Lake, DA. 1987. Review Essay: Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of North-South Relations. International Studies Quarterly: 217-234.
Reviews Hart's book and Krasner's article. Both take a position against world systems theory and dependency theory by positing the neglected role of power in establishing north-south relations. "The policies of North-South relations, these two authors tell us, are not economically predetermined. Power and bargaining matter both analytically and practically" (218).
"Realists assume, first, that the international system is anarchic, or composed of sovereign states responsible to no higher authority; second, that states are rational, unitary actors; and, third, that states seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power" (218).
The article continues and expands upon these assumptions by exploring the NIEO.
Showing posts with label Realism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Realism. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
Sunday, March 15, 2009
Gilpin: The Political Economy of International Relations
Gilpin, R, and JM Gilpin. 1987. The political economy of international relations. Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ.
"Over the past century and a half, the ideologies of liberalism, nationalism and Marxism have divided humanity...The conflict among these three moral and intellectual positions has revolved around the role and significance of the market in the organization of society and economic affairs" (25).
"These three ideologies are fundamentally different in their conceptions of the relationships among society, state, and market, and it may not be an exaggeration to say that every controversy in the field of international political economy is ultimately reducible to differing conceptions of these relationships" (25).
The word "ideology" is explicitly used to reference these different schools of thought because the word "theory" doesn't carry enough weight. Ideology captures the relationship between the positive and the normative.
"Although scholars have produced a number of 'theories' to explain the relationship of economics and politics, these three stand out and have had a profound influence on scholarship and political affairs. In highly oversimplified terms, economic nationalism...which developed from the practice of statesmen in the early modern period, assumes and advocates the primacy of politics over economics. It is essentially a doctrine of state-building and asserts that the market should be subordinate to the pursuit of state interests. It argues that political factors do, or at least should, determine economic relations. Liberalism, which emerged from the Enlightenment in the writings of Adam Smith and others, was a reaction to mercantilism and has become embodied in orthodox economics. It assumes that politics and economics exist, at least ideally, in separate spheres; it argues that markets--in the interest of efficiency, growth, and consumer choice--should be free from political interference. Marxism, which appeared in the mid-nineteenth century as a reaction against liberalism and classical economics, holds that economics drives politics. Political conflict arises from struggle among classes over the distribution of wealth. Hence, political conflict will crease with the elimination of the market and of a society of classes" (25).
"All forms of economic liberalism...are committed to the market and the price mechanism as the most efficacious means for organizing domestic and international economic relations" (27).
Assumptions: spontaneous market development; individuals form the foundation of society; they are rational in a specific way; there is free information; there is a tendency towards stability; there are always absolute gains to trade.
Nationalism: "Its central idea is that economic activities are and should be subordinate to the goal of state building and the interests of the state. All nationalists ascribe to the primacy of the state, of national security, and of military power in the organization and functioning of the international system" (31).
Viner (1958) quote: "'I believe that practically all mercantilists, whatever the period, country, or status of the particular individual, would have subscribed to all of the following propositions: (1) wealth is an absolutely essential means to power, whether for security or for aggression; (2) power is essential or valuable as a means to the acquisition or retention of wealth; (3) wealth and power are each proper ultimate ends of national policy; (4) there is long-run harmony between these ends, although in particular circumstances it may be necessary for a time to make economic sacrifices in the interest of military security and therefore also of long-run prosperity'" (32).
"Whereas liberal writers generally view the pursuit of power and wealth...as involving a tradeoff, nationalists tend to regard the two goals as being complementary" (32). (this passage references Knorr (1944))
The nationalist is keenly interested in industrialization.
"As Robert Heilbroner (1980) has argued, despite the existence of...different Marxisms, four essential elements can be found in the overall corpus of Marxist writings. The first element is the dialectical approach to knowledge and society that defines the nature of reality as dynamic and conflictual; social disequilibria and consequent change are due to the class struggle and the working out of contradictions inherent in social and political phenomena...The second element is a materialist approach to history...The third is a general view of capitalist development; the capitalist mode of production and its destiny are governed by a set of 'economic laws of motion of modern society.' The fourth is a normative commitment to socialism" (35).
"In a world of competing states, the nationalist considers relative gain to be more important than mutual gain" (33).
Thursday, December 4, 2008
Krasner: Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism
SD Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (University of California Press, 1985).
The standard story told about North-South relations is that the South is poor, wants more wealth, and that the North should help them go about achieving this. Krasner tells a different tale. Not only do Southern countries want wealth, they also want power and influence. They are out to mitigate vulnerabilities and exploit opportunities. They do this through the promotion of trade regimes that are geared towards authoritative allocation in place of market-based allocation policies. "For developing countries, authoritative international regimes are attractive because they can provide more stable and predictable transaction flows" (5).
Firstly, Southern countries achieve this by promoting regimes that are structured towards one-country one-vote policies. Secondly, these states have fought to expand the role of sovereignty (6). They are successful in accomplishing these changes based on the role of three variables identified by Krasner: "...the nature of existing institutional structures; the ability to formulate a coherent system of ideas...and the attitude and power of the North...toward both the demands of the South and the forums in which they have been made" (7).
Krasner separates Southern behavior into either relational power strategies or meta-power strategies. The later represent strategies that attempt to change the status quo.
Ch 2: The Structural Causes of Third World Strategy
This chapter outlines domestic and international structural arguments for why Southern countries would be interested in changing international regimes in the interesting of mitigating vulnerability and improving their power position. It is relatively standard Realist fare, though the focus on two distinct levels of analysis vis-a-vis structure is unique. It ends with a case study of Mexico.
The standard story told about North-South relations is that the South is poor, wants more wealth, and that the North should help them go about achieving this. Krasner tells a different tale. Not only do Southern countries want wealth, they also want power and influence. They are out to mitigate vulnerabilities and exploit opportunities. They do this through the promotion of trade regimes that are geared towards authoritative allocation in place of market-based allocation policies. "For developing countries, authoritative international regimes are attractive because they can provide more stable and predictable transaction flows" (5).
Firstly, Southern countries achieve this by promoting regimes that are structured towards one-country one-vote policies. Secondly, these states have fought to expand the role of sovereignty (6). They are successful in accomplishing these changes based on the role of three variables identified by Krasner: "...the nature of existing institutional structures; the ability to formulate a coherent system of ideas...and the attitude and power of the North...toward both the demands of the South and the forums in which they have been made" (7).
Krasner separates Southern behavior into either relational power strategies or meta-power strategies. The later represent strategies that attempt to change the status quo.
Ch 2: The Structural Causes of Third World Strategy
This chapter outlines domestic and international structural arguments for why Southern countries would be interested in changing international regimes in the interesting of mitigating vulnerability and improving their power position. It is relatively standard Realist fare, though the focus on two distinct levels of analysis vis-a-vis structure is unique. It ends with a case study of Mexico.
Wednesday, December 3, 2008
Keohane and Nye: Power and Interdependence
RO Keohane and JS Nye, Power and interdependence (Longman New York, 2001).
"We live in an era of interdependence. This vague phrase expresses a poorly understood but widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing" (3).
Some see the traditional state as unraveling and being supplanted by newer actors. Traditionalists call this view "globaloney", according to the authors (3).
"Our task in this book is not to argue either the modernist or traditionalist position. Because our era is marked by both continuity and change, this would be fruitless. Rather, our task is to provide a means fo distilling and blending the wisdom in both positions by developing a coherent theoretical framework for the political analysis of interdependence" (4).
The authors explore how increasing economic interdependence is changing politics. They also are interested in how politics is changing the nature of economic interdependence, and refer to governmental programs and actions designed to create procedures, rules, etc., as international regimes. They wonder how and why these international regimes are alter over time.
They explore the rhetoric of interdependence.
Some believe that interdependence will lessen conflict. This is naïve, and interdependence could just as easily increase conflict. This empirical question aside, the more likely claim is that interdependence will change the nature of conflict. Also, interdependnece is not synonymous with mutual benefit. Cases of mutual dependence, where both do not benefit but both are still wedded represent interdependence. Also, interdependence will change the cost of interaction because it has the potential to restrict autonomy.
The authors explore the distinction between joint gains and how those gains are divided. Economists typically address the former, not the later.
"We must therefore be cautious about the prospect that rising interdependence is creating a brave new world of cooperation to replace the bad old world of international conflict" (10).
Power and Interdependence:
"Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do...Power can also be conceived in terms of control over outcomes. In either case, measurement is not simple" (11).
The authors make a distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability. The former is how responsive changes in one country make impacts in other countries. "Sensitivity interdependence is created by interactions within a framework of policies" (12). "Vulnerability can be defined as an actor's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered...Vulnerability dependence can be measured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time" (13).
International Regime Change:
International regimes are not insignificant, though they may lack serious teeth, ie., enforcement mechanisms.
"International regimes are intermediate factors between the power structure of an international system and the political and economic bargaining that takes place within it. The structure of the system...profoundly affects the nature of the regime...The regime, in turn, affects and to some extent governs the political bargaining and daily decision-making that occurs within the system" (21).
Ch 2: Realism and Complex Interdependence:
"The realist assumptions about world politics can be seen as defining an extreme set of conditions or ideal type. One could also imagine very different conditions. In this chapter, we shall construct another ideal type, the opposite of realism. We call it complex interdependence" (23).
