Gibson-Graham, J., The end of capitalism (as we knew it), Blackwell Publishers.
Gibson and Graham provide a post-structural, feminist critique of orthodox Marxism. They conclude that Marxists have actually hurt their chances of overthrowing capitalism because they have engaged in a discourse that allows capitalism to be something larger, stronger and more intimidating that it actually is. The capitalist beast is not as imposing a beast as Marxism has painted it out to be. “Marxism has produced a discourse of Capitalism that ostensibly delineates as object of transformative class politics but that operates more powerfully to discourage and marginalize projects of class transformation…Marxism has contributed to the socialist absence through the very way in which it has theorized the capitalist presence” (Gibson and Graham 1997:252) Gibson and Graham provide a scathing critique of Marxist interpretation of globalization. These two authors fall into the Held and McGrew globalization skeptics position as they do not believe that the “penetration” or “immanent penetration” of capital into every corner of the earth is a reality, or that if such a reality did start to occur, that it could not be stopped.
They compare the “rape-script” with the “globalization-script” in one of their more striking passages. The “rape-script” allows all of us to see women as being rape-able and men as being possible rapists. Gibson and Graham take parts of the rape-script from Sharon Marcus where she, “challenges the inevitability of the claim that rape is one of the ‘real, clear facts of women’s lives’” (Gibson Graham 1997:121). We, by extension, are to challenge the reality that globalization/capitalism is one of the real, clear facts about the existence of citizens throughout the world.
This understanding of how the discourse surrounding rape has reinforced the idea that women are rape-able, open and vulnerable while men are hard, strong and potential violators helped to shape Gibson and Graham’s ideas surrounding globalization. The penetrating power of globalization has become, in many circles, an inevitability. Global capital will permeate and enter into any of the open, vulnerable developing countries. This has created a discourse that speaks us and shapes us; the globalization-script, and the eventualities it implies, may not be a reality. We are asked by the authors to reevaluate the potential for community based exchange that do not reinforce the dominant, globalization-script.
We must not become the victim of capitalism, we must make ourselves powerful. Even if our power is not initially evident, it becomes something greater as we reclaim the dialogue and shape it to our ends. This is how we make globalization lose its erection. This is how we create a world that is not dominated by one homogenizing economic system and dialogue.
Gibson and Graham then encourage us to go out and foster community based economic systems that value people. We are not to become subjects in the dominant discourse, but rather work on being stewards of our rhetoric and speak ourselves into a new discourse that does not build capitalism up into something that it is not. Gibson and Graham see globalization not as a real phenomenon that is inevitably creating one economic playing field where we will all gather. It is, on the other hand, a real phenomenon with limited scope whose real size has been artificially, and perversely, enlarged through an inaccurate discourse. The power to reshape our world does not lie in the hands of a few elite capitalists shaping the world in the interest of capital mobility, or politicians shaping the world in the interests of national capital or of global stability. The power to shape the world lies in the hands of individuals who are stewards of their rhetoric.
Showing posts with label Postmodernism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Postmodernism. Show all posts
Friday, October 10, 2008
Monday, August 4, 2008
Doty: Aporia
Doty, RL. 1997. “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory.” European Journal of International Relations 3:365.
As the name “aporia” suggests, there is much that is undecidable, unknowable and undefinable in the description of the agent-structure problem by Doty.
The article begins by addressing the complexity of the agent-structure problem, first brought to the forefront by Wendt (1987). His solution took the form of structuration theory, a mixture of agent-driven theory and structure-driven theory.
“In this article I examine some significant problems found in this very important conversation, and suggest that they result in serious gaps and silences. However, I also propose that important openings can be found that point to a more critical, if unsettling, way of conceptualizing agents and structures and the relation between them. Specifically I suggest that claims to have resolved the dualism between agents and structures are unwarranted. The ‘solutions’ that have been proposed to this problem either end up reverting to a structural determinism or alternatively to an understanding of agency which presumes pregiven, autonomous individuals. Both of these positions come full circle back to the very dilemma that gives rise to the agent-structure problem in the first place. Despite the failure to resolve the agent-structure problem, however, the conversations that have taken place contain some important insights and openings that raise just the kind of questions that can lead to a more critical understanding of International Relations. These openings have not, however, been pursued by the framers of the agent-structure problematique. Because of this, serious gaps, silences and foreclosures of possibilities remain” (366).
