Wood, EM. 2003. Empire of Capital. Verso.
If one makes arguments of the nature that the US is an imperial body, they are routinely countered that the US does not control any territory. This is, of course, true. However, this misses the fact that there is an imperial force at work in the world, that it originates and derives power from the system hegemon and that it all operates within the capitalist system.
Wood highlights the driving power of capital to continually search for higher returns as being the ultimate source of global imperialism. This imperialism does not have the same characteristics as did previous imperialistic eras; no longer is there a search for territory or direct rule. Instead, this imperialism is a control of a different and more amorphous type: the logic of capitalism.
Military expansionism is another piece of this puzzle: the US in particular possesses massive amounts of military power, and this is used as the ultimate prop for regulatory frameworks that are necessary for the further promotion of capitalism.
Showing posts with label Empire. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Empire. Show all posts
Friday, March 6, 2009
Friday, October 10, 2008
Panitch and Gindin: Global Capitalism and American Empire
Panitch, L. & Gindin, S., 2004. Global Capitalism and American Empire, Merlin Press.
The causes of globalization are seen by Panitch and Gindin to be fairly standard for Marxist scholars. In the beginning of their “Rethinking Imperialism” chapter, they note that, “There is a structural logic to capitalism that tends to its expansion and internationalization. This was famously captured in Marx’s description in the communist Manifesto of a future that stunningly matches our present” (Panitch and Gindin 2004:13). They then go on to quote Marx’s explanation of the international nature of capital expansion. However, this standard, initial accumulation of capital is complicated by the tool of capitalist accumulation: imperialism and the theory of inter-imperial rivalry.
The authors contrast the traditional account of inter-imperial rivalry with an account that takes the capitalist state to be the most important actor in the consolidation of capital as opposed to theories of economic states or crises. In the traditional account, imperialism was the tool of capitalist nations to internationalize capital. This was the result of a theory of crisis being seen as the impetus for capital expansion beyond national borders. Because this dynamic was occurring in a number of different countries, there would be a number of different imperial powers. The new markets would also eventually be saturated, thus causing home markets to suffer an exhaustion of consumption and the imperial nations would turn against one another. This is the space that inter-imperial rivalry occurred.
Panich and Gindin explain why this interpretation of inter-imperial rivalry was misinformed. In the opinion of these authors, the inter-imperial rivalry theorists were wrong because they were defective in their treatment of the dynamics of capital accumulation, they mistakenly used the theory of crisis to explain capital expansion, they failed to understand the spatial dimensions of internationalization, they mistakenly assumed that exhaustion of consumption within capitalist countries would lead to crisis and finally they wrongly stated that the deepening of capital would lead to less choice (Panich and Gindin 2004:17-8). What the authors conclude is that these theories of inter-imperial rivalry were only looking at very early stages of capitalism. This current iteration of capitalism that we are experiencing is based on a different set of drivers.
The authors then go on to explain how the capitalist state must be a more vital aspect of theorizing capitalist imperialism. They say that, “Capitalist imperialism, then, needs to be understood through an extension of the theory of the capitalist state, rather than derived directly from the theory of economic stages or crises” (Panich and Gindin 2004:18). Panich and Gindin focus on the contingent aspects of capital accumulation and adaptation to contradictions in capitalism. They see earlier Marxist thought as relying on a much too simple understanding of the separation of the economic and the political. The true nature of the interaction between the economy and politics is much more nuanced.
The inter-imperialist rivalry paradigm was changed by Panich and Gindin to incorporate global capitalist expansion without tension occurring between major capitalist nations. This global capitalist order needed a hegemonic power that drove the expansion and the unification of the capitalist states and, in this current iteration of capitalism, this leader was found in the United States. In Panich and Gindin’s version of globalization, there are two realms of capital: domestic and international. The interest of domestic capital was trumpeted by proponents of the old inter-imperialist rivalry theory of capitalist expansion. However, in this new version of capitalist expansion, the tension is not between the interests of capital from two industrialized nations, but rather the expansion of capital is in the interest of global capital more generally. This is seen as being a response to the instability that occurred after the first occurrence of globalization .