Realists focus on power and international anarchy.
Three factors give rise to complex interdependence: linkage strategies; agenda setting; transnational and transgovernmental relations.
"We live in an era of interdependence. This vague phrase expresses a poorly understood but widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing" (3).
Some see the traditional state as unraveling and being supplanted by newer actors. Traditionalists call this view "globaloney", according to the authors (3).
"Our task in this book is not to argue either the modernist or traditionalist position. Because our era is marked by both continuity and change, this would be fruitless. Rather, our task is to provide a means fo distilling and blending the wisdom in both positions by developing a coherent theoretical framework for the political analysis of interdependence" (4).
The authors explore how increasing economic interdependence is changing politics. They also are interested in how politics is changing the nature of economic interdependence, and refer to governmental programs and actions designed to create procedures, rules, etc., as international regimes. They wonder how and why these international regimes are alter over time.
They explore the rhetoric of interdependence.
Some believe that interdependence will lessen conflict. This is naïve, and interdependence could just as easily increase conflict. This empirical question aside, the more likely claim is that interdependence will change the nature of conflict. Also, interdependnece is not synonymous with mutual benefit. Cases of mutual dependence, where both do not benefit but both are still wedded represent interdependence. Also, interdependence will change the cost of interaction because it has the potential to restrict autonomy.
The authors explore the distinction between joint gains and how those gains are divided. Economists typically address the former, not the later.
"We must therefore be cautious about the prospect that rising interdependence is creating a brave new world of cooperation to replace the bad old world of international conflict" (10).
Power and Interdependence:
"Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do...Power can also be conceived in terms of control over outcomes. In either case, measurement is not simple" (11).
The authors make a distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability. The former is how responsive changes in one country make impacts in other countries. "Sensitivity interdependence is created by interactions within a framework of policies" (12). "Vulnerability can be defined as an actor's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered...Vulnerability dependence can be measured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time" (13).
International Regime Change:
International regimes are not insignificant, though they may lack serious teeth, ie., enforcement mechanisms.
"International regimes are intermediate factors between the power structure of an international system and the political and economic bargaining that takes place within it. The structure of the system...profoundly affects the nature of the regime...The regime, in turn, affects and to some extent governs the political bargaining and daily decision-making that occurs within the system" (21).
Ch 2: Realism and Complex Interdependence:
"The realist assumptions about world politics can be seen as defining an extreme set of conditions or ideal type. One could also imagine very different conditions. In this chapter, we shall construct another ideal type, the opposite of realism. We call it complex interdependence" (23).
Realists focus on power and international anarchy.
Three factors give rise to complex interdependence: linkage strategies; agenda setting; transnational and transgovernmental relations.
Friday, October 10, 2008
Gilpin: A Realist Perspective on International Governance
Gilpin, R., 2002. A Realist Perspective on International Governance. Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, 237-248.
Realist believe that the territorial state continues to be the primary actor in both domestic and international affairs. While there are other players, the state makes the most important decisions. Realist reject the popular belief that economic and technological forces have eclipsed the nation state and are creating a global economy and society in which political boundaries and national loyalties are no longer relevant. Even in a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favorable to their own national interests and the interests of their citizenry. There is no evidence that a transformation in human affairs has yet occurred or is even occurring. It is unlikely that, if the state does disappear, that it will be replaced by a global governance structure. Gilpin argues that, even though econ and tech advances lead to more world order, they do not overcome the fundamental anarchic nature of the int’l system.
Three views of global governance: Focus on new medievalism. Based on the assumption that the state and the state system have been undermined by economic, technological and other developments; the state and state system are being eclipse by non-governmental actors and by the emergence of an int’l civil society.
They conclude that such changes erode hierarchical organizations and undermine centralized power structures. The once dominant hierarchic order of nation states is being supplanted by horizontal networks composed of states, non governmental organizations and international institutions.
Counter with the fact that the nation state has been around for over three centuries and that NGO activity only begin heavily two decades ago. No one can know the future nature of NGOs. Could be that there are bad NGOs that develop. The Basel accord achieved much, but it does not prove that governance can replace government. The US used the Basel Accords and drove them to their personal ends. Governance without teeth is not effective.
Realist believe that the territorial state continues to be the primary actor in both domestic and international affairs. While there are other players, the state makes the most important decisions. Realist reject the popular belief that economic and technological forces have eclipsed the nation state and are creating a global economy and society in which political boundaries and national loyalties are no longer relevant. Even in a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favorable to their own national interests and the interests of their citizenry. There is no evidence that a transformation in human affairs has yet occurred or is even occurring. It is unlikely that, if the state does disappear, that it will be replaced by a global governance structure. Gilpin argues that, even though econ and tech advances lead to more world order, they do not overcome the fundamental anarchic nature of the int’l system.
Three views of global governance: Focus on new medievalism. Based on the assumption that the state and the state system have been undermined by economic, technological and other developments; the state and state system are being eclipse by non-governmental actors and by the emergence of an int’l civil society.
They conclude that such changes erode hierarchical organizations and undermine centralized power structures. The once dominant hierarchic order of nation states is being supplanted by horizontal networks composed of states, non governmental organizations and international institutions.
Counter with the fact that the nation state has been around for over three centuries and that NGO activity only begin heavily two decades ago. No one can know the future nature of NGOs. Could be that there are bad NGOs that develop. The Basel accord achieved much, but it does not prove that governance can replace government. The US used the Basel Accords and drove them to their personal ends. Governance without teeth is not effective.
Wednesday, October 8, 2008
Layne: Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace
Layne, C., 2007. Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.
Layne begins, as many do, by highlighting how deeply embedded the concept of the democratic peace has become in international politics and foreign policy. For example, he highlights Russett’s statement that it may actually be possible to overcome the traditional realist constraints of anarchy and a self-help international society through the democratic peace.
Layne explores whether or not realist theory or democratic peace theory is actually more able to describe and explain behavior. The author presents democratic peace as being either structural or normative. The structural account deals with, “…the restraining effects of public opinion, or of the checks and balances embedded in the democratic state’s domestic politics structure” (6). The account of the normative driver of democratic peace is also explored. This driver posits that, “…democratic norms and culture—a shared commitment to the peaceful adjudication of political disputes—that accounts for the absence of war between democratic states” (6). Layne argues that the structural account is weak, and that this puts the onus of explanation on the normative account.
“This article’s centerpiece is a test of the competing explanations of international outcomes offered by democratic peace theory and by realism. This test is based on case studies of four ‘near misses’—crises where two democratic states almost went to war with each other” (7).
“I conclude that realism is superior to democratic peace theory as a predictor of international outcomes. Indeed, democratic peace theory appears to have extremely little explanatory power in the cases studied…I conclude by discussing democratic peace theory’s troublesome implications for post-Cold War American foreign policy” (8).
The four case studies explored are those of near-misses among democratic great powers.
Layne begins, as many do, by highlighting how deeply embedded the concept of the democratic peace has become in international politics and foreign policy. For example, he highlights Russett’s statement that it may actually be possible to overcome the traditional realist constraints of anarchy and a self-help international society through the democratic peace.
Layne explores whether or not realist theory or democratic peace theory is actually more able to describe and explain behavior. The author presents democratic peace as being either structural or normative. The structural account deals with, “…the restraining effects of public opinion, or of the checks and balances embedded in the democratic state’s domestic politics structure” (6). The account of the normative driver of democratic peace is also explored. This driver posits that, “…democratic norms and culture—a shared commitment to the peaceful adjudication of political disputes—that accounts for the absence of war between democratic states” (6). Layne argues that the structural account is weak, and that this puts the onus of explanation on the normative account.
“This article’s centerpiece is a test of the competing explanations of international outcomes offered by democratic peace theory and by realism. This test is based on case studies of four ‘near misses’—crises where two democratic states almost went to war with each other” (7).
“I conclude that realism is superior to democratic peace theory as a predictor of international outcomes. Indeed, democratic peace theory appears to have extremely little explanatory power in the cases studied…I conclude by discussing democratic peace theory’s troublesome implications for post-Cold War American foreign policy” (8).
The four case studies explored are those of near-misses among democratic great powers.
Friday, September 26, 2008
Mearsheimer: Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War
Mearsheimer, J., 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), 5-56.
“The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely viewed as harbingers of a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than four decades is lifting…This article assess this optimistic view by exploring in detail the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. Specifically, I examine the effects of a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end” (5).
“I argue that the p0rospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years” (6).
“Specifically, the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the Continent; the rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe…and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal” (6-7).
“Four principal scenarios are possible. Under the first scenario, Europe would become nuclear-free, thus eliminating a central pillar of order in the Cold War era. Under the second scenario, the European states do not expand their arsenals to compensate for the departure of the superpowers’ weapons. IN a third scenario, nuclear proliferation takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are taken to dampen the many dangers inherent in the proliferation process…In the fourth and least dangerous scenario, nuclear weapons proliferate in Europe, but the process is well-managed by the current nuclear powers. They take steps to deter preventative strikes on emerging nuclear powers, to set boundaries on the proliferation process…This outcome probably provides the best hope for maintaining peace in Europe” (8).
