Babb, S, and A Buira. 2004. Mission Creep, Mission Push and Discretion in Sociological Perspective: The Case of IMF Conditionality. In , 24:8-9.
"A term that has gained popularity among World Bank and IMF critics is 'mission creep,' or the systematic shifting of organizational activities away from original mandates" (2).
"The IMF's original purpose as it was conceived in 1944 was to establish a code of conduct that would enhance economic cooperation, and avoid the 'beggar-the-neighbor' policies that led to the economic turbulence of the thirties. This code of conduct required members to establish par values...and to work toward lifting restrictions on past payments...Over time, however, the functions and activities of the Fund changed along with the introduction and expansion of 'conditionality'--the policy measures member countries must adopt in order to have access to the IMF's resources" (2).
Critics of the IMF point to this mission creep as being fundamentally problematic. However, these authors argue that it is not unique to the IMF. In fact, institutional sociologists have experienced the creeping kind of nature within institutions for some time. While institutions are created for a certain purpose, they certainly morph into their own entities that pursue their own ends irrespective of the reasons for their initial creation. In fact, these institutions become much more keenly interested in their own survival than anything that may tie them to their original mandate.
"This paper examines historical evidence of mission creep at the IMF, and explores the organizational dynamics that may have contributed to this process...Synthesizing this evidence, we describe and account for three separate phases in the expansion of conditionality: the establishment of fiscal and monetary conditions in the 1950s; the introduction o debt-related conditions in the 1970s; and the introduction of liberalizing, governance, and a host of other reforms since the 1980s.
"In contrast to these two first phases, we argue that the most recent phase has marked a significant break with the past. Whereas the first period in the Fund's evolution was associated with the development of standardized rules, this latest stage is linked to the rise of 'discretional conditionality:' the increased dependence of disbursements and lending arrangements on the judgments of Management and Staff, rather than on clear rules determined at the outset. We conclude that this reversal cannot be attributed primarily to internal bureaucratic factors, but rather responded to the demands of the Fund's most powerful organizational constituent: the US Treasury. Thus, 'mission push' seems to be the most accurate way of describing recent developments in IMF conditionality" (4).
The evidence for this is presented systematically. I will not document it here.
Showing posts with label Sociology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sociology. Show all posts
Friday, January 30, 2009
Monday, December 8, 2008
DiMaggio: Culture and Economy
P DiMaggio, “Culture and Economy,” The Handbook of Economic Sociology 27 (1994).
"The purpose of this chapter is to review critically research on the relationship between culture and economy. Most of us are accustomed to the view, assimilated by social research and theory, that economic relations influence ideas, worldviews, and symbols. That the reverse is true, that aspects of culture shape economic institutions and affairs, is less well understood and therefore richer in implication for economic sociology and for interdisciplinary conversations. Therefore I emphasize the impact of culture on the economy and only secondarily consider economic effects on culture" (27).
DiMaggio argues crucially two things: that every economic process can be seen as having crucial cultural aspects and also that these economic processes, in part because of their irreducible cultural components, must be seen granularly and not approached globally or with universal characteristics.
Culture can have many effects on economics, from defining interests (either constituting them or regulating them) and position the norms of market interaction.
If culture is so important, why don't we see it in economic analysis? DiMaggio argues that, in part, it is a matter of parsimony: economic analysis relies on parsimonious models and culture does not lend itself to such accounts.
The chapter then goes on in great detail to outline different cultural aspects to economic life. I skimmed.
"The purpose of this chapter is to review critically research on the relationship between culture and economy. Most of us are accustomed to the view, assimilated by social research and theory, that economic relations influence ideas, worldviews, and symbols. That the reverse is true, that aspects of culture shape economic institutions and affairs, is less well understood and therefore richer in implication for economic sociology and for interdisciplinary conversations. Therefore I emphasize the impact of culture on the economy and only secondarily consider economic effects on culture" (27).
DiMaggio argues crucially two things: that every economic process can be seen as having crucial cultural aspects and also that these economic processes, in part because of their irreducible cultural components, must be seen granularly and not approached globally or with universal characteristics.
Culture can have many effects on economics, from defining interests (either constituting them or regulating them) and position the norms of market interaction.
If culture is so important, why don't we see it in economic analysis? DiMaggio argues that, in part, it is a matter of parsimony: economic analysis relies on parsimonious models and culture does not lend itself to such accounts.
The chapter then goes on in great detail to outline different cultural aspects to economic life. I skimmed.
Swedberg: The New Battle of Methods
R Swedberg, The New battle of Methods. (Univ., Sociologiska institutionen, 1990).
"As the 'cold war' between economics and the other social sciences draws to a close, new scientific discoveries are being threatened by the single-minded vision of the economic imperialists" (33).
This article begins by wondering where the line will be drawn between the study of economics and other social science endeavors. "It is my contention that economic imperialism is threatening to set off a new 'battle of methods," and this is something that could have very negative consequences for economics..." (33). The author focuses on the Methodenstreit battle that came to represent early iterations of the tension between economics and other social sciences, specifically in battles between economists who argued for a more historical approach and those who worked with purely analytical approaches, most notably the marginal utility approach of Menger, etc. Webber is seen as bringing both camps together in a school of thought that brought both history and theory to bear on economic problems. This was called the socioeconomic school.
The author wonders if the rationalistic approaches of authors like Becker are not isolating economics once again. This isolation and attempt to explain everything using economic methodologies is referred to as "economic imperialism" by Swedberg (36).
"As the 'cold war' between economics and the other social sciences draws to a close, new scientific discoveries are being threatened by the single-minded vision of the economic imperialists" (33).
This article begins by wondering where the line will be drawn between the study of economics and other social science endeavors. "It is my contention that economic imperialism is threatening to set off a new 'battle of methods," and this is something that could have very negative consequences for economics..." (33). The author focuses on the Methodenstreit battle that came to represent early iterations of the tension between economics and other social sciences, specifically in battles between economists who argued for a more historical approach and those who worked with purely analytical approaches, most notably the marginal utility approach of Menger, etc. Webber is seen as bringing both camps together in a school of thought that brought both history and theory to bear on economic problems. This was called the socioeconomic school.
The author wonders if the rationalistic approaches of authors like Becker are not isolating economics once again. This isolation and attempt to explain everything using economic methodologies is referred to as "economic imperialism" by Swedberg (36).
Tuesday, November 4, 2008
Fligstein: The Architecture of Markets
Fligstein, N., 2001. The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies, Princeton University Press.
