Friday, October 10, 2008

Panitch and Gindin: Global Capitalism and American Empire

Panitch, L. & Gindin, S., 2004. Global Capitalism and American Empire, Merlin Press.

The causes of globalization are seen by Panitch and Gindin to be fairly standard for Marxist scholars. In the beginning of their “Rethinking Imperialism” chapter, they note that, “There is a structural logic to capitalism that tends to its expansion and internationalization. This was famously captured in Marx’s description in the communist Manifesto of a future that stunningly matches our present” (Panitch and Gindin 2004:13). They then go on to quote Marx’s explanation of the international nature of capital expansion. However, this standard, initial accumulation of capital is complicated by the tool of capitalist accumulation: imperialism and the theory of inter-imperial rivalry.

The authors contrast the traditional account of inter-imperial rivalry with an account that takes the capitalist state to be the most important actor in the consolidation of capital as opposed to theories of economic states or crises. In the traditional account, imperialism was the tool of capitalist nations to internationalize capital. This was the result of a theory of crisis being seen as the impetus for capital expansion beyond national borders. Because this dynamic was occurring in a number of different countries, there would be a number of different imperial powers. The new markets would also eventually be saturated, thus causing home markets to suffer an exhaustion of consumption and the imperial nations would turn against one another. This is the space that inter-imperial rivalry occurred.

Panich and Gindin explain why this interpretation of inter-imperial rivalry was misinformed. In the opinion of these authors, the inter-imperial rivalry theorists were wrong because they were defective in their treatment of the dynamics of capital accumulation, they mistakenly used the theory of crisis to explain capital expansion, they failed to understand the spatial dimensions of internationalization, they mistakenly assumed that exhaustion of consumption within capitalist countries would lead to crisis and finally they wrongly stated that the deepening of capital would lead to less choice (Panich and Gindin 2004:17-8). What the authors conclude is that these theories of inter-imperial rivalry were only looking at very early stages of capitalism. This current iteration of capitalism that we are experiencing is based on a different set of drivers.

The authors then go on to explain how the capitalist state must be a more vital aspect of theorizing capitalist imperialism. They say that, “Capitalist imperialism, then, needs to be understood through an extension of the theory of the capitalist state, rather than derived directly from the theory of economic stages or crises” (Panich and Gindin 2004:18). Panich and Gindin focus on the contingent aspects of capital accumulation and adaptation to contradictions in capitalism. They see earlier Marxist thought as relying on a much too simple understanding of the separation of the economic and the political. The true nature of the interaction between the economy and politics is much more nuanced.

The inter-imperialist rivalry paradigm was changed by Panich and Gindin to incorporate global capitalist expansion without tension occurring between major capitalist nations. This global capitalist order needed a hegemonic power that drove the expansion and the unification of the capitalist states and, in this current iteration of capitalism, this leader was found in the United States. In Panich and Gindin’s version of globalization, there are two realms of capital: domestic and international. The interest of domestic capital was trumpeted by proponents of the old inter-imperialist rivalry theory of capitalist expansion. However, in this new version of capitalist expansion, the tension is not between the interests of capital from two industrialized nations, but rather the expansion of capital is in the interest of global capital more generally. This is seen as being a response to the instability that occurred after the first occurrence of globalization .

Therefore, we see national interest undermined by global capital interests. The U.S. takes control of the operation and standardization of rules for this capital, but not entirely in their own interest. Other nations are willing to submit to the leadership of the United States because order is valued more highly than domestic capital interests. Two world wars and a global depression allowed nations to see the value of a stabilizing, international capital order controlled through one hegemonic leader. “The point is that we need to distinguish between the expansive tendency of capitalism and its actual history. A global capitalist order is always a contingent social construct: the actual development and continuity of such an order must be problematized” (Panich and Gindin 2004:14-5).

Through this account of capital expansion, Panich and Gindin show us how a contemporary, Marxist account of globalization takes into consideration the changes brought about by the increased intensity and speed of global connections. The rules and structure of international capital changed in the last half of the 20th century. Before this time, they were primarily controlled by the interest of certain nations. Now, they have moved into the realm of post-national control. Still, capital accumulation is seen as being a deterministic driver of international affairs, but the structure and the rules that it follows are to be contingent. If capital does not deterministically create the rules and structure that govern capitalism, we have opened up the possibility for substantial change that has little to do with initial capital accumulation.