Showing posts with label Complex Adaptive Systems. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Complex Adaptive Systems. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Easton: An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems

Easton, David. 1957. “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems.” World Politics 9(3) (April): 383-400.

List of attributes of a political system:
1. Properties of identification
a. Units of a political system
b. Boundaries: “Without pausing to argue the matter, I would suggest that it is useful to conceive of a political system as having a boundary in the same sense as a physical system. The boundary of a political system is defined by all those actions more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for a society; every social action that does not partake of this characteristic will be excluded from the system and thereby will automatically be viewed as an external variable in the environment” (385).
2. Inputs and outputs. “Presumably, if we select political systems for special study, we do so because we believe that they have characteristically important consequences for society, namely, authoritative decisions. These consequences I shall call the outputs” (385).
3. Differentiation within a system
4. Integration of a system

Monday, June 29, 2009

Moeller: Luhmann Explained

Moeller, H. 2006. Luhmann Explained. Chicago: Open Court.

Excellent overview of Luhmann's Systems Theory. Outlines all key concepts, roots analysis in historical processes, focuses on functional differentiation, explores globalization and then analyzes mass media. I will not present an outline of this as most of this has been copied in other abstracts.

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Seidl and Becker: Niklas Luhmann and Organization Studies

Seidl, D, and KH Becker. 2005. Niklas Luhmann and organization studies. Liber.

Introduction: There are six things that separate Luhmann's work from others:

1. the distinction between psychic and social systems; they do not overlap; they represent environments for each other;
2. his constructivist epistemology, "in particular, it focuses on the schemes of meaning, or 'distinctions', that social (and psychic) systems employ to make sense of themselves and their surroundings" (9);
3. the theory is extensively applied to society (different kinds of system meaning are explained);
4. new insights on traditional dichotomies (agent/structure, structure/process, etc;
5. heavily contributes to organizational studies;
6. self-referentiality, "since the theory aims at including all aspects of the social, it consequently has to include also itself" (9-10)

Luhmann's work is separated into early and late Luhmann. The early work is a continuation of Parsons'. The late work takes place after the "autopoietic turn" (11). "An autopoietic system is a system that reproduces its own elements on the basis of its own elements" (11).

Luhmann's late work can also be separated into two: there is his theory on social systems generally, "in those works he elaborated the general notion of social systems as self-reproducing systems consisting of communications" (11).

:On the other hand, there are his theories that focus on the different types of social systems. In these works the general theory of social systems is specified with regard to the different types of system: society, interaction and organization" (12).

Chapter 1: The Basic Concepts of Luhmann's Theory of Social Systems

The theory of autopoiesis, or self-reproduction, came from Maturana and Varela, two biologists. They were trying to answer questions about what constitutes life. They determined that, "a living system reproduces itself" (22). "They defined the autopoietic systems as a system that recursively reproduces its elements through its own elements" (22).

The opposite of autopoietic systems are allopoietic systems. Autopoietic systems are operatively closed, as no outside operations enter the system. However, this does not mean that they are closed systems, but rather are operatively closed, but interactionally open: all systems exist with environment.

This directly relates to cognition; Maturana and Varela argued that all living systems are also cognitive systems. "In this sense, the operations of an autopoietic system are defined as its cognitions; life and cognitions are one and the same. Hence, everything that has been said about life applies equally to cognition: cognition is a self-referential, autopoietic process" (23).

Self-organization is the ability of a system to create internal structure, which is not predetermined. "The structures themselves, however, are not pre-given in any sense, as in structuralist theories, but are themselves the product of the autopoietic system. In other words, in its reproduction the system produces and reproduces its very own structures of reproduction. This aspect, i.e. the self-determination of its own structures, is referred to as self-organization. Thus, while autopoiesis refers to the reproduction of elements as such, self-organization refers to the determination of structures" (24).

"A central element with8in the theory of autopoiesis is the concept of structural coupling, whi8c h refers to the relation between systems and their environment. As explained above, environmental events can trigger internal processes in an autopoietic system but the concrete processes triggered...are determined by the structures of the system...A system is said to be structurally coupled to its environment...if its structures are in some way or other 'adjusted' to the structures of the environment...; in other words, if the structures of the system allow for reactions to 'important' environmental events. For example, animals living above ground are structurally adapted to a different environment from those living underground" (24).

