Donnelly: Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy

Donnelly, J., 2006. Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society. European Journal Of International Relations, 12(2), 139-170.

“Is America an empire in fact or in the making? This article attempts to elaborate the conceptual resources required to answer such questions. I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality—concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical or even dismiss as self-contradictory” (139).

Empire in history: began through Roman usage, taken from a Greek word approximating rule. Adapted in the middle ages to create a separation between the power of the pope and the king. Empire: “…an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140).

Donnelly’s focus is highlighting traditional core-periphery polities, not exploring the more distinct and recent discussion of empire, for example, that of Hardt and Negri.

Hierarchy in Anarchy:

Waltz presents hierarchy and anarchy as dichotomous. “Rather than thinking of anarchy or hierarchy we should attend instead to hierarchy in anarchy” (141).

Figure 1: (143).



All quadrants except the bottom right are in anarchy.

“Confusion over hierarchy is exacerbated by the common association of anarchy with sovereign equality. As Waltz puts it, ‘formally, each is the equal of all others’ (1979: 88). Even David Lake, who is particularly sensitive to elements o hierarchy in international relations, equates anarchy with sovereign equality, describing ‘anarchic institutions’ as ‘those premised upon the full sovereignty of all members’ (2001: 130)” (144).

Historical account of the transformation and growth of sovereignty. Practices such as outlaw states, semi-sovereignty (servitudes, imperfect unions, financial controls, etc.) formal and informal inequalities, etc.

10 models of hierarchy in anarchy: balance of power, protection/guarantee, concert, collective security, hegemony, dominion, empire, pluralistic security, common security and amalgamated security (See Figure 2) (154).

“Contemporary America is indeed something of a colossus…It is not, however an empire” (157).

“Iraq can be read as a fairly conventional exercise in Quadrant III unipolar balance of power politics; self-help by the biggest ‘self’ on the block, without any special (formal or informal) rights” (159). “…consider the controversy over Guantanamo, which has appeared prominently in many arguments of American imperialism. In fact, it shows Quadrant III unipolar unilateralism. Empires set the rules. They do not need to assert awkward, implausible and almost universally rejected expectations for themselves. A state that cannot obtain widespread endorsement of its preferred international norms ins not an empire. A state that can’t even get grudging acquiescence by its leading ‘allies’ is not even much of a hegemon” (160).

Keohane: Neorealism and Its Critics

Keohane, R., 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press.

Ch 3: Reductionist and Systemic Theories

“A reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts” (47).

“Analysts who confine their attention to interacting units, without recognizing that systemic causes are in play, compensate for the omissions by assigning such causes arbitrarily to the level of interacting units and parceling them out among actors” (49).

Looks at inside-out theories of international politics that attempt to explain system level behavior by looking at the activities occurring within a unit. “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states” (52).

“The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent. Why then do we find such a persistent pull toward reduction [specifically citing Morgenthau, Kissinger and Levy]? The answer is that usually reduction results not from a scholar’s intent but from his errors” (53).

Changes in structure can be separated from changes in units (55).

“From the first part of this article, we know that the theory we want to construct has to be a systemic one” (56).

“What do I mean by explain? I mean explain in these senses: to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to say why patterns of behavior recur; to say why events repeat themselves, including events that none or few of the actors may like” (57).

“A theory has explanatory and predictive power. A theory also has elegance. Elegance in social-science theories means that explanations and predictions will be general” (57).

“Structures, moreover, may suddenly change. A structural change is a revolution, whether or not violently produced, and it is so because it gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the system varied with changes in structure. Across systems, a theory explains change. A theory of international politics can succeed only if political structures are defined in ways that identify their causal effects and show how those effects vary as structural changes” (58).

“In a systems theory, some part of the explanation of behaviors and outcomes is found in the system’s structure. A political structure is akin to a field of forces in physics interactions within a field have properties as the field affects the objects, so the objects affect the field” (62).

