McNally: Sino-Capitalism

McNally, Christopher A. “Sino-Capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the International Political Economy.” World Politics 64, no. 4 (2012): 741–776.

Outlines the IR debate on the rise of China.  Then focuses on IPE interpretation of Sino-Capitalism in contrast to Anglo-Capitalism.  Sino-Capitalism:  "...relies on informal business networks rather than on legal codes and transparent rules.  It also assigns the Chinese state a leading role in fostering and guiding capitalist accumulation." (744)  "Central to Sino-capitalism's institutional structure is a unique duality that combines top-down state-led development with bottom-up entrepreneurial private capital accumulation" (744).

Piece goes on to place Sino-Capitalism within the varieties of capitalism literature.  It argues that the unique characteristics of this economic structure will be challenging to assimilate within the liberal economic order.  Author makes the interesting observation that China is entering the international system characterized by neoliberal globalization and other Asian countries that entered the system earlier did so  when it was more characterized by embedded liberalism.  

The article then goes on to document the moves that China is making to internationalize the yuan.  The further implications for the rise of China and US-China relations are ambiguous, but the author claims that the rise of Sino-Capitalism will continue to challenge the international financial order.

Mearshimer: The Gathering Storm

Mearsheimer, John J. “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (December 21, 2010): 381–396.

 The argument here is that "China cannot rise peacefully" (382). This is because of power transition theory and standard Realist accounts of behavior in the international system. There are three arguments for why China will rise peacefully and Mearsheimer refutes each. 1. China will mitigate fears of it's revisionist nature by signaling to their neighbors that it will be peaceful. This isn't possible because states can have no truthful expectation about the behavior of other states. Cites Hobbes related work. Second, China could build defensive military capabilities in place of offensive. This isn't plausible because the line between defensive and offensive capabilities is blurry. 3. China's behavior to her neighbors has been peaceful lately. Problem with this thinking is that past behavior isn't predictive of future behavior.

 He also addresses the US role in the future and its desire to remain the global hegemon. This will further initiate conflict.

Then, after telling the reader that we can't understand the decisions of leaders in 2025 he goes on to tell us how we should expect countries to behave.

Weltman: Systems Theory in International Relations

Weltman, John J. 1973. Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.


“The best-known application of this approach to international relations is embodies in Morton A. Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics. Building on Kaplan’s framework and modifying it to suit their own purposes, other authors have employed systems theory in many studies. …We propose to analyze in this work the utility of this body of thought as a vehicle by which knowledge relating to the field of international relations may be advanced” (1). Utility will be defined as the explanatory power of the theory.

Kaplan’s definition of systems approach to IR: “A system of action is a set of variables so related, in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of the variables to each other and the external relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables” (3).

“Through the use of this concept it is possible to describe the state of the system, and to delineate the requirements for its continue dexistance. Processes contributing to these requirements are functional. The system is by definition in equilibrium. The regularities observable in its operation provide the limits of the equilibrium. A disequilibrium indicates the dissolution of the system; with the ordered pattern of interaction previously defining it no longer operative, the system can no longer be distinguished from its environment” (3).

Discussion of feedback, a term drawn from cybernetics (4).

“Marion J. Levy’s definition of Structure, as cited in Weltman: “The term structure as used here means a pattern, i.e., an observable uniformity ,of action or operation” (4) The definition of function: “The term function…is defined here as a condition, or state of affairs, resultant from the operation…of a structure through time” (4).

Martindale quote on holism and elementarism in Weltman: “Holism is the view tha the basic social reality consists of interrelated wholes which are superior to the individual and his acts…One cannot of course have a whole without parts, but the whole is prior to the parts in the sense that its operations are irreducible to these parts and their properties. Elementarism is the view that the basic social reality is constituted by individuals and their acts. Social events consist solely in their interaction. Any notion that interaction possesses new or emergent properties such that some sort of whole with irreducible properties of its own arises is a pure product of reification” (5).

There is a discussion of “sociological functionalism” with many references to “self sufficiency” “system maintaining” “system determined” (6-7).

In summarizing Merton: “Function is defined as an equilibrium-conducing operation” (7).

“But precisely what is the nature of this system called political? Easton answers this question by referring to what can only be called the function of the political within the larger context of the social system or society. The political system stems from and fulfills a need of the social system. Without fulfillment of this function of ‘authoritative allocation of values,’ a society cannot exist” (9).

The discussion moves from sociological functional theories to general systems theory, its structure, and ability to produce hypotheses of use. General Systems Theory is an attempt to create the language of a methodological approach that can be used across scientific fields.

“The view of reality lying behind the more ambitious formulations of the utility of general systems theory can be neither proved nor disproved; it can only be stated. It is basically a metaphysical scheme which seeks to find in reality an ultimate orderliness above and beyond the ken of normal scientific methods of verification. Systems theory in the study of international relations is a mode of analysis growing out of, and conditioned by, two pervasive currents of thought—functional sociology and general systems theory. These modes of thought do exhibit certain points of common concern. They are both essentially holistic; each would find more in the whole than the sum of its parts. They approach this point of common concern, whoever, by different, and one might say complementary, routes. The functional sociologists are more concerned with activity than with the entity within which this activity occurs, to which it is related, and in terms of which it is assessed. The whole often appears as a residual, whose definition is important less for operational utility than for logical completeness. What is secondary for functional sociology is primary in general systems theory. The nature of the entity within which activity occurs is paramount, often to the exclusion of direct concern with the concrete activity itself” (14).

