Gibson-Graham, J., The end of capitalism (as we knew it), Blackwell Publishers.
Gibson and Graham provide a post-structural, feminist critique of orthodox Marxism. They conclude that Marxists have actually hurt their chances of overthrowing capitalism because they have engaged in a discourse that allows capitalism to be something larger, stronger and more intimidating that it actually is. The capitalist beast is not as imposing a beast as Marxism has painted it out to be. “Marxism has produced a discourse of Capitalism that ostensibly delineates as object of transformative class politics but that operates more powerfully to discourage and marginalize projects of class transformation…Marxism has contributed to the socialist absence through the very way in which it has theorized the capitalist presence” (Gibson and Graham 1997:252) Gibson and Graham provide a scathing critique of Marxist interpretation of globalization. These two authors fall into the Held and McGrew globalization skeptics position as they do not believe that the “penetration” or “immanent penetration” of capital into every corner of the earth is a reality, or that if such a reality did start to occur, that it could not be stopped.
They compare the “rape-script” with the “globalization-script” in one of their more striking passages. The “rape-script” allows all of us to see women as being rape-able and men as being possible rapists. Gibson and Graham take parts of the rape-script from Sharon Marcus where she, “challenges the inevitability of the claim that rape is one of the ‘real, clear facts of women’s lives’” (Gibson Graham 1997:121). We, by extension, are to challenge the reality that globalization/capitalism is one of the real, clear facts about the existence of citizens throughout the world.
This understanding of how the discourse surrounding rape has reinforced the idea that women are rape-able, open and vulnerable while men are hard, strong and potential violators helped to shape Gibson and Graham’s ideas surrounding globalization. The penetrating power of globalization has become, in many circles, an inevitability. Global capital will permeate and enter into any of the open, vulnerable developing countries. This has created a discourse that speaks us and shapes us; the globalization-script, and the eventualities it implies, may not be a reality. We are asked by the authors to reevaluate the potential for community based exchange that do not reinforce the dominant, globalization-script.
We must not become the victim of capitalism, we must make ourselves powerful. Even if our power is not initially evident, it becomes something greater as we reclaim the dialogue and shape it to our ends. This is how we make globalization lose its erection. This is how we create a world that is not dominated by one homogenizing economic system and dialogue.
Gibson and Graham then encourage us to go out and foster community based economic systems that value people. We are not to become subjects in the dominant discourse, but rather work on being stewards of our rhetoric and speak ourselves into a new discourse that does not build capitalism up into something that it is not. Gibson and Graham see globalization not as a real phenomenon that is inevitably creating one economic playing field where we will all gather. It is, on the other hand, a real phenomenon with limited scope whose real size has been artificially, and perversely, enlarged through an inaccurate discourse. The power to reshape our world does not lie in the hands of a few elite capitalists shaping the world in the interest of capital mobility, or politicians shaping the world in the interests of national capital or of global stability. The power to shape the world lies in the hands of individuals who are stewards of their rhetoric.
Showing posts with label Feminism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Feminism. Show all posts
Friday, October 10, 2008
Friday, September 26, 2008
Fukuyama: Women and the Evolution of World Politics
Fukuyama, F., 1998. Women and the Evolution of World Politics. Foreign Affairs, 77(5), 24-40.
“In other words, female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik” (25).
While earlier civilizations were clearly distinct from our modern civilization, they were still brutally violent. Much of this violence was the act of males. While there are examples of female leadership, the core of aggression comes from men. “The line from chimp to modern man is continuous” (27).
As the world becomes more equally distributed vis-à-vis power and gender, there will be a move towards more passive, less aggressive policy. Also, there is a move to make men more feminine and less aggressive, but the author believes that this will run into limits as biological drivers will be impossible to fully surmount. Also, while feminists believe that aggression and war stem from patriarchical societies, the author contends that their origin is fully biological.
The historic turn to explain social events has been constructivist. Things are determined by context, social roles and norms. This leads to relativism, in our author’s view. Alternative drivers are becoming more important, such as biology. Our author claims that this does not lead necessarily to biological determinism, as there is a great variety in the ways in which biological differences are actually filtered by culture and context. For example, for him, racial differences are not taken into consideration because race is a recent evolutionary phenomenon. Sex, however, is different and is the defining characteristic of a species.