He then highlights the possibility of three counter arguments being posited. The first is the standard liberal claim that economic interdependence will reduce conflict. The second is democratic peace considerations. The third involves a degree of collective self-awareness amongst Europeans. “But the theories behind these arguments are flawed, as I explain; hence their prediction of peace in a multipolar Europe is flawed as well” (8).
The pre-1945 Europe was quite violent because there were no nuclear weapons and there was a multipolar world. The post 45 world was more peaceful because of bipolarity. “A bipolar system is more peaceful for three main reasons. First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely” (14).
Mearsheimer supports these theses in the remainder of the text.
“The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely viewed as harbingers of a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than four decades is lifting…This article assess this optimistic view by exploring in detail the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. Specifically, I examine the effects of a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end” (5).
“I argue that the p0rospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years” (6).
“Specifically, the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the Continent; the rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe…and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal” (6-7).
“Four principal scenarios are possible. Under the first scenario, Europe would become nuclear-free, thus eliminating a central pillar of order in the Cold War era. Under the second scenario, the European states do not expand their arsenals to compensate for the departure of the superpowers’ weapons. IN a third scenario, nuclear proliferation takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are taken to dampen the many dangers inherent in the proliferation process…In the fourth and least dangerous scenario, nuclear weapons proliferate in Europe, but the process is well-managed by the current nuclear powers. They take steps to deter preventative strikes on emerging nuclear powers, to set boundaries on the proliferation process…This outcome probably provides the best hope for maintaining peace in Europe” (8).
He then highlights the possibility of three counter arguments being posited. The first is the standard liberal claim that economic interdependence will reduce conflict. The second is democratic peace considerations. The third involves a degree of collective self-awareness amongst Europeans. “But the theories behind these arguments are flawed, as I explain; hence their prediction of peace in a multipolar Europe is flawed as well” (8).
The pre-1945 Europe was quite violent because there were no nuclear weapons and there was a multipolar world. The post 45 world was more peaceful because of bipolarity. “A bipolar system is more peaceful for three main reasons. First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely” (14).
Mearsheimer supports these theses in the remainder of the text.
Mearsheimer and Walt: An Unnecessary War
Mearsheimer, J. & Walt, S., 2003. An Unnecessary War. Foreign Policy, 134(1), 2003.
*this was a word document version of the article, so pagination may be problematic
“In the full-court press for war with Iraq, the Bush administration deems Saddam Hussein reckless, ruthless, and not fully rational. Such a man, when mixed with nuclear weapons, is too unpredictable to be prevented from threatening the United States, the hawks say. But scrutiny of his past dealings with the world shows that Saddam, though cruel and calculating, is eminently deterrable” (1).
The main argument of those that support the preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003 was that Saddam could not be trusted with nuclear weapons and that, for this reason alone, he had to go. Even though proponents of the preemptive attack on Saddam acknowledged that the war could lead to a costly occupation, they believed that a nuclear armed Saddam was not tolerable.
Mearsheimer and Walt explore the notion that Saddam was a mad-man. They find that the Iran-Iraq war of the 80s was defensive, from the Iraqi perspective. The invasion of Kuwait can also be seen as being rational: Kuwait was being non-compliant and diplomatic alternatives were exhausted and the US seemed to signal that it would not involve itself in the matter. What about Saddam’s use of chemical and biological weapons on his own people? That calculation taken on the part of Saddam was also through a metric that didn’t see those people possibly responding in a way that would be damaging to Saddam’s critical interests. The calculation of using WMDs against Western targets would be radically different. Also, Saddam used these chemical and biological weapons at a time when we were, and remained, friends of him and Iraq. The US can contain Iraq, even a nuclear armed Iraq, as it did the Soviet Union.
What about the possibility of a “nuclear handoff”? (7). Firstly, Iraq and al Qaeda have no substantive proven connection. In fact, prior to 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq and al Qaeda were in a state of war as the former was a secular Arab nation and the later proponed theocracy. Secondly, if Iraq wanted to secretively transfer a nuke to a terrorist organization, it would be difficult to imagine that the weapon would not be ultimately traced back to Saddam.
“If the United States is, or soon will be, at war with Iraq, Americans should understand that a compelling strategic rationale is absent. This war would be one the Bush administration chose to fight but did not have to fight. Even if such a war goes well and has positive long-range consequences, it will still have been unnecessary. And if it goes badly—whether in the form of high U.S. casualties, significant civilian deaths, a heightened risk of terrorism, or increased hatred of the United States in the Arab and Islamic world—then its architects will have even more to answer for” (9).
*this was a word document version of the article, so pagination may be problematic
“In the full-court press for war with Iraq, the Bush administration deems Saddam Hussein reckless, ruthless, and not fully rational. Such a man, when mixed with nuclear weapons, is too unpredictable to be prevented from threatening the United States, the hawks say. But scrutiny of his past dealings with the world shows that Saddam, though cruel and calculating, is eminently deterrable” (1).
The main argument of those that support the preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003 was that Saddam could not be trusted with nuclear weapons and that, for this reason alone, he had to go. Even though proponents of the preemptive attack on Saddam acknowledged that the war could lead to a costly occupation, they believed that a nuclear armed Saddam was not tolerable.
Mearsheimer and Walt explore the notion that Saddam was a mad-man. They find that the Iran-Iraq war of the 80s was defensive, from the Iraqi perspective. The invasion of Kuwait can also be seen as being rational: Kuwait was being non-compliant and diplomatic alternatives were exhausted and the US seemed to signal that it would not involve itself in the matter. What about Saddam’s use of chemical and biological weapons on his own people? That calculation taken on the part of Saddam was also through a metric that didn’t see those people possibly responding in a way that would be damaging to Saddam’s critical interests. The calculation of using WMDs against Western targets would be radically different. Also, Saddam used these chemical and biological weapons at a time when we were, and remained, friends of him and Iraq. The US can contain Iraq, even a nuclear armed Iraq, as it did the Soviet Union.
What about the possibility of a “nuclear handoff”? (7). Firstly, Iraq and al Qaeda have no substantive proven connection. In fact, prior to 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq and al Qaeda were in a state of war as the former was a secular Arab nation and the later proponed theocracy. Secondly, if Iraq wanted to secretively transfer a nuke to a terrorist organization, it would be difficult to imagine that the weapon would not be ultimately traced back to Saddam.
“If the United States is, or soon will be, at war with Iraq, Americans should understand that a compelling strategic rationale is absent. This war would be one the Bush administration chose to fight but did not have to fight. Even if such a war goes well and has positive long-range consequences, it will still have been unnecessary. And if it goes badly—whether in the form of high U.S. casualties, significant civilian deaths, a heightened risk of terrorism, or increased hatred of the United States in the Arab and Islamic world—then its architects will have even more to answer for” (9).
Grieco: Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation
Grieco, J., 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization, 42(3), 485-507.
“For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions” (485).
The main response to realism has come from liberals and Grieco divides this into three types: early functionalist integration theory, later neofunctionalist regional integration theory and even later interdependence theory. These theories were then followed by liberal institutionalism, which argues that, while anarchy is an structuring variable, states are still able to find ways to cooperate at times.
“This essay’s principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences of actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory’s optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong” (487).
Much of this debate centers around conceptions of cooperation and the limits to cooperation. Institutionalists argue that states will be most concerned that the state that they are cooperating with will “cheat”, as there is no enforcement mechanism. Grieco argues that, yes, while cheating is crucial, one aspect of the formula is missing in the neoliberal institutionalist account: that states will seek both relative and absolute gains. The liberal focuses on the absolute gains to be taken by states in cooperation. The realist emphasizes the fear that states may have in cooperation: they do not want their counterpart to gain more than they gain. This logic is rooted in the assumption of state survival and rationality.
Five properties of realism: states are the actors, international structure penalizes states who are not exclusively looking out for their interest, anarchy is an organizing principle, states in such a situation are worried about security and power, and institutions only roughly affect the above equation.
Liberals have argued against the above assumptions for a variety of reasons. Earlier funcationalism argued against, for example, centering theories on the state. However, the later neoliberal institutionalism began to take on many of the assumptions of realism, though with clearly different consequences. Thus, you have scholars positing theories that begin with basically the same premise, rational states in anarchy, but finding ways for cooperation to emerge.
Grieco does not see this as being legitimate, as the kind of state the two schools of thought envisage are quite different. The liberal state is an atomistic, anthropormorphised actor who is, “only concerned with their self interest”. For the liberal, this equation eventually becomes cooperation, as states can find ways to work together in anarchy. For the liberal, the biggest problem is cheating. Realists reject this focus on cheating as missing the main point about anarchy as an organizing principle. Anarchy does not simply mean that there is no one to enforce treaties, etc. Anarchy means that there is no guarantee that another state will not try to kill you. This leads states to directly worry about relative gains in place of absolute gains.
“For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions” (485).
The main response to realism has come from liberals and Grieco divides this into three types: early functionalist integration theory, later neofunctionalist regional integration theory and even later interdependence theory. These theories were then followed by liberal institutionalism, which argues that, while anarchy is an structuring variable, states are still able to find ways to cooperate at times.
