Hanson, BT. 2003. What happened to fortress Europe?: external trade policy liberalization in the European Union. International Organization 52, no. 01: 55-85.
Many feared that, with the integration of Europe, there would be an inward focus for trade as price incentives would push producers to trade with their European community as tariffs fell. This was refered to as Fortress Europe.
"What is most remarkable about European trade policy in the 1990s is that, despite ominous warnings and theoretical expectations, fortress Europe has not been built. To the contrary, this article shows that since the late 1980s not only have few new trade barriers been erected, but external trade policy in Europe has been significantly liberalized in recent years, even in politically and economically sensitive sectors. This marks a significant departure from the past and occurred at a time when liberalization was least expected" (56).
"I argue that European integration has played a considerable role in the liberalization of European external trade policy by changing the institutional context in which trade policy is made, creating a systematic bias toward liberalization over increased protection" (56).
Showing posts with label EU. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EU. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Friday, September 26, 2008
Mearsheimer: Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War
Mearsheimer, J., 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), 5-56.
“The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely viewed as harbingers of a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than four decades is lifting…This article assess this optimistic view by exploring in detail the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. Specifically, I examine the effects of a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end” (5).
“I argue that the p0rospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years” (6).
“Specifically, the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the Continent; the rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe…and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal” (6-7).
“Four principal scenarios are possible. Under the first scenario, Europe would become nuclear-free, thus eliminating a central pillar of order in the Cold War era. Under the second scenario, the European states do not expand their arsenals to compensate for the departure of the superpowers’ weapons. IN a third scenario, nuclear proliferation takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are taken to dampen the many dangers inherent in the proliferation process…In the fourth and least dangerous scenario, nuclear weapons proliferate in Europe, but the process is well-managed by the current nuclear powers. They take steps to deter preventative strikes on emerging nuclear powers, to set boundaries on the proliferation process…This outcome probably provides the best hope for maintaining peace in Europe” (8).
He then highlights the possibility of three counter arguments being posited. The first is the standard liberal claim that economic interdependence will reduce conflict. The second is democratic peace considerations. The third involves a degree of collective self-awareness amongst Europeans. “But the theories behind these arguments are flawed, as I explain; hence their prediction of peace in a multipolar Europe is flawed as well” (8).
The pre-1945 Europe was quite violent because there were no nuclear weapons and there was a multipolar world. The post 45 world was more peaceful because of bipolarity. “A bipolar system is more peaceful for three main reasons. First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely” (14).
Mearsheimer supports these theses in the remainder of the text.
“The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely viewed as harbingers of a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than four decades is lifting…This article assess this optimistic view by exploring in detail the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. Specifically, I examine the effects of a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end” (5).
“I argue that the p0rospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years” (6).
“Specifically, the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the Continent; the rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe…and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal” (6-7).
“Four principal scenarios are possible. Under the first scenario, Europe would become nuclear-free, thus eliminating a central pillar of order in the Cold War era. Under the second scenario, the European states do not expand their arsenals to compensate for the departure of the superpowers’ weapons. IN a third scenario, nuclear proliferation takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are taken to dampen the many dangers inherent in the proliferation process…In the fourth and least dangerous scenario, nuclear weapons proliferate in Europe, but the process is well-managed by the current nuclear powers. They take steps to deter preventative strikes on emerging nuclear powers, to set boundaries on the proliferation process…This outcome probably provides the best hope for maintaining peace in Europe” (8).
He then highlights the possibility of three counter arguments being posited. The first is the standard liberal claim that economic interdependence will reduce conflict. The second is democratic peace considerations. The third involves a degree of collective self-awareness amongst Europeans. “But the theories behind these arguments are flawed, as I explain; hence their prediction of peace in a multipolar Europe is flawed as well” (8).
The pre-1945 Europe was quite violent because there were no nuclear weapons and there was a multipolar world. The post 45 world was more peaceful because of bipolarity. “A bipolar system is more peaceful for three main reasons. First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely” (14).
Mearsheimer supports these theses in the remainder of the text.
Waever: Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community
Waever, O., 1998. Insecurity, security and asecurity in the West European non-war community. In Security Communities. Cambridge University Press.
“Western Europe is a security community. In contrast to the expectations of most contemporary theorists of security communities, this has not been achieved by erecting common security structures or institutions, but primarily through a process of ‘desecuritization’, a progressive marginalization of mutual security concerns in favor of other issues” (69).