“The core of the feminist agenda for international politics seems fundamentally correct: the violent and aggressive tendencies of men have to be controlled, not simply by redirecting them to external aggression, but by constraining those impulses through a web of norms, laws, agreements, contracts, and the like” (34).
“In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability"
“In other words, female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik” (25).
While earlier civilizations were clearly distinct from our modern civilization, they were still brutally violent. Much of this violence was the act of males. While there are examples of female leadership, the core of aggression comes from men. “The line from chimp to modern man is continuous” (27).
As the world becomes more equally distributed vis-à-vis power and gender, there will be a move towards more passive, less aggressive policy. Also, there is a move to make men more feminine and less aggressive, but the author believes that this will run into limits as biological drivers will be impossible to fully surmount. Also, while feminists believe that aggression and war stem from patriarchical societies, the author contends that their origin is fully biological.
The historic turn to explain social events has been constructivist. Things are determined by context, social roles and norms. This leads to relativism, in our author’s view. Alternative drivers are becoming more important, such as biology. Our author claims that this does not lead necessarily to biological determinism, as there is a great variety in the ways in which biological differences are actually filtered by culture and context. For example, for him, racial differences are not taken into consideration because race is a recent evolutionary phenomenon. Sex, however, is different and is the defining characteristic of a species.
“The core of the feminist agenda for international politics seems fundamentally correct: the violent and aggressive tendencies of men have to be controlled, not simply by redirecting them to external aggression, but by constraining those impulses through a web of norms, laws, agreements, contracts, and the like” (34).
“In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability"
Saturday, September 6, 2008
Cohn: Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals
Cohn, C., 1987. Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals. Signs, 12(4), 687-718.
Author interested in how think-tank types can “think that way”, ie., be so cavalier about statements about nuclear attacks, etc. Calls the logic technostrategic.
The language used by these technocrats is comprised generally of euphemisms. These metaphors build a narrative that promotes a certain kind of thought pattern that can rationally explore the possibility of the destruction of millions of people as being the most positive outcome in a given scenario.
This kind of thinking, in the eyes of Cohn, is transformative, and that is caused by the kinds of language that is used.
Overall, a very fun read.
Author interested in how think-tank types can “think that way”, ie., be so cavalier about statements about nuclear attacks, etc. Calls the logic technostrategic.
The language used by these technocrats is comprised generally of euphemisms. These metaphors build a narrative that promotes a certain kind of thought pattern that can rationally explore the possibility of the destruction of millions of people as being the most positive outcome in a given scenario.
This kind of thinking, in the eyes of Cohn, is transformative, and that is caused by the kinds of language that is used.
Overall, a very fun read.
Monday, April 21, 2008
Nussbaum: Human Capabilities, Femal Human Beings
Nussbaum, Martha Craven, Jonathan Glover and World Institute for Development Economics Research. (1995). Women, culture, and development : a study of human capabilities. Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0605/94042602-d.html
Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings
“Women have rarely been kings, or nobles, or couriers, or rich. They have, on the other hand, frequently been poor and sick and dead” (62).
“My proposal is frankly universalist and ‘essentialist’. That is, it asks us to focus on what is common to all, rather than on differences…and to see some capabilities and functions as more central, more at the core of human life, than others” (63).
This account begins by telling stories that emerge from academic conferences. These stories involve interactions between “relativists” and “universalists”. The universalists present papers and the relativists take issue with their essentialist claims. The relativists do not want the universalists to fall into traps that do not respect basic levels of diversity and difference. The universalists want the relativists to understand that there are some underlying aspects of life that are not uniquely subjective, for example, the difference between life and death.
“For we see here highly-intelligent people, people deeply committed to the good of women and men in developing countries, people who think of themselves as progressive and feminist and anti-racist, people who correctly argue that the concept of development is an evaluative concept requiring normative argument—effectively eschewing normative argument and taking up positions that converge…with the positions of reaction, oppression, and sexism” (66).