“This essay’s principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences of actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory’s optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong” (487).
Much of this debate centers around conceptions of cooperation and the limits to cooperation. Institutionalists argue that states will be most concerned that the state that they are cooperating with will “cheat”, as there is no enforcement mechanism. Grieco argues that, yes, while cheating is crucial, one aspect of the formula is missing in the neoliberal institutionalist account: that states will seek both relative and absolute gains. The liberal focuses on the absolute gains to be taken by states in cooperation. The realist emphasizes the fear that states may have in cooperation: they do not want their counterpart to gain more than they gain. This logic is rooted in the assumption of state survival and rationality.
Five properties of realism: states are the actors, international structure penalizes states who are not exclusively looking out for their interest, anarchy is an organizing principle, states in such a situation are worried about security and power, and institutions only roughly affect the above equation.
Liberals have argued against the above assumptions for a variety of reasons. Earlier funcationalism argued against, for example, centering theories on the state. However, the later neoliberal institutionalism began to take on many of the assumptions of realism, though with clearly different consequences. Thus, you have scholars positing theories that begin with basically the same premise, rational states in anarchy, but finding ways for cooperation to emerge.
Grieco does not see this as being legitimate, as the kind of state the two schools of thought envisage are quite different. The liberal state is an atomistic, anthropormorphised actor who is, “only concerned with their self interest”. For the liberal, this equation eventually becomes cooperation, as states can find ways to work together in anarchy. For the liberal, the biggest problem is cheating. Realists reject this focus on cheating as missing the main point about anarchy as an organizing principle. Anarchy does not simply mean that there is no one to enforce treaties, etc. Anarchy means that there is no guarantee that another state will not try to kill you. This leads states to directly worry about relative gains in place of absolute gains.
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Walt: The Progressive Power of Realism
Walt, S., 1997. The Progressive Power of Realism. American Political Science Review, 91(4), 931-935.
This article is a response to an article written by Vasquez that compares Realism to a degenerative research program in contrast to a progressive research program. This concept stems from Lakatos.
“There are three main problems with Vasquez’s criticism. First, his reliance on Lakatos is problematic, both because that model of scientific progress is flawed and because Vasquez’s interpretation of it would justify abandoning most (if not all) social science theory. Second, Vasquez’s characterization of the realist tradition is misleading and understates its range and diversity. Third, Vasquez overlooks the progressive character of contemporary realist theorizing, in large part because he did not condiser all the relevant literature. In particular, his treatment of my own work is both inconsistent and demonstrably inaccurate” (931).
“The realist perspective offers a simple and powerful way to understand relations among political groups (including states) and offers compelling (albeit imperfect) accounts of a diverse array of international phenomena” (934).
This article is a response to an article written by Vasquez that compares Realism to a degenerative research program in contrast to a progressive research program. This concept stems from Lakatos.
“There are three main problems with Vasquez’s criticism. First, his reliance on Lakatos is problematic, both because that model of scientific progress is flawed and because Vasquez’s interpretation of it would justify abandoning most (if not all) social science theory. Second, Vasquez’s characterization of the realist tradition is misleading and understates its range and diversity. Third, Vasquez overlooks the progressive character of contemporary realist theorizing, in large part because he did not condiser all the relevant literature. In particular, his treatment of my own work is both inconsistent and demonstrably inaccurate” (931).
“The realist perspective offers a simple and powerful way to understand relations among political groups (including states) and offers compelling (albeit imperfect) accounts of a diverse array of international phenomena” (934).
Vasquez: The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Versus Progressive Research Programs
Vasquez, J., 1997. The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 91, 899-912.
“Several analysts argue that, despite anomalies, the realist paradigm is dominant because it si more fertile than its rivals While the ability of the realist paradigm to reformulate its theories in light of criticism accounts for its persistence, it is argued that the proliferation of emendations exposes a degenerating tendency in the paradigm’s research program” (899).
It is a degenerative program because: theoretical development is highly varied, its inability to identify the core of the discipline for falsification, an overuse of “auxiliary” positions to explain away shortcomings and a shortcoming of solid discoveries.
Lakatos argued that theories must be falsifiable, but that a school of thought, or paradigm, will never be falsified because auxiliary formulations will always be constructed to explain away anomalies (in line with Kuhn).
He examines the failures of realist theories partially through the lenses of balance of power and theorists’ attempts to alleviate some of Waltz’ earlier errors.
“Several analysts argue that, despite anomalies, the realist paradigm is dominant because it si more fertile than its rivals While the ability of the realist paradigm to reformulate its theories in light of criticism accounts for its persistence, it is argued that the proliferation of emendations exposes a degenerating tendency in the paradigm’s research program” (899).
It is a degenerative program because: theoretical development is highly varied, its inability to identify the core of the discipline for falsification, an overuse of “auxiliary” positions to explain away shortcomings and a shortcoming of solid discoveries.
Lakatos argued that theories must be falsifiable, but that a school of thought, or paradigm, will never be falsified because auxiliary formulations will always be constructed to explain away anomalies (in line with Kuhn).
He examines the failures of realist theories partially through the lenses of balance of power and theorists’ attempts to alleviate some of Waltz’ earlier errors.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Gowa: Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade
Gowa, J., 1994. Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade, Princeton University Press.
“In this book, I develop what I hope is an intuitively appealing and analytically rigorous explanation of the impact of power politics on inter-state trade. In order to do so, I construct a very simple game-theoretic model to address the question of substantive importance.. That question is whether free trade is more likely within than across alliances. More precisely, I address this question: Under what, if any, conditions does it make sense for states to trad3e more freely with their allies than with their adversaries?” (5-6).
“…I analyze the impact of the anarchic structure of international politics on the exchange of goods and services among states. Prior to doing so, I argue that hegemonic stability theory, the preeminent system-level theory of the relationship between power politics and free trade, does not resolve the question of the political correlates of open international markets…Here, I* summarize the core argument of this book. I contend that the play of power politics is an inexorable element of any agreement to open international markets, because of the security externalities that trade produces. These externalities arise because the source of gains from trade is the increased efficiency with which domestic resources can be employed. As a consequence, trade frees economic resources for military uses. Thus, trade enhances the potential military power of any country that engages in it. The anarchic structure of the international system…compels its constitute states to attend closely to the military power and potential of both prospective and actual allies and adversaries. It does so because the absence of any supranational authority in the international system enables a state either to threaten or to actually resort to force at any time to achieve its goals. The probability that a state will do so depends in part upon its power. The latter, in turn, depends partially upon its real income. As a consequence, the real-income gains that motivate free trade are also the source of the security externalities that can either impede or facilitate trade: Trade with an adversary produces a security diseconomy; trade with an ally produces a positive externality. In either case, agreements to open international markets create a divergence between the private and social costs of trade…In other words, because trade generates security externalities adherence to a policy of free and non-discriminatory trade may not be optimal for states in an anarchic international system…I consider these external effects explicitly. Doing so leads me to two conclusions: (1) free trade is more likely within than across political-0miliitary alliances; and (2) the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary: those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions than are their mutipolar counterparts” (6-7).
Kindleberger is seen as the father of hegemonic stability theory, though he preferred to use the word “leader” to “hegemon”, as the later connoted control and coercion. The argument went something like this: international trade is a public good, and in order to have this public good be freely available, there had to be a hegemon to support its diffusion. Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable (the examples given by Gowa are nuclear deterrence and clean air). With public goods, there is obviously the problem of free riders in rationalist models.
Gowa then explores alliances from a rationalist perspective. He defines an alliance as, following Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan, “a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues” (32). Gowa points out three kinds of alliances: defense pacts, nonaggression pacts and ententes mandating cooperation in war (32). Alliances can make sense from a realist perspective when they successfully balance.
“Trade with an ally produces a positive externality; trade with an adversary creates a security diseconomy. A s a result, ceteris paribus, free trade is more likely within than across political-military alliances” (120).
“In this book, I develop what I hope is an intuitively appealing and analytically rigorous explanation of the impact of power politics on inter-state trade. In order to do so, I construct a very simple game-theoretic model to address the question of substantive importance.. That question is whether free trade is more likely within than across alliances. More precisely, I address this question: Under what, if any, conditions does it make sense for states to trad3e more freely with their allies than with their adversaries?” (5-6).
“…I analyze the impact of the anarchic structure of international politics on the exchange of goods and services among states. Prior to doing so, I argue that hegemonic stability theory, the preeminent system-level theory of the relationship between power politics and free trade, does not resolve the question of the political correlates of open international markets…Here, I* summarize the core argument of this book. I contend that the play of power politics is an inexorable element of any agreement to open international markets, because of the security externalities that trade produces. These externalities arise because the source of gains from trade is the increased efficiency with which domestic resources can be employed. As a consequence, trade frees economic resources for military uses. Thus, trade enhances the potential military power of any country that engages in it. The anarchic structure of the international system…compels its constitute states to attend closely to the military power and potential of both prospective and actual allies and adversaries. It does so because the absence of any supranational authority in the international system enables a state either to threaten or to actually resort to force at any time to achieve its goals. The probability that a state will do so depends in part upon its power. The latter, in turn, depends partially upon its real income. As a consequence, the real-income gains that motivate free trade are also the source of the security externalities that can either impede or facilitate trade: Trade with an adversary produces a security diseconomy; trade with an ally produces a positive externality. In either case, agreements to open international markets create a divergence between the private and social costs of trade…In other words, because trade generates security externalities adherence to a policy of free and non-discriminatory trade may not be optimal for states in an anarchic international system…I consider these external effects explicitly. Doing so leads me to two conclusions: (1) free trade is more likely within than across political-0miliitary alliances; and (2) the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary: those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions than are their mutipolar counterparts” (6-7).
