Keohane, R., 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press.
Ch 3: Reductionist and Systemic Theories
“A reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts” (47).
“Analysts who confine their attention to interacting units, without recognizing that systemic causes are in play, compensate for the omissions by assigning such causes arbitrarily to the level of interacting units and parceling them out among actors” (49).
Looks at inside-out theories of international politics that attempt to explain system level behavior by looking at the activities occurring within a unit. “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states” (52).
“The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent. Why then do we find such a persistent pull toward reduction [specifically citing Morgenthau, Kissinger and Levy]? The answer is that usually reduction results not from a scholar’s intent but from his errors” (53).
Changes in structure can be separated from changes in units (55).
“From the first part of this article, we know that the theory we want to construct has to be a systemic one” (56).
“What do I mean by explain? I mean explain in these senses: to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to say why patterns of behavior recur; to say why events repeat themselves, including events that none or few of the actors may like” (57).
“A theory has explanatory and predictive power. A theory also has elegance. Elegance in social-science theories means that explanations and predictions will be general” (57).
“Structures, moreover, may suddenly change. A structural change is a revolution, whether or not violently produced, and it is so because it gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the system varied with changes in structure. Across systems, a theory explains change. A theory of international politics can succeed only if political structures are defined in ways that identify their causal effects and show how those effects vary as structural changes” (58).
“In a systems theory, some part of the explanation of behaviors and outcomes is found in the system’s structure. A political structure is akin to a field of forces in physics interactions within a field have properties as the field affects the objects, so the objects affect the field” (62).
Structure: will unify outputs with a variety of inputs; also, “…a set of constraining conditions” (62). “Agents and agencies act; systems as a whole do not” (63).
“The first way in which structures work their effects is through a process of socialization that limits and molds behavior” (65).
“Order may prevail without an borderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator. The mayor of New York City does not phone the gardeners of southern New Jersey and tell them to grow more tomatoes next year because too few were recently supplied” (67).
Ch 4: Political Structures
“A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” (70).
“’Relation’ is used to mean both the interaction of units and the positions they occupy vis-à-vis each other…To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system” (71).
“A structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting parts” (72).
“Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system. Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them” (73). There is an exploration of the structure of domestic politics to juxtapose with international politics. “A domestic political structure is thus defined, first, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second, by specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units” (74).
“Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long as a strubu8re endures…Structure operates as a cause, but it is not the only cause in play” (80).
“I defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capabilities across units” (81).
Ordering Principles:
“Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic” (81). Whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability” (81-2).
“If structure is an organizational concept, the terms ‘structure’ and ‘anarchy’ seem to be in contradiction. If international politics is ‘politics in the absence of government,’ what are we in the presence of? In looking for international structure, one is brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable position to be in. The problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking” (82). Draws parallels w/ microeconomic theory.
“International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units” (84).
“I assume that states seek to ensure their survival” (85).
The Character of the Units:
“The second term in the definition of domestic political structure specifies the functions performed by differentiated units. Hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation…The second term is not needed in defining international-political structure, because so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units. International structures vary only through a change of organizing principle, or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units” (87).
“Just as economists define markets in terms of firms, so I define international-political structures in terms of states” (88).
The units are all sovereign; the units tend not to die; the units vary widely in terms of power, etc.
Distribution of Capabilities:
“The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks” (92).
“I have not defined the two essential elements of a systems theory of international politics—the structure of the system and its interacting units” (94).
“Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered…second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units… third, by the distribution of capabilities across units” (96).
Ch 5: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power
“The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (98).
“The distinction between international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or the nonuse of force but in their different structures” (99).
“Differences between national and international structures are reflected in the ways the units of each system define their ends and develop the means for reaching them” (100).
“Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities” (101).
“The structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states in two ways” (101). “In a self-help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others” (101). “A state also worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. That is the second way in whi8ch the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states” (103).
Discussion of emergent phenomena, insecurity and freedom, organization costs in anarchy…
“National politcs is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation” (111).
“I have described anarchies and hierarchies as though every political order were of one type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write of structures allow for a greater, and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types” (112).
“Increasing the number of categories would bring the classification of societies closer to reality. But that would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy. One who wishes to explain rather than to describe should resist moving in that direction if resistance is reasonable” (113).
Realpolitik: “The ruler’s, and later the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; success is the ultimate test of policy; and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state” (115-6).
“A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: they are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (117).
States use means available to them: internal and external (117).