Therefore, we see national interest undermined by global capital interests. The U.S. takes control of the operation and standardization of rules for this capital, but not entirely in their own interest. Other nations are willing to submit to the leadership of the United States because order is valued more highly than domestic capital interests. Two world wars and a global depression allowed nations to see the value of a stabilizing, international capital order controlled through one hegemonic leader. “The point is that we need to distinguish between the expansive tendency of capitalism and its actual history. A global capitalist order is always a contingent social construct: the actual development and continuity of such an order must be problematized” (Panich and Gindin 2004:14-5).
Through this account of capital expansion, Panich and Gindin show us how a contemporary, Marxist account of globalization takes into consideration the changes brought about by the increased intensity and speed of global connections. The rules and structure of international capital changed in the last half of the 20th century. Before this time, they were primarily controlled by the interest of certain nations. Now, they have moved into the realm of post-national control. Still, capital accumulation is seen as being a deterministic driver of international affairs, but the structure and the rules that it follows are to be contingent. If capital does not deterministically create the rules and structure that govern capitalism, we have opened up the possibility for substantial change that has little to do with initial capital accumulation.
The causes of globalization are seen by Panitch and Gindin to be fairly standard for Marxist scholars. In the beginning of their “Rethinking Imperialism” chapter, they note that, “There is a structural logic to capitalism that tends to its expansion and internationalization. This was famously captured in Marx’s description in the communist Manifesto of a future that stunningly matches our present” (Panitch and Gindin 2004:13). They then go on to quote Marx’s explanation of the international nature of capital expansion. However, this standard, initial accumulation of capital is complicated by the tool of capitalist accumulation: imperialism and the theory of inter-imperial rivalry.
The authors contrast the traditional account of inter-imperial rivalry with an account that takes the capitalist state to be the most important actor in the consolidation of capital as opposed to theories of economic states or crises. In the traditional account, imperialism was the tool of capitalist nations to internationalize capital. This was the result of a theory of crisis being seen as the impetus for capital expansion beyond national borders. Because this dynamic was occurring in a number of different countries, there would be a number of different imperial powers. The new markets would also eventually be saturated, thus causing home markets to suffer an exhaustion of consumption and the imperial nations would turn against one another. This is the space that inter-imperial rivalry occurred.
Panich and Gindin explain why this interpretation of inter-imperial rivalry was misinformed. In the opinion of these authors, the inter-imperial rivalry theorists were wrong because they were defective in their treatment of the dynamics of capital accumulation, they mistakenly used the theory of crisis to explain capital expansion, they failed to understand the spatial dimensions of internationalization, they mistakenly assumed that exhaustion of consumption within capitalist countries would lead to crisis and finally they wrongly stated that the deepening of capital would lead to less choice (Panich and Gindin 2004:17-8). What the authors conclude is that these theories of inter-imperial rivalry were only looking at very early stages of capitalism. This current iteration of capitalism that we are experiencing is based on a different set of drivers.
The authors then go on to explain how the capitalist state must be a more vital aspect of theorizing capitalist imperialism. They say that, “Capitalist imperialism, then, needs to be understood through an extension of the theory of the capitalist state, rather than derived directly from the theory of economic stages or crises” (Panich and Gindin 2004:18). Panich and Gindin focus on the contingent aspects of capital accumulation and adaptation to contradictions in capitalism. They see earlier Marxist thought as relying on a much too simple understanding of the separation of the economic and the political. The true nature of the interaction between the economy and politics is much more nuanced.