Kindleberger is seen as the father of hegemonic stability theory, though he preferred to use the word “leader” to “hegemon”, as the later connoted control and coercion. The argument went something like this: international trade is a public good, and in order to have this public good be freely available, there had to be a hegemon to support its diffusion. Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable (the examples given by Gowa are nuclear deterrence and clean air). With public goods, there is obviously the problem of free riders in rationalist models.
Gowa then explores alliances from a rationalist perspective. He defines an alliance as, following Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan, “a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues” (32). Gowa points out three kinds of alliances: defense pacts, nonaggression pacts and ententes mandating cooperation in war (32). Alliances can make sense from a realist perspective when they successfully balance.
“Trade with an ally produces a positive externality; trade with an adversary creates a security diseconomy. A s a result, ceteris paribus, free trade is more likely within than across political-military alliances” (120).
Saturday, September 20, 2008
Niebuhr: Moral Man and Immoral Society
Niebuhr, R., 2001. Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, Westminster John Knox Press.
From the Introduction:
“The thesis to be elaborated in these pages is that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and of social groups, national, racial, and economic; and that this distinction justifies and necessitates political parties which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing” (xi).
“Individual men may be moral in the sense tha they are able to consider interests other than their own…But all these achievements are more difficult, if not impossible, for human societies and social groups. In every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse, less capiacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism…” (xi).
From the Introduction:
“The thesis to be elaborated in these pages is that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and of social groups, national, racial, and economic; and that this distinction justifies and necessitates political parties which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing” (xi).
“Individual men may be moral in the sense tha they are able to consider interests other than their own…But all these achievements are more difficult, if not impossible, for human societies and social groups. In every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse, less capiacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism…” (xi).
Saturday, September 6, 2008
Legro and Moravcsik: Is Anyone Still a Realist?
Legro, J. & Moravcsik, A., 1999. Is anyone still a realist? International Security, 24(2), 55-106.
Realism is in trouble. “The central problem is instead that the theoretical core of the realist approach has been undermined by its own defenders—in particular so-called defensive and neoclassical realists—who seek to address anomalies by recasting realism in forms that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent and less distinctive to realism” (6).
New versions of realism try to take into consideration what earlier realists had tried to argue against, like economic interdependence, etc. It would be a great boon to realism if it could be shown that, from Machiavelli to Morgenthau the structural pushes and pulls were the same. For example, minimalist realism only retains anarchy and rationality as assumptions and thus waters down the school of thought beyond recognition.
“We begin by elaborating the desirable qualities of a theoretical paradigm in international relations and, guided by these criteria, propose a formulation of realism that we believe captures its enduring essence. We then document the theoretical degeneration of recent ‘minimalist realist’ theory. We conclude by highlighting the practical advantages for theoretical debate and empirical research of consistently adhering to a narrower and more rigorous reformulation of the realist paradigm” (8-9).
Realism as a Theoretical Paradigm: realism is a paradigm because it is coherent and distinct. There are four paradigms in IR: realism, institutionalism, liberalism and the epistemic paradigm.
Three core assumptions of realism:
1-the nature of the actors: rational, unitary political units in anarchy (13)
2-the nature of state preferences: fixed and uniformly conflictual goals (14)
3-international structure: the primacy of material capabilities (16)
Minimalist realists only keep anarchy and rationality. Power can be assumed to be fluid, thus also undermining realist assumptions.
Snyder and Grieco are bad realists, among others.
Realism is in trouble. “The central problem is instead that the theoretical core of the realist approach has been undermined by its own defenders—in particular so-called defensive and neoclassical realists—who seek to address anomalies by recasting realism in forms that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent and less distinctive to realism” (6).
New versions of realism try to take into consideration what earlier realists had tried to argue against, like economic interdependence, etc. It would be a great boon to realism if it could be shown that, from Machiavelli to Morgenthau the structural pushes and pulls were the same. For example, minimalist realism only retains anarchy and rationality as assumptions and thus waters down the school of thought beyond recognition.
“We begin by elaborating the desirable qualities of a theoretical paradigm in international relations and, guided by these criteria, propose a formulation of realism that we believe captures its enduring essence. We then document the theoretical degeneration of recent ‘minimalist realist’ theory. We conclude by highlighting the practical advantages for theoretical debate and empirical research of consistently adhering to a narrower and more rigorous reformulation of the realist paradigm” (8-9).
Realism as a Theoretical Paradigm: realism is a paradigm because it is coherent and distinct. There are four paradigms in IR: realism, institutionalism, liberalism and the epistemic paradigm.
Three core assumptions of realism:
1-the nature of the actors: rational, unitary political units in anarchy (13)
2-the nature of state preferences: fixed and uniformly conflictual goals (14)
3-international structure: the primacy of material capabilities (16)
Minimalist realists only keep anarchy and rationality. Power can be assumed to be fluid, thus also undermining realist assumptions.
Snyder and Grieco are bad realists, among others.
Snyder: Process Variables in Neorealist Theory
Snyder, G., 1996. Process variables in neorealist theory. Security Studies, 5(3), 167-192.
“For any single theory, it is enough that it highlight ‘a small number of big and important things’; and that is all that Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealism, claims for his theory” (167).
“He [Waltz] treats only peripherally the process by which structural and unit influences are transmitted onto behavior and outcomes. It is this later area that could well be developed further without undue sacrifice of parsimony” (168). Snyder’s goal is to increase the ability of neorealism to explain things, while not doing too much damage to the parsimony promoted by Waltz.
Structural Modifiers: “First, it is necessary to take account of certain variables which have sometimes been called process but which I would exclude from that category” (168). Nye points out two variables that do not seem to fit within Waltz’s framework. These are “(1) non-power incentives; and (2) the ability to communicate and cooperate” (168). Nye calls these “Systemic Process”. Snyder doesn’t believe that these are process, though he agrees with Nye that they are not unit-based. Snyder on process: “That term ought to be reserved for the political relations and interactions that occur between sovereign states” (168). Snyder would classify Nye’s two points above in a category called “structural modifiers”. Institutions, norms and military technology (nuclear weapons, for example) are also structural modifiers.
Relationships: “Interaction is behavior” (171). “Relations or relationships are not behavior itself, but the situational context of behavior…Relationships lie between structure and interaction; they are the conduit through which structural effects are transmitted to behavior” (172). Relationships can be added to the structural realist account to make it more nuanced. Relationships also can provide the framework for analyzing “structural change”, a common critique of realist theory. For example, WWI could be explained through the deep interconnection through treaties of different countries that compelled them to go to war when it might not have been in their interest vis-à-vis relative power gains.
Figure 1: (174)
Process variables include alignments, conflicts, capabilities and interdependence. Interaction Arenas can also form process or relationship variables. Interaction can take place through preparedness, diplomacy and action.
“For any single theory, it is enough that it highlight ‘a small number of big and important things’; and that is all that Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealism, claims for his theory” (167).
“He [Waltz] treats only peripherally the process by which structural and unit influences are transmitted onto behavior and outcomes. It is this later area that could well be developed further without undue sacrifice of parsimony” (168). Snyder’s goal is to increase the ability of neorealism to explain things, while not doing too much damage to the parsimony promoted by Waltz.
Structural Modifiers: “First, it is necessary to take account of certain variables which have sometimes been called process but which I would exclude from that category” (168). Nye points out two variables that do not seem to fit within Waltz’s framework. These are “(1) non-power incentives; and (2) the ability to communicate and cooperate” (168). Nye calls these “Systemic Process”. Snyder doesn’t believe that these are process, though he agrees with Nye that they are not unit-based. Snyder on process: “That term ought to be reserved for the political relations and interactions that occur between sovereign states” (168). Snyder would classify Nye’s two points above in a category called “structural modifiers”. Institutions, norms and military technology (nuclear weapons, for example) are also structural modifiers.
Relationships: “Interaction is behavior” (171). “Relations or relationships are not behavior itself, but the situational context of behavior…Relationships lie between structure and interaction; they are the conduit through which structural effects are transmitted to behavior” (172). Relationships can be added to the structural realist account to make it more nuanced. Relationships also can provide the framework for analyzing “structural change”, a common critique of realist theory. For example, WWI could be explained through the deep interconnection through treaties of different countries that compelled them to go to war when it might not have been in their interest vis-à-vis relative power gains.
Figure 1: (174)
Process variables include alignments, conflicts, capabilities and interdependence. Interaction Arenas can also form process or relationship variables. Interaction can take place through preparedness, diplomacy and action.
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
Grieco: Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics
Grieco, JM. 1997. “Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics.” New Thinking in International Relations Theory 163-201.