“Many critics of universalism in ethics are really critics of metaphysical realism who assume that realism is a necessary basis for universalism. I shall argue that this assumption is false” (67-8).
“…the attack on realism has been sufficiently deep and sufficiently sustained that it would appear strategically wise for an ethical and political view that seeks broad support not to rely on the truth of metaphysical realism, if it can defend itself in some other ways” (69).
Nussbaum firstly tries to situate an argument about universality within a pragmatic framework. She understands that the relativist position does have something important to add to the broader discussion regarding the rights of women. She claims that she must be able to take her universalistic argument and defend it using different strategies than would normally be deployed. She tones down the universalist rhetoric and makes the case regarding subjective interpretation of sensory facts: the relativists believe that observations are tinged with subjectivity, and that this is what constructs narratives and discourses, etc. Nussbaum takes that position that she agrees, but she also argues that, while this may or may not be true, the history of development and academia has been a history of universals.
She also highlights some anecdotal accounts of universality among human beings, from Aristotle to a person with a broadly trans-national extended family.
She moves on to claim that she must examine her account with an eye towards more standard criticisms of universalism. She begins by looking at the, “neglect of historical and cultural differences” critique.
“The opposition charges that any attempt to pick out some elements of human life as more fundamental than others, even without appeal to a transhistorical reality, is bound to be insufficiently respectful of actual historical and cultural differences” (70). “It is far from clear what this objection shows” (71).
“Neglect of Autonomy”: This critique of universalism argues that the subject of development is not given the right to determine what they themselves want.
“Prejudicial Application”: “If we operate with a determinate conception of the human being that is meant to have some normative moral and political force, we must also, in applying it, ask which beings we shall take to fall under the concept” (71). The example of Aristotle is given: he didn’t believe that women or slaves were fully human.
However, Nussbaum argues that it is unclear whether or not we would be better off or worse off without these universal concepts: “For it could be plausibly argued that it would have been even easier to exclude women and slaves on a whim if one did not have such a concept to contend with” (72).
Nussbaum goes on to identify the central capabilities that make someone a human being.
She then lists 8 methodological points: the procedure is not ahistorical or a priori; it attempts to look across boundaries for similarities; the account is not biologtical or metaphysical; the account is open-ended; the account accepts that some accounts are constructed differently in different societies; this consensus must be reached by reasonable procedures; the list is heterogeneous; and the concept human being is normative and ethical.
Here is the account of human life:
Morality: we all die.
The Human Body: we all have one
Hunger and Thirst:
Shelter:
Sexual Desire:
Mobility:
Pain and Pleasure:
Cognitive Capacity:
Infant Development:
Practical Reason:
Affiliation with other Human Beings:
Related ness to other Species and Nature:
Humor and Play:
Separateness:
Strong Separateness:
“This is a working list. It is put out to generate debate. It has done so and will continue to do so, and it will be revised accordingly” (80). This list is composed of both capabilities and limits.
Nussbaum now attempts to identify two distinct thresholds: “…a threshold of capability to function beneath which all life will be so impoverished that it will not be human at all; and a somewhat higher threshold, beneath which those characteristic functions are available in such a reduced way that, although we may judge the form of life a human one, we will not think it a good human life. The latter threshold is the on that will eventually concern us when we turn to public policy: for we don’t want societies to make their citizens capable of the bare minimum” (81).
Nussbaum then argues that it should be capabilities and functioning that determine human well being. She lists these in section 4.1, and they are derivatives of her earlier account of what makes a human life. She then examines how well countries have been meeting the needs of their populations. She claims that there is a clear need for a conception of a human being in policy realms.
Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings
“Women have rarely been kings, or nobles, or couriers, or rich. They have, on the other hand, frequently been poor and sick and dead” (62).
“My proposal is frankly universalist and ‘essentialist’. That is, it asks us to focus on what is common to all, rather than on differences…and to see some capabilities and functions as more central, more at the core of human life, than others” (63).