If one state is successful, others will emulate. The structure of the international system is the driver of balances of power recurring.
Showing posts with label Order. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Order. Show all posts
Monday, July 14, 2008
Saturday, June 28, 2008
Bull: The Anarchical Society
Bull, Hedley. (1977). The anarchical society : a study of order in world politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ch 1: The Nature of Order in World Politics:
Bull begins by defining the concept of order. Order is a set pattern that emerges in the interaction of different variables. While this is a crucial first step, it is not sufficient: order also needs a purpose, or an end. For Bull vis-à-vis society, order has three goals: safety, contractual honesty and legal security.
International Order: “…independent political communities each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relations to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population” (8).
System of States: “…is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave…as parts of a whole” (9).
Society of States: “…exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another” (13).
“An international society in this sense presupposes an international system, but an international system may exist that is not an international society” (13).
What are the goals of international order? Preservation of the system (16). Maintain independence and sovereignty of the states (16). Peace (17). The goals mentioned at the beginning of the chapter: life, truth, property (18).
World Order: “…those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole” (19).
International Order: “…order among states” (19).
Ch 2: Does Order Exist in World Politics?
“This present study takes as its starting-point the proposition that, on the contrary, order is part of the historical record of international relations and in particular, that modern states have formed, and continue to form, not only a system of states but also an international society” (22-3).
Bull goes on to identify three different logics, or traditions of thought that have dominated understandings of international systems: Hobbsian, Kantian and Grotian. Hobbisan: international politics is a constant state of war. Kantian: international politics is a community of humankind. Grotian: international politics takes place in an international society.
“A chief intellectual support of this doctrine is what I have called the domestic analogy, the argument from the experience of individual men in domestic society to the experience of states, according to which states, like individuals, are capable of orderly social life only if, as in Hobbe’s phrase, they stand in awe of a common power” (44). This is empirically false. The modern international system doesn’t compare to the Hobbsian world of war of all against all.
Ch 3: How is Order Maintained in World Politics?
In short, common interests that determine a common goal. These common interests are determined by rules that are constantly in flux. These rules facilitate more coordinated action between states.
Institutions: “…a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals” (71).
Ch 4: Order verses Justice in World Politics:
There is a trade off between the two, though not a zero-sum game.
Ch 5: The balance of Power and International Order:
BoP: “…a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others” (97).
There is simple and complex BoP arrangements. Simple arrangements are between two states. Complex arrangements involve many actors and many different kinds of power. In the complex arrangement, there is no need for all actors to be entirely equal in their ability to compete against one another; relative power can be emphasized in these situations.
Bull also draws a distinction between general BoP and local BoP. He also draws a distinction between subjective and objective BoP, the former being an accepted understanding of a country’s capabilities and the later being the actual capabilities of a country. Bull also draws a distinction between a fortuitous and a contrived BoP.
He then explores BoP through the medium of nuclear weapons.
Ch 9: The Great Powers and International Order:
Great Powers: must be two or more in the international system. They have great military strength. Have special rights and duties. These powers can contribute to international order in two ways: managing the relations with one another; impart a degree of central authority.
Ch 1: The Nature of Order in World Politics:
Bull begins by defining the concept of order. Order is a set pattern that emerges in the interaction of different variables. While this is a crucial first step, it is not sufficient: order also needs a purpose, or an end. For Bull vis-à-vis society, order has three goals: safety, contractual honesty and legal security.
International Order: “…independent political communities each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relations to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population” (8).
System of States: “…is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave…as parts of a whole” (9).
Society of States: “…exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another” (13).
“An international society in this sense presupposes an international system, but an international system may exist that is not an international society” (13).
What are the goals of international order? Preservation of the system (16). Maintain independence and sovereignty of the states (16). Peace (17). The goals mentioned at the beginning of the chapter: life, truth, property (18).
World Order: “…those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole” (19).
International Order: “…order among states” (19).
Ch 2: Does Order Exist in World Politics?
“This present study takes as its starting-point the proposition that, on the contrary, order is part of the historical record of international relations and in particular, that modern states have formed, and continue to form, not only a system of states but also an international society” (22-3).
Bull goes on to identify three different logics, or traditions of thought that have dominated understandings of international systems: Hobbsian, Kantian and Grotian. Hobbisan: international politics is a constant state of war. Kantian: international politics is a community of humankind. Grotian: international politics takes place in an international society.