The claim is that, ever since the publication of Morgenthau’s seminal book in 1948, realism has been the most important school of thought in international relations. “This is because realist theory addresses the key questions in international relations: What are the causes of conflict and war among nations, and what are the conditions for cooperation dn peace among them?” (163). “Precisely because it engages these fundamental international problems, other scholars, seeking to develop alternative analytical approaches to international affairs...have often defined their theoretical perspectives and research programs in large measure through their opposition to one or more elements of realist theory” (163). “In this chapter I present a critical appreciation of realist international theory” (163). “The view put forward in that section is that realism does in fact provide substantial leverage on many aspects of world politics…in the third and final main section of the chapter I identify two serious conceptual ambiguities and tensions in realist theory and offer a discussion of possible lines of analysis that might address these problems and thus allow realist theory to provide a more effective understanding of politics among nations” (164).
Realist Assumptions:
State is the central focus of enquiry. People fight for what they want, against what they do not want in groups. This insight is provided by R. Gilpin. “For realists, the fundamental unit of political organization for the past several centuries ahs been, and at present it is, the nation-state” (164). While there are other international actors, the state is the one that conditions the ability of all others to act.
Anarchy:
“Realism’s second core assumption is that states coexist in a context of international anarchy, that is, the absence of a reliable central authority to which they can appeal for protection or the redress of grievances” (164). States must be self-help agents. They operate in a world where they can never be sure of the intentions of the other agents. This is a world of constant potential conflict and war.
States are rational, autonomous and unitary:
States’ rationality is goal oriented, these goals are consistent and these goals are achieved through the construction of strategies.
Secondly, states are able to pursue the national interest without undue distracting influence from powerful groups domestically.
Finally, states are able to act unitarily and coherently in relation to other countries.
Propositions:
States are Defensive Actors:
Security is the states’ central goal.
States are Defensive Positionalists:
Relative power gains encourage states to be positionally focused. States are interested in maximizing their relative power capabilities and minimizing the gains of others.
State Interest in Independence and Autonomy:
States seek to be free to pursue their defensive positionalism. States seek to be independent and autonomous.
These assumptions and propositions are then explored vis-à-vis historical examples.
Realists have three main clusters of explanations that derive from the above assumptions:
Balancing: “…if the security of independence of some states are threatened by the growth in power of one state or a group of states, the threatened states, according to realist theory, will respond to that challenge by seeking to take actions that mitigate or offset the growth in power of the rising side” (169-70). In contrast, states may bandwagon, but not in the above example.
System Polarity and Stability:
Stability is a product of the amount of poles in the international system. Waltz says that a multipolar system is prone to conflict.
Hypothesized Constraints on Cooperation:
It is not outside of the border of this theory for states to form alliances to fight common enemies. However, there are constraints, like cheating. Also, because the world is self-help, alliances are also difficult to form. Finally, there is a difficulty in cooperating because of the logic of relative gains.
How, then, could cooperation take place? Through a hegemon. For example, Gilpin and Krasner assert that a liberal international order will arise only if there is a state that is strong enough and willing enough to take on that responsibility.
Criticisms:
Change: Realism can not account for international change.
Does not look at the domestic.
(These are both followed by lengthy explanations of possible Realist responses to these criticisms)
Two other issues that may be more problematic, from Grieco’s perspective: The EU.
Secondly: “Does anarchy lead ‘normal’ states to be security or power maximizers, and is there an observable difference between the two goals?” (186).
The claim is that, ever since the publication of Morgenthau’s seminal book in 1948, realism has been the most important school of thought in international relations. “This is because realist theory addresses the key questions in international relations: What are the causes of conflict and war among nations, and what are the conditions for cooperation dn peace among them?” (163). “Precisely because it engages these fundamental international problems, other scholars, seeking to develop alternative analytical approaches to international affairs...have often defined their theoretical perspectives and research programs in large measure through their opposition to one or more elements of realist theory” (163). “In this chapter I present a critical appreciation of realist international theory” (163). “The view put forward in that section is that realism does in fact provide substantial leverage on many aspects of world politics…in the third and final main section of the chapter I identify two serious conceptual ambiguities and tensions in realist theory and offer a discussion of possible lines of analysis that might address these problems and thus allow realist theory to provide a more effective understanding of politics among nations” (164).
Realist Assumptions:
State is the central focus of enquiry. People fight for what they want, against what they do not want in groups. This insight is provided by R. Gilpin. “For realists, the fundamental unit of political organization for the past several centuries ahs been, and at present it is, the nation-state” (164). While there are other international actors, the state is the one that conditions the ability of all others to act.
Anarchy:
“Realism’s second core assumption is that states coexist in a context of international anarchy, that is, the absence of a reliable central authority to which they can appeal for protection or the redress of grievances” (164). States must be self-help agents. They operate in a world where they can never be sure of the intentions of the other agents. This is a world of constant potential conflict and war.
States are rational, autonomous and unitary:
States’ rationality is goal oriented, these goals are consistent and these goals are achieved through the construction of strategies.
Secondly, states are able to pursue the national interest without undue distracting influence from powerful groups domestically.
Finally, states are able to act unitarily and coherently in relation to other countries.
Propositions:
States are Defensive Actors:
Security is the states’ central goal.
States are Defensive Positionalists:
Relative power gains encourage states to be positionally focused. States are interested in maximizing their relative power capabilities and minimizing the gains of others.
State Interest in Independence and Autonomy:
States seek to be free to pursue their defensive positionalism. States seek to be independent and autonomous.
These assumptions and propositions are then explored vis-à-vis historical examples.
Realists have three main clusters of explanations that derive from the above assumptions:
Balancing: “…if the security of independence of some states are threatened by the growth in power of one state or a group of states, the threatened states, according to realist theory, will respond to that challenge by seeking to take actions that mitigate or offset the growth in power of the rising side” (169-70). In contrast, states may bandwagon, but not in the above example.
System Polarity and Stability:
Stability is a product of the amount of poles in the international system. Waltz says that a multipolar system is prone to conflict.
Hypothesized Constraints on Cooperation:
It is not outside of the border of this theory for states to form alliances to fight common enemies. However, there are constraints, like cheating. Also, because the world is self-help, alliances are also difficult to form. Finally, there is a difficulty in cooperating because of the logic of relative gains.
How, then, could cooperation take place? Through a hegemon. For example, Gilpin and Krasner assert that a liberal international order will arise only if there is a state that is strong enough and willing enough to take on that responsibility.
Criticisms:
Change: Realism can not account for international change.
Does not look at the domestic.
(These are both followed by lengthy explanations of possible Realist responses to these criticisms)
Two other issues that may be more problematic, from Grieco’s perspective: The EU.
Secondly: “Does anarchy lead ‘normal’ states to be security or power maximizers, and is there an observable difference between the two goals?” (186).
Morgenthau: Politics among Nations
Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. “Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.” New York.
Six Principles of Political Realism:
1.
“Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure” (4).
“For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts” (4).
Must approach politics through the lenses of rationality and assume that leaders are operating with a certain amount of rational calculus.
2.
“The main signpost that helps poli8tical realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” (5). This is the connection between the rationality of the actors and what they are striving for. “The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible” (5).
Political realism’s rationality is both descriptive and normative. It is rational for states to maximize the cost-benefit analysis that they undertake. It is also something that should happen if they are to survive. This has nothing to do with intentions, as the example of Neville Chamberlain illustrates.
3.
“Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all” (10). “…the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (11). “The same observations apply to the concept of power…Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man” (11).
4.
“Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action” (12). “There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” (12). “Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics” (12).
5.
“Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted…to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purpose of the universe” (13). “…it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them” (13).
6.
“The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound…Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth…” (13).
Realism views things in their nature, not as we would like them to be. They focus “political man” as a power maximizer as other disciplines have their own distinct foci.
Six Principles of Political Realism:
1.
“Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure” (4).
“For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts” (4).
Must approach politics through the lenses of rationality and assume that leaders are operating with a certain amount of rational calculus.
2.
“The main signpost that helps poli8tical realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” (5). This is the connection between the rationality of the actors and what they are striving for. “The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible” (5).
Political realism’s rationality is both descriptive and normative. It is rational for states to maximize the cost-benefit analysis that they undertake. It is also something that should happen if they are to survive. This has nothing to do with intentions, as the example of Neville Chamberlain illustrates.
3.
“Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all” (10). “…the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (11). “The same observations apply to the concept of power…Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man” (11).
4.
“Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action” (12). “There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” (12). “Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics” (12).
5.
“Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted…to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purpose of the universe” (13). “…it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them” (13).
6.
“The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound…Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth…” (13).
Realism views things in their nature, not as we would like them to be. They focus “political man” as a power maximizer as other disciplines have their own distinct foci.
Monday, July 28, 2008
Copeland: Economic Interdependence and War
Copeland, DC. 1996. “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations.” International Security 20:5-41.
“The prolonged debate between realists and liberals on the causes of war has been largely a debate about the relative salience of different causal variables. Realists stress such factors as relative power, while liberals focus on the absence or presence of collective security regimes and the pervasiveness of democratic communities” (5).
“Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression…Realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war” (5-6). Different periods in time can be used as supports for either theory, and the results appear to be problematically correlated.
