizes—between voluntarism and determinism, between synchrony and diachrony, and between individual and society” (458).
“The morphogenetic argument that structure and action operate over different time periods is based on two simple propositions:
-that structure logically predates the action(s) which transform it,
-that structural elaboration logically postdates those actions, which can be represented as shown in Figure 1” (468).
(468).
Wednesday, August 6, 2008
Archer: For Structure
Archer, M., 2000. For structure: its reality, properties and powers: A reply to Anthony King. The Sociological Review, 48(3), 464-472.
“As Bhaskar wrote, ‘the real problem appears to be not so much that of how one could give an individualistic explanation of social behaviour, but that of how one could ever give a non-social (ie, strictly individualistic) explanation of individual, at least characteristically human behaviour! For the predicates designating properties special to persons all pre-suppose a social context for other employment. A tribesman implies a tribe, the cashing of a cheque a banking system. Explanation, whether by subsummption under general laws, advertion to motives and rules, or redescription…alw3ays involves irreducibly social predicates’” (464).
Realist social theory uses analytical dualism and not philosophical dualism, as stated by King. It is analytical for very instrumental reasons. The interaction: Structural Conditioning -> Social Interaction -> Structural Elaboration never allow for structure and agency to interact simultaneously, but they do provide for analytical tools for exploring the behavior of the micro/macro.
Archer re-presents the three kinds of emergence: numerical emergence, relational emergence and bureaucratic emergence.
Numerical Emergence: It is not simply that individuals can change things if they want to and if they possess enough information, as stated by Watkins. It is also the result of the social structure surrounding them. For example, if a small part of a population is literate and tries to improve the literacy rates for others, it will take longer than if a larger part of the population was in their shoes.
Relational Emergence: uses the example of the division of labor and how collective productive activity was on aggregate more than individual action. First order emergence, more efficient pin making, leads to second order emergence, wealthier nations, leads to third order emergence, current advantages in education, for example.
Bureaucratic Emergence: the emergent nature of roles.
UPDATE: Distinguishing emergence from aggregation: "has the generative capacity to modify the powers of its constituents in fundamental ways and to exercise causal influences sui generis. This is the litmus test which differentiates between emergence on the one hand and aggregation and combination on the other" (466)
“As Bhaskar wrote, ‘the real problem appears to be not so much that of how one could give an individualistic explanation of social behaviour, but that of how one could ever give a non-social (ie, strictly individualistic) explanation of individual, at least characteristically human behaviour! For the predicates designating properties special to persons all pre-suppose a social context for other employment. A tribesman implies a tribe, the cashing of a cheque a banking system. Explanation, whether by subsummption under general laws, advertion to motives and rules, or redescription…alw3ays involves irreducibly social predicates’” (464).
Realist social theory uses analytical dualism and not philosophical dualism, as stated by King. It is analytical for very instrumental reasons. The interaction: Structural Conditioning -> Social Interaction -> Structural Elaboration never allow for structure and agency to interact simultaneously, but they do provide for analytical tools for exploring the behavior of the micro/macro.
Archer re-presents the three kinds of emergence: numerical emergence, relational emergence and bureaucratic emergence.
Numerical Emergence: It is not simply that individuals can change things if they want to and if they possess enough information, as stated by Watkins. It is also the result of the social structure surrounding them. For example, if a small part of a population is literate and tries to improve the literacy rates for others, it will take longer than if a larger part of the population was in their shoes.
Relational Emergence: uses the example of the division of labor and how collective productive activity was on aggregate more than individual action. First order emergence, more efficient pin making, leads to second order emergence, wealthier nations, leads to third order emergence, current advantages in education, for example.
Bureaucratic Emergence: the emergent nature of roles.
UPDATE: Distinguishing emergence from aggregation: "has the generative capacity to modify the powers of its constituents in fundamental ways and to exercise causal influences sui generis. This is the litmus test which differentiates between emergence on the one hand and aggregation and combination on the other" (466)
King: Against Structure
King, A., 1999. Against Structure: A Critique of Morphogenetic Social Theory. The Sociological Review, 47(2), 199-227.
This represents a criticism of Archer’s morphogenetic social theory because of its “autonomous social structure” (199). This, King finds contradictory. King tries to, “re-habilitate the interpretive tradition which Archer dismisses…” (199).
“The central claim of Archer’s morphogenetic social theory is to maintain a stratified social ontology. Society must be understood and analyzed as the interaction over time of objective structure and individual, subjective agency or of the macro and the micro” (199).
Archer argues for the ontological separation of society from individuals. “As a consequence of her insistence upon the dual nature of social reality, Archer is vehement in her rejection of any social theory which seems to threaten to collapse social reality into either the structural and objective or individual and subjective dimensions because these approaches will necessarily involve either the exaggeration or elimination of human freedom and the misrepresentation of the Janus-faced nature of society” (202).
Archer uses structural, agential and cultural emergence to tread the fine line between a theory of structure that is not reducible to individualist interpretations. King takes issue with this and explores the claims of structural emergence claiming that these can all be traced back to actions taken by individuals at one moment in time. Discusses three types of structural emergence: numerical, relational and bureaucratic.