This account begins by telling stories that emerge from academic conferences. These stories involve interactions between “relativists” and “universalists”. The universalists present papers and the relativists take issue with their essentialist claims. The relativists do not want the universalists to fall into traps that do not respect basic levels of diversity and difference. The universalists want the relativists to understand that there are some underlying aspects of life that are not uniquely subjective, for example, the difference between life and death.
“For we see here highly-intelligent people, people deeply committed to the good of women and men in developing countries, people who think of themselves as progressive and feminist and anti-racist, people who correctly argue that the concept of development is an evaluative concept requiring normative argument—effectively eschewing normative argument and taking up positions that converge…with the positions of reaction, oppression, and sexism” (66).
“Many critics of universalism in ethics are really critics of metaphysical realism who assume that realism is a necessary basis for universalism. I shall argue that this assumption is false” (67-8).
“…the attack on realism has been sufficiently deep and sufficiently sustained that it would appear strategically wise for an ethical and political view that seeks broad support not to rely on the truth of metaphysical realism, if it can defend itself in some other ways” (69).
Nussbaum firstly tries to situate an argument about universality within a pragmatic framework. She understands that the relativist position does have something important to add to the broader discussion regarding the rights of women. She claims that she must be able to take her universalistic argument and defend it using different strategies than would normally be deployed. She tones down the universalist rhetoric and makes the case regarding subjective interpretation of sensory facts: the relativists believe that observations are tinged with subjectivity, and that this is what constructs narratives and discourses, etc. Nussbaum takes that position that she agrees, but she also argues that, while this may or may not be true, the history of development and academia has been a history of universals.
She also highlights some anecdotal accounts of universality among human beings, from Aristotle to a person with a broadly trans-national extended family.
She moves on to claim that she must examine her account with an eye towards more standard criticisms of universalism. She begins by looking at the, “neglect of historical and cultural differences” critique.
“The opposition charges that any attempt to pick out some elements of human life as more fundamental than others, even without appeal to a transhistorical reality, is bound to be insufficiently respectful of actual historical and cultural differences” (70). “It is far from clear what this objection shows” (71).
“Neglect of Autonomy”: This critique of universalism argues that the subject of development is not given the right to determine what they themselves want.
“Prejudicial Application”: “If we operate with a determinate conception of the human being that is meant to have some normative moral and political force, we must also, in applying it, ask which beings we shall take to fall under the concept” (71). The example of Aristotle is given: he didn’t believe that women or slaves were fully human.
However, Nussbaum argues that it is unclear whether or not we would be better off or worse off without these universal concepts: “For it could be plausibly argued that it would have been even easier to exclude women and slaves on a whim if one did not have such a concept to contend with” (72).
Nussbaum goes on to identify the central capabilities that make someone a human being.
She then lists 8 methodological points: the procedure is not ahistorical or a priori; it attempts to look across boundaries for similarities; the account is not biologtical or metaphysical; the account is open-ended; the account accepts that some accounts are constructed differently in different societies; this consensus must be reached by reasonable procedures; the list is heterogeneous; and the concept human being is normative and ethical.
Here is the account of human life:
Morality: we all die.
The Human Body: we all have one
Hunger and Thirst:
Shelter:
Sexual Desire:
Mobility:
Pain and Pleasure:
Cognitive Capacity:
Infant Development:
Practical Reason:
Affiliation with other Human Beings:
Related ness to other Species and Nature:
Humor and Play:
Separateness:
Strong Separateness:
“This is a working list. It is put out to generate debate. It has done so and will continue to do so, and it will be revised accordingly” (80). This list is composed of both capabilities and limits.
Nussbaum now attempts to identify two distinct thresholds: “…a threshold of capability to function beneath which all life will be so impoverished that it will not be human at all; and a somewhat higher threshold, beneath which those characteristic functions are available in such a reduced way that, although we may judge the form of life a human one, we will not think it a good human life. The latter threshold is the on that will eventually concern us when we turn to public policy: for we don’t want societies to make their citizens capable of the bare minimum” (81).
Nussbaum then argues that it should be capabilities and functioning that determine human well being. She lists these in section 4.1, and they are derivatives of her earlier account of what makes a human life. She then examines how well countries have been meeting the needs of their populations. She claims that there is a clear need for a conception of a human being in policy realms.
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