“Given the non-operational or tautological nature of the bulk of the ‘essential rules’ of his systems, it follows that Kaplan’s conclusions concerning systemic stability and transformation are not compelling. Too often these statements refer merely to end results of processes…We are left with little to enable us to predict in concrete circumstances which one among several possible transformations will occur…Conclusions as to stability or transformation—if they are not make indeterminate as above—turn on hypotheses as to international relations which are not made an explicit part of the systems analysis. It is possible to trace through Kaplan’s work a series of assumptions of this sort, which, rather than systemic analysis, provide the basis from which his conclusions follow. Thus Kaplan assumes rather than demonstrates a tendency toward instability as the state structure approaches bipolarity” (34).

The next book explored is Haas and Beyond the Nation-State. The same criterion are used to judge the use of the theory.

“It should of course be obvious that this analysis too could easily be formulated without the intrusion of the concepts of systems theory…That third parties find their positions enhanced by the occurrence of conflict between others is a commonplace of the folk wisdom of political thought…Haas has attempted to rework the systems approach so as to eliminate the occurrence of causal statements purporting to explain phenomena by reference to an attribute of the system. This he has attempted to do by introducing his ‘concrete, actor-oriented’ system. Unfortunately, by doing away with the type of explanation mentioned, he has left us with little but an undifferentiated mass of data. It is only by introducing criteria of importance and behavioral assumptions which are systemic and autonomous that this data can be made to yield explanations and interpretations. At best the conceptualizations of systems theory become simply redundant in this process. At worst the approach can serve to absolutize arbitrary interpretations by concealing their origins, and to lend seeming objectivity to mere value preferences. Furthermore, Haas is unable to demonstrate the necessity of the systems approach in arriving at his substantive conclusions or in making predictions” (47-8).

Next is Rosecrance and his Action and Reaction in World Politics. “Rosecrance’s analysis falls into three parts. First there is a series of historical essays describing nine periods of international politics…Next, these nine periods are translated into nine international systems. On the basis of this systemic analysis Rosecrance then explains the mutations of international politics in terms of the interactions of four factors whose influence in the present day he assesses” (49).

“The conclusions Rosecrance derives, supposedly through the vehicle of systemic analysis, are simply the themes of his historical analysis in slightly different form…Thus, the distinction between stable and unstable historical periods is correlated in most instances simply with the presence or absence of international war; and historical analyses in terms of a regulative mechanism often strike the reader as serving no useful purpose furthering explanation of the materials at hand” (60).

Chapter 6 is highly germane for my work. It is on balance of power in the international system and the stability.

“It may be that systems theory should not be regarded as an explanatory scheme, but only as a suggestive device. It does not serve to verify hypotheses, but merely to provide them. It should be understood, then, primarily as a sort of bank of ideas and novel interpretations” (79). However, we have plenty of hypotheses, and what we need is a way to solve them. “The systems approach, then, seems to ahev little utility either as an explanatory scheme or a suggestive device” (79).

Kirshner: Globalization, American Power, and International Security

Kirshner, J. 2008. Globalization, American Power, and International Security. Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 3: 363-389.

How will increasing globalization affect American security? "Switching from polo on horseback to water polo does not change the principals or the objectives, but the contest is still profoundly transformed by the change in setting. Some players, for example, might have been much better riders than they are swimmers" (363).

"This paper draws three principal conclusions: First, globalization, in aggregate and on average tends to reduce the autonomy and capacity of states, although in some ways states may find their powers enhanced. Second, because the processes of globalization affect various states (and their relative capacities) differently, globalization affects the balance of power between states. In particular, as the biggest fish in a more open pond, the United States emerges as relatively more powerful than other states. However, and third, the United States, nevertheless, finds its own autonomy and capacity encroached upon by the processes of globalization, and will attract both more violent resistance and political opposition to its international ambitions" (363).

Definition: "...an array of phenomena that derive from unorganized and stateless forces but that generate pressures that are felt by states" (364).

This paper argues that globalization is a contingent phenomena that is not unique to history in the broadest sense. However, while it may not be unique, that does not mean that it is not one of the most pressing issues of the day.

This article in an excellent overview of globalization and security issues, though it does not focus enough on what I am currently working. ABSOLUTELY read this if you are interested in globalization, conflict, balance of power, the US and the changing nature of power politics.

Zakaria: The Post-American World

F Zakaria, The Post-American World (WW Norton & Company, 2008).

The book traces possible future worlds where the US is no longer the sole hegemon. The author posits that there have been three fundamental shifts in global power historically: the rise of the West from the 1500s through the Industrial Revolution and into the 20th century, the rise of the US as the world's main super power from WWII on and the coming "rise of the rest", which will change the way that the world works.

Zakaria briefly explores a seeming paradox between strong economic growth and a seemingly increasingly dangerous world. Even as, for example, war between Israel and Hezbollah raged, the Israeli stock-market drove skywards. The author claims that the apparent violence that is presented graphical and perpetually is overstated by the nature of modern media. This proclamation is obviously poorly timed, as global financial contractions also indicate that previously strong economic growth may have been based on faulty premises.

There is great global abundance of peace and wealth, and this, the author claims, stems from deep structural drivers that have been around for quite a while. These drivers are related to either politics, the economy or technology. These forces create problems of plenty, ie., the most pressing problems that we face globally are those that are a result of our resounding "success".

Will the future world be clearly Western or not? What will the role of culture be? China is positioned as the challenger and India is positioned as the ally. What role will American power play in this post-American world? Now that America has succeeded in globalizing the world, has it failed in globalizing itself?

Mearsheimer: Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War

Mearsheimer, J., 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), 5-56.