Argues against these structurally emergent properties. Argues against relational emergence by saying that the interpretive tradition does not reduce all effects to an individual, but to individuals, and that all emergent properties can be reduced to individuals.
Archer also explores numerical emergence through literacy in Cuba.
Archer explores bureaucratic emergence through the concept of roles.
“This article has tried to demonstrate the interpretive tradition’s rejection of the concept of structure on the grounds that structure is not autonomous, pre-existent or causal” (222).
This represents a criticism of Archer’s morphogenetic social theory because of its “autonomous social structure” (199). This, King finds contradictory. King tries to, “re-habilitate the interpretive tradition which Archer dismisses…” (199).
“The central claim of Archer’s morphogenetic social theory is to maintain a stratified social ontology. Society must be understood and analyzed as the interaction over time of objective structure and individual, subjective agency or of the macro and the micro” (199).
Archer argues for the ontological separation of society from individuals. “As a consequence of her insistence upon the dual nature of social reality, Archer is vehement in her rejection of any social theory which seems to threaten to collapse social reality into either the structural and objective or individual and subjective dimensions because these approaches will necessarily involve either the exaggeration or elimination of human freedom and the misrepresentation of the Janus-faced nature of society” (202).
Archer uses structural, agential and cultural emergence to tread the fine line between a theory of structure that is not reducible to individualist interpretations. King takes issue with this and explores the claims of structural emergence claiming that these can all be traced back to actions taken by individuals at one moment in time. Discusses three types of structural emergence: numerical, relational and bureaucratic.
Argues against these structurally emergent properties. Argues against relational emergence by saying that the interpretive tradition does not reduce all effects to an individual, but to individuals, and that all emergent properties can be reduced to individuals.
Archer also explores numerical emergence through literacy in Cuba.
Archer explores bureaucratic emergence through the concept of roles.
“This article has tried to demonstrate the interpretive tradition’s rejection of the concept of structure on the grounds that structure is not autonomous, pre-existent or causal” (222).
Monday, August 4, 2008
Doty: A Reply to Colin Wight
Doty, RL. 1999. “A Reply to Colin Wight.” European Journal of International Relations 5:387.
Doty defends the article that Wight criticizes. Firstly, by identifying that a plurality of readings is possible, and that one reading of a given text is not necessarily the only possible reading. This is a broad point about the texts in that he criticizes her, and his reading of her text. She also criticizes him putting her in the “post-structural” category. She said that she was proving “a post-structural gaze” and nothing definitive.
Also, Doty criticizes Wight’s understanding of “undecidablitiy” as derived from Derrida. Wight seems to think that undecidability is a non-decision, when Doty argues that it is infact most helpfully understood as a present.
Doty defends the article that Wight criticizes. Firstly, by identifying that a plurality of readings is possible, and that one reading of a given text is not necessarily the only possible reading. This is a broad point about the texts in that he criticizes her, and his reading of her text. She also criticizes him putting her in the “post-structural” category. She said that she was proving “a post-structural gaze” and nothing definitive.
Also, Doty criticizes Wight’s understanding of “undecidablitiy” as derived from Derrida. Wight seems to think that undecidability is a non-decision, when Doty argues that it is infact most helpfully understood as a present.
Wight: They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They?
Wight, C. 1999. “They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They?: Locating Agency in the Agent-Structure Problematique.” European Journal of International Relations 5:109.
Doty’s article attempted to do many things vis-à-vis the agent-structure debate in IR. One of these things was to make the claim that structures have been overwhelmingly emphasized while agents have received relatively less attention. Another claim is to, in the words of Wight, shoot right to the heart of the dead horse by identifying the relationship between agent-structure as an aporia.
“…I will argue that Doty’s treatment of the agent-structure writers is highly problematic and that the manner in which she sets up the agent-structure writers facilitates their easy refutation. In particular, I will argue that Doty’s treatment of the idea of resolution of the agent-structure problematic. Doty treats resolution in oppositional either/or terms; problems are either totally resolved or there is no resolution. Contrary to this I argue that approaches to the agent-structure problem should be viewed from the perspective of better or worse than prevailing alternatives. Indeed, I argue that it is her failure to contextualize the agent-structure problem in terms of the dominant alternatives—methodological individualism and methodological strucdturalism—that leads Doty to view the agent-structure writers as presenting the ‘final solution’ to this problem. Contra this, I argue that the agent-structure writers do not conceive of their theoretical articulations as ‘final solutions’, but as differing complex social ontologies. Given this, the agent-structure writers should be viewed not as advancing solutions, but alternatives—alternatives, that is, to the dominant ways of conceptualizing complex social ontologies” (111).
Wight spends some time trying to situate himself within a “gang” of ontological disposition. He is not sure exactly where he fits, as he reads Derrida, Foucault, but also Bakshar. He claims that he is a critical realist, and that the above authors can be read as critical realists. He also says that what he is will be displayed in his practice.
The distinction between agent and structure is a long-standing one with clear sociological roots. There are two main-line approaches to this problem, the methodological individualism and methodological structuralism (this is highlighted in Wendt’s article about agents and structure, but Wend asks for a structuration (originating with Giddens) solution to the problem (is it a final solution?!?!)).