Copeland presents a theory of trade relations that tries to overcome these problems. “The theory starts b y clarifying the notion of economic interdependence, fusing the liberal insight that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to avoid war with the realist view that the potential costs of being cut off can push states to war to secure vital goods. The total of the benefits and potential costs of trade versus autarchy reveals the true level of dependence a state faces, for if trade is completely severed, the state not only loses the gains from trade but also suffers the costs of adjusting its economy to the new situation” (6). “Trade expectations theory introduces a new causal variable, the expectatt4ions of future trade, examining its impact on the overall expected value of the trading option if a state decides to forgo war” (6). “Levels of interdependence and expectations of future trade, considered simultaneously, lead to new predictions” (7). “Interdependence can foster peace, as liberals argue, but this will only be so when states expect that trade levels will be high into the foreseeable future” (7).
The liberal argument that free trade incentivises nations towards making peaceful decisions was first made popular in the 1850s by Richard Cobden. “Realists turn the liberal argument on its head, arguing that economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace, but in fact heightens the likelihood of war” (10). This realist logic is most clearly made by Waltz and Mearsheimer, though it has its roots in mercantilist thinking of the 1800s. “Mercantilists saw states as locked in a competition for relative power and for the wealth that underpins that power” (11).
“While the liberal and the realist arguments display critical differences, they possess one important similarity: the causal logic of both perspectives is founded on an individual state’s decision-making process. That is, while the two camps freely use the term ‘interdependence,’ both derive predictions from how particular decision-making units—states—deal with their own specific dependence” (12).
“The main difference between liberals and realists has to do with their emphasis on the benefits versus the costs of interdependence” (12).
“…these theories [realism and liberalis] lack an understanding of how rational decision-makers incorporate the future trading environment into their choice between peace and war” (16).
“For the purposes of forging strong theories, however, trading patterns cannot be simply assumed a priori to match the stipulations of either liberalism or of realism. Trade levels fluctuate significantly over time, both for the system as a whole and particularly between specific trading partners, as the last two centuries demonstrate” (16-7).
“From consideration of the expectations-of-future-trade variable along with a state’s level of dependence, one can derive a consistent deductive theory of state decision-making showing the conditions under which high interdependence will lead to peace or to war” (17).
On page 24 there is a very nice overview of the difference between liberal, realist and trade expectations theory.
The theory is then applied to Germany and WWI and Germany and WWII.
“The prolonged debate between realists and liberals on the causes of war has been largely a debate about the relative salience of different causal variables. Realists stress such factors as relative power, while liberals focus on the absence or presence of collective security regimes and the pervasiveness of democratic communities” (5).
“Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression…Realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war” (5-6). Different periods in time can be used as supports for either theory, and the results appear to be problematically correlated.
Copeland presents a theory of trade relations that tries to overcome these problems. “The theory starts b y clarifying the notion of economic interdependence, fusing the liberal insight that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to avoid war with the realist view that the potential costs of being cut off can push states to war to secure vital goods. The total of the benefits and potential costs of trade versus autarchy reveals the true level of dependence a state faces, for if trade is completely severed, the state not only loses the gains from trade but also suffers the costs of adjusting its economy to the new situation” (6). “Trade expectations theory introduces a new causal variable, the expectatt4ions of future trade, examining its impact on the overall expected value of the trading option if a state decides to forgo war” (6). “Levels of interdependence and expectations of future trade, considered simultaneously, lead to new predictions” (7). “Interdependence can foster peace, as liberals argue, but this will only be so when states expect that trade levels will be high into the foreseeable future” (7).
The liberal argument that free trade incentivises nations towards making peaceful decisions was first made popular in the 1850s by Richard Cobden. “Realists turn the liberal argument on its head, arguing that economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace, but in fact heightens the likelihood of war” (10). This realist logic is most clearly made by Waltz and Mearsheimer, though it has its roots in mercantilist thinking of the 1800s. “Mercantilists saw states as locked in a competition for relative power and for the wealth that underpins that power” (11).
“While the liberal and the realist arguments display critical differences, they possess one important similarity: the causal logic of both perspectives is founded on an individual state’s decision-making process. That is, while the two camps freely use the term ‘interdependence,’ both derive predictions from how particular decision-making units—states—deal with their own specific dependence” (12).
“The main difference between liberals and realists has to do with their emphasis on the benefits versus the costs of interdependence” (12).
“…these theories [realism and liberalis] lack an understanding of how rational decision-makers incorporate the future trading environment into their choice between peace and war” (16).
“For the purposes of forging strong theories, however, trading patterns cannot be simply assumed a priori to match the stipulations of either liberalism or of realism. Trade levels fluctuate significantly over time, both for the system as a whole and particularly between specific trading partners, as the last two centuries demonstrate” (16-7).
“From consideration of the expectations-of-future-trade variable along with a state’s level of dependence, one can derive a consistent deductive theory of state decision-making showing the conditions under which high interdependence will lead to peace or to war” (17).
On page 24 there is a very nice overview of the difference between liberal, realist and trade expectations theory.
The theory is then applied to Germany and WWI and Germany and WWII.
Sunday, July 20, 2008
Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
Mearsheimer, JJ. 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. WW Norton & Company.
Ch. 1: Introduction:
This book begins as a response to those (utopianists? Idealists?) who believe that the fall of the USSR marked the end of history. This can not be the case because the nature of the international system make it such that states continually have to search for their own survival through offensive realism. This account is a break from classical realism and defensive structural realism. Mearsheimer positions himself as an offensive realist.
“The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system” (2). “Simply put, great powers are primed for offence” (3). “Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (3).
“This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, in genuinely tragic” (3).
He applies this approach to US/China relations: “Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail” (4).
“…I argue that multipolar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar systems that contain especially powerful states—potential hegemons—are the most dangerous systems of all” (5).
“Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability” (5).
“In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists” (12).
The book is organized around six questions:
1—why do great powers want power?
2—how much power?
3—what is power?
4—how do they go after power?
5—what are the causes of war?
6—when do threatened powers balance and when do they band-wagon/buck-pass? (12-3)
Contrasts liberalism with realism:
Liberalism: States the actor, internal characteristic of states vary considerably, calculations of power not important (15-6).
Realism: states the actor, behavior of great powers influenced by external environment, and power calculations crucial.
Two kinds of realism: “human nature realism” (aka classical realism) through Morgenthau and defensive realism, through Waltz.
For Morgenthau, human nature instills a “limitless lust for power” and thus creates the international system in a certain kind of way (19).
For Waltz, states do not want power, but survival. “For Waltz, balancing checkmates offence” (20).
“Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want” (21).
“The key difference between the two perspectives [human nature realism and offensive realism] is that offensive realists reject Morgenthau’s claim that states are naturally endowed with Type A personalities. ON the contrary, they believe that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security” (21).
There is then a bizarre explanation of why Americans don’t like realism because it’s too negative and they’re all optimists.
Ch. 2: Anarchy and the Struggle for Power:
Great powers want to be the hegemon.
Five assumptions underly his view of the world:
1—anarchy is an ordering principle
2—great powers have some military capability
3—states can never be certain about other states’ intentions
4—states primarily want to survive
5—states are rational actors
“Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power” (35).
“A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system” (40).
“My argument, which I develop at length in subsequent chapters, is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony” (41).
“The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon” (41).
Ch. 1: Introduction:
This book begins as a response to those (utopianists? Idealists?) who believe that the fall of the USSR marked the end of history. This can not be the case because the nature of the international system make it such that states continually have to search for their own survival through offensive realism. This account is a break from classical realism and defensive structural realism. Mearsheimer positions himself as an offensive realist.
“The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system” (2). “Simply put, great powers are primed for offence” (3). “Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (3).
“This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, in genuinely tragic” (3).
He applies this approach to US/China relations: “Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail” (4).
“…I argue that multipolar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar systems that contain especially powerful states—potential hegemons—are the most dangerous systems of all” (5).
“Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability” (5).
“In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists” (12).
The book is organized around six questions:
1—why do great powers want power?
2—how much power?
3—what is power?
4—how do they go after power?
5—what are the causes of war?
6—when do threatened powers balance and when do they band-wagon/buck-pass? (12-3)
Contrasts liberalism with realism:
Liberalism: States the actor, internal characteristic of states vary considerably, calculations of power not important (15-6).
Realism: states the actor, behavior of great powers influenced by external environment, and power calculations crucial.
Two kinds of realism: “human nature realism” (aka classical realism) through Morgenthau and defensive realism, through Waltz.
For Morgenthau, human nature instills a “limitless lust for power” and thus creates the international system in a certain kind of way (19).
For Waltz, states do not want power, but survival. “For Waltz, balancing checkmates offence” (20).
“Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want” (21).
“The key difference between the two perspectives [human nature realism and offensive realism] is that offensive realists reject Morgenthau’s claim that states are naturally endowed with Type A personalities. ON the contrary, they believe that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security” (21).
There is then a bizarre explanation of why Americans don’t like realism because it’s too negative and they’re all optimists.
Ch. 2: Anarchy and the Struggle for Power:
Great powers want to be the hegemon.