Waever claims that Europe went through a period of unsecurity to over security to desecuritization and then a potential situation in the 90s of resecuritization. Security communities, a concept that stems from Deutsch, are non-war communities. Thus, there can be security tensions that do not escalate to the level of war, but the community will not be tempted to militarize disputes. Waever also posits that other issues have become painted as security issues (economic, environmental, etc.), and that this has the possibility to raise tensions, but that these will not result in war, but may be discussed in terms of security.
Waever explores the Scandinavian security community, one that he claims would not be contested by many scholars as being a security community (Europe is likely to be contested, and the US-Canada relationship is likely not to be contested, though it is substantively different). He finds that this community has not always been, and has resulted from a long and bloody history between groups. However, this community emerged over 100 years ago and this can be identified by the peaceful resolution of tensions that would have been previously only solved militarily.
Waever then explores the emergence of the European security community from WWII to the late 90s.
“Western Europe is a security community. In contrast to the expectations of most contemporary theorists of security communities, this has not been achieved by erecting common security structures or institutions, but primarily through a process of ‘desecuritization’, a progressive marginalization of mutual security concerns in favor of other issues” (69).
Waever claims that Europe went through a period of unsecurity to over security to desecuritization and then a potential situation in the 90s of resecuritization. Security communities, a concept that stems from Deutsch, are non-war communities. Thus, there can be security tensions that do not escalate to the level of war, but the community will not be tempted to militarize disputes. Waever also posits that other issues have become painted as security issues (economic, environmental, etc.), and that this has the possibility to raise tensions, but that these will not result in war, but may be discussed in terms of security.
Waever explores the Scandinavian security community, one that he claims would not be contested by many scholars as being a security community (Europe is likely to be contested, and the US-Canada relationship is likely not to be contested, though it is substantively different). He finds that this community has not always been, and has resulted from a long and bloody history between groups. However, this community emerged over 100 years ago and this can be identified by the peaceful resolution of tensions that would have been previously only solved militarily.
Waever then explores the emergence of the European security community from WWII to the late 90s.
Tuesday, February 5, 2008
Knast: Assessing Opportunities for ICT to Contribute to Sustainable Development
Knast, Joanna. (2005). Assessing Opportunities for ICT to Contribute to Sustainable Development. Brussels: Developed for the DG Information Society of the European Commission.
Sustainable development is defined up front as, “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (3). They highlight three forms of sustainability: economic, social and environmental. They highlight 6 unsustainable trends: climate change, public health, poverty and social exclusion, aging society, management of natural resources, and mobility and transport (3). They point to the contribution made by ICT to EU GDP growth, at about 25%.
ICT is acknowledged to be either a factor in contributing to negative trends or positive trends. There is “little evidence” of greater “resource-use efficiency in the ‘new economy’” (4). But, through a holistic approach (I believe that this means an approach that combines government, civil society and business), movements in positive directions can be had.
ICT can reduce environmental impacts. ICT can contribute to social inclusion by providing those excluded with virtual access to events, training, etc. ICT can help grow the economy. ICT can reduce climate change. ICT has not, however, bridged the digital divide (5).
Social inclusion: more opportunities are provided to the poor; better distribution of human capital; improved quality of life; more efficient public administration; improved governance; improved participation; improved access to health services and education; increased access to cultural expression; better combination of home/work/education.
Environmental sustainability: must break link between GDP growth and environmental degradation; decoupling can be absolute or relative; ASA helpful in identifying environmental trends in this regard; product-service shift; energy management in buildings; improved transportation efficiency; requires shift to knowledge economy.
Energy efficiency: generates great growth with little electrical use; better management of energy use in buildings; more intelligent buildings; Waste Electric and Electrical Equipment (WEEE) a major problem; recycling a key component in this regard; efficient transportation by improved rail network; improved satellite use (Galileo); transport substitution (i.e. work at home).
Governance: holistic approach to using ICT required; three major drivers are 1.) acting in conformity with regulation; 2.) catering for companies’ good reputation; 3.) realizing the efficiency benefits of their own technologies (19); must measure impacts and progress; measure corporate social responsibility (CSR) metrics.
Leveraging and Catalysing: need conditions to establish consistent results; governments can demand sustainable development; EU to encourage green procedures; business stakeholders and civil society need to be included; create European core of “Business Leaders” in ICT (21)
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