“Market society has produced more income, wealth, goods, and services than any other form of human social organization. It has done so by creating the conditions for social exchange between large groups of human beings, often separated across large geographic spaces. For most observers, the driving forces of this wealth creation have been technology and competition” (3).
“The purpose of this book is to begin to systematically understand how the dynamism of technology and competition is situated in, defined by, and structured through the production of firms, their social relations with each other, and their relations to government. Put simply, the dynamism of market society is made possible by this extensive social organization. Competition and technological change are themselves defined by market actors and governments over time. These forces are not exogenous to market society, but endogenous to these social relations” (4).
“This dependence of t5echnology and competition on social factors implies that making sense of economic growth requires we think more systematically about these factors. Economic growth depends on governments, institutions, and the social technologies by which firms are created, class struggle si routinized, and competition between firms is mediated” (5-6).
“My overall goal is to provide scholars and other persons interested in policy with analytic tools to make sense of such phenomena as globalization. Ultimately, my analysis suggests that governments and citizens are part and parcel of market processes. The evidence shows that very different systems of relations among workers, firms, and governments have produced economic growth. The frequently invoked opposition between governments and market actors, in which governments are viewed as intrusive and inefficient, and firms as efficient wealth producers, is simply wrong. Firms rely on governments and citizens for making markets. Their ability to produce stable worlds depends greatly on these relationships. The analytic frame proposed here explores when these relationships produce positive and less positive outcomes for all members of society” (6).
“Economic sociology is the study of how the material production and consumption of human populations depend on social processes for their structure and dynamics” (6).
The author then attempts to be more clear about exactly what a sociological approach to markets fully encompasses. One wants to strike a balance between being too inclusive and too exclusive in this distinction. Instead of drawing a line around the boundary of the field, the author proposes five key questions that people who work in this field should take interest:
“1. What social rules must exist for markets to function, and what types of social structures are necessary to produce stable markets?...
2. What is the relation between states and firms in the production of markets?...
3. What is a ‘social’ view of what actors seek to do in markets, as opposed to an ‘economic’ one?...
4. What are the dynamics by which markets are created, attain stability, and are transformed and how can we characterize the relations among markets?...
5. What are the implications of market dynamics for the internal structuring of firms and labor markets more generally?” (10-4).
The author then attempts to answer these questions from a framework that he refers to as the “political-cultural approach” (15).
Ch. 9: Globalization:
“The political-cultural approach implies that the relations between political and economic elites and the long histories of their interactions have created laws and informal practices that constitute distinct national systems of property rights and governance” (191). This chapter addresses the paradox between increased globalization and decreasing or stagnating convergence. “The political-cultural approach gives us analytic tools to make sense of some of the reasons why trade can grow and yet national capitalisms persist” (192). The author argues, in part, that globalization is not destroying national firm identities or levers of governmental control.
“Globalization generally refers to three economic processes. First, there has been an increase in the amount of world trade such that firms do not just compete in their won economy, but against first from economies around the world…The second meaning of globalization is that the rise of the so-called Asian tigers has come at the expense of First World jobs in Europe and North America..The final meaning of globalization is that the world financial markets for debt, equity, and particularly currency have grown substantially” (193).
The author argues that standard stories about a revolutionary transformation that resulted from increased global interaction are specious. The process of globalization has taken place over a very long period of time with gradual growth in trade and interconnections. Also, while increased usage of information technology is an important part of this story, it is often overstated. Finally, standard stories of jobs being exported from Western countries in a race to the bottom are not necessarily attributable to globalization.
There is then a discussion of finance and the changing role of central banks. Central banks have moved towards more of an emphasis on price stability, most notably after the contractionary fiscal policy of Volker produced a recession after the 70s oil crisis. Also, it is noted that finance has always relied upon governance for a framework in which to operate.
Arguments that the state is dying in the face of globalization are wrong. Some have claimed that states must choose between equity and efficiency, but this assumes that these are mutually exclusive and that the market universally emphasizes one and the state another. Others have claimed that firms will always be able to bypass the controls of states. This has not proven to be the case. The author argues that many of these views stem from those who believe that governments represent rational rent seekers, and are thus a universal ill on the function of markets.
“There is no evidence that trade has made states ‘smaller’ over the past 30 years. In fact, it is quite the opposite. There is evidence that high exposure to trade combined with organized labor has produced more social protection and larger states. There are theoretical reasons to believe that states continue to matter in producing economic growth by providing public goods, the stable rule of law, and under certain conditions, good industrial policy” (217).
“Market society has produced more income, wealth, goods, and services than any other form of human social organization. It has done so by creating the conditions for social exchange between large groups of human beings, often separated across large geographic spaces. For most observers, the driving forces of this wealth creation have been technology and competition” (3).
“The purpose of this book is to begin to systematically understand how the dynamism of technology and competition is situated in, defined by, and structured through the production of firms, their social relations with each other, and their relations to government. Put simply, the dynamism of market society is made possible by this extensive social organization. Competition and technological change are themselves defined by market actors and governments over time. These forces are not exogenous to market society, but endogenous to these social relations” (4).
“This dependence of t5echnology and competition on social factors implies that making sense of economic growth requires we think more systematically about these factors. Economic growth depends on governments, institutions, and the social technologies by which firms are created, class struggle si routinized, and competition between firms is mediated” (5-6).
“My overall goal is to provide scholars and other persons interested in policy with analytic tools to make sense of such phenomena as globalization. Ultimately, my analysis suggests that governments and citizens are part and parcel of market processes. The evidence shows that very different systems of relations among workers, firms, and governments have produced economic growth. The frequently invoked opposition between governments and market actors, in which governments are viewed as intrusive and inefficient, and firms as efficient wealth producers, is simply wrong. Firms rely on governments and citizens for making markets. Their ability to produce stable worlds depends greatly on these relationships. The analytic frame proposed here explores when these relationships produce positive and less positive outcomes for all members of society” (6).
“Economic sociology is the study of how the material production and consumption of human populations depend on social processes for their structure and dynamics” (6).
The author then attempts to be more clear about exactly what a sociological approach to markets fully encompasses. One wants to strike a balance between being too inclusive and too exclusive in this distinction. Instead of drawing a line around the boundary of the field, the author proposes five key questions that people who work in this field should take interest:
“1. What social rules must exist for markets to function, and what types of social structures are necessary to produce stable markets?...
2. What is the relation between states and firms in the production of markets?...
3. What is a ‘social’ view of what actors seek to do in markets, as opposed to an ‘economic’ one?...
4. What are the dynamics by which markets are created, attain stability, and are transformed and how can we characterize the relations among markets?...