“The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely viewed as harbingers of a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than four decades is lifting…This article assess this optimistic view by exploring in detail the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. Specifically, I examine the effects of a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end” (5).

“I argue that the p0rospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years” (6).

“Specifically, the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the Continent; the rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe…and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal” (6-7).

“Four principal scenarios are possible. Under the first scenario, Europe would become nuclear-free, thus eliminating a central pillar of order in the Cold War era. Under the second scenario, the European states do not expand their arsenals to compensate for the departure of the superpowers’ weapons. IN a third scenario, nuclear proliferation takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are taken to dampen the many dangers inherent in the proliferation process…In the fourth and least dangerous scenario, nuclear weapons proliferate in Europe, but the process is well-managed by the current nuclear powers. They take steps to deter preventative strikes on emerging nuclear powers, to set boundaries on the proliferation process…This outcome probably provides the best hope for maintaining peace in Europe” (8).

He then highlights the possibility of three counter arguments being posited. The first is the standard liberal claim that economic interdependence will reduce conflict. The second is democratic peace considerations. The third involves a degree of collective self-awareness amongst Europeans. “But the theories behind these arguments are flawed, as I explain; hence their prediction of peace in a multipolar Europe is flawed as well” (8).

The pre-1945 Europe was quite violent because there were no nuclear weapons and there was a multipolar world. The post 45 world was more peaceful because of bipolarity. “A bipolar system is more peaceful for three main reasons. First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely” (14).

Mearsheimer supports these theses in the remainder of the text.

Christensen and Snyder: Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks

Christensen, T. & Snyder, J., 1990. Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity. International Organization, 44(2), 137-168.

“Kenneth Waltz’s rigorous recasting of traditional balance-of-power theory has provided the intellectual foundation for much of the most fruitful recent work in the fields of international politics and national security. But there is a tension between Waltz’s theory and those who apply it in their practical research agendas. Waltz’s is a theory of international politics; it addresses properties of the international system, such as the recurrence of war and the recurrent formation of balances of power. Those who have applied Waltz’s ideas, however, have normally used them as a theory of foreign policy to make predictions about or prescriptions for the strategic choices of states” (137-8).

“In a nutshell, we argue that given Europe’s multipolar checkerboard geographically, the perception of offensive military advantages gave rise to alliance chain-ganging before 1914, whereas the perception of defensive advantages gave rise to buck-passing before 1939. These perceptions of the international conditions constraining strategic choice were, however, misperceptions, rooted in patterns of civil-military relations and the engrained lessons of formative experiences” (139).

“In multipolarity, the approximate equality of alliance partners leads to a high degree of security interdependence within an alliance. Given the anarchic setting and this relative equality, each state feels its own security is integrally intertwined with the security of its alliance partners. As a result, any nation that marches to war inexorably drags its alliance partners with it. No state can restrain a reckless ally by threatening to sit out the conflict, since the demise of its reckless ally would decisively cripple its own security” (140). See WWI, for example.

“To turn Waltz’s ideas into a theory of foreign policy that accurately explains alliance behavior before World Wars I and II, two complications must be introduced. First, the variable elements of international structure must be broadened to include not only polarity but also the security dilemma variables: technology and geography. Second, perception of the strategic incentives inherent in the systemic structure must be introduced as a potentially autonomous factor” (144).


Figure 1 (147)

Vasquez: The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Versus Progressive Research Programs

Vasquez, J., 1997. The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 91, 899-912.

“Several analysts argue that, despite anomalies, the realist paradigm is dominant because it si more fertile than its rivals While the ability of the realist paradigm to reformulate its theories in light of criticism accounts for its persistence, it is argued that the proliferation of emendations exposes a degenerating tendency in the paradigm’s research program” (899).

It is a degenerative program because: theoretical development is highly varied, its inability to identify the core of the discipline for falsification, an overuse of “auxiliary” positions to explain away shortcomings and a shortcoming of solid discoveries.

Lakatos argued that theories must be falsifiable, but that a school of thought, or paradigm, will never be falsified because auxiliary formulations will always be constructed to explain away anomalies (in line with Kuhn).

He examines the failures of realist theories partially through the lenses of balance of power and theorists’ attempts to alleviate some of Waltz’ earlier errors.

Mansfield: Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power

Mansfield, E., 1993. Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power. International Studies Quarterly, 37, 105.

This article argues that a more helpful metric for measuring power in the international system is not polarity, but concentration. “The argument of this paper is that, for the purposes of explaining patterns of balancing behavior, the onset of war, and many aspects of the international political economy, scholars are likely to find it useful to analyze both features of the distribution of power that have been used repeatedly in studies of international relations: (1) polarity; and (2) concentration” (106).

“In this paper, I argue that, despite the fact that the use of polarity has enabled political scientists to make significant advances, it is also fraught with a number of limitations…These limitations can be redressed, in part, by focusing on concentration as well as on the number of poles in the global system. Concentration is entirely consistent with the microeconomic underpinnings of modern realist explanations of international relations. Unlike polarity, it also incorporates both the power inequalities among the major powers and the number of…major powers” (106).

Polarity is a problematic way to measure balance of power phenomena for a number of reasons. For example, even though Waltz said that anyone with “common sense” would be able to assert how many poles there were in the international system, it actually remains quite a contentious issue. Mansfield goes on to explain that IR should take an example from business literature, which measures the relative power of different firms using a more complex method.

Concentration is, “…a function of: (1) the number of major powers in the global system; and (2) the relative inequality of capabilities among the major powers” (111).