Must go beyond Doty’s prescription for an agency based on an understanding of subject positions and create a more nuanced, “multi-layered perspective” (125). This approach can not anthropormophise the state.
Taken from Spivak, there are three forms of agency that form in the social world: “…accountability, intentionality and subjectivity…” (130).
Separates three kinds of agency: 1, 2 and 3. 1 involves the core-make-up of a person. 2 involves the position in that the find themselves (diplomat, is an example). 3 is the specific way that 1 and 2 interact from person to person.
Doty’s article attempted to do many things vis-à-vis the agent-structure debate in IR. One of these things was to make the claim that structures have been overwhelmingly emphasized while agents have received relatively less attention. Another claim is to, in the words of Wight, shoot right to the heart of the dead horse by identifying the relationship between agent-structure as an aporia.
“…I will argue that Doty’s treatment of the agent-structure writers is highly problematic and that the manner in which she sets up the agent-structure writers facilitates their easy refutation. In particular, I will argue that Doty’s treatment of the idea of resolution of the agent-structure problematic. Doty treats resolution in oppositional either/or terms; problems are either totally resolved or there is no resolution. Contrary to this I argue that approaches to the agent-structure problem should be viewed from the perspective of better or worse than prevailing alternatives. Indeed, I argue that it is her failure to contextualize the agent-structure problem in terms of the dominant alternatives—methodological individualism and methodological strucdturalism—that leads Doty to view the agent-structure writers as presenting the ‘final solution’ to this problem. Contra this, I argue that the agent-structure writers do not conceive of their theoretical articulations as ‘final solutions’, but as differing complex social ontologies. Given this, the agent-structure writers should be viewed not as advancing solutions, but alternatives—alternatives, that is, to the dominant ways of conceptualizing complex social ontologies” (111).
Wight spends some time trying to situate himself within a “gang” of ontological disposition. He is not sure exactly where he fits, as he reads Derrida, Foucault, but also Bakshar. He claims that he is a critical realist, and that the above authors can be read as critical realists. He also says that what he is will be displayed in his practice.
The distinction between agent and structure is a long-standing one with clear sociological roots. There are two main-line approaches to this problem, the methodological individualism and methodological structuralism (this is highlighted in Wendt’s article about agents and structure, but Wend asks for a structuration (originating with Giddens) solution to the problem (is it a final solution?!?!)).
Must go beyond Doty’s prescription for an agency based on an understanding of subject positions and create a more nuanced, “multi-layered perspective” (125). This approach can not anthropormophise the state.
Taken from Spivak, there are three forms of agency that form in the social world: “…accountability, intentionality and subjectivity…” (130).
Separates three kinds of agency: 1, 2 and 3. 1 involves the core-make-up of a person. 2 involves the position in that the find themselves (diplomat, is an example). 3 is the specific way that 1 and 2 interact from person to person.
Doty: Aporia
Doty, RL. 1997. “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory.” European Journal of International Relations 3:365.
As the name “aporia” suggests, there is much that is undecidable, unknowable and undefinable in the description of the agent-structure problem by Doty.
The article begins by addressing the complexity of the agent-structure problem, first brought to the forefront by Wendt (1987). His solution took the form of structuration theory, a mixture of agent-driven theory and structure-driven theory.
“In this article I examine some significant problems found in this very important conversation, and suggest that they result in serious gaps and silences. However, I also propose that important openings can be found that point to a more critical, if unsettling, way of conceptualizing agents and structures and the relation between them. Specifically I suggest that claims to have resolved the dualism between agents and structures are unwarranted. The ‘solutions’ that have been proposed to this problem either end up reverting to a structural determinism or alternatively to an understanding of agency which presumes pregiven, autonomous individuals. Both of these positions come full circle back to the very dilemma that gives rise to the agent-structure problem in the first place. Despite the failure to resolve the agent-structure problem, however, the conversations that have taken place contain some important insights and openings that raise just the kind of questions that can lead to a more critical understanding of International Relations. These openings have not, however, been pursued by the framers of the agent-structure problematique. Because of this, serious gaps, silences and foreclosures of possibilities remain” (366).
“I make the following arguments. (1) Scientific realism, the philosophy of science which either explicitly or implicitly underpins the various ‘solutions’ to the agent-structure problem, remains wedded to an essentialist notion of structure which is at odds with attempts to give equal ontological and explanatory priority to the practices of agents. (2) Structuration theory contains contradictions that are most manifest in its resort to ‘bracketing’… (3) Far from transcending the subject-object dualism, the proposed solutions to the agent-structure problem merely replicate it” (366).
“One popular story is that of agents whose practices produce, reproduce and sometimes transform the structures that make up society. The other story is that of the structures themselves which enable, constrain and make possible the practices of agents…Dressler…frames the issue as involving two uncontentious truths—(1) human agency is the only moving force behind actions, events and outcomes; and (2) agency can only be realized in concrete historical circumstances. Wendt…suggests that the agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life—(1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and (2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (367).