5. What are the implications of market dynamics for the internal structuring of firms and labor markets more generally?” (10-4).
The author then attempts to answer these questions from a framework that he refers to as the “political-cultural approach” (15).
Ch. 9: Globalization:
“The political-cultural approach implies that the relations between political and economic elites and the long histories of their interactions have created laws and informal practices that constitute distinct national systems of property rights and governance” (191). This chapter addresses the paradox between increased globalization and decreasing or stagnating convergence. “The political-cultural approach gives us analytic tools to make sense of some of the reasons why trade can grow and yet national capitalisms persist” (192). The author argues, in part, that globalization is not destroying national firm identities or levers of governmental control.
“Globalization generally refers to three economic processes. First, there has been an increase in the amount of world trade such that firms do not just compete in their won economy, but against first from economies around the world…The second meaning of globalization is that the rise of the so-called Asian tigers has come at the expense of First World jobs in Europe and North America..The final meaning of globalization is that the world financial markets for debt, equity, and particularly currency have grown substantially” (193).
The author argues that standard stories about a revolutionary transformation that resulted from increased global interaction are specious. The process of globalization has taken place over a very long period of time with gradual growth in trade and interconnections. Also, while increased usage of information technology is an important part of this story, it is often overstated. Finally, standard stories of jobs being exported from Western countries in a race to the bottom are not necessarily attributable to globalization.
There is then a discussion of finance and the changing role of central banks. Central banks have moved towards more of an emphasis on price stability, most notably after the contractionary fiscal policy of Volker produced a recession after the 70s oil crisis. Also, it is noted that finance has always relied upon governance for a framework in which to operate.
Arguments that the state is dying in the face of globalization are wrong. Some have claimed that states must choose between equity and efficiency, but this assumes that these are mutually exclusive and that the market universally emphasizes one and the state another. Others have claimed that firms will always be able to bypass the controls of states. This has not proven to be the case. The author argues that many of these views stem from those who believe that governments represent rational rent seekers, and are thus a universal ill on the function of markets.
“There is no evidence that trade has made states ‘smaller’ over the past 30 years. In fact, it is quite the opposite. There is evidence that high exposure to trade combined with organized labor has produced more social protection and larger states. There are theoretical reasons to believe that states continue to matter in producing economic growth by providing public goods, the stable rule of law, and under certain conditions, good industrial policy” (217).
Monday, March 17, 2008
Luhmann: Social Systems
Luhmann, Niklas. (1995). Social systems. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
"What distinguishes autopoietic systems from machines and the closed systems of classical equilibrium thermodynamics is the recursivity of their operations: they ‘not only produce and change their own structures’ but ‘everything that is used as a unit by the system is produced as a unit by the system itself’” (xx).
“The theory of self-referential systems maintains that systems can differentiate only by self-reference, which is to say, only insofar as systems refer to themselves…in constituting their elements and their elemental operations” (9). “The…distinction between ‘closed’ and ‘open’ systems is replaced by the question of how self-referential closure can create openness” (9).
“Our thesis, namely, that there are systems, can now be narrowed down to: there are self-referential systems…there are systems that have the ability to establish relations with themselves and to differentiate these relations from relations with their environment” (13).
“There is agreement within the discipline today that the point of departure for all systems-theoretical analysis must be the difference between system and environment” (16). “The environment receives its unity through the system and only in relation to the system…Accordingly, the environment has no self-reflection or capacity to act” (17).
“As a paradigm, the difference between system and environment forces systems theory to replace the difference between the whole and its parts with a theory of system differentiation. System differentiation is nothing more than the repetition of system formation within systems” (18) “…the entire system multiplies itself as a multiplicity of system/environment differences” (18).
“The difference between system and environment must be distinguished from a second, equally constitutive difference: namely, the difference between element and relation” (20).
“Just as there are no systems without environments or environments without systems, there are no elements without relational connections or relations without elements” (20).
“Whether the unity of an element should be 0065lained as emergence ‘from below’ or as constitution ‘from above’ seems to be a matter of theoretical dispute. We opt decisively for the latter. Elements are elements only for the system that employs them as units and they are such only through this system. This is formulated in the concept of autopoiesis. One of the most important consequences is that systems of a higher (emergent) order can possess less complexity than systems of a lower order because they determine the unity and number of the elements that compose them’ thus in their own complexity they are independent of their material substratum…Thus emergence is not simply an accumulation of complexity, but rather an interruption and new beginning in the constitution of complexity” (22-3).
“We will call an interconnected collection of elements ‘complex’ when, because of immanent constraints in the elements’ connective capacity, it is no longer possible at any moment to connect every element with every other element” (24).
Autopoiesis: Self referent systems are systems ‘for themselves’, that are, “…independent of the cut of observation by others” (33). “ON the level of this self-referential organization, self-referential systems are closed systems, for they allow no other forms of processing in their self-determination. Thus. Social systems have no use for consciousness, and personal systems no use for frequency changes in the neuronal system” (34).
“The living system is inaccessible to the psychic system; it must itch, hurt, or in some other way attract attention in order to stir another level of system formation—the consciousness of the psychic system into operation” (40).
Chapter 2: Meaning
This chapter only concerns psychic and social systems.
“Psychic and social systems have evolved together. At any time the one kind of system is the necessary environment of the other…Persons cannot emerge and continue to exist without social systems, nor can social systems without persons…Both kinds of systems are ordered according to it [a common achievement, namely, meaning], and for both it si binding as the indispensable, undeniable form of their complexity and self-reference. We call this evolutionary achievement ‘meaning’” (59). Meaning forces a narrowing down of options and leads directly to selection. Anything of importance is perceived vis-à-vis meaning.
Meaning exists on the plane between what should be and what is. “…meaning processing constantly shapes anew the meaning-constitutive difference between actuality and potentiality. Meaning is the continual actualization of potentialities” (65).
Information is the key to allowing meaning to be understood as beyond a mere tautology. Meaning is a tautology because it defines itself by the system in that it exists. Meaning is, “…processing of itself by itself” (67). Information is, “…an event that selects system states” (67).
Information is, by definition, something that informs. Thus, once it has been digested by a system, is ceases to be information and essentially dies. Information selects system states, that is, new data that enters the system allows the system to reiterate itself.
“Thus no meaning-constituting system can escape the meaningfulness of all its own processes. But meaning refers to further meaning. The circular closure of these references appears in its unity as the ultimate horizon of all meaning: as the world” (69). The world takes on a character that is transcendent, god-like: “The historical semantics of different concepts of ‘world’ has reflected in many ways this double status of the world as simultaneously containing and transcending itself as description: …the relationship to a God who can be experienced everywhere as the center of the world, but nowhere as its boundary” (69).