Structure: will unify outputs with a variety of inputs; also, “…a set of constraining conditions” (62). “Agents and agencies act; systems as a whole do not” (63).

“The first way in which structures work their effects is through a process of socialization that limits and molds behavior” (65).

“Order may prevail without an borderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator. The mayor of New York City does not phone the gardeners of southern New Jersey and tell them to grow more tomatoes next year because too few were recently supplied” (67).

Ch 4: Political Structures

“A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” (70).

“’Relation’ is used to mean both the interaction of units and the positions they occupy vis-à-vis each other…To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system” (71).

“A structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting parts” (72).

“Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system. Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them” (73). There is an exploration of the structure of domestic politics to juxtapose with international politics. “A domestic political structure is thus defined, first, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second, by specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units” (74).

“Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long as a strubu8re endures…Structure operates as a cause, but it is not the only cause in play” (80).

“I defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capabilities across units” (81).

Ordering Principles:

“Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic” (81). Whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability” (81-2).
“If structure is an organizational concept, the terms ‘structure’ and ‘anarchy’ seem to be in contradiction. If international politics is ‘politics in the absence of government,’ what are we in the presence of? In looking for international structure, one is brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable position to be in. The problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking” (82). Draws parallels w/ microeconomic theory.

“International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units” (84).

“I assume that states seek to ensure their survival” (85).

The Character of the Units:

“The second term in the definition of domestic political structure specifies the functions performed by differentiated units. Hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation…The second term is not needed in defining international-political structure, because so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units. International structures vary only through a change of organizing principle, or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units” (87).

“Just as economists define markets in terms of firms, so I define international-political structures in terms of states” (88).

The units are all sovereign; the units tend not to die; the units vary widely in terms of power, etc.

Distribution of Capabilities:

“The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks” (92).

“I have not defined the two essential elements of a systems theory of international politics—the structure of the system and its interacting units” (94).

“Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered…second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units… third, by the distribution of capabilities across units” (96).

Ch 5: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power

“The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (98).

“The distinction between international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or the nonuse of force but in their different structures” (99).

“Differences between national and international structures are reflected in the ways the units of each system define their ends and develop the means for reaching them” (100).

“Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities” (101).

“The structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states in two ways” (101). “In a self-help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others” (101). “A state also worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. That is the second way in whi8ch the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states” (103).

Discussion of emergent phenomena, insecurity and freedom, organization costs in anarchy…

“National politcs is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation” (111).

“I have described anarchies and hierarchies as though every political order were of one type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write of structures allow for a greater, and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types” (112).

“Increasing the number of categories would bring the classification of societies closer to reality. But that would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy. One who wishes to explain rather than to describe should resist moving in that direction if resistance is reasonable” (113).

Realpolitik: “The ruler’s, and later the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; success is the ultimate test of policy; and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state” (115-6).

“A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: they are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (117).

States use means available to them: internal and external (117).

If one state is successful, others will emulate. The structure of the international system is the driver of balances of power recurring.

Deudney: Bounding Power: Chapter 1: Republican Security Theory

Deudney, Daniel. (2007). Bounding power : republican security theory from the polis to the global village. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 1: Republican Security Theory
“From its inception, republican security theory has been concerned with what might be termed the security-political question: what kinds of political arrangements are necessary for security?” (27). This focus on security first and foremost assumes that the freedom from violence is the most political issue. Later, Deudney identifies this approach to security as normative survivalism (31).

“In the broadest terms, insecurity results from the absence of restraint on violent power, and security results from the presence of restraints on violent power” (27). This is the double meaning of “bounding power”: firstly, violent power continues to bound upwards in its material capability and secondly, political power must discover ways in which it is possible to bound this power.

The other problem of republican security strategy is that neither anarchy or hierarchy are suitable: “…the extremes of anarchy and hierarchy are fundamentally alike because neither provides adequate restraints upon the application of violence to the human body” (31). This is problematic, and requires that republican security strategy find a middle ground between these two extremes.