“The difficulty…is the oppositional logic within which the agent-structure problem has been articulated, i.e. the agent-structure problem has been formulated within a system of thought that defines structures and agents as two distinct, fully constituted and opposed entities each with essential properties, while the central feature of structures, as defined in the agent-structure problematique, makes problematic this very distinction” (371-2).
Doty claims that the issue of agency has been underwhelmingly emphasized and tries to shed light on it.
The current treatment of the agent-structure problem does not allow for the undecidability of the aporia, that Doty puts forth. This post-structural approach, this rejection of decidability is not an embrace of nihilism or non-action, but rather is a problematization of the ability of scholars to truly identify whether causality takes place in the realm of structure or agency. In fact, the current treatment of the dichotomy, in its inadequacy to identify and highlight the interaction of structure/agent, actually makes quite clearly the case that the agent-structure issue has not, and cannot, be brought to clarity.
Doty then presents undecidability and paradoxes as a method for achieving three things:
“I do, however, claim that it is possible to take the undecidability of issues seriously and to press these paradoxes further than they have been pressed by IR theorists. The purpose of doing this are threefold—(1) to reconceptualize the nature and significance of practice; (2) to suggest an alternative way of understanding the agent-structure relationship; and (3) to point out how current ‘solutions’ foreclose important possibilities in terms of critical International Relations theory” (375).
Doty uses concepts like play and practice in determining the causal implications of either structure or agency.
Doty does not argue that the efforts of Wendt and others in re-associating the agent-structure problem with a contsructeivist method and ontology is wholely base. She makes the case that they could go much further. “Certainly, approaches which reject a priori assumptions about the givenness of either agents or structures enable the posing of a much wider range of questions than do those which give explanatory priority to either one of these. However, the current framing of the agent-structure problem precludes important critical moves and creates boundaries beyond which IR theory cannot go. At stake is the extent to which the inquiries enabled by particular framings of the issue are complicit with existing discourses, and the extent to which they make problematic these discourses, their underlying presuppositions and the power inherent in them” (383).
There is a discussion of practice informing identity, which is over determined, and the concept of subject-position, being discursively formed and uncentered (always already uncenterable?) as being important as well.
“If structures, meanings and identities are overdetermined and inherently undecidable, and the construction of all of these things results from practices which marginalize and exclude the excesses that would call into question the center of itself…, then we can reasonably suggest that power is fundamental to discursive constructions. There are no constructions in the absence of power” (386).
“Hollis and Smith…suggest that there are still two stories to tell, that of agency and that of structure. Wendt…also suggests that there are two stories to tell regarding the relationship between structure and process—one based exclusively on microeconomic analogies, and one based on sociological and social psychological analogies. In this article, I have attempted to show that there are also other stories to tell regarding agency, structure and the relationship between them and practices” (387).
As the name “aporia” suggests, there is much that is undecidable, unknowable and undefinable in the description of the agent-structure problem by Doty.
The article begins by addressing the complexity of the agent-structure problem, first brought to the forefront by Wendt (1987). His solution took the form of structuration theory, a mixture of agent-driven theory and structure-driven theory.
“In this article I examine some significant problems found in this very important conversation, and suggest that they result in serious gaps and silences. However, I also propose that important openings can be found that point to a more critical, if unsettling, way of conceptualizing agents and structures and the relation between them. Specifically I suggest that claims to have resolved the dualism between agents and structures are unwarranted. The ‘solutions’ that have been proposed to this problem either end up reverting to a structural determinism or alternatively to an understanding of agency which presumes pregiven, autonomous individuals. Both of these positions come full circle back to the very dilemma that gives rise to the agent-structure problem in the first place. Despite the failure to resolve the agent-structure problem, however, the conversations that have taken place contain some important insights and openings that raise just the kind of questions that can lead to a more critical understanding of International Relations. These openings have not, however, been pursued by the framers of the agent-structure problematique. Because of this, serious gaps, silences and foreclosures of possibilities remain” (366).
“I make the following arguments. (1) Scientific realism, the philosophy of science which either explicitly or implicitly underpins the various ‘solutions’ to the agent-structure problem, remains wedded to an essentialist notion of structure which is at odds with attempts to give equal ontological and explanatory priority to the practices of agents. (2) Structuration theory contains contradictions that are most manifest in its resort to ‘bracketing’… (3) Far from transcending the subject-object dualism, the proposed solutions to the agent-structure problem merely replicate it” (366).
“One popular story is that of agents whose practices produce, reproduce and sometimes transform the structures that make up society. The other story is that of the structures themselves which enable, constrain and make possible the practices of agents…Dressler…frames the issue as involving two uncontentious truths—(1) human agency is the only moving force behind actions, events and outcomes; and (2) agency can only be realized in concrete historical circumstances. Wendt…suggests that the agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life—(1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and (2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (367).
“The difficulty…is the oppositional logic within which the agent-structure problem has been articulated, i.e. the agent-structure problem has been formulated within a system of thought that defines structures and agents as two distinct, fully constituted and opposed entities each with essential properties, while the central feature of structures, as defined in the agent-structure problematique, makes problematic this very distinction” (371-2).