Mansfield then goes on to show how the concept of concentration can be helpfully applied to a debate about hegemonic stability theory. “By focusing on concentration, it is possible to assess empirically the influence of some aspect of the interaction between the number of major powers and the relative inequality of power among them on international economic outcomes” (121).

Deutsch and Singer: Multiple Power Systems and International Stability

Deutsch, K. & Singer, J., 1964. Multiple Power Systems and International Stability. World Politics, 16(3), 390-406.

“In the classical literature of diplomatic history, the balance-of-power concept occupies a central position.” (390) This article explores the IV of the number of independent actors in a system against the DV of system stability.

“Stability may, of course, be considered from the vantage point of both the total system and the individual states comprising it. From the broader, or systemic, point of view, we shall define stability as the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur. And from the more limited perspective of the individual nations, stability would refer to the probability of their continued political independence and territorial integrity without any significant probability of becoming engaged in a ‘war for survival.” (390-1)

There is a comparison between probabilistic concepts of stability and classical notions of stability, specifically that of Richardson. “Richardson’s stability referred simply to any set of conditions under which the system would return to its equilibrium state” (391). Kaplan’s definition of equilibrium is slightly different. In Richardson’s formulation, systems can be stable even if there is transition, like, for example, the increase of armament spending as a percentage of GDP as long as it’s consistent across countries. Kaplan is interested in being consistent with the variable that is the focus of the study.

The authors explore the amount of interactions that can possibly take place between different countries as the amount of poles increase in the international system. This obviously takes the form of an exponential growth curve.

Next, they explore the “Share of Attention” that can be offered by countries that is, “available for conflict” (396).

“Thus, if some minimum percentage of a nation’s external attention is required for that nation to engage in behavior tending toward armed conflict, and the increase in number of independent t actors diminishes that share that any nation can allocate to any other single actor, such an increase is likely to have a stabilizing effect upon the system” (400).

“In the long run, according to this model, even multi-polar systems operating under the rules of balance-of-power policies are shown to be self-destroying, but both in the short and the long run the instability of tight bipolar systems appears to be substantially greater. It seems plausible that, if the spread of nuclear weapons could be slowed down or controlled, a transition from the bipolar international system of the early 1950’s to an increasingly multipolar system in the 1960’s might by mankind some valuable time to seek some more dependable bases for world order” (406).

Gulick: Europe's Classical Balance of Power

Gulick, E., 1955. Europe's classical balance of power: a case history of the theory and practice of one of the great concepts of European statecraft, New York: Norton.

Ch. 1: Assumptions:

Writers on balance of power issues have made a variety of assumptions. “They have assumed, for example, the initial existence of the state, a unit of power based upon land and people, which was capable of exerting influence beyond its own borders; they have assumed also that power existed; that it could be measured by men; that men, having measured it, could balance it; that their balancing policies could affect the lives of states and the movement of history; and that the state system could be, and would be, perpetuated through human analysis, direction, and action” (3-4).

Gulick then explores four of these assumptions.

State System:

The state system is an assumption about the world, and it is a relatively new assumption, all things considered. Gulick warns not to under emphasize the relative importance of this assumption.

Relative homogeneity:

Kant assumed relative homogeneity in the interactions of states in a state system. This was important for instrumental purposes. This provided a kind of uniformity of assumptions and a standardization of practices. “The absence of homogeneity…could be described more accurately as crippling to the balance of power, not destructive of it” (24).

Rational System of Estimating Power:

“By and large, a statesman in 1750 or 1815, if he possessed in formation on the size of armies, on the men who led them, and on the relative wealth of the rulers, probably had a better chance of estimating the power of a foreign state than he would have today” (28).

*missing some pages and thus the fourth assumption

Ch. 2: Aims:

Preserve Independence and Secure Survival

“The basic aim of the balance of power was to insure the survival of independent states” (30).

Preserve the State System

Best way to preserve the state was to preserve the system.

No One State Shall Preponderate

Straight forward.

*skipped rest of chapter

Ch. 3: Means:

“We can now discern the basic assumptions and aims of the balance of power, and we have scraped off some of the obscurities which encrusted it. Given the assumptions and aims, it is possible to enumerate the means and show their proper relationship to the foregoing, must as the Euclidian geometrist, having made assumptions with regard to points, lines, p-lanes and numbers can build with corollaries and entire theoretical system, self-consistent and demonstrable” (52).

Vigilance

Alliances

Intervention

Holding the Balance

Need for Mobility

Reciprocal Compensation

Preservation of Components: Moderation

Coalitions

War

Haas: The Balance of Power

Haas, E., 1953. The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda. World Politics, 5(4), 442-477.

Haas explores the reemergence of the balance of power concept. This wouldn’t be problematic if the term was well defined, but it is not. “The term is defined differently by different writers; it is used in varying senses, even if not defined exactly at all; and, finally, it is the focal concept in several quite distinct theories of international relations” (442).

“Professor Hans Morgenthau, himself a well-known exponent of the balance of power theory, states that the term may carry these meanings in technical discussion: (1) a policy aimed at bringing about a certain power distribution; (2) a description of any actual state of affairs in international politics; (3) an approximately equal distribution of power internationally; and (4) a term describing any distribution of political power in international relations” (445).

Haas then highlights different verbal usages associated with the balance of power:

-distribution of power
-equilibrium
-hegemony
-stability/peace
-instability/war
-power politics
-as universal law of history
-as a system, or guide

Different ways that the balance of power is put to meaning:

-as a description
-as ideology
-as analytical tool
-as a prescription

Walt: Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power

Walt, S.M., 1985. Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. International Security, 9(4), 3-43.