Chapter 3: Double Contingency
“…action cannot take place if alter makes his action dependent on how ego acts, and ego wants to connect his action to alter’s. A pure circle of self-referential determination, lacking any further elaboration, leaves action indeterminate, makes it indeterminable. This is not a matter of mere behavioral agreement, nor of coordinating the interests of intentions of different actors. Instead, it concerns a basic condition of possibility for social actions as such. No action can occur without first solving this problem of double contingency…” (103).
The basic situation of double contingency is then simple: two black boxes, by whatever accident, come to have dealing with one another” (109). This situation is very reminiscent of Sartre’s construction of the self’s relation to the other.
Chapter 4: Communication and Action
Are social systems made up of actions, or communications? What is the relationship between the two? “…the basal process of social systems, which produces their elements, can only be communication” (138).
Action is necessary for interpreting communication; communication does not imply action. “The difference between constitution and observation can and must e built back into the theory. In this chapter, the concepts of communication and action accomplished that. Communication is the elemental unit of self-constitution; action is the elemental unit of social systems; self-observation and self-description…Therefore the question of which individuals, atoms, and elements compose social systems cannot be answered more simply. Any simplification at this point would mean a loss in the wealth of references, which a general theory of social systems can hardly afford” (175).
Chapter 5: System and Environment
“Everything that happens belongs to a system (or to many systems) and always at the same time to the environment of other systems...every increase in complexity in one place increases the complexity of the environment for all other systems (177).
Chapter 6: Interpenetration
“This chapter deals with a specific environment of social systems: human beings and their relations to social systems” (210). Relations of interpenetration and binding are a core feature of the relationship between human beings and social systems, as well as human beings and other human beings.
“The foregoing theoretical preparations allow us to formulate a question. We distinguished social interpenetration from interhuman interpenetration. Moreover, by examining problems of complexity and relationships of interpenetration, we explained the advantages of binary schematisms. Our question now is: is there a binary schematism that can serve both kinds of interpenetration at once, that works in a way functionally diffuse enough to reduce the complexity of both social interpenetration and interhuman interpenetration? The answer is yes. This is the special function of morality” (234). “Morality is a symbolic generalization that reduces the full reflexive complexity of doublely contingent ego/alter relations to expressions of esteem and by this generalization open up (1) room for the freeplay of conditionings and (2) the possibility of reconstructing complexity through the binary schematism esteem/distain [seen as the effect of morality on subjects’ view of other, or ego’s view of alter]” (236).
“To be sure, legs remain leg and ears remain ears, despite all sociocultural evolution. As environment, the body is given in advance to society…But as a highly complex agglomeration of systems, one that can therefore be conditioned, the body has a meaning that allows complexity in social systems to appear as available: one immediately sees, takes into account, and anticipates that one can behave in one way or another. But this unity of complexity, as well as this immediacy in orienting to it, are not the body itself; they become a unity and an immediacy only in the difference schemata produced by interpenetration” (251).
Chapter 7: The Individuality of Psychic Systems
Social systems represent the environment for psychic systems. While individualists believe that the psychic system can be observed sans the social system, this account clearly claims that this is not possible. “Every versions of individualist reductionism has encountered the objection that, as reductionism, it cannot be fair to the ‘emergent’ properties of social systems” (256).
“The contention that social systems are not composed of individuals and cannot be created out of bodily or psychic processes does not mean, of course, that there are not individuals in the world of social systems. On the contrary, a theory of self-referential autopoietic social systems provokes the question of psychic systems’ self-referential autopoiesis and with it the question of how psychic systems can establish their self-reproduction, the ‘stream’ of their ‘conscious life,’ from one moment to the next so that its closure is compatible with an environment of social systems” (257).
Chapter 8: Structure and Time
Structure is not a sensible way for a theory of autopoietic systems to develop. Self-referential theories to not fall into the structuralist or structuralist functionalist realm of sociological theories. That structure is being discussed in chapter 8 of this book indicates its relative importance to the theory.
Chapter 9: Contradiction and Conflict
Chapter 10: Society and Interaction
Chapter 11: Self-Reference and Rationality
Chapter 12: Consequences for Epistemology
"What distinguishes autopoietic systems from machines and the closed systems of classical equilibrium thermodynamics is the recursivity of their operations: they ‘not only produce and change their own structures’ but ‘everything that is used as a unit by the system is produced as a unit by the system itself’” (xx).
“The theory of self-referential systems maintains that systems can differentiate only by self-reference, which is to say, only insofar as systems refer to themselves…in constituting their elements and their elemental operations” (9). “The…distinction between ‘closed’ and ‘open’ systems is replaced by the question of how self-referential closure can create openness” (9).
“Our thesis, namely, that there are systems, can now be narrowed down to: there are self-referential systems…there are systems that have the ability to establish relations with themselves and to differentiate these relations from relations with their environment” (13).
“There is agreement within the discipline today that the point of departure for all systems-theoretical analysis must be the difference between system and environment” (16). “The environment receives its unity through the system and only in relation to the system…Accordingly, the environment has no self-reflection or capacity to act” (17).
“As a paradigm, the difference between system and environment forces systems theory to replace the difference between the whole and its parts with a theory of system differentiation. System differentiation is nothing more than the repetition of system formation within systems” (18) “…the entire system multiplies itself as a multiplicity of system/environment differences” (18).
“The difference between system and environment must be distinguished from a second, equally constitutive difference: namely, the difference between element and relation” (20).
“Just as there are no systems without environments or environments without systems, there are no elements without relational connections or relations without elements” (20).
“Whether the unity of an element should be 0065lained as emergence ‘from below’ or as constitution ‘from above’ seems to be a matter of theoretical dispute. We opt decisively for the latter. Elements are elements only for the system that employs them as units and they are such only through this system. This is formulated in the concept of autopoiesis. One of the most important consequences is that systems of a higher (emergent) order can possess less complexity than systems of a lower order because they determine the unity and number of the elements that compose them’ thus in their own complexity they are independent of their material substratum…Thus emergence is not simply an accumulation of complexity, but rather an interruption and new beginning in the constitution of complexity” (22-3).
“We will call an interconnected collection of elements ‘complex’ when, because of immanent constraints in the elements’ connective capacity, it is no longer possible at any moment to connect every element with every other element” (24).