Doty claims that the issue of agency has been underwhelmingly emphasized and tries to shed light on it.
The current treatment of the agent-structure problem does not allow for the undecidability of the aporia, that Doty puts forth. This post-structural approach, this rejection of decidability is not an embrace of nihilism or non-action, but rather is a problematization of the ability of scholars to truly identify whether causality takes place in the realm of structure or agency. In fact, the current treatment of the dichotomy, in its inadequacy to identify and highlight the interaction of structure/agent, actually makes quite clearly the case that the agent-structure issue has not, and cannot, be brought to clarity.
Doty then presents undecidability and paradoxes as a method for achieving three things:
“I do, however, claim that it is possible to take the undecidability of issues seriously and to press these paradoxes further than they have been pressed by IR theorists. The purpose of doing this are threefold—(1) to reconceptualize the nature and significance of practice; (2) to suggest an alternative way of understanding the agent-structure relationship; and (3) to point out how current ‘solutions’ foreclose important possibilities in terms of critical International Relations theory” (375).
Doty uses concepts like play and practice in determining the causal implications of either structure or agency.
Doty does not argue that the efforts of Wendt and others in re-associating the agent-structure problem with a contsructeivist method and ontology is wholely base. She makes the case that they could go much further. “Certainly, approaches which reject a priori assumptions about the givenness of either agents or structures enable the posing of a much wider range of questions than do those which give explanatory priority to either one of these. However, the current framing of the agent-structure problem precludes important critical moves and creates boundaries beyond which IR theory cannot go. At stake is the extent to which the inquiries enabled by particular framings of the issue are complicit with existing discourses, and the extent to which they make problematic these discourses, their underlying presuppositions and the power inherent in them” (383).
There is a discussion of practice informing identity, which is over determined, and the concept of subject-position, being discursively formed and uncentered (always already uncenterable?) as being important as well.
“If structures, meanings and identities are overdetermined and inherently undecidable, and the construction of all of these things results from practices which marginalize and exclude the excesses that would call into question the center of itself…, then we can reasonably suggest that power is fundamental to discursive constructions. There are no constructions in the absence of power” (386).
“Hollis and Smith…suggest that there are still two stories to tell, that of agency and that of structure. Wendt…also suggests that there are two stories to tell regarding the relationship between structure and process—one based exclusively on microeconomic analogies, and one based on sociological and social psychological analogies. In this article, I have attempted to show that there are also other stories to tell regarding agency, structure and the relationship between them and practices” (387).
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Wendt: Agent-Structure Problem in IR
Wendt, Alexander. 1987. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” International Organization 41:335-370.
Neorealism and World System Theory (WST) both claim to provide structural accounts of IR. Both have a different understanding of system structure. “Neorealists define international system structures in terms of the observable attributes of their member states…, and as a result, they understand the explanatory role of those structures in individualist terms as constraining the choices of preexisting state actors” (335). “World-system theorists, on the other hand, define international system structures in terms of the fundamental organizing principles of the capitalist world economy which underlie and constitute states, and thus they understand the explanatory role of structures in structuralist terms as generating state actors themselves” (335).
These theories could be critiqued from a number of perspectives, but Wendt chooses to explore the ontological critique: “…neorealism embodies an individualist ontology, while world-system theory embodies a holistic one” (336). “A useful way to capture the nature and implications of this difference is to evaluate the two theories in terms of their underlying assumptions about the relationship of system structures to human agents (336).
“All social scientific theories embody an at least implicit solution to the ‘agent-structure problem,’ which situates agents and social structures in relation to one another” (337).
The Agent-Structure Problem:
“The agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life which underlie most social scientific inquiry: 1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (337-8).
Agent and structure are interdependent, co-constitutive, etc.
There are two issues involved in this debate, one is ontological and the other epistemological. The ontological issues, “…concerns the nature of both agents and structures and, because they are in some way mutually implicating, of their interrelationship” (339). There are three possible responses to the “ontological problem”: individualism, structuralism, and structurationism (339). Neorealists and WST theorists embrace the first two solutions. “The structurationist approach, on the other hand, tries to avoid what I shall argue are the negative consequences of individualism and structuralism by giving agents and structures equal ontological status” (339).
The answer to the ontological issue drives the scientists’ answer to the epistemological problem. “This problem actually raises two epistemological issues. The first is the choice of the form of explanation corresponding respectively to agents and structures…On the other hand, approaches that conceive of human beings as nothing more than complex organisms processing stimuli—such as behaviorism—generate agent-explanations that are more mechanistically causal in form” (339-40).
Reductionism and Reification in International Relations Theory:
Wendt compares neorealism and WST in their conception of structuralism, as well as showing that their approaches are similar and that, “…precludes an explanation of the essential properties of their respective primitive units” (340).
Thorough critique of the nature of neorealist conceptions of international structure affecting its atomized, individualist state without the deployment of a theory of the state.
WST: “Without a recognition of the ontological dependence of system structures on state and class agents, Wallerstein is forced into an explanation of that transition in terms of exogenous shocks and the teleological imperatives of an immanent capitalist mode of production” (348).
