GJ Ikenberry, “A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,” International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 289-321.
How was it possible for the post war international economic order to emerge from the chaos of WWII? This article explores how British and American experts found areas of consensus in order to push forward a vision of the world that was neither emphasized old imperial economic orders or entirely free trade.
"I argue that the policy ideas inspired by Keynesianism and embraced by a group of well-placed British and American economists and policy specialists were crucial in defining government conceptions of postwar interests, building coalitions in support of the postwar settlement, and legitimating the exercise of American power. By shifting the focus from trad3e issues, which were highly contentious, to monetary issues, about which there was an emerging 'middle ground' created by Keynesian ideas, these experts helped overcome political stalemate both within and between the two governments. Put simply, this group of British and American experts intervened at a particularly fluid moment in history to help the British and American political establishments identify their interests, thereby creating the basses of postwar economic cooperation" (291).
Ikenberry goes on to list seven key features of this group of policy experts and the context in which they were making decisions.
"The group of economists and policy specialists involved in the postwar settlement, however, did not fully constitute an epistemic community, nor did the manner in which these experts influenced the terms of the settlement conform to the strict logic of epistemic community influence that is proposed elsewhere in this volume" (293). Firstly, this was not a scientific community affecting policy, but a group brought together in the interest of solving a problem. Secondly, the ideas of the group were not as homogenous or as deeply rooted in tenants of a theory as would be the ideas of an epistemic community. Thirdly, this group did not drive policy adoption, but rather, political needs drove the selection of this group.
This story is then told in great detail and I skimmed it.
Showing posts with label Epistemic Communities. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Epistemic Communities. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 3, 2008
Monday, September 8, 2008
Adler: The Spread of Security Communities
Adler, E., 2008. The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post--Cold War Transformation. European Journal of International Relations, 14(2), 195.
“This article invokes a combination of analytical and normative arguments that highlight the leading role of practices in explaining the expansion of security communities” (195).
Adler begins by exploring different reasons where by international institutions spread. He highlights explanations including, the rhetorical, normative imitation, socialization, persuasion. “While these theories are not mutually exclusive and while the different mechanisms are important at particular stages, they may not be sufficient because they do not make practices a central focus or let them carry the major causal and constitutive weight in the explanation” (196). “…security communities…spread by the co-evolution of background knowledge and subjectivities of self-restraint. The combined effect of communities of practice and the institutionalization of self-restraint accounts both for the social construction of rationality, in the sense that cooperative-security practices related to self-restraint help constitute dependable expectations of peaceful change, and for normative evolution, in the sense that self-restraint brings about security through cooperation” (196).
Illustrates this argument by exploring NATO expansion.
“Practices are knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that structure experience” (198).
Communities of practice are the nexus between agent and structure. These communities shape the identities of their members, facilitate learning, socialize, etc. They grow and change through “cognitive evolution”. Some communities of practice can become self-restraint communities. Violence becomes unnecessary amongst these communities for resolving conflict.
Much on NATO and how NATO is an example of communities of practice.
“This article invokes a combination of analytical and normative arguments that highlight the leading role of practices in explaining the expansion of security communities” (195).
Adler begins by exploring different reasons where by international institutions spread. He highlights explanations including, the rhetorical, normative imitation, socialization, persuasion. “While these theories are not mutually exclusive and while the different mechanisms are important at particular stages, they may not be sufficient because they do not make practices a central focus or let them carry the major causal and constitutive weight in the explanation” (196). “…security communities…spread by the co-evolution of background knowledge and subjectivities of self-restraint. The combined effect of communities of practice and the institutionalization of self-restraint accounts both for the social construction of rationality, in the sense that cooperative-security practices related to self-restraint help constitute dependable expectations of peaceful change, and for normative evolution, in the sense that self-restraint brings about security through cooperation” (196).
Illustrates this argument by exploring NATO expansion.
“Practices are knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that structure experience” (198).
Communities of practice are the nexus between agent and structure. These communities shape the identities of their members, facilitate learning, socialize, etc. They grow and change through “cognitive evolution”. Some communities of practice can become self-restraint communities. Violence becomes unnecessary amongst these communities for resolving conflict.
Much on NATO and how NATO is an example of communities of practice.
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Adler: The Emergence of Cooperation
Adler, Emanuel. The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control, International Organization 46 (Winter 1992): 101-146.
Adler approaches the study of nuclear arms control from the perspective of evolutionary changes made on two levels: domestically and internationally. This study emphasizes the causal force of epistemic communities in shaping the rules of the nuclear game. This approach also claims that material accounts of this story can not be fully explanatory as they are lacking a substantive causal driver.