The inter-imperialist rivalry paradigm was changed by Panich and Gindin to incorporate global capitalist expansion without tension occurring between major capitalist nations. This global capitalist order needed a hegemonic power that drove the expansion and the unification of the capitalist states and, in this current iteration of capitalism, this leader was found in the United States. In Panich and Gindin’s version of globalization, there are two realms of capital: domestic and international. The interest of domestic capital was trumpeted by proponents of the old inter-imperialist rivalry theory of capitalist expansion. However, in this new version of capitalist expansion, the tension is not between the interests of capital from two industrialized nations, but rather the expansion of capital is in the interest of global capital more generally. This is seen as being a response to the instability that occurred after the first occurrence of globalization .
Therefore, we see national interest undermined by global capital interests. The U.S. takes control of the operation and standardization of rules for this capital, but not entirely in their own interest. Other nations are willing to submit to the leadership of the United States because order is valued more highly than domestic capital interests. Two world wars and a global depression allowed nations to see the value of a stabilizing, international capital order controlled through one hegemonic leader. “The point is that we need to distinguish between the expansive tendency of capitalism and its actual history. A global capitalist order is always a contingent social construct: the actual development and continuity of such an order must be problematized” (Panich and Gindin 2004:14-5).
Through this account of capital expansion, Panich and Gindin show us how a contemporary, Marxist account of globalization takes into consideration the changes brought about by the increased intensity and speed of global connections. The rules and structure of international capital changed in the last half of the 20th century. Before this time, they were primarily controlled by the interest of certain nations. Now, they have moved into the realm of post-national control. Still, capital accumulation is seen as being a deterministic driver of international affairs, but the structure and the rules that it follows are to be contingent. If capital does not deterministically create the rules and structure that govern capitalism, we have opened up the possibility for substantial change that has little to do with initial capital accumulation.
Monday, October 6, 2008
Munkler: Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Angient Rome to the United States
Munkler, H., 2007. Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States, Cambridge: Polity Press.
What is the difference between empire and state? What is the difference between empire and imperialism? What is the difference between hegemony and empire? Is the US an empire?
Munkler begins by exploring what is not an empire. “First, an empire must be distinguished from a state…which operates according to completely different imperatives and a completely different action logic” (4-5). “Empires have no neighbours which they recognize as equals, that is, as possessing equal rights; with states, by contrast, this is the rule” (5). “Whoever thinks of imperiality as simply an alternative to statehood will come to the conclusion that no empires exist today. Whoever, on the contrary, proceeds from the superimposition of imperial structures on the state order will encounter structures of power and influence not identical to those of the state” (6).
“Second, empire must be delineated in contrast to hegemonic structures of dominance…Hegemony is supr3emacy within a group of formally equal political players; imperiality, by contrast, dissolves this…equality and reduces subordinates to the status of client states or satellites” (6).
“Third…empire may be delineated in contrast to what has since the nineteenth century been called imperialism…’Imperialism’ means that there is a will to empire” (8).
In addition, one must consider both spatial and temporal factors before determining whether or not something is an empire. If it doesn’t last, and if it doesn’t cover enough territory, it is not an empire. This is one important and difficult set of factors to distinguish between when asking questions about US empire in comparison to other historical instances of empire. For example, the world of the British was much “smaller” when they were an empire, the world of Athens, much smaller still.
“How does this [the distinction between empire, imperialism and hegemony] relate to the question of whether the United States is now an empire or a hegemon? The first point to be made is that the distinction between the two is much more fluid than it I soften assumed. If we take interference in the internal affairs of smaller states as the only hallmark of imperiality, and a basic lack of interest in their internal affairs as integral to hegemony, then the United States has been an empire since President Carter launched his human rights offensive, but was a hegemon in the preceding period when it tolerated military dictatorships even within NATO” (46).
The Augustan Threshold: The period when an empire goes from ascent to decline and when it moves from plundering the periphery to “civilizing” it.
What is the difference between empire and state? What is the difference between empire and imperialism? What is the difference between hegemony and empire? Is the US an empire?