“I make the following arguments. (1) Scientific realism, the philosophy of science which either explicitly or implicitly underpins the various ‘solutions’ to the agent-structure problem, remains wedded to an essentialist notion of structure which is at odds with attempts to give equal ontological and explanatory priority to the practices of agents. (2) Structuration theory contains contradictions that are most manifest in its resort to ‘bracketing’… (3) Far from transcending the subject-object dualism, the proposed solutions to the agent-structure problem merely replicate it” (366).
“One popular story is that of agents whose practices produce, reproduce and sometimes transform the structures that make up society. The other story is that of the structures themselves which enable, constrain and make possible the practices of agents…Dressler…frames the issue as involving two uncontentious truths—(1) human agency is the only moving force behind actions, events and outcomes; and (2) agency can only be realized in concrete historical circumstances. Wendt…suggests that the agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life—(1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and (2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (367).
“The difficulty…is the oppositional logic within which the agent-structure problem has been articulated, i.e. the agent-structure problem has been formulated within a system of thought that defines structures and agents as two distinct, fully constituted and opposed entities each with essential properties, while the central feature of structures, as defined in the agent-structure problematique, makes problematic this very distinction” (371-2).
Doty claims that the issue of agency has been underwhelmingly emphasized and tries to shed light on it.
The current treatment of the agent-structure problem does not allow for the undecidability of the aporia, that Doty puts forth. This post-structural approach, this rejection of decidability is not an embrace of nihilism or non-action, but rather is a problematization of the ability of scholars to truly identify whether causality takes place in the realm of structure or agency. In fact, the current treatment of the dichotomy, in its inadequacy to identify and highlight the interaction of structure/agent, actually makes quite clearly the case that the agent-structure issue has not, and cannot, be brought to clarity.
Doty then presents undecidability and paradoxes as a method for achieving three things:
“I do, however, claim that it is possible to take the undecidability of issues seriously and to press these paradoxes further than they have been pressed by IR theorists. The purpose of doing this are threefold—(1) to reconceptualize the nature and significance of practice; (2) to suggest an alternative way of understanding the agent-structure relationship; and (3) to point out how current ‘solutions’ foreclose important possibilities in terms of critical International Relations theory” (375).
Doty uses concepts like play and practice in determining the causal implications of either structure or agency.
Doty does not argue that the efforts of Wendt and others in re-associating the agent-structure problem with a contsructeivist method and ontology is wholely base. She makes the case that they could go much further. “Certainly, approaches which reject a priori assumptions about the givenness of either agents or structures enable the posing of a much wider range of questions than do those which give explanatory priority to either one of these. However, the current framing of the agent-structure problem precludes important critical moves and creates boundaries beyond which IR theory cannot go. At stake is the extent to which the inquiries enabled by particular framings of the issue are complicit with existing discourses, and the extent to which they make problematic these discourses, their underlying presuppositions and the power inherent in them” (383).
There is a discussion of practice informing identity, which is over determined, and the concept of subject-position, being discursively formed and uncentered (always already uncenterable?) as being important as well.
“If structures, meanings and identities are overdetermined and inherently undecidable, and the construction of all of these things results from practices which marginalize and exclude the excesses that would call into question the center of itself…, then we can reasonably suggest that power is fundamental to discursive constructions. There are no constructions in the absence of power” (386).
“Hollis and Smith…suggest that there are still two stories to tell, that of agency and that of structure. Wendt…also suggests that there are two stories to tell regarding the relationship between structure and process—one based exclusively on microeconomic analogies, and one based on sociological and social psychological analogies. In this article, I have attempted to show that there are also other stories to tell regarding agency, structure and the relationship between them and practices” (387).
As the name “aporia” suggests, there is much that is undecidable, unknowable and undefinable in the description of the agent-structure problem by Doty.
The article begins by addressing the complexity of the agent-structure problem, first brought to the forefront by Wendt (1987). His solution took the form of structuration theory, a mixture of agent-driven theory and structure-driven theory.