This article, clearly from a Cold War perspective, explores alliances in relation to balance of power. Alliances form in response to threats. These alliances can cause bandwagoning or balancing practices.

“First, states risk their own survival if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong. To ally with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can” (5). Also, if they join “the more vulnerable side”, the new state’s relative influence is greater (6).

The literature on balancing and bandwagoning is not clear in its dissemination of the different forms of power. It is a certain kind of power that states will bandwagon or balance with/against and that is threatening power.

States also must consider aggregate power as well as proximate power, offensive power.

He then explores the conditions under which states will either bandwagon or balance, and the effects that this will have on the character of the international system. For example, a heavily bandwagoning world is very competitive. A world of heavy balancing is less so, and states attempt not to be the chicken with the long neck.

There is a discussion of the role of ideology in alliance formation. Also, the role that international aid (referred to as bribery) plays in alliance formation.

“The analysis above may be summarized as follows. First, states form alliances to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with them. Threats, in turn, are the product of several different sources. Second, ideology is a weaker cause of alliance formation, and ideological movements that strive for tight central authority are more likely to lead to conflict than cooperation. Third, the instruments of ‘bribery’ and penetration are by themselves weak determinants of alignment; they make existing alliances more effective, but rarely create them in the absence of common interests” (33).

Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

Mearsheimer, JJ. 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. WW Norton & Company.

Ch. 1: Introduction:

This book begins as a response to those (utopianists? Idealists?) who believe that the fall of the USSR marked the end of history. This can not be the case because the nature of the international system make it such that states continually have to search for their own survival through offensive realism. This account is a break from classical realism and defensive structural realism. Mearsheimer positions himself as an offensive realist.

“The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system” (2). “Simply put, great powers are primed for offence” (3). “Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (3).

“This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, in genuinely tragic” (3).

He applies this approach to US/China relations: “Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail” (4).

“…I argue that multipolar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar systems that contain especially powerful states—potential hegemons—are the most dangerous systems of all” (5).

“Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability” (5).

“In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists” (12).

The book is organized around six questions:
1—why do great powers want power?
2—how much power?
3—what is power?
4—how do they go after power?
5—what are the causes of war?
6—when do threatened powers balance and when do they band-wagon/buck-pass? (12-3)

Contrasts liberalism with realism:

Liberalism: States the actor, internal characteristic of states vary considerably, calculations of power not important (15-6).

Realism: states the actor, behavior of great powers influenced by external environment, and power calculations crucial.

Two kinds of realism: “human nature realism” (aka classical realism) through Morgenthau and defensive realism, through Waltz.

For Morgenthau, human nature instills a “limitless lust for power” and thus creates the international system in a certain kind of way (19).

For Waltz, states do not want power, but survival. “For Waltz, balancing checkmates offence” (20).

“Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want” (21).

“The key difference between the two perspectives [human nature realism and offensive realism] is that offensive realists reject Morgenthau’s claim that states are naturally endowed with Type A personalities. ON the contrary, they believe that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security” (21).

There is then a bizarre explanation of why Americans don’t like realism because it’s too negative and they’re all optimists.

Ch. 2: Anarchy and the Struggle for Power:

Great powers want to be the hegemon.

Five assumptions underly his view of the world:
1—anarchy is an ordering principle
2—great powers have some military capability
3—states can never be certain about other states’ intentions
4—states primarily want to survive
5—states are rational actors

“Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power” (35).

“A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system” (40).

“My argument, which I develop at length in subsequent chapters, is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony” (41).

“The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon” (41).

Keohane: Neorealism and Its Critics

Keohane, R., 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press.

Ch 3: Reductionist and Systemic Theories

“A reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts” (47).

“Analysts who confine their attention to interacting units, without recognizing that systemic causes are in play, compensate for the omissions by assigning such causes arbitrarily to the level of interacting units and parceling them out among actors” (49).

Looks at inside-out theories of international politics that attempt to explain system level behavior by looking at the activities occurring within a unit. “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states” (52).

“The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent. Why then do we find such a persistent pull toward reduction [specifically citing Morgenthau, Kissinger and Levy]? The answer is that usually reduction results not from a scholar’s intent but from his errors” (53).

Changes in structure can be separated from changes in units (55).

“From the first part of this article, we know that the theory we want to construct has to be a systemic one” (56).

“What do I mean by explain? I mean explain in these senses: to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to say why patterns of behavior recur; to say why events repeat themselves, including events that none or few of the actors may like” (57).

“A theory has explanatory and predictive power. A theory also has elegance. Elegance in social-science theories means that explanations and predictions will be general” (57).

“Structures, moreover, may suddenly change. A structural change is a revolution, whether or not violently produced, and it is so because it gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the system varied with changes in structure. Across systems, a theory explains change. A theory of international politics can succeed only if political structures are defined in ways that identify their causal effects and show how those effects vary as structural changes” (58).

“In a systems theory, some part of the explanation of behaviors and outcomes is found in the system’s structure. A political structure is akin to a field of forces in physics interactions within a field have properties as the field affects the objects, so the objects affect the field” (62).

Structure: will unify outputs with a variety of inputs; also, “…a set of constraining conditions” (62). “Agents and agencies act; systems as a whole do not” (63).

“The first way in which structures work their effects is through a process of socialization that limits and molds behavior” (65).

“Order may prevail without an borderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator. The mayor of New York City does not phone the gardeners of southern New Jersey and tell them to grow more tomatoes next year because too few were recently supplied” (67).

Ch 4: Political Structures

“A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” (70).