Luhmann didn't take the concept of autopoiesis directly from biology, but adapted it, attempting to make a general, cross-discipline concept viable. "Luhmann suggests that we speak of autopoiesis whenever the elements of a system are reproduced by the elements of the system itself...Apart from living systems, Luhmann identifies two additional types of autopoietic systems: social systems and psychic systems. While living systems reproduce themselves on the basis of life, social systems reproduce themselves on the basis of communication, and psychic systems on the basis of consciousness or thoughts, their elements are not physical substances but elements of meaning" (25). Social systems are then broken down into either Interactions, Organizations or Societies.

The concept of element is also no longer ontologically privileged. Elements are produced by systems "as a result of being used" (27).

Social Systems

The tradition of sociology would imply that systems are made up of either agents or actions. Luhmann chose communication. Communication is understood as three components: information, utterance and understanding (28).

Information: a selection from a set of possibilities
Utterance: the why and how something is being communicated; the form a communication takes and the reason for the communication
Understanding: "...the distinction between information and utterance". The example given is the statement "I am tired". Taken as words, it is information. However, put in context, there is the utterance (the way it is said, the reason it is said). The understanding is the meaning derived from the distinction between the two (maybe the person who says this wants the other to leave them alone).

"...a communication is ultimately determined through the understanding" (29).

Understanding is only understood within the context of communication. So, when one comment is made, it is understood through the following comment. This following comment is understood by the next. This makes the theory dynamic.

Understanding is also not the end of the communication process. Luhmann argues that a decision must be made to either accept or reject the communication.

This explains how communications produce communications, but not what kinds of communications are produced. For that, one has to understand Luhmann's concept of expectations. If someone states that they are not feeling well, the expectation is that it will not be followed up with a statement about the local sports team. "Luhmann conceptualizes social structures as expectations" (31). Understanding is predicated on expectations. The topics that are germane for communication are relevant to expectations, and thus the structure of the system.

Humans in relation to Social Systems: Persons are constructions of social systems. Human beings are made up of psychic systems and organic systems. The two systems are operationally distinct, but functionally connected.

The psychic system and social system are connected because both are reproduced based on meaning, though differently. Social systems reproduce based on communication. Psychic systems are reproduced based on thoughts. Only thoughts can produce thoughts, as only communication can produce communication. Psychic systems are reproduced based on consciousness.

There are three forms of social systems: society, interaction and organization.

Society is the all-encompassing system outside of which communication does not exist. There have been three major changes within the structure of society historically: archaic times saw differentiation into subsystems (tribes, clans, families: segmented); later, there was differentiation between core and periphery (city/country: stratified); modernity brought about functional differentiation (law, art, etc) (36). Each primary differentiation can be secondarily broken down using a different categorization (stratified primary structure can be secondarily broken down segmentarily.

Functionally differentiated systems distinguish themselves by their "binary coding" (36). For the legal system, things are legal or illegal and cannot be understood otherwise. For economics, it is payment or non-payment. Science is truth/untruth. Only communication from one functionally differentiated system can produce that same system.

Systems can be functionally structurally connected. The example given is of a sales contract which couples economic and legal systems, though it produces very different meaning for both systems.

Interactions are the second form of social systems. These involve the binary present/absent. The structure of the communication determines what is considered communication.

Organization: These social systems are distinguished based on decisions. Decisions are "compact communications" that highlight that there was more than one thing that could have been chosen between (39). Decisions are paradoxical in that the more that the decision highlights that there are alternatives, the less it is likely to have authority as a decision.

"Because of their paradoxical nature, decision communications are subtly calling for their own deconstruction by ensuing communication" (40). How do organizations survive? Organizations close themselves operatively based on decisions. If a decision is destructed, that is also a decision. Secondly, decisions are made based on previous decisions, thus giving historic credibility.

One key aspect of Luhmann is that decisions cannot be made without absorbing uncertainty, as no decision rests on perfect information. "Uncertainty absorption now takes place in the connection between decisions" (41).

Spencer Brown's The Laws of Form was influential to Luhmann. This theory begins with observation as the most foundational concept. "Every observation is constructed from two components: a distinction and an indication" (47). An observer has to focus on one thing, and thus distinguishes between others and makes an indication. "We get a marked state and an unmarked state" (47).