These two extremes are then highlighted in more detail. “The main argument of the anarchy-interdependence problematique, as we have seen, is that situations of intense violence interdependence combined with anarchy are a first anarchy. First anarchies are incompatible with security, and the size of the space with intense violence interdependence has expanded over time with far-reaching implications for security” (41). The second extreme is the hierarchy-restraint problematique. “The animating insight of the second problematique is the realization that governments can themselves pose as severe a security threat as first anarchy” (46).

Deudney deploys the concept of negarchy to explain the set of Republican negative constraints that comprise a triad between hierarchy and anarchy. This negative forces mutually restrain, while also providing for freedom. This involves, “balances all the way up and down” (49).

Donnelly: Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society

Donnelly, Jack. (2006). "Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society". European Journal Of International Relations, 12(2), 139-170. http://www.csa.com/ids70/gateway.php?mode=pdf&doi=10.1177%2F1354066106064505&db=sagepol-set-c&s1=80ee883868977a98ef5390896262f864&s2=aba9bbf7ab98695f11b9924f219fa0de

“I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality — concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical, or even dismiss as selfcontradictory” (139).

Donnelly argues in this piece that most current understandings of US power and empire are lacking. He deploys an approach that seeks to examine a more nuanced view of international society, one that allows for hierarchy to exist in international anarchy and one that sees sovereign states as not always participating with the same bundle of basic rights. He is also critical of views of American empire, which tend to lightly gloss over important traditional definitions and understandings that emphasize rule over others.

He begins by tracing out the etymology of the word empire and finding that it is derived from the Latin “imperium”, which was translated into the Greek arche (rule). Initially, this was used to describe the Roman republic as it moved away from its earlier republic status.
He claims that we still need the concept: “But we still need ‘empire’ to describe an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140). His definition of empire requires a central rule over previously autonomous international agents and states. He dismisses the Hardt and Negri empire account as missing the broader point derived from the original meaning.

Waltz then makes an appearance in this text. Donnelly highlights Waltz’s account of hierarchy and anarchy operating as ordering principles. Instead, Donnelly claims that we should not focus on hierarchy or anarchy, but rather that we should be looking for hierarchy in anarchy. Also, he claims that Waltz is formally wrong in that he identifies hierarchy as being the opposite of anarchy, when it is really archy, or rule.

The nature of the distinction between hierarchy and anarchy is then explored. Waltz’s approach presents hierarchy and anarchy as being polar opposites. This, Donnelly claims, is empirically false and problematic. Firstly, hierarchy is not the opposite of anarchy, but rather its opposite is archy, or simply rule/governance. Donnelly explores a domestic government situation to make a comparison: the congress is not subordinate to the executive branch, though there is hierarchy in different realms. There is hierarchy, but clearly there is not rule.

He then creates a 2x2 quadrant that examines the current realities of empire. The x axis is authority, whether it is coordinated or not. The y axis is system polarity. The highly coordinated authority and low polarity system represents an empire like Rome/Athens. The highly coordinated multi-polarity, in Donnelly’s example, the Concert of Rome, represents a situation that is similar to the current US relation vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

Different forms of sovereign inequality are examined in order to make a clear distinction between un-equal measures and international arrangements from empire. There have been myriad cases and examples of nations that did not enjoy fully sovereign status. These nations were not able to exercise the same amount of sovereign rights as were fully sovereign nations. However, this does not signify that these nations were being fully controlled by the more fully sovereign nations. Instead, this simply signified that there was international inequality.

There is then an examination of the typological movement from hegemony to domination to empire. There is much in this section detailing different possible characteristics of international society. In terms of an overview of possible international systems, it is quite helpful.