Munkler begins by exploring what is not an empire. “First, an empire must be distinguished from a state…which operates according to completely different imperatives and a completely different action logic” (4-5). “Empires have no neighbours which they recognize as equals, that is, as possessing equal rights; with states, by contrast, this is the rule” (5). “Whoever thinks of imperiality as simply an alternative to statehood will come to the conclusion that no empires exist today. Whoever, on the contrary, proceeds from the superimposition of imperial structures on the state order will encounter structures of power and influence not identical to those of the state” (6).
“Second, empire must be delineated in contrast to hegemonic structures of dominance…Hegemony is supr3emacy within a group of formally equal political players; imperiality, by contrast, dissolves this…equality and reduces subordinates to the status of client states or satellites” (6).
“Third…empire may be delineated in contrast to what has since the nineteenth century been called imperialism…’Imperialism’ means that there is a will to empire” (8).
In addition, one must consider both spatial and temporal factors before determining whether or not something is an empire. If it doesn’t last, and if it doesn’t cover enough territory, it is not an empire. This is one important and difficult set of factors to distinguish between when asking questions about US empire in comparison to other historical instances of empire. For example, the world of the British was much “smaller” when they were an empire, the world of Athens, much smaller still.
“How does this [the distinction between empire, imperialism and hegemony] relate to the question of whether the United States is now an empire or a hegemon? The first point to be made is that the distinction between the two is much more fluid than it I soften assumed. If we take interference in the internal affairs of smaller states as the only hallmark of imperiality, and a basic lack of interest in their internal affairs as integral to hegemony, then the United States has been an empire since President Carter launched his human rights offensive, but was a hegemon in the preceding period when it tolerated military dictatorships even within NATO” (46).
The Augustan Threshold: The period when an empire goes from ascent to decline and when it moves from plundering the periphery to “civilizing” it.
Monday, September 8, 2008
Donnelly: Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy
Donnelly, J., 2006. Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society. European Journal Of International Relations, 12(2), 139-170.
“Is America an empire in fact or in the making? This article attempts to elaborate the conceptual resources required to answer such questions. I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality—concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical or even dismiss as self-contradictory” (139).
Empire in history: began through Roman usage, taken from a Greek word approximating rule. Adapted in the middle ages to create a separation between the power of the pope and the king. Empire: “…an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140).
Donnelly’s focus is highlighting traditional core-periphery polities, not exploring the more distinct and recent discussion of empire, for example, that of Hardt and Negri.
Hierarchy in Anarchy:
Waltz presents hierarchy and anarchy as dichotomous. “Rather than thinking of anarchy or hierarchy we should attend instead to hierarchy in anarchy” (141).
Figure 1: (143).
All quadrants except the bottom right are in anarchy.
“Confusion over hierarchy is exacerbated by the common association of anarchy with sovereign equality. As Waltz puts it, ‘formally, each is the equal of all others’ (1979: 88). Even David Lake, who is particularly sensitive to elements o hierarchy in international relations, equates anarchy with sovereign equality, describing ‘anarchic institutions’ as ‘those premised upon the full sovereignty of all members’ (2001: 130)” (144).
Historical account of the transformation and growth of sovereignty. Practices such as outlaw states, semi-sovereignty (servitudes, imperfect unions, financial controls, etc.) formal and informal inequalities, etc.
10 models of hierarchy in anarchy: balance of power, protection/guarantee, concert, collective security, hegemony, dominion, empire, pluralistic security, common security and amalgamated security (See Figure 2) (154).
“Contemporary America is indeed something of a colossus…It is not, however an empire” (157).
“Iraq can be read as a fairly conventional exercise in Quadrant III unipolar balance of power politics; self-help by the biggest ‘self’ on the block, without any special (formal or informal) rights” (159). “…consider the controversy over Guantanamo, which has appeared prominently in many arguments of American imperialism. In fact, it shows Quadrant III unipolar unilateralism. Empires set the rules. They do not need to assert awkward, implausible and almost universally rejected expectations for themselves. A state that cannot obtain widespread endorsement of its preferred international norms ins not an empire. A state that can’t even get grudging acquiescence by its leading ‘allies’ is not even much of a hegemon” (160).