“The epistemic community approach has some clear ‘comparative advantages.’ First, it allows us to understand why superpower cooperation was conceptualized via arms control in the first place. Second, it increases our sensitivity to domestic political factors, especially to the notion that within each national actor different interpretations of the national interest compete for the shaping of international agendas as well as international practices. Third, in ways that allow for empirical research, focusing on an epistemic community draws our attention to the impact of scientific knowledge on international cooperation processes. Fourth, it helps us to see that, in spite of or even because of superpower disagreement over political interests and visions, the fact that [Soviets also understood ideational drivers to be important] was not inconsequential for peaceful change…Sixth, common epistemic understandings proved to be more lasting than disagreements over long-term goals” (104).
Adler then deploys an “evolutionary research framework” for exploring this issue. This framework involves the use of five variables: units of variation, innovation, selection, diffusion and units of effective modification (104).
Who represent the epistemic community for arms control? “Two subgroups constituted this community. One group of experts…considered the underlying cause of international conflict to be the clash between the interests of nations as they pursue their seperat4e goals…The other group…believed that armaments were indeed a serious cause of international tension and that therefore reducing weapons would reduce tensions…These two groups converged into an epistemic community because, surprising as it may seem, they were in agreement about the short-term advantages and necessity of arms control and there was scarcely member of either group who did not concede the validity of the recommendations of the other” (111).
Conclusion:
“First, the community created an intellectual climate favorable to arms control…Second, the members produced the technical knowledge required to deal with nuclear arms control…Third, the community focused attention on cooperative phenomena and helped provide the superpowers with reasons why…it as important that they cooperate…Forth, it paved the way for the creation of vested interests in arms control…Fifth,…[it] helped generate an awareness about arms control that eventually led to public support for it…Sixth, arms controllers helped persuade Congress about the value of specific arms control agreements…Seventh, members were able to propose a logically coherent arms control negotiation agenda and helped think through the bargaining positions to be taken in the ABM negotiations…Eighth, the community helped formulate specific norms and rules, researched and proposed verification means, and suggested posttreaty reviews and conditions for withdrawal from agreements…Ninth, arms controllers in many cases became what Robert Gilpin called ‘full partners with politicians, administration, and military officers in the formulations of policy’…Finally, the community was instrumental in transmitting arms control ideas to the Soviet Union” (140-2).
Adler approaches the study of nuclear arms control from the perspective of evolutionary changes made on two levels: domestically and internationally. This study emphasizes the causal force of epistemic communities in shaping the rules of the nuclear game. This approach also claims that material accounts of this story can not be fully explanatory as they are lacking a substantive causal driver.
“The epistemic community approach has some clear ‘comparative advantages.’ First, it allows us to understand why superpower cooperation was conceptualized via arms control in the first place. Second, it increases our sensitivity to domestic political factors, especially to the notion that within each national actor different interpretations of the national interest compete for the shaping of international agendas as well as international practices. Third, in ways that allow for empirical research, focusing on an epistemic community draws our attention to the impact of scientific knowledge on international cooperation processes. Fourth, it helps us to see that, in spite of or even because of superpower disagreement over political interests and visions, the fact that [Soviets also understood ideational drivers to be important] was not inconsequential for peaceful change…Sixth, common epistemic understandings proved to be more lasting than disagreements over long-term goals” (104).
Adler then deploys an “evolutionary research framework” for exploring this issue. This framework involves the use of five variables: units of variation, innovation, selection, diffusion and units of effective modification (104).
Who represent the epistemic community for arms control? “Two subgroups constituted this community. One group of experts…considered the underlying cause of international conflict to be the clash between the interests of nations as they pursue their seperat4e goals…The other group…believed that armaments were indeed a serious cause of international tension and that therefore reducing weapons would reduce tensions…These two groups converged into an epistemic community because, surprising as it may seem, they were in agreement about the short-term advantages and necessity of arms control and there was scarcely member of either group who did not concede the validity of the recommendations of the other” (111).
Conclusion:
“First, the community created an intellectual climate favorable to arms control…Second, the members produced the technical knowledge required to deal with nuclear arms control…Third, the community focused attention on cooperative phenomena and helped provide the superpowers with reasons why…it as important that they cooperate…Forth, it paved the way for the creation of vested interests in arms control…Fifth,…[it] helped generate an awareness about arms control that eventually led to public support for it…Sixth, arms controllers helped persuade Congress about the value of specific arms control agreements…Seventh, members were able to propose a logically coherent arms control negotiation agenda and helped think through the bargaining positions to be taken in the ABM negotiations…Eighth, the community helped formulate specific norms and rules, researched and proposed verification means, and suggested posttreaty reviews and conditions for withdrawal from agreements…Ninth, arms controllers in many cases became what Robert Gilpin called ‘full partners with politicians, administration, and military officers in the formulations of policy’…Finally, the community was instrumental in transmitting arms control ideas to the Soviet Union” (140-2).
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