The example of a circle drawn on a piece of paper is used.

The distinction between inside and outside of the circle both separates and unites the two sides.

"The central point in this concept of observation is that once you have drawn a distinction you cannot see the distinction that constitutes the observation - you can only see one side of it...this can be referred to as the 'blind spot' of observation. The complete distinction with both its sides (the inside and outside), can only be seen from outside; if you are inside the distinction you cannot see the distinction" (49).

This leads to two types of observations: first-order and second-order (49). "So far we have been explaining the operation of a first-order observer, who cannot observe the distinction he uses in order to observe. The second-order observer is an observer who observes another observer. He uses a different distinction from the first-order observer: in order to observe the observer, he has to draw a distinction that contains the distinction...of the first-order observer in his marked state. The second-order observer can see the blind spot - the distinction - of the first-order observer. He can see what the first-order observer cannot see and he can see that he cannot see. ...Since the second-order observer needs a distinction to ob serve the distinction of the first-order observer, he himself is a first-order observer, who could be observed by another second-order observer" (49).

Autopoietic systems process distinctions, and this is how the boundary of the system is determined.

Friday, June 12, 2009

Phelan: What is Complexity Science, Really?

Phelan, SE. 2001. What is complexity science, really? Emergence 3, no. 1: 120-136.

"It is my contention that much of the work in complexity theory has indeed been pseudo-science, that is, many writers in this field have used the symbols and methods of complexity science...to give the illusion of science even though they lack supporting evidence and plausibility" (120).

"The purpose of this article is twofold: to provide a working definition of complexity science; and to use this definition to differentiate complexity science from complexity pseudo-science" (120).

The author then explores arguments in philosophy of science, moving from empiricism, to positivism, to historicism, to constructivism. The author argues that complexity theory offers a new way of studying regularities that is methodologically different from previous science. Science has always been about reducing complexity.

"Complexity science posits simple causes for complex effects. At the core of complexity science is the assumption that complexity in the world arises from simple rules. However, these rules...are unlike rules...of traditional science. Generative rules typically determine how a set of artificial agents will behave in their virtual environment over time, including their interaction with other agents. Unlike traditional science, generative rules do not predict an outcome for every state of the world. Instead, generative rules use feedback and learning algorithms to enable the agent to adapt to its environment over time" (130-1).

Three things that complexity science is not: general systems theory, a postmodern science and a set of "metaphores or analogies based on resemblance thinking" (132).

"Complexity science, defined earlier as the search for generative rules, does not embrace the radical holism of systems theory. Complexity scientists are seeking simple rules that underpin complexity...In contrast, systems theory almost seems to surrender to complexity because it is not particularly interested in the identification of regularities. Regularities do not exist in open systems, almost by definition.

Axelrod and Cohen: Harnessing Complexity

Axelrod, RM, and MD Cohen. 2001. Harnessing complexity: Organizational implications of a scientific frontier. Basic Books.

Complex Adaptive Systems are systems where there are a large number of participants interacting in various ways. There may be a wide variety of participants. Old patterns may continue forward, or they may change quickly.

The goal is not to try to overcome complexity, but to harness complexity.

The authors claim to make important contributions to the field of complexity: "These include the critical role of nonrandom interactions in adaptation, the contrast of biological with informational copying, the relationships between credit allocation and measures of performance" (xii-xiii).

"In our analysis there are there key processes in a Complex Adaptive System. These key processes provide the basis of our three central chapters: Variation, Interaction, and Selection. We see variation, interaction, and selection as interlocking sets of concepts that can generate productive actions in a world that cannot be fully understood. We show how the very complexity that makes the world hard to understand provides opportunities and resources for improvement over time" (xv).

In the first chapter of this pop book, the vocabulary of the framework is explicated: agents, strategy (how agents respond to environment), population, system, selection, adaptation, co-evolution (4-8).

Complex Adaptive Systems make prediction difficult if not impossible.


"Agents, of a variety of types, use their strategies, in patterned interaction, with each other and with artifacts. Performance measures on the resulting events drive the selection of agents and/or strategies through processes of error-prone copying and recombination, thus changing the frequencies of the types within the system" (154).