Five assumptions underly his view of the world:
1—anarchy is an ordering principle
2—great powers have some military capability
3—states can never be certain about other states’ intentions
4—states primarily want to survive
5—states are rational actors
“Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power” (35).
“A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system” (40).
“My argument, which I develop at length in subsequent chapters, is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony” (41).
“The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon” (41).
Monday, July 14, 2008
Keohane: Neorealism and Its Critics
Keohane, R., 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press.
Ch 3: Reductionist and Systemic Theories
“A reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts” (47).
“Analysts who confine their attention to interacting units, without recognizing that systemic causes are in play, compensate for the omissions by assigning such causes arbitrarily to the level of interacting units and parceling them out among actors” (49).
Looks at inside-out theories of international politics that attempt to explain system level behavior by looking at the activities occurring within a unit. “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states” (52).
“The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent. Why then do we find such a persistent pull toward reduction [specifically citing Morgenthau, Kissinger and Levy]? The answer is that usually reduction results not from a scholar’s intent but from his errors” (53).
Changes in structure can be separated from changes in units (55).
“From the first part of this article, we know that the theory we want to construct has to be a systemic one” (56).
“What do I mean by explain? I mean explain in these senses: to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to say why patterns of behavior recur; to say why events repeat themselves, including events that none or few of the actors may like” (57).
“A theory has explanatory and predictive power. A theory also has elegance. Elegance in social-science theories means that explanations and predictions will be general” (57).
“Structures, moreover, may suddenly change. A structural change is a revolution, whether or not violently produced, and it is so because it gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the system varied with changes in structure. Across systems, a theory explains change. A theory of international politics can succeed only if political structures are defined in ways that identify their causal effects and show how those effects vary as structural changes” (58).
“In a systems theory, some part of the explanation of behaviors and outcomes is found in the system’s structure. A political structure is akin to a field of forces in physics interactions within a field have properties as the field affects the objects, so the objects affect the field” (62).
Structure: will unify outputs with a variety of inputs; also, “…a set of constraining conditions” (62). “Agents and agencies act; systems as a whole do not” (63).
“The first way in which structures work their effects is through a process of socialization that limits and molds behavior” (65).
“Order may prevail without an borderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator. The mayor of New York City does not phone the gardeners of southern New Jersey and tell them to grow more tomatoes next year because too few were recently supplied” (67).
Ch 4: Political Structures
“A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” (70).
“’Relation’ is used to mean both the interaction of units and the positions they occupy vis-à-vis each other…To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system” (71).
“A structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting parts” (72).
“Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system. Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them” (73). There is an exploration of the structure of domestic politics to juxtapose with international politics. “A domestic political structure is thus defined, first, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second, by specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units” (74).
“Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long as a strubu8re endures…Structure operates as a cause, but it is not the only cause in play” (80).
“I defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capabilities across units” (81).
Ordering Principles:
“Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic” (81). Whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability” (81-2).
“If structure is an organizational concept, the terms ‘structure’ and ‘anarchy’ seem to be in contradiction. If international politics is ‘politics in the absence of government,’ what are we in the presence of? In looking for international structure, one is brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable position to be in. The problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking” (82). Draws parallels w/ microeconomic theory.
“International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units” (84).
“I assume that states seek to ensure their survival” (85).
The Character of the Units:
“The second term in the definition of domestic political structure specifies the functions performed by differentiated units. Hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation…The second term is not needed in defining international-political structure, because so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units. International structures vary only through a change of organizing principle, or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units” (87).
“Just as economists define markets in terms of firms, so I define international-political structures in terms of states” (88).
The units are all sovereign; the units tend not to die; the units vary widely in terms of power, etc.
Distribution of Capabilities:
“The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks” (92).
“I have not defined the two essential elements of a systems theory of international politics—the structure of the system and its interacting units” (94).
“Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered…second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units… third, by the distribution of capabilities across units” (96).
Ch 5: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power
“The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (98).
“The distinction between international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or the nonuse of force but in their different structures” (99).
“Differences between national and international structures are reflected in the ways the units of each system define their ends and develop the means for reaching them” (100).
“Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities” (101).
“The structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states in two ways” (101). “In a self-help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others” (101). “A state also worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. That is the second way in whi8ch the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states” (103).
Discussion of emergent phenomena, insecurity and freedom, organization costs in anarchy…
“National politcs is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation” (111).
“I have described anarchies and hierarchies as though every political order were of one type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write of structures allow for a greater, and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types” (112).
“Increasing the number of categories would bring the classification of societies closer to reality. But that would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy. One who wishes to explain rather than to describe should resist moving in that direction if resistance is reasonable” (113).
Realpolitik: “The ruler’s, and later the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; success is the ultimate test of policy; and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state” (115-6).
“A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: they are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (117).
States use means available to them: internal and external (117).
If one state is successful, others will emulate. The structure of the international system is the driver of balances of power recurring.
Ch 3: Reductionist and Systemic Theories
“A reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts” (47).
“Analysts who confine their attention to interacting units, without recognizing that systemic causes are in play, compensate for the omissions by assigning such causes arbitrarily to the level of interacting units and parceling them out among actors” (49).
Looks at inside-out theories of international politics that attempt to explain system level behavior by looking at the activities occurring within a unit. “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states” (52).
“The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent. Why then do we find such a persistent pull toward reduction [specifically citing Morgenthau, Kissinger and Levy]? The answer is that usually reduction results not from a scholar’s intent but from his errors” (53).
Changes in structure can be separated from changes in units (55).
“From the first part of this article, we know that the theory we want to construct has to be a systemic one” (56).
“What do I mean by explain? I mean explain in these senses: to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to say why patterns of behavior recur; to say why events repeat themselves, including events that none or few of the actors may like” (57).
“A theory has explanatory and predictive power. A theory also has elegance. Elegance in social-science theories means that explanations and predictions will be general” (57).
“Structures, moreover, may suddenly change. A structural change is a revolution, whether or not violently produced, and it is so because it gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the system varied with changes in structure. Across systems, a theory explains change. A theory of international politics can succeed only if political structures are defined in ways that identify their causal effects and show how those effects vary as structural changes” (58).
“In a systems theory, some part of the explanation of behaviors and outcomes is found in the system’s structure. A political structure is akin to a field of forces in physics interactions within a field have properties as the field affects the objects, so the objects affect the field” (62).
Structure: will unify outputs with a variety of inputs; also, “…a set of constraining conditions” (62). “Agents and agencies act; systems as a whole do not” (63).
“The first way in which structures work their effects is through a process of socialization that limits and molds behavior” (65).
“Order may prevail without an borderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator. The mayor of New York City does not phone the gardeners of southern New Jersey and tell them to grow more tomatoes next year because too few were recently supplied” (67).
Ch 4: Political Structures
“A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” (70).
“’Relation’ is used to mean both the interaction of units and the positions they occupy vis-à-vis each other…To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system” (71).
“A structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting parts” (72).
“Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system. Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them” (73). There is an exploration of the structure of domestic politics to juxtapose with international politics. “A domestic political structure is thus defined, first, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second, by specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units” (74).
“Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long as a strubu8re endures…Structure operates as a cause, but it is not the only cause in play” (80).
“I defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capabilities across units” (81).
Ordering Principles:
“Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic” (81). Whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability” (81-2).
“If structure is an organizational concept, the terms ‘structure’ and ‘anarchy’ seem to be in contradiction. If international politics is ‘politics in the absence of government,’ what are we in the presence of? In looking for international structure, one is brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable position to be in. The problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking” (82). Draws parallels w/ microeconomic theory.
“International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units” (84).
“I assume that states seek to ensure their survival” (85).
The Character of the Units:
“The second term in the definition of domestic political structure specifies the functions performed by differentiated units. Hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation…The second term is not needed in defining international-political structure, because so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units. International structures vary only through a change of organizing principle, or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units” (87).
“Just as economists define markets in terms of firms, so I define international-political structures in terms of states” (88).
The units are all sovereign; the units tend not to die; the units vary widely in terms of power, etc.
Distribution of Capabilities:
“The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks” (92).
“I have not defined the two essential elements of a systems theory of international politics—the structure of the system and its interacting units” (94).
“Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered…second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units… third, by the distribution of capabilities across units” (96).
Ch 5: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power
“The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (98).
“The distinction between international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or the nonuse of force but in their different structures” (99).
“Differences between national and international structures are reflected in the ways the units of each system define their ends and develop the means for reaching them” (100).
“Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities” (101).
“The structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states in two ways” (101). “In a self-help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others” (101). “A state also worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. That is the second way in whi8ch the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states” (103).
Discussion of emergent phenomena, insecurity and freedom, organization costs in anarchy…
“National politcs is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation” (111).
“I have described anarchies and hierarchies as though every political order were of one type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write of structures allow for a greater, and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types” (112).
“Increasing the number of categories would bring the classification of societies closer to reality. But that would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy. One who wishes to explain rather than to describe should resist moving in that direction if resistance is reasonable” (113).
Realpolitik: “The ruler’s, and later the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; success is the ultimate test of policy; and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state” (115-6).
“A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: they are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (117).
States use means available to them: internal and external (117).
If one state is successful, others will emulate. The structure of the international system is the driver of balances of power recurring.
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