“World-system theorists, then, like neorealistis, treat their primitive units, in this case the structure of world system, as given and unprobmeatic. This treatment leads them to separate the operation of system structures from the activities of state and class agents—in other words, to reify system structures in a way which leads to static and even functional explanations of state action” (348).
“I have…attempted to show that…neorealism and world-system theory share a common, underlying approach to the agent-structure problem: they both attempt to make either agents or structures into primitive units, which leaves each equally unable to explain the properties of those units, and therefore to justify its theoretically and explanatory claims about state action” (349).
The implication of all of this is the following: theories need to start somewhere, they need to begin with either agents or structures, but they also need to have a theory for why they begin where they begin. Theories can have “primitive units”, but they should also explain that they are not ontologically prior or from God.
Alternative Approach to the Agent-Structure Problem:
“Structuration theory is a relational solution to the agent-structure problem that conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually constituted or codetermined entities” (350).
Digresses to the debate between rationalists and empiricists.
Implications: “First, scientific realism attempts to make sense of what practicing natural and social scientists in fact do, rather than prescribing on the legitimacy of certain research practices versus others…in contrast to empiricism, scientific realism can make scientific sense of unobservable generative structures, of structures that are irreducible to and generate their elements…Finally, although there are important problems in translating the protocols and discourse of natural scientific practice directly to the social sciences…the basic realist idea that scientific explanation consists in the identification of underlying causal mechanisms rather than in generalizations about observable regularities does apply to the social sciences, and its adoption there would have important implications for the explanation of social action” (354-5).
“Structuraiton theory attempts to preserve the generative and relational aspects of structuralism while taking explicit conceptual and methodological steps to prevent the analytical separation of generative structures fro the self-understandings and practices of human agents to prevent structural reification” (355). It is analytical, and not substantive, about the, “analysis rather than the substance of the social world” (355).
Core of the program: accept unobservable social structures as generative; stress human intentionality and motivation; there is a unification of agents and structures in a “dialectical synthesis”; social and space/time structures are different (356).
Agents and structures can not be seen or determined independently.
Neorealism and World System Theory (WST) both claim to provide structural accounts of IR. Both have a different understanding of system structure. “Neorealists define international system structures in terms of the observable attributes of their member states…, and as a result, they understand the explanatory role of those structures in individualist terms as constraining the choices of preexisting state actors” (335). “World-system theorists, on the other hand, define international system structures in terms of the fundamental organizing principles of the capitalist world economy which underlie and constitute states, and thus they understand the explanatory role of structures in structuralist terms as generating state actors themselves” (335).
These theories could be critiqued from a number of perspectives, but Wendt chooses to explore the ontological critique: “…neorealism embodies an individualist ontology, while world-system theory embodies a holistic one” (336). “A useful way to capture the nature and implications of this difference is to evaluate the two theories in terms of their underlying assumptions about the relationship of system structures to human agents (336).
“All social scientific theories embody an at least implicit solution to the ‘agent-structure problem,’ which situates agents and social structures in relation to one another” (337).
The Agent-Structure Problem:
“The agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life which underlie most social scientific inquiry: 1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (337-8).
Agent and structure are interdependent, co-constitutive, etc.
There are two issues involved in this debate, one is ontological and the other epistemological. The ontological issues, “…concerns the nature of both agents and structures and, because they are in some way mutually implicating, of their interrelationship” (339). There are three possible responses to the “ontological problem”: individualism, structuralism, and structurationism (339). Neorealists and WST theorists embrace the first two solutions. “The structurationist approach, on the other hand, tries to avoid what I shall argue are the negative consequences of individualism and structuralism by giving agents and structures equal ontological status” (339).
The answer to the ontological issue drives the scientists’ answer to the epistemological problem. “This problem actually raises two epistemological issues. The first is the choice of the form of explanation corresponding respectively to agents and structures…On the other hand, approaches that conceive of human beings as nothing more than complex organisms processing stimuli—such as behaviorism—generate agent-explanations that are more mechanistically causal in form” (339-40).
Reductionism and Reification in International Relations Theory:
Wendt compares neorealism and WST in their conception of structuralism, as well as showing that their approaches are similar and that, “…precludes an explanation of the essential properties of their respective primitive units” (340).
Thorough critique of the nature of neorealist conceptions of international structure affecting its atomized, individualist state without the deployment of a theory of the state.
WST: “Without a recognition of the ontological dependence of system structures on state and class agents, Wallerstein is forced into an explanation of that transition in terms of exogenous shocks and the teleological imperatives of an immanent capitalist mode of production” (348).
“World-system theorists, then, like neorealistis, treat their primitive units, in this case the structure of world system, as given and unprobmeatic. This treatment leads them to separate the operation of system structures from the activities of state and class agents—in other words, to reify system structures in a way which leads to static and even functional explanations of state action” (348).
“I have…attempted to show that…neorealism and world-system theory share a common, underlying approach to the agent-structure problem: they both attempt to make either agents or structures into primitive units, which leaves each equally unable to explain the properties of those units, and therefore to justify its theoretically and explanatory claims about state action” (349).