“’Relation’ is used to mean both the interaction of units and the positions they occupy vis-à-vis each other…To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system” (71).

“A structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting parts” (72).

“Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system. Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them” (73). There is an exploration of the structure of domestic politics to juxtapose with international politics. “A domestic political structure is thus defined, first, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second, by specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units” (74).

“Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long as a strubu8re endures…Structure operates as a cause, but it is not the only cause in play” (80).

“I defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capabilities across units” (81).

Ordering Principles:

“Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic” (81). Whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability” (81-2).
“If structure is an organizational concept, the terms ‘structure’ and ‘anarchy’ seem to be in contradiction. If international politics is ‘politics in the absence of government,’ what are we in the presence of? In looking for international structure, one is brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable position to be in. The problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking” (82). Draws parallels w/ microeconomic theory.

“International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units” (84).

“I assume that states seek to ensure their survival” (85).

The Character of the Units:

“The second term in the definition of domestic political structure specifies the functions performed by differentiated units. Hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation…The second term is not needed in defining international-political structure, because so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units. International structures vary only through a change of organizing principle, or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units” (87).

“Just as economists define markets in terms of firms, so I define international-political structures in terms of states” (88).

The units are all sovereign; the units tend not to die; the units vary widely in terms of power, etc.

Distribution of Capabilities:

“The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks” (92).

“I have not defined the two essential elements of a systems theory of international politics—the structure of the system and its interacting units” (94).

“Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered…second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units… third, by the distribution of capabilities across units” (96).

Ch 5: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power

“The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (98).

“The distinction between international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or the nonuse of force but in their different structures” (99).

“Differences between national and international structures are reflected in the ways the units of each system define their ends and develop the means for reaching them” (100).

“Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities” (101).

“The structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states in two ways” (101). “In a self-help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others” (101). “A state also worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. That is the second way in whi8ch the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states” (103).

Discussion of emergent phenomena, insecurity and freedom, organization costs in anarchy…

“National politcs is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation” (111).

“I have described anarchies and hierarchies as though every political order were of one type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write of structures allow for a greater, and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types” (112).

“Increasing the number of categories would bring the classification of societies closer to reality. But that would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy. One who wishes to explain rather than to describe should resist moving in that direction if resistance is reasonable” (113).

Realpolitik: “The ruler’s, and later the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; success is the ultimate test of policy; and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state” (115-6).

“A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: they are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (117).

States use means available to them: internal and external (117).

If one state is successful, others will emulate. The structure of the international system is the driver of balances of power recurring.

Bull: The Anarchical Society

Bull, Hedley. (1977). The anarchical society : a study of order in world politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ch 1: The Nature of Order in World Politics:

Bull begins by defining the concept of order. Order is a set pattern that emerges in the interaction of different variables. While this is a crucial first step, it is not sufficient: order also needs a purpose, or an end. For Bull vis-à-vis society, order has three goals: safety, contractual honesty and legal security.

International Order: “…independent political communities each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relations to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population” (8).

System of States: “…is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave…as parts of a whole” (9).

Society of States: “…exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another” (13).

“An international society in this sense presupposes an international system, but an international system may exist that is not an international society” (13).

What are the goals of international order? Preservation of the system (16). Maintain independence and sovereignty of the states (16). Peace (17). The goals mentioned at the beginning of the chapter: life, truth, property (18).

World Order: “…those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole” (19).

International Order: “…order among states” (19).

Ch 2: Does Order Exist in World Politics?

“This present study takes as its starting-point the proposition that, on the contrary, order is part of the historical record of international relations and in particular, that modern states have formed, and continue to form, not only a system of states but also an international society” (22-3).

Bull goes on to identify three different logics, or traditions of thought that have dominated understandings of international systems: Hobbsian, Kantian and Grotian. Hobbisan: international politics is a constant state of war. Kantian: international politics is a community of humankind. Grotian: international politics takes place in an international society.

“A chief intellectual support of this doctrine is what I have called the domestic analogy, the argument from the experience of individual men in domestic society to the experience of states, according to which states, like individuals, are capable of orderly social life only if, as in Hobbe’s phrase, they stand in awe of a common power” (44). This is empirically false. The modern international system doesn’t compare to the Hobbsian world of war of all against all.

Ch 3: How is Order Maintained in World Politics?

In short, common interests that determine a common goal. These common interests are determined by rules that are constantly in flux. These rules facilitate more coordinated action between states.

Institutions: “…a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals” (71).

Ch 4: Order verses Justice in World Politics:

There is a trade off between the two, though not a zero-sum game.

Ch 5: The balance of Power and International Order:

BoP: “…a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others” (97).

There is simple and complex BoP arrangements. Simple arrangements are between two states. Complex arrangements involve many actors and many different kinds of power. In the complex arrangement, there is no need for all actors to be entirely equal in their ability to compete against one another; relative power can be emphasized in these situations.

Bull also draws a distinction between general BoP and local BoP. He also draws a distinction between subjective and objective BoP, the former being an accepted understanding of a country’s capabilities and the later being the actual capabilities of a country. Bull also draws a distinction between a fortuitous and a contrived BoP.

He then explores BoP through the medium of nuclear weapons.

Ch 9: The Great Powers and International Order:

Great Powers: must be two or more in the international system. They have great military strength. Have special rights and duties. These powers can contribute to international order in two ways: managing the relations with one another; impart a degree of central authority.