Donnelly then examines the recent war in Iraq with an eye towards the arguments that it involves an exercise of empirical powers. He finds that the justification for the war relied on standard non-proliferation discussions, though they were followed up with physical intervention, which has not been the norm. This could simply represent a change in the international regime of non-proliferation from a static, sanction imposition institution to one with more teeth and more propensity for action. Additionally, some critics of US policy in Iraq point to the Coalition of the Willing as an example of US empiric powers. This is simply false, as, while some nations were bribed and broadly coerced, none were ruled or directed to join. This is not an example of empirical rule, but simply hegemonic dominance and coercion. Regional control is another metric used to evaluate the degree of empirical power by some, but Iraq is again a poor example of this. The US is unable to gain influence in this region to really any degree, as this can be seen by Syria and Iran’s explicit refusal to bow to US interest. Most interestingly, this lack of influence can be seen in Iraq’s refusal to support the US in its policy towards Israel. This is not an empire, but a materially rich, ideationally weak nation trying to impose its will upon others with limited success.

Lake: Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations

Lake, David A. (1996). "Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations". International Organization, 50(1), 1. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=9602295562&site=ehost-live

Lake posits that realist theory can not fully explain the inconsistent actions of various super-powers historically. He uses an approach taken from economics: he compares countries to firms that produce security. These security production firms then engage in interactions with other nations. These interactions can either be more mutually accepted or more hierarchical. “The choice between these alternatives, I posit, is a function of two main variables: the expected costs of opportunism, which decline with relational hierarchy, and governance costs, which rise with relational hierarchy” (2).

He then examines alliance formation, with an eye towards the literature on this subject. He finds that the literature has been relatively poor at coalescing and finding commonalities in different independent variables. He also explicitly takes the position that it could be the result of countries. “…the range of possible variation in strategy--the dependent variable--commonly is abridged” (3).

Lake then defines security as the ability of a country to use their own wealth as they see fit without the constraints of use being imposed by another nation or group. For Lake, informal empire clearly exists. States exercise control over the actions of other states that are in their sphere of influence. Not only is there the positive aspect of empire, where the strong state imposes its will on the weak state, but there is a more coercive and invasive aspect. Informal empire also means that the subsumed country must anticipate the whims and wishes of the powerful.

Contract theory is then explored to determine the nature of the relationships in that states engage. Because his initial assumptions are economist and rational in nature, his approach is not surprising: “The central hypothesis of the contracting approach is that parties choose relations to economize on resources-in other words, to maximize benefits from exchange and minimize transaction costs. In short, actors choose the relationship that is most efficient for conducting the transaction. By doing so, the parties maximize the resources that can be used for other valued purposes; for firms, this implies profit maximization and for states…cost minimization” (10-1).

Lake then explains his assumptions. He begins by assuming rationality, which he acknowledges is heavily criticized. He defines this as, “…I mean simply that actors possess transitive preferences and act purposively” (12). Secondly, security only represents one aspect of policy, and the government acts perfectly in the interests of the selctorate. Thirdly, states have no preference whether or not their foreign relations are wealth seeking, power maximizing or something else. Imperialism may be used by a state and the selctorate understand this as a means to an end. “Together, these first three assumptions imply that states choose the relationship that minimizes their costs of producing a desired level of security” (12). Fourthly, threats faced by state dyads are exogenous. Fifthly, if there is a disagreement between groups as to which policy is preferred, the stronger nation will prevail.

States take part in opportunistic behavior. This can, at time, be costly and is a reflection of a system that does not possess an ultimate leader. “In anarchic relations, ceteris paribus, the probability that the partner will behave opportunistically is comparatively high. In an empire, at the other extreme, states merge their formerly autonomous decision-making processes and transfer rights of residual control to the dominant member. The dominant state now decides-to continue with the same example-who is the victim of any attack…who is the aggressor, and how many resources its partner
must mobilize” (14).

Supply/Demand curves are used to illustrate the relationship between opportunism, governance cost and the degree to which the international society is anarchical or hierarchical. “In equilibrium, we should observe anarchic relations most commonly when the expected costs of opportunism are low or governance costs are high, and hierarchic relations when the expected costs of opportunism are high or governance costs are low. These equilibrium conditions reconcile the apparent contradiction revealed in the discussion of opportunism in the literatures on alliance formation and imperialism above” (21).