“Is America an empire in fact or in the making? This article attempts to elaborate the conceptual resources required to answer such questions. I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality—concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical or even dismiss as self-contradictory” (139).
Empire in history: began through Roman usage, taken from a Greek word approximating rule. Adapted in the middle ages to create a separation between the power of the pope and the king. Empire: “…an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140).
Donnelly’s focus is highlighting traditional core-periphery polities, not exploring the more distinct and recent discussion of empire, for example, that of Hardt and Negri.
Hierarchy in Anarchy:
Waltz presents hierarchy and anarchy as dichotomous. “Rather than thinking of anarchy or hierarchy we should attend instead to hierarchy in anarchy” (141).
Figure 1: (143).
All quadrants except the bottom right are in anarchy.
“Confusion over hierarchy is exacerbated by the common association of anarchy with sovereign equality. As Waltz puts it, ‘formally, each is the equal of all others’ (1979: 88). Even David Lake, who is particularly sensitive to elements o hierarchy in international relations, equates anarchy with sovereign equality, describing ‘anarchic institutions’ as ‘those premised upon the full sovereignty of all members’ (2001: 130)” (144).
Historical account of the transformation and growth of sovereignty. Practices such as outlaw states, semi-sovereignty (servitudes, imperfect unions, financial controls, etc.) formal and informal inequalities, etc.
10 models of hierarchy in anarchy: balance of power, protection/guarantee, concert, collective security, hegemony, dominion, empire, pluralistic security, common security and amalgamated security (See Figure 2) (154).
“Contemporary America is indeed something of a colossus…It is not, however an empire” (157).
“Iraq can be read as a fairly conventional exercise in Quadrant III unipolar balance of power politics; self-help by the biggest ‘self’ on the block, without any special (formal or informal) rights” (159). “…consider the controversy over Guantanamo, which has appeared prominently in many arguments of American imperialism. In fact, it shows Quadrant III unipolar unilateralism. Empires set the rules. They do not need to assert awkward, implausible and almost universally rejected expectations for themselves. A state that cannot obtain widespread endorsement of its preferred international norms ins not an empire. A state that can’t even get grudging acquiescence by its leading ‘allies’ is not even much of a hegemon” (160).
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
Donnelly: Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society
Donnelly, Jack. (2006). "Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society". European Journal Of International Relations, 12(2), 139-170. http://www.csa.com/ids70/gateway.php?mode=pdf&doi=10.1177%2F1354066106064505&db=sagepol-set-c&s1=80ee883868977a98ef5390896262f864&s2=aba9bbf7ab98695f11b9924f219fa0de
“I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality — concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical, or even dismiss as selfcontradictory” (139).
Donnelly argues in this piece that most current understandings of US power and empire are lacking. He deploys an approach that seeks to examine a more nuanced view of international society, one that allows for hierarchy to exist in international anarchy and one that sees sovereign states as not always participating with the same bundle of basic rights. He is also critical of views of American empire, which tend to lightly gloss over important traditional definitions and understandings that emphasize rule over others.
He begins by tracing out the etymology of the word empire and finding that it is derived from the Latin “imperium”, which was translated into the Greek arche (rule). Initially, this was used to describe the Roman republic as it moved away from its earlier republic status.
He claims that we still need the concept: “But we still need ‘empire’ to describe an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140). His definition of empire requires a central rule over previously autonomous international agents and states. He dismisses the Hardt and Negri empire account as missing the broader point derived from the original meaning.
Waltz then makes an appearance in this text. Donnelly highlights Waltz’s account of hierarchy and anarchy operating as ordering principles. Instead, Donnelly claims that we should not focus on hierarchy or anarchy, but rather that we should be looking for hierarchy in anarchy. Also, he claims that Waltz is formally wrong in that he identifies hierarchy as being the opposite of anarchy, when it is really archy, or rule.