Kaufman, et. al.: The Balance of Power in World History

Kaufman, Stuart J., Little, Richard, & Wohlforth, William Curti. (2007). The balance of power in world history. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

“Hegemony leads to balance through all of the centuries we can contemplate” Kenneth Waltz, 1993:77

Is the balance of power as it has been understood by IR scholars, specifically realist scholars, a trans-historical fact, as Waltz claims? This book has been written to disprove this claim by looking at different historical periods where the actual imposition of balancing politics may or may not exist. There is even a nice quantitative overview of polarity in world history in the last chapter. The authors argue that balancing has had a role historically, but this is only about half of the time. Therefore, we can throw away the antiquated (and presumptuous) notion that balancing is a trans-historical fact.

The ways in which the term balance of power has been used is discussed. Haas (1953) has argued that balance of power is used in four ways: descriptively, prescriptively, normatively and analytically (2). Levy claims that balance of power, “is ‘that hegemonies do not form in multi-state systems because perceived threats of hegemony over the system generate balancing behavior by other leading states in the system’” (3).

“Overall, we conclude, the contemporary unipolar system is best understood not by assessing the logic of balancing, or balance-of-power theory; but by considering the logic of domination, and hegemonic stability theory” (20).

The rest of the book compromises the case studies, which are very interesting. I will not detail them here.

Little: The Balance of Power in International Relations

Little, Richard. (2007). The balance of power in international relations : metaphors, myths, and models. New York: Cambridge University Press.

This book attempts to unpack the metaphor of “balance of power”. It is a constructivist account of how balance of power can be situated within theoretical debates between positivists and post-positivists. It also takes apart four different Realist theories of IR and situates the concept of balance of power within those theories, highlighting how these theories can also be seen as being constructive in their approach.

Balance of power in IR is initially associated with anti-hegemonic alliances. When one power becomes too strong, other nations will rally together to create a different pole in the international system. This pole is designed to balance the power of the hegemon. Waltz famously said that states will either balance or bandwagon.

“The aim of this book is to illuminate the central, complex and yet contentious role that the balance of power plays in the theory and practice of international relations” (11). “Although there are significant areas of disagreement among…realists, it is generally accepted that the great powers monitor the material power possessed by all the other states in the international system and endeavour [sic] to manipulate the resulting distribution of power in their own favor as a means of enhancing their chances of survival” (11). By contrast…English school theorists…also link the balance of power to the existence of an international society and their approach requires them to take account of ideational l as well as material factors” (11-2). “For critics, the balance of power looks increasingly anachronistic and unhelpful as a tool for understanding international relations” (12).

He claims to make two main “moves”. These are a movement from agency to structure, as the metaphor eventually becomes so institutionalized that it becomes accepted as being a salient effect of international structure. The second move is to associate the balance of power with myth and metaphor and then to relate this to some of the most important attempts to understand IR since WWII.

Little then discusses the complex, confusing and ambiguous meaning that metaphors can come to have. The balance of power, for example, can be understood to mean a variety of things, and is defined in 9 different ways (27). The metaphor was originally used to explain Italian city states interacting.

He examines the metaphor from the perspective of scales on which power is balanced. “What impact does the scales metaphor have on this conception of power? In essence, it moves us away from an agency-based conception of power and towards a structural conception of power. It tells us less about the power possessed by the participants as agents and more about how the power possessed by the members of the system defines the structure of the social setting” (47).

Summing up chapter two’s argument, Little states, “…I argue that metaphors are not only a surprisingly complex phenomenon but also that any assessment of the balance of power is profoundly affected by whether we regard the concept as a substitution or an interaction metaphor” (50).

In the third chapter, Little makes a distinction between positivist and post-positivist approaches to understanding the relationship between metaphor, model and myth. “From a positivist perspective, myth is used in a colloquial sense and is associated with a fundamental error of some kind, whereas postpositivism associates myths with ideological narratives that draw on deep-seated beliefs about the nature of reality” (51).

The remainder of this third chapter further fleshes out the distinction between myth, metaphor and models from the positivist and post-positivist perspectives. There is a relation of the metaphor in the rhetoric of Churchill and George W. Bush. There is an extension of the balance of power metaphor to include bodies and arches. There is also a very informative flow-chart that tracks different iterations of balance of power metaphors and how these relate to the four authors that Little examines.

The next four chapters are explorations of the concept of balance of power within the structure of Mearsheimer, Waltz, Bull and Mortenthau. They are not detailed here, but should be reviewed. This is a limited review focusing on the first three chapters.

UPDATE:

Ch. 4: Morgenthau: Politics among Nations

The balance of power is a central feature of Morgenthau’s book. Wight highlights two processes that Morgenthau conflates: “One associates the balance of power with the unintended outcome of great powers engaged in a mechanistic drive for hegemony. The other dynamic is associated with a complex set of social, ideational and material factors that ameliorate the effects of the first dynamic and assists the great powers in maintaining an equilibrium that promotes their collective security and common interests” (92).

A first general criticism of Morgenthau’s approach is that it is ahistorical. A second criticism is that it is generally ambiguous. Thirdly, it is generally thought to be incoherent. For example, Donnelly (2000) critiques Morgenthau’s conception of balance of power as being two mutually exclusive things.

For Morgenthau, power politics are eternal, as this is deeply rooted in human nature. However, he also argues that the balance of power is made possible by a certain kind of international structure that some might call modern and rooted in European history. There is a dualism at play here which is difficult to reconcile, though I would be tempted to explain it through the same distinction as that between structural realists and neo-classical realists.

Morgenthau highlights the golden age of the balance of power at the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War. “He justifies this assessment on two grounds; first, that this was the time when most of the literature on the balance of power was published, and second, that this was the era when princes most explicitly drew on the balance of power to guide their foreign policy” (101).

