Mantzavinos, C, DC North, and S Shariq. 2004. Learning, institutions, and economic performance. Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 01: 75-84.
"In this article, we provide a broad overview of the interplay among cognition, belief systems, and institutions, and how they affect economic performance. We argue that a deeper understanding of institutions' emergence, their working properties, and their effect on economic and political outcomes should begin from an analysis of cognitive processes. We explore the nature of individual and collective learning, stressing that the issue is not whether agents are perfectly or bounded rationally, but rather how human beings actually reason and choose, individually and in collective settings. We then tie the processes of learning to institutional analysis, providing arguments in favor of what can be characterized as 'cognitive institutionalism'" (from abstract).
Showing posts with label Learning. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Learning. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Elkins et. al.: On Waves, Clusters and Diffusion
Elkins, Zachary, & Simmons, Beth. (2005). "On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598, 33-51.
This article begins by making a distinction between diffusion in general, and specific instances where the term may not be applicable. For example if reform, “…lacks an exchange of some sort between actors, it is not diffusion as scholars have come to use the term” (32).
Clustering of idea diffusion is a characteristic of policy reform. One reason that it happens at a similar, yet independent streak, is because countries have similar domestic constraints and structures to that they are responding. Another reason is coordination: this can occur through epistemic communities, or through more explicitly vertical or horizontal arrangements. Another reason may combine aspects of the first two: “…governments are independent in the sense that they make their own decisions without cooperation or coercion but interdependent in the sense that they factor in the choices of other governments. In other words, uncoordinated interdependence” (35).
The next section of the articles wonders whether or not the concept of diffusion should be thought of as an independent or a dependent variable.
The drivers of diffusion are then examined, with three conditions of/for diffusion explored: cultural norms, support groups and competition (39). Then, different forms of learning are identified. The goal of this article was to present a set of terms and a framework for further empirical research.
This article begins by making a distinction between diffusion in general, and specific instances where the term may not be applicable. For example if reform, “…lacks an exchange of some sort between actors, it is not diffusion as scholars have come to use the term” (32).
Clustering of idea diffusion is a characteristic of policy reform. One reason that it happens at a similar, yet independent streak, is because countries have similar domestic constraints and structures to that they are responding. Another reason is coordination: this can occur through epistemic communities, or through more explicitly vertical or horizontal arrangements. Another reason may combine aspects of the first two: “…governments are independent in the sense that they make their own decisions without cooperation or coercion but interdependent in the sense that they factor in the choices of other governments. In other words, uncoordinated interdependence” (35).
The next section of the articles wonders whether or not the concept of diffusion should be thought of as an independent or a dependent variable.
The drivers of diffusion are then examined, with three conditions of/for diffusion explored: cultural norms, support groups and competition (39). Then, different forms of learning are identified. The goal of this article was to present a set of terms and a framework for further empirical research.
Meseguer: Poilcy Learning, Policy Diffusion and the Making of a New Order
Meseguer, Covadonga. (2005). "Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598, 67-82.
"This article surveys the role of learning as mechanism of policy diffusion in the context of the creation of a new political order” (67).
Mexeguer examines how learning from the examples of others may have contributed to policy diffusion and liberalization in the later decades of the 20th century. Specifically, the author examines whether or not countries and polities learned from failed collectivization and interventionism policies. This article attempts to more broadly contextualize the idea of learning as a tool of policy diffusion, examine alternative perspectives and explain the difficulties of testing this empirically.
“I argue that although learning is suggested as a fundamental mechanism of diffusion of the previous wave of deregulation and privatization and of the current wave of regulatory reforms, we still lack the empirical tests to evaluate the impact that learning may have had on these two trends” (68).
Learning is a voluntary act (71). It also implies an adaptation of beliefs (72). “Rational learning, in short, would imply convergence i9n policy choices. This is a model of learning that seems to match the sort of trend this chapter seeks to explain” (72).
Bounded learning is placed in contrast to rational learning. “Rather than scanning all information, governments look at relevant information” (72).
“Empirically, there is a strong evidence for the hypothesis that emulation has driven the adoption of a wide range of economic and social policy reforms. There is also strong evidence that emulation is behind the very recent ascendance of the regulatory state…The truth is that the empirical evidence we can rely on is still limited and partial (79).
"This article surveys the role of learning as mechanism of policy diffusion in the context of the creation of a new political order” (67).
Mexeguer examines how learning from the examples of others may have contributed to policy diffusion and liberalization in the later decades of the 20th century. Specifically, the author examines whether or not countries and polities learned from failed collectivization and interventionism policies. This article attempts to more broadly contextualize the idea of learning as a tool of policy diffusion, examine alternative perspectives and explain the difficulties of testing this empirically.
“I argue that although learning is suggested as a fundamental mechanism of diffusion of the previous wave of deregulation and privatization and of the current wave of regulatory reforms, we still lack the empirical tests to evaluate the impact that learning may have had on these two trends” (68).
Learning is a voluntary act (71). It also implies an adaptation of beliefs (72). “Rational learning, in short, would imply convergence i9n policy choices. This is a model of learning that seems to match the sort of trend this chapter seeks to explain” (72).
Bounded learning is placed in contrast to rational learning. “Rather than scanning all information, governments look at relevant information” (72).
“Empirically, there is a strong evidence for the hypothesis that emulation has driven the adoption of a wide range of economic and social policy reforms. There is also strong evidence that emulation is behind the very recent ascendance of the regulatory state…The truth is that the empirical evidence we can rely on is still limited and partial (79).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