“A chief intellectual support of this doctrine is what I have called the domestic analogy, the argument from the experience of individual men in domestic society to the experience of states, according to which states, like individuals, are capable of orderly social life only if, as in Hobbe’s phrase, they stand in awe of a common power” (44). This is empirically false. The modern international system doesn’t compare to the Hobbsian world of war of all against all.
Ch 3: How is Order Maintained in World Politics?
In short, common interests that determine a common goal. These common interests are determined by rules that are constantly in flux. These rules facilitate more coordinated action between states.
Institutions: “…a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals” (71).
Ch 4: Order verses Justice in World Politics:
There is a trade off between the two, though not a zero-sum game.
Ch 5: The balance of Power and International Order:
BoP: “…a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others” (97).
There is simple and complex BoP arrangements. Simple arrangements are between two states. Complex arrangements involve many actors and many different kinds of power. In the complex arrangement, there is no need for all actors to be entirely equal in their ability to compete against one another; relative power can be emphasized in these situations.
Bull also draws a distinction between general BoP and local BoP. He also draws a distinction between subjective and objective BoP, the former being an accepted understanding of a country’s capabilities and the later being the actual capabilities of a country. Bull also draws a distinction between a fortuitous and a contrived BoP.
He then explores BoP through the medium of nuclear weapons.
Ch 9: The Great Powers and International Order:
Great Powers: must be two or more in the international system. They have great military strength. Have special rights and duties. These powers can contribute to international order in two ways: managing the relations with one another; impart a degree of central authority.
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Hayek: The Use of Knowledge in Society
Hayek, F. A. (1945). "The Use of Knowledge in Society". American Economic Review, 35(4), 519-530.
”What is the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational economic order?” (521). Hayek begins by wondering how it is necessarily possible for people to structure an economic order. If there is full transparency and information, then there really isn’t a problem. However, as Hayek rightly notes, there is not full transparency or information: it is impossible to know fully the desires of their neighbor. The problem is thus, “…the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality” (520).
All economic activity, whether centralized or decentralized, according to Hayek, involves planning. “Which of these systems is likely to be more efficient depends mainly on the question under which of them we can expect that fuller use will be made of the existing knowledge” (521). If we are looking for experts to use this knowledge, it then becomes a complicated problem of choosing the expert. “What I wish to point out is that, even assuming that this problem can be readily solved, it is only a small part of the wider problem” (521).
Scientific knowledge, or the knowledge of experts, will never be the full extent of knowledge. There are other kinds of knowledge that each person possesses that goes above and beyond this professional, elitist knowledge. This is the knowledge of a particular time and space, in the words of Hayek (522). This is a knowledge of needs, desires and goals that can never be fully understood by scientific knowledge.
Additionally, the need for economic planning tends to take place when issues of change arise. This presents a situation in that the scientist must explore her own knowledge and eventually determine a course of action. However, Hayek claims that the type of knowledge that is accessed by these scientists is not necessarily the correct type of knowledge for the situation at hand. In reality, the type of knowledge that must be accessed in order to make economic policy decisions is of a particular time and place, it is owned by a particular individual. This type of knowledge can not be evaluated in the realm of statistics.
There then remains the problem of how you provide the necessary information about the current situation to the person with the knowledge of a particular time and space. Hayek wonders how much information this person requires and eventually concludes that they do not need more information than that is provided them by their immediate surroundings. They only need to know the cost of producing something, that there is more or less of a factor in supply and that the price of various goods has changed and to what level they have changed. These prices eventually act as a tool for coordinating the actions of the many people in a market place; they are the catalyst for bringing the many individuals with particular information of a time and space together to make informed collective decisions.
At the end of the piece, he takes issue with Professor Schumpeter’s formulation of market interaction, where people are taking into consideration very large amounts of knowledge that border on full knowledge. First of all, it is crucial for Hayek to assume that the fullness of knowledge is unattainable. Secondly, he uses this assumption to make the claim that large groups of people with limited knowledge must come together to make decisions. Thirdly, he determines that prices are the mechanism whereby these individuals are able to come together to achieve socially optimum levels of production and consumption, or, rather, economic equilibrium that is, by definition, particular to a time and a space.
”What is the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational economic order?” (521). Hayek begins by wondering how it is necessarily possible for people to structure an economic order. If there is full transparency and information, then there really isn’t a problem. However, as Hayek rightly notes, there is not full transparency or information: it is impossible to know fully the desires of their neighbor. The problem is thus, “…the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality” (520).