Lake then claims that it is nearly impossible to operationalize his construction. Firstly, his independent variables are nearly impossible to find proxies for. Secondly, these variables must necessarily be defined probabilistically, as states can not ever know exactly the costs of governance or opportunity. Finally, the theory can observe the chosen decisions made by actors, but it is impossible to fully understand the full range of their choices. However with the observation of some case studies, further information my become available. He goes on to examine the US/USSR relationship after WWII understanding that it is both abridged, and limited, but hoping that it will show that this approach is applicable.

He finds that the relationship between the US and its interests in Europe as well as the USSR’s relationship with their interests in Eastern Europe are fully consistent with his approach that focuses on the costs of informal empire being determined by the relative interaction of opportunity costs and governance levels. He sees this as being validation of his theoretical approach.

Nexton et. al.: What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate

Nexon, Daniel H., & Wright, Thomas. (2007). What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate (Vol. 101, 253-271): Cambridge Journals Online.

“Empires, we argue, are characterized by rule through intermediaries and the existence of distinctive contractual relations between cores and their peripheries. These features endow them with a distinctive network-structure from those associated with unipolar and hegemonic orders. The existence of imperial relations alters the dynamics of international politics: processes of divide and rule supplant the balance-of-power mechanism; the major axis of relations shift from interstate to those among imperial authorities, local intermediaries, and other peripheral actors; and preeminent powers face special problems of legitimating their bargains across heterogeneous audiences” (253)

This article take the debate about empires and makes the case that America is not an empire because it does not exhibit many of the characteristics of previous empires, specifically those of direct, territorial rule. This argument is fleshed out by providing examples of different forms of organization in international society. “We argue that ideal-typical empires, contra Ferguson, differ from hegemonic and uni-polar orders because they combine two features: rule through intermediaries and heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities”(253). However, while it is not a formal empire, it does exhibit many characteristics of an informal empire.

The authors identify three types of approaches to understanding an international system with a dominant player. There is the uni-polar system, where one country represents the strongest player in the international system. Many who theorize about this feature of international organization do so with assumptions of anarchy and rational agency. Some believe that this represents a stable form of international societal organization. Another form of international organization is that of hegemony, which can be understood and theorized in many ways. Many see this form of organization requiring the hegemonic leader to control economic, military and technological aspects of global interaction. The third form of international control is empire.

The authors then expand upon the notion of empire and imperial rule. They claim that it focuses on policies of divide and rule. They use Moytl’s construction of empire as a hub and spokes with no rim between the core and periphery. This form of empire works well, until, that is, the periphery begins to communicate with one another and thus opens up the opportunity for increased resistance. They explain that empires can operate through channels of informal rule.

They then approach the American Empire question: “It follows that questions such as “is America an empire?” or “is the international system an imperial one?” obscure more than they reveal. The problem of contemporary empire (American or otherwise) hinges, rather, on the degree to which specific relations—–among polities, between polities and nonstate actors, and in specific policy arenas—–look more or less like those associated with ideal-typical empires” (266). And, “Whenever relations between or among two or more political organizations involve indirect rule and heterogeneous contracting, their interactions will develop at least some of the dynamics associated with imperial control” (266). And, “…influence, exercised routinely and consistently, becomes indistinguishable from indirect rule. In informal empires the lines between influence and rule necessarily blur. When actors believe that certain options are “off the table” because of an asymmetric (if tacit) contract, or consistently comply with the wishes of another
because they recognize steep costs from noncompliance, then the relationship between the two becomes effectively one between ruler and ruled” (266).

Also, there is a focus on institutional power. Units must be understood as something broader than states, as this is a limited metric. Intuitions have a clearly structural dimension. Predominant powers can choose to organize the world in different ways.