“…as I have tried to show in this chapter, from his perspective, the nature of international politics has undergone at least tw2o major transformations over the last three hundred years” (124). The first was the French Revolution, which challenged the aristocracy. The second was after WWI, with international super-powers. In this sense, Morgenthau begins to look somewhat like a constructivist. While international structure pushes countries towards something resembling hegemony, countries can fight back and bring about a sort of stability to the system. Morgenthau spoke against nationalistic universalism and thought of the historical transition as moving towards a world order. As we move there, we must attempt to achieve an associational balance of power (as opposed to an adversarial balance of power) through the tool of diplomacy.

Ch. 5: Bull: Anarchical Society

The concept of the balance of power figures strongly in Bull’s The Anarchical Society.

He begins by using Vattel’s definition (Swiss diplomat): “’a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to the others’” (135). “For Vattel, therefore, the balance of power is contrasted with hegemony and it applies to a political arena where there is no overarching authority” (135).

Bull refers to balance of power as an institution, as defined as the following: “’a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals’” (135).

Balancing then necessarily implies, “....’self-restraint as well as the restraint of others’” (135). In this sense, structure impels countries to work to resist the hegemonic rise of other countries, as well as resist hegemonic attempts of their own.

There are six complications to this: 1.) polarity is important; 2.) there are multiple types of power; 3.) the way that power is distributed geographically is important; 4.) the way that power is perceived is important; 5.) nuclear weapons change things; and 6.) the type of balance of power is important, for example, whether or not it is fortuitous or contrived.

“An international system exists…whenever ‘states are in regular contact with one another and where in addition there is interaction between them, sufficient to make the behavior of each a necessary element in the calculation of the other’” (139).

“By contrast, an international society exists when states, on the one hand, are ‘conscious of certain common interests and common values’ and, on the other, ‘conceive of themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’” (139).

Bull’s view of the institutional relationships involved in international society are represented in Figure 5.4: In the middle there is balance of power. As nodes that move away from this central point, there is international law, diplomacy, war and great power management (149).

Ch. 6: Kenneth N. Waltz’s Theory of International Politics:

“Waltz…insists that if there is any ‘distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of power is it’” (167).

Little argues that, while Waltz is typically seen as being a proponent of adversarial balances of power, the story can also be read as promoting an associational balance of power.

“So…Walt…has drawn a distinction between balance of power theory and balance of threat theory and he argues that the latter incorporates the idea of power but subsumes it, in conjunction with geography, offensive capabilities and intentions, within the more general concept of threat. He then goes on to argue that where as the balance of power theory predicts that states will ally against the strongest state, the balance of threat theory predicts that states will ally against the most threatening state” (169-70).

Reverse Balancing: “…identifies collaborative policies that are designed to promote stability by reducing the level of arms or implementing measures that are designed to inhibit the use of weapons” (172).

Waltz tries to establish an international political realm that is distinct from the realm of domestic politics, or unit level analyses. There are two forms of political order, one with an organizing principle of hierarchy and another with an organizing principle of anarchy.

The issue of power is central to Waltz’s theory. Firstly, he conceptualizes power in material terms, and disputes whether or not these material ends need to actually control outcomes of others. Secondly, he assumes that there is only ever a small amount of states that can affect the system. Thirdly, he assumes power is relative.

“From Waltz’s perspective, it is not that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, in Wendt’s memorable phrase, but rather ‘anarchy is what polarity makes of it’ (192).

“…the two great powers are much more able to manage international affairs constructively than are the great powers in a mltipolar world” (206).

“He accepts, however, that a theory that is based on the structure of the international system can only help to explain ‘some big, important, and enduring patterns’… In essence, he makes three major claims in the book. The first is that anarchy is an extremely resilient political structure and that the balance of power provides the best theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. The second claim is that the nature of international politics is very different in bipolar and multipolar systems and this is because the balance of power operates on a very different basis in these two kinds of systems. The third claim, closely related to the second, is that the international system can be more constructively managed in a bipolar system than in a multipolar system. This is because the miltipola4r balance of power inhibits the constructive management of international affairs. Structural explanations, therefore, can account for continuity within systems and differences between systems” (209-10).

Ch. 7: John J. Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics:

Little explains that this book was written in response to those who believed that the end of the cold war represented some sort of “end of history” (213).

Little earlier argues that reading Waltz as a defensive realist is a misreading, something that Mearsheimer relies on in his situating of his IR theory. In line with the focus on metaphors, myths, etc., Little analogizes the international system to a tread mill. In Waltz’s theory, states run and run on the treadmill and there will always be competition and conflict, unless only two states remain. Only then is there the possibility of working together to solve problems. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, presents a treadmill where the great powers try to run faster than the other states until other states succumb to fatigue and only one state remains.

“The aim of this chapter is to highlight the role that the balance of power plays in Mearsheimer’s theory of international politics and to show how his theory transforms the conventional or certainly the Waltzian image of the international system and reveals that it is, inherently, a regionally based system” (215).

Assumes that great powers shape the international system. States are overwhelmingly concerned with their own survival because the international system is a self-help system. The, “…logic of anarchy compels every great power to adopt an aggressive stance in the international system” (224). States strive to be hegemons, though it’s virtually impossible (espseically in the age of nuclear weapons) to become the hegemon (based on Mearcheimer’s definition).

Mearsheimer then moves away from some more foundational, Waltzian structural realist assumptions and brings geography into the equation by talking about the “stopping power of water”.