Autopoiesis: Self referent systems are systems ‘for themselves’, that are, “…independent of the cut of observation by others” (33). “ON the level of this self-referential organization, self-referential systems are closed systems, for they allow no other forms of processing in their self-determination. Thus. Social systems have no use for consciousness, and personal systems no use for frequency changes in the neuronal system” (34).
“The living system is inaccessible to the psychic system; it must itch, hurt, or in some other way attract attention in order to stir another level of system formation—the consciousness of the psychic system into operation” (40).
Chapter 2: Meaning
This chapter only concerns psychic and social systems.
“Psychic and social systems have evolved together. At any time the one kind of system is the necessary environment of the other…Persons cannot emerge and continue to exist without social systems, nor can social systems without persons…Both kinds of systems are ordered according to it [a common achievement, namely, meaning], and for both it si binding as the indispensable, undeniable form of their complexity and self-reference. We call this evolutionary achievement ‘meaning’” (59). Meaning forces a narrowing down of options and leads directly to selection. Anything of importance is perceived vis-à-vis meaning.
Meaning exists on the plane between what should be and what is. “…meaning processing constantly shapes anew the meaning-constitutive difference between actuality and potentiality. Meaning is the continual actualization of potentialities” (65).
Information is the key to allowing meaning to be understood as beyond a mere tautology. Meaning is a tautology because it defines itself by the system in that it exists. Meaning is, “…processing of itself by itself” (67). Information is, “…an event that selects system states” (67).
Information is, by definition, something that informs. Thus, once it has been digested by a system, is ceases to be information and essentially dies. Information selects system states, that is, new data that enters the system allows the system to reiterate itself.
“Thus no meaning-constituting system can escape the meaningfulness of all its own processes. But meaning refers to further meaning. The circular closure of these references appears in its unity as the ultimate horizon of all meaning: as the world” (69). The world takes on a character that is transcendent, god-like: “The historical semantics of different concepts of ‘world’ has reflected in many ways this double status of the world as simultaneously containing and transcending itself as description: …the relationship to a God who can be experienced everywhere as the center of the world, but nowhere as its boundary” (69).
Chapter 3: Double Contingency
“…action cannot take place if alter makes his action dependent on how ego acts, and ego wants to connect his action to alter’s. A pure circle of self-referential determination, lacking any further elaboration, leaves action indeterminate, makes it indeterminable. This is not a matter of mere behavioral agreement, nor of coordinating the interests of intentions of different actors. Instead, it concerns a basic condition of possibility for social actions as such. No action can occur without first solving this problem of double contingency…” (103).
The basic situation of double contingency is then simple: two black boxes, by whatever accident, come to have dealing with one another” (109). This situation is very reminiscent of Sartre’s construction of the self’s relation to the other.
Chapter 4: Communication and Action
Are social systems made up of actions, or communications? What is the relationship between the two? “…the basal process of social systems, which produces their elements, can only be communication” (138).
Action is necessary for interpreting communication; communication does not imply action. “The difference between constitution and observation can and must e built back into the theory. In this chapter, the concepts of communication and action accomplished that. Communication is the elemental unit of self-constitution; action is the elemental unit of social systems; self-observation and self-description…Therefore the question of which individuals, atoms, and elements compose social systems cannot be answered more simply. Any simplification at this point would mean a loss in the wealth of references, which a general theory of social systems can hardly afford” (175).
Chapter 5: System and Environment
“Everything that happens belongs to a system (or to many systems) and always at the same time to the environment of other systems...every increase in complexity in one place increases the complexity of the environment for all other systems (177).
Chapter 6: Interpenetration
“This chapter deals with a specific environment of social systems: human beings and their relations to social systems” (210). Relations of interpenetration and binding are a core feature of the relationship between human beings and social systems, as well as human beings and other human beings.
“The foregoing theoretical preparations allow us to formulate a question. We distinguished social interpenetration from interhuman interpenetration. Moreover, by examining problems of complexity and relationships of interpenetration, we explained the advantages of binary schematisms. Our question now is: is there a binary schematism that can serve both kinds of interpenetration at once, that works in a way functionally diffuse enough to reduce the complexity of both social interpenetration and interhuman interpenetration? The answer is yes. This is the special function of morality” (234). “Morality is a symbolic generalization that reduces the full reflexive complexity of doublely contingent ego/alter relations to expressions of esteem and by this generalization open up (1) room for the freeplay of conditionings and (2) the possibility of reconstructing complexity through the binary schematism esteem/distain [seen as the effect of morality on subjects’ view of other, or ego’s view of alter]” (236).
“To be sure, legs remain leg and ears remain ears, despite all sociocultural evolution. As environment, the body is given in advance to society…But as a highly complex agglomeration of systems, one that can therefore be conditioned, the body has a meaning that allows complexity in social systems to appear as available: one immediately sees, takes into account, and anticipates that one can behave in one way or another. But this unity of complexity, as well as this immediacy in orienting to it, are not the body itself; they become a unity and an immediacy only in the difference schemata produced by interpenetration” (251).
Chapter 7: The Individuality of Psychic Systems
Social systems represent the environment for psychic systems. While individualists believe that the psychic system can be observed sans the social system, this account clearly claims that this is not possible. “Every versions of individualist reductionism has encountered the objection that, as reductionism, it cannot be fair to the ‘emergent’ properties of social systems” (256).
“The contention that social systems are not composed of individuals and cannot be created out of bodily or psychic processes does not mean, of course, that there are not individuals in the world of social systems. On the contrary, a theory of self-referential autopoietic social systems provokes the question of psychic systems’ self-referential autopoiesis and with it the question of how psychic systems can establish their self-reproduction, the ‘stream’ of their ‘conscious life,’ from one moment to the next so that its closure is compatible with an environment of social systems” (257).
Chapter 8: Structure and Time
Structure is not a sensible way for a theory of autopoietic systems to develop. Self-referential theories to not fall into the structuralist or structuralist functionalist realm of sociological theories. That structure is being discussed in chapter 8 of this book indicates its relative importance to the theory.
Chapter 9: Contradiction and Conflict
Chapter 10: Society and Interaction
Chapter 11: Self-Reference and Rationality
Chapter 12: Consequences for Epistemology
Sunday, March 16, 2008
Sawyer: Social Emergence
Sawyer, R. Keith. (2005). Social emergence : societies as complex systems. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
This account examines the history of sociological thought relating to micro-macro issues and presents the concept of emergence as the third-wave of sociology. Additionally, this account attempts to map out the place that emergence plays in both psychology and sociology. Also, there is an examination of the ability to model emergent behavior using agent-based models.