The nature of the distinction between hierarchy and anarchy is then explored. Waltz’s approach presents hierarchy and anarchy as being polar opposites. This, Donnelly claims, is empirically false and problematic. Firstly, hierarchy is not the opposite of anarchy, but rather its opposite is archy, or simply rule/governance. Donnelly explores a domestic government situation to make a comparison: the congress is not subordinate to the executive branch, though there is hierarchy in different realms. There is hierarchy, but clearly there is not rule.
He then creates a 2x2 quadrant that examines the current realities of empire. The x axis is authority, whether it is coordinated or not. The y axis is system polarity. The highly coordinated authority and low polarity system represents an empire like Rome/Athens. The highly coordinated multi-polarity, in Donnelly’s example, the Concert of Rome, represents a situation that is similar to the current US relation vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
Different forms of sovereign inequality are examined in order to make a clear distinction between un-equal measures and international arrangements from empire. There have been myriad cases and examples of nations that did not enjoy fully sovereign status. These nations were not able to exercise the same amount of sovereign rights as were fully sovereign nations. However, this does not signify that these nations were being fully controlled by the more fully sovereign nations. Instead, this simply signified that there was international inequality.
There is then an examination of the typological movement from hegemony to domination to empire. There is much in this section detailing different possible characteristics of international society. In terms of an overview of possible international systems, it is quite helpful.
Donnelly then examines the recent war in Iraq with an eye towards the arguments that it involves an exercise of empirical powers. He finds that the justification for the war relied on standard non-proliferation discussions, though they were followed up with physical intervention, which has not been the norm. This could simply represent a change in the international regime of non-proliferation from a static, sanction imposition institution to one with more teeth and more propensity for action. Additionally, some critics of US policy in Iraq point to the Coalition of the Willing as an example of US empiric powers. This is simply false, as, while some nations were bribed and broadly coerced, none were ruled or directed to join. This is not an example of empirical rule, but simply hegemonic dominance and coercion. Regional control is another metric used to evaluate the degree of empirical power by some, but Iraq is again a poor example of this. The US is unable to gain influence in this region to really any degree, as this can be seen by Syria and Iran’s explicit refusal to bow to US interest. Most interestingly, this lack of influence can be seen in Iraq’s refusal to support the US in its policy towards Israel. This is not an empire, but a materially rich, ideationally weak nation trying to impose its will upon others with limited success.
“I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality — concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical, or even dismiss as selfcontradictory” (139).
Donnelly argues in this piece that most current understandings of US power and empire are lacking. He deploys an approach that seeks to examine a more nuanced view of international society, one that allows for hierarchy to exist in international anarchy and one that sees sovereign states as not always participating with the same bundle of basic rights. He is also critical of views of American empire, which tend to lightly gloss over important traditional definitions and understandings that emphasize rule over others.
He begins by tracing out the etymology of the word empire and finding that it is derived from the Latin “imperium”, which was translated into the Greek arche (rule). Initially, this was used to describe the Roman republic as it moved away from its earlier republic status.
He claims that we still need the concept: “But we still need ‘empire’ to describe an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140). His definition of empire requires a central rule over previously autonomous international agents and states. He dismisses the Hardt and Negri empire account as missing the broader point derived from the original meaning.
Waltz then makes an appearance in this text. Donnelly highlights Waltz’s account of hierarchy and anarchy operating as ordering principles. Instead, Donnelly claims that we should not focus on hierarchy or anarchy, but rather that we should be looking for hierarchy in anarchy. Also, he claims that Waltz is formally wrong in that he identifies hierarchy as being the opposite of anarchy, when it is really archy, or rule.
The nature of the distinction between hierarchy and anarchy is then explored. Waltz’s approach presents hierarchy and anarchy as being polar opposites. This, Donnelly claims, is empirically false and problematic. Firstly, hierarchy is not the opposite of anarchy, but rather its opposite is archy, or simply rule/governance. Donnelly explores a domestic government situation to make a comparison: the congress is not subordinate to the executive branch, though there is hierarchy in different realms. There is hierarchy, but clearly there is not rule.