The implication of all of this is the following: theories need to start somewhere, they need to begin with either agents or structures, but they also need to have a theory for why they begin where they begin. Theories can have “primitive units”, but they should also explain that they are not ontologically prior or from God.
Alternative Approach to the Agent-Structure Problem:
“Structuration theory is a relational solution to the agent-structure problem that conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually constituted or codetermined entities” (350).
Digresses to the debate between rationalists and empiricists.
Implications: “First, scientific realism attempts to make sense of what practicing natural and social scientists in fact do, rather than prescribing on the legitimacy of certain research practices versus others…in contrast to empiricism, scientific realism can make scientific sense of unobservable generative structures, of structures that are irreducible to and generate their elements…Finally, although there are important problems in translating the protocols and discourse of natural scientific practice directly to the social sciences…the basic realist idea that scientific explanation consists in the identification of underlying causal mechanisms rather than in generalizations about observable regularities does apply to the social sciences, and its adoption there would have important implications for the explanation of social action” (354-5).
“Structuraiton theory attempts to preserve the generative and relational aspects of structuralism while taking explicit conceptual and methodological steps to prevent the analytical separation of generative structures fro the self-understandings and practices of human agents to prevent structural reification” (355). It is analytical, and not substantive, about the, “analysis rather than the substance of the social world” (355).
Core of the program: accept unobservable social structures as generative; stress human intentionality and motivation; there is a unification of agents and structures in a “dialectical synthesis”; social and space/time structures are different (356).
Agents and structures can not be seen or determined independently.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Wight: Agents, Structures and International Relations
Wight, Colin. (2006). Agents, structures and international relations : politics as ontology. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
The agent-structure problem is the medium whereby Wight attempts to “unpack” his argument. He chooses this for three reasons: firstly, this problem is essentially ontological; secondly, every theoretical approach posits a solution to the agent-structure problem whether explicitly or tacitly; and thirdly, is the intersection of politics and ontology whereby the assumption is that the agent-structure problem is a part of social ontology. From later in the book, “If ever the agent-structure problem were solved, in the sense of requiring no further discussion, then social theoretic activity would come to an end, and along with it political, economic, cultural and ethical dispute. In this sense, the agent-structure problem is political” (63).
Wight also rejects the possibility that a general theory of IR is even achievable. “The attempt to construct a parsimonious theory of IR is not only flawed and doomed to failure, but also politically and ethically dangerous” (8).
In the second chapter, Wight situates his own political position vis-à-vis that of positivism. He claims that the current IR theoretical mess requires one to orient themselves with this hegemonic approach. “According to the positivist model of science, there is a general set of rules, procedures and axioms, which when taken together constitutes the ‘scientific method’” (19).
Wight rejects this positivism and instead embraces a scientific realism: “But it is not just the ‘covering law model’ which scientific realism rejects; it is the very attempt to demarcate a ‘scientific method’. For scientific realists there can be no single ‘scientific method’. Understood as the attempt to provide depth explanations of phenomena, it must be the case that differing phenomena will require differing modes of investigation and perhaps different models of explanation. Contra positivism, then, for scientific realists, the content of science is not the method” (19). “For scientific realists the productions of science are always open to revision and reformulation. The dialectic of science is never ending and no scientific discovery, or claim, is ever beyond critique” (24).
There is an account of the Kantian epistemological turn that arose from the catalyst that was David Hume. The scientific realists must always question epistemological claims and must revert back to ontology, though ontology will always require epistemology for further exploration.
He ontologically establishes three points about society: “First, societies are irreducible to people; social forms are a necessary condition for any intentional social act. Second, their pre-existence establishes their autonomy as possible objects of study. Third, their causal power establishes their reality” (46).
Wight then deploys the Bourdieu concept of habitus. He defines this as, “a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules” (49). Society and the individual interact thought the medium of the habitus.
The remainder of the second chapter is a relatively rushed sketch of different theories and Wight’s classification of their position vis-à-vis the agent-structure problem and the issues surrounding either ontology, epistemology or methodology. He looks at Webber, Wallerstein, Waltz, Wendt, Cox, Carr and many others.
The third chapter’s aim is to, “identify what lies at the heart of the agent-structure problem and disentangle this from the other issues that surfaced during the debate surrounding this issue within IR, but which are not an integral part of it” (90). This debate is problematic because there are so many different theoretical approaches that have been taken and that must be disentangled. There is the standard levels of analysis approach, the micro-macro approach and the two structures approach. All of these are problematic on certain levels for Wight if they do not involve an understanding of full interaction between agents and structure where structure operates at all levels. The third chapter also has relevant, interesting and important things to say about emergence and deserves a more thorough read.
This abstract will stop at this point and should be taken up later with chapter 4-the end.
UPDATE:
Conclusion:
The agent-structure debate has provided the following to IR: it has brought forward the impossibility of focusing only on the international while ignoring the domestic; it has also rejected structural monism; it has also problematized methodological individualism; finally, it brought forward the difficulty of operationalizing this approach.