The first distinction that is made examines the descriptions of societies that have existed throughout history. For example, early in the study of sociology, there was what Sawyer terms a mechanistic interpretation of history. Later on, there developed an organic view of social interaction that, “…compared the various institutions of society to the organs of the human body” (1). Later, there appeared a structural-functional approach which was based on studies of cybernetics and that was promoted by Talcott Parsons. “Common to all of these approaches is the basic insight that societies are complex configurations of many people engaged in overlapping and interlocking patterns of relationships with one another” (1).
Sawyer argues that there is a third-wave of sociological approaches that goes a long way to resolve long-standing debates in the field. For example, this new approach takes an agent based computer simulation to create artificial societies. These can be used to explore emergent phenomena. Later in the book, he refers to this third-wave as providing a synthesis of the first two waves.
The concept of emergence is contentious for Sawyer. He explores how it has been used in sociology and psychology and finds usages to be contradictory. He attempts to correct this problem in the later chapters of his book by exploring a concept of social emergence. Emergence is typically understood as being phenomena that exist as “higher level properties” (2) that emerge from lower level properties. Emergence also refers to “complex phenomena are those that reside between simplicity and randomness” (3). Some theorists (Kauffman 1993) refer to this as being at the “edge of randomness (3). “In complex systems so conceived, relatively simple higher-level order ‘emerges’ from relatively complex lower-level processes” (3).
Emergent phenomena are seen by many as necessarily being unpredictable, irreducible to regular laws and novel (4). Typically, this paradigm is associated with complexity theory. Complexity theory is seen as being the opposite of reductionist theories. In terms of the relative preponderance of emergent phenomena, the nature of the system is important. Four characteristics have been identified that make emergent phenomena more likely: many components in density, global functions are distributed not to individuals but broadly, global system is impossible to fully decompose into smaller systems, and that communication plays a crucial role (4-5).
There has been a traditional divide between atomism and holism. Emergentism bridges this divide. It, “…is a form of nonreductionism that accepts the ontological position of materialism…[it] accepts that nothing exists except the component parts and their interactions, and thus avoids the ontological problem of holism [how can holist features have an ontology if they are merely the sum of lower-level interactions?]. However, the emergentist also rejects atomism and argues that reductionism, physicalism, mechanism, and epiphenomenalism are not necessary consequences of materialism. Some complex natural phenomena cannot be studied with reductionism methods; these phenomena are complex systems in which more comple4x and differentiated ‘higher-level’ structures emerge from the organization and interaction of simpler, ‘lower-level’ component parts” (29).
Sawyer also touches on the study of economics and argues that it holds the position as the core of social science approaches because it deals with emergent phenomena. He briefly mentions Hayek, Arrow and Menger. They all explain emergent phenomena and believe that, while it can not be reduced to the agency of individual actors, it can be explained by looking at individual action. Sawyer would like sociology to take the place as the zenith discipline in the social sciences. By deploying a theory of social emergence, Sawyer believes that this will become possible.
In the 10th chapter, our author becomes very explicit about his long-term goals for the study of emergence in the social sciences. “Social emergence is the central phenomenon of the social sciences” (189). “In th4e second half of the twentieth century, economics has made the best case for being the foundational social science, by making social emergence central to its theory and practice” (189). Sociology can play this role, if it develops the emergence paradigm.
He explores the three waves of sociology, once again, and finds that the first wave was too rigid and simple, the second wave built on the first wave by highlighting the interaction between structure and agent (and Sawyer considers Luhmann to be a second-wave sociological theorist). Sawyer has three problems with second-wave theories: they do not theorize between social structure and interaction, between individual and interaction and they have not conceptualization of social emergence (206-7).
The emergence paradigm is then launched. It involves five stages of development between the micro and macro levels. The stages proceed in the following order: individual (agency, etc.), interaction (communication, etc.), ephemeral emergents (things that emerge from agent and communication that are unlikely to remain), stable emergents (subcultures, slang, social practices, etc.) and then social structure (laws, infrastructure, etc.).
Sociology should be considered with the “circle of emergence” (220). This circle cuts through all five levels of the emergence paradigm, but does not dive as deeply down into the first level or as high into the fifth level. The implication is that sociology can be the theory that links together all of the social sciences: it does not do psychology (bottom of the first level) nor does it do law (top of the fifth level). However, it does link these schools together by providing a framework for understanding how phenomena move between the bottom and top levels. It is, in essence, the tool that mitigates the levels of analysis problem.
This account examines the history of sociological thought relating to micro-macro issues and presents the concept of emergence as the third-wave of sociology. Additionally, this account attempts to map out the place that emergence plays in both psychology and sociology. Also, there is an examination of the ability to model emergent behavior using agent-based models.
The first distinction that is made examines the descriptions of societies that have existed throughout history. For example, early in the study of sociology, there was what Sawyer terms a mechanistic interpretation of history. Later on, there developed an organic view of social interaction that, “…compared the various institutions of society to the organs of the human body” (1). Later, there appeared a structural-functional approach which was based on studies of cybernetics and that was promoted by Talcott Parsons. “Common to all of these approaches is the basic insight that societies are complex configurations of many people engaged in overlapping and interlocking patterns of relationships with one another” (1).
Sawyer argues that there is a third-wave of sociological approaches that goes a long way to resolve long-standing debates in the field. For example, this new approach takes an agent based computer simulation to create artificial societies. These can be used to explore emergent phenomena. Later in the book, he refers to this third-wave as providing a synthesis of the first two waves.
The concept of emergence is contentious for Sawyer. He explores how it has been used in sociology and psychology and finds usages to be contradictory. He attempts to correct this problem in the later chapters of his book by exploring a concept of social emergence. Emergence is typically understood as being phenomena that exist as “higher level properties” (2) that emerge from lower level properties. Emergence also refers to “complex phenomena are those that reside between simplicity and randomness” (3). Some theorists (Kauffman 1993) refer to this as being at the “edge of randomness (3). “In complex systems so conceived, relatively simple higher-level order ‘emerges’ from relatively complex lower-level processes” (3).
Emergent phenomena are seen by many as necessarily being unpredictable, irreducible to regular laws and novel (4). Typically, this paradigm is associated with complexity theory. Complexity theory is seen as being the opposite of reductionist theories. In terms of the relative preponderance of emergent phenomena, the nature of the system is important. Four characteristics have been identified that make emergent phenomena more likely: many components in density, global functions are distributed not to individuals but broadly, global system is impossible to fully decompose into smaller systems, and that communication plays a crucial role (4-5).