He then creates a 2x2 quadrant that examines the current realities of empire. The x axis is authority, whether it is coordinated or not. The y axis is system polarity. The highly coordinated authority and low polarity system represents an empire like Rome/Athens. The highly coordinated multi-polarity, in Donnelly’s example, the Concert of Rome, represents a situation that is similar to the current US relation vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
Different forms of sovereign inequality are examined in order to make a clear distinction between un-equal measures and international arrangements from empire. There have been myriad cases and examples of nations that did not enjoy fully sovereign status. These nations were not able to exercise the same amount of sovereign rights as were fully sovereign nations. However, this does not signify that these nations were being fully controlled by the more fully sovereign nations. Instead, this simply signified that there was international inequality.
There is then an examination of the typological movement from hegemony to domination to empire. There is much in this section detailing different possible characteristics of international society. In terms of an overview of possible international systems, it is quite helpful.
Donnelly then examines the recent war in Iraq with an eye towards the arguments that it involves an exercise of empirical powers. He finds that the justification for the war relied on standard non-proliferation discussions, though they were followed up with physical intervention, which has not been the norm. This could simply represent a change in the international regime of non-proliferation from a static, sanction imposition institution to one with more teeth and more propensity for action. Additionally, some critics of US policy in Iraq point to the Coalition of the Willing as an example of US empiric powers. This is simply false, as, while some nations were bribed and broadly coerced, none were ruled or directed to join. This is not an example of empirical rule, but simply hegemonic dominance and coercion. Regional control is another metric used to evaluate the degree of empirical power by some, but Iraq is again a poor example of this. The US is unable to gain influence in this region to really any degree, as this can be seen by Syria and Iran’s explicit refusal to bow to US interest. Most interestingly, this lack of influence can be seen in Iraq’s refusal to support the US in its policy towards Israel. This is not an empire, but a materially rich, ideationally weak nation trying to impose its will upon others with limited success.
Nexton et. al.: What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate
Nexon, Daniel H., & Wright, Thomas. (2007). What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate (Vol. 101, 253-271): Cambridge Journals Online.
“Empires, we argue, are characterized by rule through intermediaries and the existence of distinctive contractual relations between cores and their peripheries. These features endow them with a distinctive network-structure from those associated with unipolar and hegemonic orders. The existence of imperial relations alters the dynamics of international politics: processes of divide and rule supplant the balance-of-power mechanism; the major axis of relations shift from interstate to those among imperial authorities, local intermediaries, and other peripheral actors; and preeminent powers face special problems of legitimating their bargains across heterogeneous audiences” (253)
This article take the debate about empires and makes the case that America is not an empire because it does not exhibit many of the characteristics of previous empires, specifically those of direct, territorial rule. This argument is fleshed out by providing examples of different forms of organization in international society. “We argue that ideal-typical empires, contra Ferguson, differ from hegemonic and uni-polar orders because they combine two features: rule through intermediaries and heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities”(253). However, while it is not a formal empire, it does exhibit many characteristics of an informal empire.
The authors identify three types of approaches to understanding an international system with a dominant player. There is the uni-polar system, where one country represents the strongest player in the international system. Many who theorize about this feature of international organization do so with assumptions of anarchy and rational agency. Some believe that this represents a stable form of international societal organization. Another form of international organization is that of hegemony, which can be understood and theorized in many ways. Many see this form of organization requiring the hegemonic leader to control economic, military and technological aspects of global interaction. The third form of international control is empire.
The authors then expand upon the notion of empire and imperial rule. They claim that it focuses on policies of divide and rule. They use Moytl’s construction of empire as a hub and spokes with no rim between the core and periphery. This form of empire works well, until, that is, the periphery begins to communicate with one another and thus opens up the opportunity for increased resistance. They explain that empires can operate through channels of informal rule.