All economic activity, whether centralized or decentralized, according to Hayek, involves planning. “Which of these systems is likely to be more efficient depends mainly on the question under which of them we can expect that fuller use will be made of the existing knowledge” (521). If we are looking for experts to use this knowledge, it then becomes a complicated problem of choosing the expert. “What I wish to point out is that, even assuming that this problem can be readily solved, it is only a small part of the wider problem” (521).
Scientific knowledge, or the knowledge of experts, will never be the full extent of knowledge. There are other kinds of knowledge that each person possesses that goes above and beyond this professional, elitist knowledge. This is the knowledge of a particular time and space, in the words of Hayek (522). This is a knowledge of needs, desires and goals that can never be fully understood by scientific knowledge.
Additionally, the need for economic planning tends to take place when issues of change arise. This presents a situation in that the scientist must explore her own knowledge and eventually determine a course of action. However, Hayek claims that the type of knowledge that is accessed by these scientists is not necessarily the correct type of knowledge for the situation at hand. In reality, the type of knowledge that must be accessed in order to make economic policy decisions is of a particular time and place, it is owned by a particular individual. This type of knowledge can not be evaluated in the realm of statistics.
There then remains the problem of how you provide the necessary information about the current situation to the person with the knowledge of a particular time and space. Hayek wonders how much information this person requires and eventually concludes that they do not need more information than that is provided them by their immediate surroundings. They only need to know the cost of producing something, that there is more or less of a factor in supply and that the price of various goods has changed and to what level they have changed. These prices eventually act as a tool for coordinating the actions of the many people in a market place; they are the catalyst for bringing the many individuals with particular information of a time and space together to make informed collective decisions.
At the end of the piece, he takes issue with Professor Schumpeter’s formulation of market interaction, where people are taking into consideration very large amounts of knowledge that border on full knowledge. First of all, it is crucial for Hayek to assume that the fullness of knowledge is unattainable. Secondly, he uses this assumption to make the claim that large groups of people with limited knowledge must come together to make decisions. Thirdly, he determines that prices are the mechanism whereby these individuals are able to come together to achieve socially optimum levels of production and consumption, or, rather, economic equilibrium that is, by definition, particular to a time and a space.
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Hayek: Law, Legislation and Liberty: Chapter 2: Cosmos and Taxis
Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. (1982). Law, legislation, and liberty : a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy (New pbk. ed.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Chapter 2: Cosmos and Taxis
Hayek spends this chapter distinguishing between two types of orders: those that are made and those that are grown. “By ‘order’ we shall throughout describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct” (36). He claims that the concept of order has been hijacked by those who favor authoritarianism, as they see it relating to command and obedience. “A spontaneous order…has in many respects properties different from those of a made order” (36).
Spontaneous orders have been studied for a long time in the field of economics and biology, claims Hayek. These orders focus on self-organization and self-generation. These orders are endogenous to a system. On the other hand, made orders are exogenously controlled; these are constructions and can be called organizations.
The title of this chapter derives from Greek words that separate made orders from spontaneous orders. “Taxis” is an order that is constructed, much like, “an order of battle”. “Kosmos”, on the other hand, is a grown order, or a spontaneous order.
“One of our main contentions will be that very complex orders, comprising more particular facts than any brain could ascertain or manipulate, can be brought about only through forces inducing the formation of spontaneous orders” (38). These systems have drivers that abstractly relate to one another. To preserve these orders, all one needs, “…is that a certain structure of relationships be maintained…” (39). These orders have no overarching purpose, or telos (not his words), though they can prove very handy for individuals and groups of people. These orders involve the regular interaction of small units that are relatively consistent. “The important point is that the regularity of the conduct of the elements will determine the general character of the resulting order but not all the detail of its particular manifestation” (40). And, to prediction: “…we shall be able to predict only the general character of the order that will form itself, and not the particular position which any particular element will occupy relatively to any other element” (40).
Spontaneous orders arise because all of the elements that are compromise these orders obey simple sets of rules in their, “…responses to their immediate environment” (43). Some of these rules, for example, can be seen in human interaction in the market place. “In a modern society based on exchange, one of the chief regularities in individual behavior will result from the similarity of situations in which most individuals find themselves in working to earn an income; which means that they will normally prefer a larger return from their efforts to a smaller one, and often that they will increase their efforts in a particular direction if the prospects of return improve. This is a rule that will be followed at least with sufficient frequency to impress u8pon such a society an order of a certain kind” (45).