“In this article I examine some significant problems found in this very important conversation, and suggest that they result in serious gaps and silences. However, I also propose that important openings can be found that point to a more critical, if unsettling, way of conceptualizing agents and structures and the relation between them. Specifically I suggest that claims to have resolved the dualism between agents and structures are unwarranted. The ‘solutions’ that have been proposed to this problem either end up reverting to a structural determinism or alternatively to an understanding of agency which presumes pregiven, autonomous individuals. Both of these positions come full circle back to the very dilemma that gives rise to the agent-structure problem in the first place. Despite the failure to resolve the agent-structure problem, however, the conversations that have taken place contain some important insights and openings that raise just the kind of questions that can lead to a more critical understanding of International Relations. These openings have not, however, been pursued by the framers of the agent-structure problematique. Because of this, serious gaps, silences and foreclosures of possibilities remain” (366).
“I make the following arguments. (1) Scientific realism, the philosophy of science which either explicitly or implicitly underpins the various ‘solutions’ to the agent-structure problem, remains wedded to an essentialist notion of structure which is at odds with attempts to give equal ontological and explanatory priority to the practices of agents. (2) Structuration theory contains contradictions that are most manifest in its resort to ‘bracketing’… (3) Far from transcending the subject-object dualism, the proposed solutions to the agent-structure problem merely replicate it” (366).
“One popular story is that of agents whose practices produce, reproduce and sometimes transform the structures that make up society. The other story is that of the structures themselves which enable, constrain and make possible the practices of agents…Dressler…frames the issue as involving two uncontentious truths—(1) human agency is the only moving force behind actions, events and outcomes; and (2) agency can only be realized in concrete historical circumstances. Wendt…suggests that the agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life—(1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and (2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (367).
“The difficulty…is the oppositional logic within which the agent-structure problem has been articulated, i.e. the agent-structure problem has been formulated within a system of thought that defines structures and agents as two distinct, fully constituted and opposed entities each with essential properties, while the central feature of structures, as defined in the agent-structure problematique, makes problematic this very distinction” (371-2).
Doty claims that the issue of agency has been underwhelmingly emphasized and tries to shed light on it.
The current treatment of the agent-structure problem does not allow for the undecidability of the aporia, that Doty puts forth. This post-structural approach, this rejection of decidability is not an embrace of nihilism or non-action, but rather is a problematization of the ability of scholars to truly identify whether causality takes place in the realm of structure or agency. In fact, the current treatment of the dichotomy, in its inadequacy to identify and highlight the interaction of structure/agent, actually makes quite clearly the case that the agent-structure issue has not, and cannot, be brought to clarity.
Doty then presents undecidability and paradoxes as a method for achieving three things:
“I do, however, claim that it is possible to take the undecidability of issues seriously and to press these paradoxes further than they have been pressed by IR theorists. The purpose of doing this are threefold—(1) to reconceptualize the nature and significance of practice; (2) to suggest an alternative way of understanding the agent-structure relationship; and (3) to point out how current ‘solutions’ foreclose important possibilities in terms of critical International Relations theory” (375).
Doty uses concepts like play and practice in determining the causal implications of either structure or agency.
Doty does not argue that the efforts of Wendt and others in re-associating the agent-structure problem with a contsructeivist method and ontology is wholely base. She makes the case that they could go much further. “Certainly, approaches which reject a priori assumptions about the givenness of either agents or structures enable the posing of a much wider range of questions than do those which give explanatory priority to either one of these. However, the current framing of the agent-structure problem precludes important critical moves and creates boundaries beyond which IR theory cannot go. At stake is the extent to which the inquiries enabled by particular framings of the issue are complicit with existing discourses, and the extent to which they make problematic these discourses, their underlying presuppositions and the power inherent in them” (383).
There is a discussion of practice informing identity, which is over determined, and the concept of subject-position, being discursively formed and uncentered (always already uncenterable?) as being important as well.
“If structures, meanings and identities are overdetermined and inherently undecidable, and the construction of all of these things results from practices which marginalize and exclude the excesses that would call into question the center of itself…, then we can reasonably suggest that power is fundamental to discursive constructions. There are no constructions in the absence of power” (386).
“Hollis and Smith…suggest that there are still two stories to tell, that of agency and that of structure. Wendt…also suggests that there are two stories to tell regarding the relationship between structure and process—one based exclusively on microeconomic analogies, and one based on sociological and social psychological analogies. In this article, I have attempted to show that there are also other stories to tell regarding agency, structure and the relationship between them and practices” (387).
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
Devetak: Postmodernism
Devetak, R. 1996. “Postmodernism.” Theories of International Relations.