They then approach the American Empire question: “It follows that questions such as “is America an empire?” or “is the international system an imperial one?” obscure more than they reveal. The problem of contemporary empire (American or otherwise) hinges, rather, on the degree to which specific relations—–among polities, between polities and nonstate actors, and in specific policy arenas—–look more or less like those associated with ideal-typical empires” (266). And, “Whenever relations between or among two or more political organizations involve indirect rule and heterogeneous contracting, their interactions will develop at least some of the dynamics associated with imperial control” (266). And, “…influence, exercised routinely and consistently, becomes indistinguishable from indirect rule. In informal empires the lines between influence and rule necessarily blur. When actors believe that certain options are “off the table” because of an asymmetric (if tacit) contract, or consistently comply with the wishes of another
because they recognize steep costs from noncompliance, then the relationship between the two becomes effectively one between ruler and ruled” (266).
Also, there is a focus on institutional power. Units must be understood as something broader than states, as this is a limited metric. Intuitions have a clearly structural dimension. Predominant powers can choose to organize the world in different ways.
“Empires, we argue, are characterized by rule through intermediaries and the existence of distinctive contractual relations between cores and their peripheries. These features endow them with a distinctive network-structure from those associated with unipolar and hegemonic orders. The existence of imperial relations alters the dynamics of international politics: processes of divide and rule supplant the balance-of-power mechanism; the major axis of relations shift from interstate to those among imperial authorities, local intermediaries, and other peripheral actors; and preeminent powers face special problems of legitimating their bargains across heterogeneous audiences” (253)
This article take the debate about empires and makes the case that America is not an empire because it does not exhibit many of the characteristics of previous empires, specifically those of direct, territorial rule. This argument is fleshed out by providing examples of different forms of organization in international society. “We argue that ideal-typical empires, contra Ferguson, differ from hegemonic and uni-polar orders because they combine two features: rule through intermediaries and heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities”(253). However, while it is not a formal empire, it does exhibit many characteristics of an informal empire.
The authors identify three types of approaches to understanding an international system with a dominant player. There is the uni-polar system, where one country represents the strongest player in the international system. Many who theorize about this feature of international organization do so with assumptions of anarchy and rational agency. Some believe that this represents a stable form of international societal organization. Another form of international organization is that of hegemony, which can be understood and theorized in many ways. Many see this form of organization requiring the hegemonic leader to control economic, military and technological aspects of global interaction. The third form of international control is empire.
The authors then expand upon the notion of empire and imperial rule. They claim that it focuses on policies of divide and rule. They use Moytl’s construction of empire as a hub and spokes with no rim between the core and periphery. This form of empire works well, until, that is, the periphery begins to communicate with one another and thus opens up the opportunity for increased resistance. They explain that empires can operate through channels of informal rule.
They then approach the American Empire question: “It follows that questions such as “is America an empire?” or “is the international system an imperial one?” obscure more than they reveal. The problem of contemporary empire (American or otherwise) hinges, rather, on the degree to which specific relations—–among polities, between polities and nonstate actors, and in specific policy arenas—–look more or less like those associated with ideal-typical empires” (266). And, “Whenever relations between or among two or more political organizations involve indirect rule and heterogeneous contracting, their interactions will develop at least some of the dynamics associated with imperial control” (266). And, “…influence, exercised routinely and consistently, becomes indistinguishable from indirect rule. In informal empires the lines between influence and rule necessarily blur. When actors believe that certain options are “off the table” because of an asymmetric (if tacit) contract, or consistently comply with the wishes of another
because they recognize steep costs from noncompliance, then the relationship between the two becomes effectively one between ruler and ruled” (266).
Also, there is a focus on institutional power. Units must be understood as something broader than states, as this is a limited metric. Intuitions have a clearly structural dimension. Predominant powers can choose to organize the world in different ways.
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