While society has the features of a spontaneous order, a government, or made order, also exists. These two orders co-exist. The example of a cell and a cell’s nucleus is used to explain this relationship. The government is meant to fill the role of a, “maintenance squad of a factory” (47), or the group that keeps everything free to operate smoothly on its own.
Organizations, just like spontaneous orders, also rely on rules. This is so that the corporate knowledge can exceed that of any individual. This knowledge is far and above what any one individual can possess, and thus it is impossible to constrain through made orders. A spontaneous order, “…arises from each element balancing all the various factors operating on it and by adjusting all its various actions to each other, a balance which will be destroyed if some of the actions are determined by another agency on the basis of different knowledge and in the service of different ends. What the general argument against ‘interference’ thus amounts to is that, although we can endeavor to improve a spontaneous order by revising the general rules on which it rests, and can supplement its results by the efforts of various organizations, we cannot improve the results by specific commands that deprive its members of the possibility of using their knowledge for their purposes” (51).
Humans can not know the effects of their policy interventions. Thus, “…the only possibility of transcending the capacity of individual minds is to rely on those super-personal ‘self-organizing’ forces which create spontaneous orders” (54).
Chapter 2: Cosmos and Taxis
Hayek spends this chapter distinguishing between two types of orders: those that are made and those that are grown. “By ‘order’ we shall throughout describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct” (36). He claims that the concept of order has been hijacked by those who favor authoritarianism, as they see it relating to command and obedience. “A spontaneous order…has in many respects properties different from those of a made order” (36).
Spontaneous orders have been studied for a long time in the field of economics and biology, claims Hayek. These orders focus on self-organization and self-generation. These orders are endogenous to a system. On the other hand, made orders are exogenously controlled; these are constructions and can be called organizations.
The title of this chapter derives from Greek words that separate made orders from spontaneous orders. “Taxis” is an order that is constructed, much like, “an order of battle”. “Kosmos”, on the other hand, is a grown order, or a spontaneous order.
“One of our main contentions will be that very complex orders, comprising more particular facts than any brain could ascertain or manipulate, can be brought about only through forces inducing the formation of spontaneous orders” (38). These systems have drivers that abstractly relate to one another. To preserve these orders, all one needs, “…is that a certain structure of relationships be maintained…” (39). These orders have no overarching purpose, or telos (not his words), though they can prove very handy for individuals and groups of people. These orders involve the regular interaction of small units that are relatively consistent. “The important point is that the regularity of the conduct of the elements will determine the general character of the resulting order but not all the detail of its particular manifestation” (40). And, to prediction: “…we shall be able to predict only the general character of the order that will form itself, and not the particular position which any particular element will occupy relatively to any other element” (40).
Spontaneous orders arise because all of the elements that are compromise these orders obey simple sets of rules in their, “…responses to their immediate environment” (43). Some of these rules, for example, can be seen in human interaction in the market place. “In a modern society based on exchange, one of the chief regularities in individual behavior will result from the similarity of situations in which most individuals find themselves in working to earn an income; which means that they will normally prefer a larger return from their efforts to a smaller one, and often that they will increase their efforts in a particular direction if the prospects of return improve. This is a rule that will be followed at least with sufficient frequency to impress u8pon such a society an order of a certain kind” (45).
While society has the features of a spontaneous order, a government, or made order, also exists. These two orders co-exist. The example of a cell and a cell’s nucleus is used to explain this relationship. The government is meant to fill the role of a, “maintenance squad of a factory” (47), or the group that keeps everything free to operate smoothly on its own.
Organizations, just like spontaneous orders, also rely on rules. This is so that the corporate knowledge can exceed that of any individual. This knowledge is far and above what any one individual can possess, and thus it is impossible to constrain through made orders. A spontaneous order, “…arises from each element balancing all the various factors operating on it and by adjusting all its various actions to each other, a balance which will be destroyed if some of the actions are determined by another agency on the basis of different knowledge and in the service of different ends. What the general argument against ‘interference’ thus amounts to is that, although we can endeavor to improve a spontaneous order by revising the general rules on which it rests, and can supplement its results by the efforts of various organizations, we cannot improve the results by specific commands that deprive its members of the possibility of using their knowledge for their purposes” (51).
Humans can not know the effects of their policy interventions. Thus, “…the only possibility of transcending the capacity of individual minds is to rely on those super-personal ‘self-organizing’ forces which create spontaneous orders” (54).
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