There has been a traditional divide between atomism and holism. Emergentism bridges this divide. It, “…is a form of nonreductionism that accepts the ontological position of materialism…[it] accepts that nothing exists except the component parts and their interactions, and thus avoids the ontological problem of holism [how can holist features have an ontology if they are merely the sum of lower-level interactions?]. However, the emergentist also rejects atomism and argues that reductionism, physicalism, mechanism, and epiphenomenalism are not necessary consequences of materialism. Some complex natural phenomena cannot be studied with reductionism methods; these phenomena are complex systems in which more comple4x and differentiated ‘higher-level’ structures emerge from the organization and interaction of simpler, ‘lower-level’ component parts” (29).
Sawyer also touches on the study of economics and argues that it holds the position as the core of social science approaches because it deals with emergent phenomena. He briefly mentions Hayek, Arrow and Menger. They all explain emergent phenomena and believe that, while it can not be reduced to the agency of individual actors, it can be explained by looking at individual action. Sawyer would like sociology to take the place as the zenith discipline in the social sciences. By deploying a theory of social emergence, Sawyer believes that this will become possible.
In the 10th chapter, our author becomes very explicit about his long-term goals for the study of emergence in the social sciences. “Social emergence is the central phenomenon of the social sciences” (189). “In th4e second half of the twentieth century, economics has made the best case for being the foundational social science, by making social emergence central to its theory and practice” (189). Sociology can play this role, if it develops the emergence paradigm.
He explores the three waves of sociology, once again, and finds that the first wave was too rigid and simple, the second wave built on the first wave by highlighting the interaction between structure and agent (and Sawyer considers Luhmann to be a second-wave sociological theorist). Sawyer has three problems with second-wave theories: they do not theorize between social structure and interaction, between individual and interaction and they have not conceptualization of social emergence (206-7).
The emergence paradigm is then launched. It involves five stages of development between the micro and macro levels. The stages proceed in the following order: individual (agency, etc.), interaction (communication, etc.), ephemeral emergents (things that emerge from agent and communication that are unlikely to remain), stable emergents (subcultures, slang, social practices, etc.) and then social structure (laws, infrastructure, etc.).
Sociology should be considered with the “circle of emergence” (220). This circle cuts through all five levels of the emergence paradigm, but does not dive as deeply down into the first level or as high into the fifth level. The implication is that sociology can be the theory that links together all of the social sciences: it does not do psychology (bottom of the first level) nor does it do law (top of the fifth level). However, it does link these schools together by providing a framework for understanding how phenomena move between the bottom and top levels. It is, in essence, the tool that mitigates the levels of analysis problem.
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Albert: On the Modern Systems Theory of Society and IR
Albert, Mathias. (2004). "On the Modern Systems Theory of society and IR: contacts and disjunctures between different kinds of theorizing". In M. Albert & L. Hilkermeier (Eds.), Observing international relations : Niklas Luhmann and world politics (pp. xiv, 254 p.). London ; New York: Routledge.
From Albert’s Introduction to the Volume:
From the onset, this volume concludes that Modern Systems Theory (MST) and IR are not well suited for each other: “The chapters in this volume are an attempt to provide possible answers to this question [why bring another approach to IR?], particularly also giving room to answers which in the end conclude that Modern Systems Theory and International Relations make uneasy bedfellows” (1).
Two reasons why IR hasn’t taken up MST are given: firstly, it has been late to be translated into English, and, secondly, that it is, “an extremely complex kind of theory; as a theory of society, it consists of three different sets of theories connected to each other: a theory of social systems, a theory of social differentiation, and a theory of social evolution” (2). Understanding the limited interactions between MST and IR, this volume attempts to, “…stage a number of encounters between element s of Luhmann’s theory of society and parts of contemporary IR theorizing” (3).
Chapter 2: On the Modern Systems Theory of society and IR: contacts and disjunctures between different kinds of theorizing
There are two reasons that Albert believes that a fruitful encounter with Luhmann may be ripe in IR: Firstly, ideas of international society are increasingly of importance and secondly, because MST provides a very through and all-encompassing theory of society.
The idea of globalization plays a major role in IR theory. Albert wonders whether or not MST is applicable to IR because it doen’t see national separation as being anything beyond a social construct. World Society is the largest iteration of human system organization, and the nation doesn’t play much of a role. Thus, the idea of “international relations”, “…becomes highly problematic” (16).
Albert then looks at classic sociological visions of society, initially focusing on the post-Westphalian version of state society. However, these models of society are limited because they do not see the global system as a whole.
“For MST, all social systems are constituted by a difference between system and environment and are communicative systems” (17). “…communication here is conceptualized as being produced and reproduced in recursive networks of communication…communication is thus seen as being produced within the system alone” (17). “If social systems are constituted by communication and by communication alone, then society is the highest-order social system which comprises all communication” (17).
Albert finds that the difference between MST and IR is not that one is more substantive than the other, but rather that it there is a qualitative difference: “It is different in kind regarding ‘what’ is observed and ‘how’ it is observed” (21). In MST, the observer is also observed.
Also, Albert believes that it may be possible to prove MST empirically wrong. Because MST believes that functional differentiation is the most important differentiation between lower and upper forms of organization, there is less of a focus on societal differentiation. If it can be shown that the world is comprised of different societies, then MST may be wrong. Put concisely by Albert: “…if world society is conceived in the Luhmannian sense of being constituted by the fact that all communication can connect to all other communication, that, so to speak, the ‘world’ is embedded or implied in each communication, and if this world society achieves its unity only through its internal differentiation which is primarily a functional differentiation between its subsystems, then it makes no sense to speak of societies in the plural” (24). From this reading of Luhmann, there are no interesting or meaningful readings of IR.
MST provides a comprehensive view of world society. IR provides a comprehensive view of international political relations. The two are, in a way, mutually exclusive (28-9).
From Albert’s Introduction to the Volume:
From the onset, this volume concludes that Modern Systems Theory (MST) and IR are not well suited for each other: “The chapters in this volume are an attempt to provide possible answers to this question [why bring another approach to IR?], particularly also giving room to answers which in the end conclude that Modern Systems Theory and International Relations make uneasy bedfellows” (1).
Two reasons why IR hasn’t taken up MST are given: firstly, it has been late to be translated into English, and, secondly, that it is, “an extremely complex kind of theory; as a theory of society, it consists of three different sets of theories connected to each other: a theory of social systems, a theory of social differentiation, and a theory of social evolution” (2). Understanding the limited interactions between MST and IR, this volume attempts to, “…stage a number of encounters between element s of Luhmann’s theory of society and parts of contemporary IR theorizing” (3).