“The ability to predict outcomes in open systems is beyond all science” (52).“There are simply no epistemological or methodological divides to accept, defend or bridge. …the argument advanced in this book promises nothing less than a comprehensive reassessment and restructuring of the theoretical cleavages that divide the discipline” (1). The theoretical divisions that are currently a very real trend in IR are not, Wight claims, epistemological or methodological, but they are rather ontological. Wight attempts to right this mess by focusing on the ontological arguments that have been overlooked by many in the discipline.
The agent-structure problem is the medium whereby Wight attempts to “unpack” his argument. He chooses this for three reasons: firstly, this problem is essentially ontological; secondly, every theoretical approach posits a solution to the agent-structure problem whether explicitly or tacitly; and thirdly, is the intersection of politics and ontology whereby the assumption is that the agent-structure problem is a part of social ontology. From later in the book, “If ever the agent-structure problem were solved, in the sense of requiring no further discussion, then social theoretic activity would come to an end, and along with it political, economic, cultural and ethical dispute. In this sense, the agent-structure problem is political” (63).
Wight also rejects the possibility that a general theory of IR is even achievable. “The attempt to construct a parsimonious theory of IR is not only flawed and doomed to failure, but also politically and ethically dangerous” (8).
In the second chapter, Wight situates his own political position vis-à-vis that of positivism. He claims that the current IR theoretical mess requires one to orient themselves with this hegemonic approach. “According to the positivist model of science, there is a general set of rules, procedures and axioms, which when taken together constitutes the ‘scientific method’” (19).
“…positivism can be characterized in the following manner. (1) Phenomenalism: the doctrine that holds that we cannot get beyond the way things appear to us and thereby obtain reliable knowledge of reality—in other words, appearances, not realities are the only objects of knowledge. (2) Nominalism: the doctrine that there is no objective meaning to the words we use—words and concepts do not pick out any actual objects or universal aspects of reality, they are simply conventional symbols or names that we happen to use for our own convenience. (3) Cognitivism: the doctrine that holds that no cognitive value can be ascribed to value judgments and normative statements. (4) Naturalism: the belief that there is an essential unity of scientific method such that the social sciences can be studies in the same manner as natural science” (21).Positivists then use covering laws, instrumental treatments of theoretical terms, a Humean account of cause and an embrace of operationalism.
Wight rejects this positivism and instead embraces a scientific realism: “But it is not just the ‘covering law model’ which scientific realism rejects; it is the very attempt to demarcate a ‘scientific method’. For scientific realists there can be no single ‘scientific method’. Understood as the attempt to provide depth explanations of phenomena, it must be the case that differing phenomena will require differing modes of investigation and perhaps different models of explanation. Contra positivism, then, for scientific realists, the content of science is not the method” (19). “For scientific realists the productions of science are always open to revision and reformulation. The dialectic of science is never ending and no scientific discovery, or claim, is ever beyond critique” (24).
There is an account of the Kantian epistemological turn that arose from the catalyst that was David Hume. The scientific realists must always question epistemological claims and must revert back to ontology, though ontology will always require epistemology for further exploration.
“The empirical realist error is the conflation of three domains, or levels of realty, into one—that of the empirical. In contrast to this, scientific realists argue that in order to make sense of the scientific enterprise we need to distinguish between the domains of the empirical (experiences and impressions), the actual (events and states-of-affairs—i.e. the actual objects of potential direct experience) and the real or non-actual (the deep structures, mechanisms and tendencies)” (34-5).There is a continued critique of positivism in its many forms. The hope of Wight is the imposition of a science without positivist “residues”. For him, scientific realism is one way that this can become a reality.
He ontologically establishes three points about society: “First, societies are irreducible to people; social forms are a necessary condition for any intentional social act. Second, their pre-existence establishes their autonomy as possible objects of study. Third, their causal power establishes their reality” (46).
Wight then deploys the Bourdieu concept of habitus. He defines this as, “a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules” (49). Society and the individual interact thought the medium of the habitus.
The remainder of the second chapter is a relatively rushed sketch of different theories and Wight’s classification of their position vis-à-vis the agent-structure problem and the issues surrounding either ontology, epistemology or methodology. He looks at Webber, Wallerstein, Waltz, Wendt, Cox, Carr and many others.
The third chapter’s aim is to, “identify what lies at the heart of the agent-structure problem and disentangle this from the other issues that surfaced during the debate surrounding this issue within IR, but which are not an integral part of it” (90). This debate is problematic because there are so many different theoretical approaches that have been taken and that must be disentangled. There is the standard levels of analysis approach, the micro-macro approach and the two structures approach. All of these are problematic on certain levels for Wight if they do not involve an understanding of full interaction between agents and structure where structure operates at all levels. The third chapter also has relevant, interesting and important things to say about emergence and deserves a more thorough read.
This abstract will stop at this point and should be taken up later with chapter 4-the end.
UPDATE:
Conclusion:
The agent-structure debate has provided the following to IR: it has brought forward the impossibility of focusing only on the international while ignoring the domestic; it has also rejected structural monism; it has also problematized methodological individualism; finally, it brought forward the difficulty of operationalizing this approach.
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