This chapter attempts to present a positive account of post-modernism in IR. It begins by claiming that many see it as a bete noir, but this is because it is just poorly understood. It is also poorly defined from within: many proponents disagree about exactly what postmodernism means.
Power and Knowledge:
The treatment of knowledge is not devoid of political movements, according to post-moderns. This point is most clearly made by Foucault. For Foucault, power and knowledge implied one another, and thus they could never be separated. The scientists’ goal should be to explore the interaction of these two variables, as he did in a variety of books. For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault traced the exertion of power from a pre-modern state to a modern state, from the sovereign’s direct imposition onto the body of the criminal, to the clean, clinical approach to modern incarceration. Examples are drawn from the study of sovereignty and its overdetermined characteristics.
Genealogy:
This is a methodological approach of tracing histories of domination from the “perspective of nowhere”. The point is to decenter the traditional historical tellings of events away from narratives of truth and right and towards a narrative that embraces context and contingency. The work of Nietzsche and Campbell are highlighted.
Textual Strategies:
“The ‘reality’ of power politics (like any social reality) is always already constituted through textuality and inscribed modes of representation” (186). This focus on text-based interpretations of politics presents two questions: “…what is meant by textual interplay?...and…how, by using what methods and strategies, does postmodernism seek to disclose this textual interplay?” (186). The focus on textuality stems from On Grammatology. The world is like a text in the sense that it must be interpreted by subjects for it to be real.
Deconstruction:
This is a method that is meant to disrupt previously “settled” understandings of things (histories, meanings, identities, etc.).
Double Reading:
“Derrida seeks to expose this relationship between stability-effects and destabilizations by passing through two readings in any analysis. As expressed by Derrida, double reading is essentially a duplicitous strategy which is ‘simultaneously faithful and violent’. The first reading is a commentary or repetition of the dominant interpretation…the second, counter-memorializing reading unsettles it by applying pressure to those points of instability within a text, discourse or institution” (187-8).
Violence, boundaries, identity, statecraft, are seen as tools in the making of a sovereign state system. What might ethics say about this situation? Post-modern scholars are interested in and find questions like the above stated to be fruitful areas of inquiry. The discussion of ethics moves to Levinas.
This chapter attempts to present a positive account of post-modernism in IR. It begins by claiming that many see it as a bete noir, but this is because it is just poorly understood. It is also poorly defined from within: many proponents disagree about exactly what postmodernism means.
Power and Knowledge:
The treatment of knowledge is not devoid of political movements, according to post-moderns. This point is most clearly made by Foucault. For Foucault, power and knowledge implied one another, and thus they could never be separated. The scientists’ goal should be to explore the interaction of these two variables, as he did in a variety of books. For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault traced the exertion of power from a pre-modern state to a modern state, from the sovereign’s direct imposition onto the body of the criminal, to the clean, clinical approach to modern incarceration. Examples are drawn from the study of sovereignty and its overdetermined characteristics.
Genealogy:
This is a methodological approach of tracing histories of domination from the “perspective of nowhere”. The point is to decenter the traditional historical tellings of events away from narratives of truth and right and towards a narrative that embraces context and contingency. The work of Nietzsche and Campbell are highlighted.
Textual Strategies:
“The ‘reality’ of power politics (like any social reality) is always already constituted through textuality and inscribed modes of representation” (186). This focus on text-based interpretations of politics presents two questions: “…what is meant by textual interplay?...and…how, by using what methods and strategies, does postmodernism seek to disclose this textual interplay?” (186). The focus on textuality stems from On Grammatology. The world is like a text in the sense that it must be interpreted by subjects for it to be real.
Deconstruction:
This is a method that is meant to disrupt previously “settled” understandings of things (histories, meanings, identities, etc.).
Double Reading:
“Derrida seeks to expose this relationship between stability-effects and destabilizations by passing through two readings in any analysis. As expressed by Derrida, double reading is essentially a duplicitous strategy which is ‘simultaneously faithful and violent’. The first reading is a commentary or repetition of the dominant interpretation…the second, counter-memorializing reading unsettles it by applying pressure to those points of instability within a text, discourse or institution” (187-8).
Violence, boundaries, identity, statecraft, are seen as tools in the making of a sovereign state system. What might ethics say about this situation? Post-modern scholars are interested in and find questions like the above stated to be fruitful areas of inquiry. The discussion of ethics moves to Levinas.
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