Chapter 2: On the Modern Systems Theory of society and IR: contacts and disjunctures between different kinds of theorizing
There are two reasons that Albert believes that a fruitful encounter with Luhmann may be ripe in IR: Firstly, ideas of international society are increasingly of importance and secondly, because MST provides a very through and all-encompassing theory of society.
The idea of globalization plays a major role in IR theory. Albert wonders whether or not MST is applicable to IR because it doen’t see national separation as being anything beyond a social construct. World Society is the largest iteration of human system organization, and the nation doesn’t play much of a role. Thus, the idea of “international relations”, “…becomes highly problematic” (16).
Albert then looks at classic sociological visions of society, initially focusing on the post-Westphalian version of state society. However, these models of society are limited because they do not see the global system as a whole.
“For MST, all social systems are constituted by a difference between system and environment and are communicative systems” (17). “…communication here is conceptualized as being produced and reproduced in recursive networks of communication…communication is thus seen as being produced within the system alone” (17). “If social systems are constituted by communication and by communication alone, then society is the highest-order social system which comprises all communication” (17).
Albert finds that the difference between MST and IR is not that one is more substantive than the other, but rather that it there is a qualitative difference: “It is different in kind regarding ‘what’ is observed and ‘how’ it is observed” (21). In MST, the observer is also observed.
Also, Albert believes that it may be possible to prove MST empirically wrong. Because MST believes that functional differentiation is the most important differentiation between lower and upper forms of organization, there is less of a focus on societal differentiation. If it can be shown that the world is comprised of different societies, then MST may be wrong. Put concisely by Albert: “…if world society is conceived in the Luhmannian sense of being constituted by the fact that all communication can connect to all other communication, that, so to speak, the ‘world’ is embedded or implied in each communication, and if this world society achieves its unity only through its internal differentiation which is primarily a functional differentiation between its subsystems, then it makes no sense to speak of societies in the plural” (24). From this reading of Luhmann, there are no interesting or meaningful readings of IR.
MST provides a comprehensive view of world society. IR provides a comprehensive view of international political relations. The two are, in a way, mutually exclusive (28-9).
Thursday, February 21, 2008
Benavot et. al.: Knowledge for the Masses
Benavot, Aaron, Cha, Yun-Kyung, Kamens, David, Meyer, John W., & Wong, Suk-Ying. (1991). "Knowledge for the Masses: World Models and National Curricula, 1920-1986". American Sociological Review, 56(1), 85-100. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1224%28199102%2956%3A1%3C85%3AKFTMWM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I
This article examines how much of the primary school curriculum has become standardized from a sociological perspective. Old perspectives on this issue constructed the formation of school curriculum as the result of either the, “…functional requirements of society”, or, “…as a reflection of existing power relations in society” (86). This would skew the result more heavily towards a nationally patterned set of distinct curricula.
However, these authors posit that the rise of the standardization of national curricula can be seen a corollary of the rise of, “standardized models of society” (86). This can be seen as an emerging world cultural set of values and structures. “…the same world-wide processes that were involved in the spread of primary education may also have generated similarity in its content” (86).
The authors put forth a number of hypotheses. Increased social development would relate to increased standardization in curriculum as well as more focus on math, natural science and social science. Increasing development would also be seen through an increasing focus on “modern values”.
They deploy a statistical method for exploring these hypotheses. They find that there is a “world-wide trend” that moves countries towards standardization of curriculum. “This striking worldwide trend toward a more integrated notion of society could have a functionalist interpretation, e.g., greater public involvement in and control over social life produced a stronger conception of society as a ‘social system’” (92). Other statistical finding support the view that the standardization process was formed mostly not by national processes but by global processes.
Conclusion: “Functionalist theory suggests that national curricula vary by level of socioeconomic development, increasingly incorporate modern subject matter, and are slow to change” (96). What are the deeper drivers of this standardization? “We have no information on the processes by which this curricular standardization is achieved” (97). “The real surprise of our findings lies not in the unimportance of local influences, but in the relative unimportance of national influences on curricular structure” (98).
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Barnett, et. al.: The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations
Barnett, Michael N., & Finnemore, Martha. (1999). "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations ". International Organization, 53(04), 699-732.
“…IOs stray from the efficiency goals these theories impute [Pareto efficiency, etc.] and that many IOs exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated by states at their creation” (699).
They use a constructivist approach that is highly influenced by sociological institutionalism. “…we argue that the rational-legal authority that IOs embody gives them power independent of the states that created them and channels that power in particular directions. Bureaucracies, by definition, make rules, but in so doing they also create social knowledge” (699).
They claim that their approach to IOs offers a different view of power in IOs, that it provides a base for treating IOs as autonomous actors, and then that they then can assess the desirability of IOs.
They firstly explore theoretical approaches to understanding organizations. They contrast an econometric approach with a sociological approach. In the economic approach, there is little social interaction. In the sociological approach, this is reversed. “Our point is simply that when we choose a theoretical framework, we should choose one whose assumptions approximate the empirical conditions of the IO we are analyzing, and that we should be aware of the biases created by those assumptions” (704).
They then look at whether or not IOs can be seen as being autonomous. For a realist, an IO can be reduced to the interests of the nation that was formative in its creation. However, they claim that there is a rupture in the principle-agent problem: what the principle wants is not necessarily what the agent will give them. They use Weber.
They claim that IOs are autonomous sites of authority. To make this claim, they rely heavily on Weber’s study of bureaucracies. IOs do the following: they classify, they fix meaning, they distribute norms.
The authors then make the claim that IOs can be pathological. IOs are prone to dysfunctional behavior, “…but international relations scholars have rarely investigated this…” (715). “…we elaborate how the same sources of bureaucratic power, sketched earlier, can cause dysfunctional behavior. We term this particular type of dysfunction pathology” (716). The source of the dysfunction is then pursued: is it inside or outside the IO and whether it is material or cultural (716).
World polity model would posit that there are two reasons for IO dysfunction: they seek legitimacy in place of efficiency and that they live in a world of contradictions (717-8). They explore five mechanisms by which pathologies can arise in IOs: “irrationality of rationalization, universalisms, normatization of deviance, organizational insulation, and cultural contestation” (719). “Our claim, therefore, is that the very nature of bureaucracy-the ‘social stuff’ of which it is made—creates behavioral predispositions that make bureaucracy prone to these kinds of behaviors” (719).
They conclude that this approach can be useful for IR scholars for three reasons: 1.) IOs are treated as actors; 2.) IOs can have independent effects on the world; and 3.) IOs can be normatively evaluated (726).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
