Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Knorr: The War Potential of Nations


Knorr, Klaus Eugen. The War Potential of Nations. Greenwood Press Reprint, 1978.

 “This book is meant to contribute to a theory of war potential.  The term ‘war potential’ is used frequently in literature, press, lectures, and classroom discussion, yet its meaning is usually hazy and the literature to which the student might turn for consultation is inadequate” (vii).  The book is interested in economic, industrial, and morale components of war potential.

“Military means is one of the instruments through which nations attempt to settle international conflicts of interest.  Since the instrument is used to influence the behavior of other nations, military power is necessarily relative to that of other nations…Military power is subject to change for two reasons.  A nation’s power may rise or fall because there are changes in the power constituents of other nations or because there is a change in its own means of waging war” (19). 

“Short of battle, there is no precise test or measurement of mobilized military power” (28).

“In this sense, ‘war potential’ is simply a collective term for all the relevant elements of military strength other than the armed forces themselves” (40).

“For example, the following list of components have been drawn up by five different authors:”  (40):

This is Nicholas Spykman in America’s Strategy in World Politics

“(1) Size of territory; nature of frontiers; size of population; absence or presence of raw materials; economic and technological development; financial strength’ ethnic homogeneity’ effective social integration’ political stability’ and national spirit.” (40) 

This is Morgenthau in In Defense of the National Interest:

“(2) Geography; natural resources; industrial capacity; military preparedness; population; national character; national morale; quality of diplomacy.” (41) 

This is Gulick in Administrative Reflections from World War II:

“(3) Manpower; raw materials; capital investments; science, technology, and research; organizations and institutions (including government and economic and social institutions).” (41) 

This is Steinmetz:

“(4) Population (size and structure); size of territory; wealth; political institutions; leadership; national unity and cohesion; respect and friends abroad; moral qualities.” (41)

This is Fischer:

“ (5) Political factors:  geographical position; size of state and number and density of population; organizational skill and cultural level; kinds of frontiers and attitudes of neighboring countries.  Psychological factors:  economic flexibility and inventive skill; perseverance and adaptability of the population.  Economic factors:  fertility of soil and mineral wealth; industrial organization and stage of technology; development of commerce and transportation; and financial strength” (41).

This list is debilitating.  So the author makes three broad categories:  economic capacity, institutional acumen, and war motivation.

“If it is hard to measure and compare the ready striking power of nations, it is still harder to measure and compare their war potential and hence their total military power, of which potential is a major, and at most time the predominant, part…How can we measure administrative competence, motivation for war, and economic capacity?  How can the various components of these aggregates be measured?  Even if we could measure the three broad constituents of potential, how can we measure and compare the total war potential so long as our units of measurement are incommensurable?” (47).

Tuesday, March 5, 2013


Alcock and Newcombe:  The Perception of National Power


Alcock, Norman Z., and Alan G. Newcombe. “The Perception of National Power.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 14, no. 3 (September 1, 1970): 335–343.

"...if international relations is to become a science it will have to establish a definitive quantitative measure for its most basic variable--national power" (335).

"There may be differences between 'real' power and 'perceived' power.  Given some objective level of 'real' power, a nation may nevertheless be perceived as stronger, or weaker, y the people of another nation.  Yet both objective and subjective power must ber based on a number of measurable facts.  The purpose of this empirical study is to ascertain these measurable facts and thus help to establish a quantitative definition of national power.  In addition to its theoretical value, a quantitative measurement of power can have an immediate practical application for peace--that is, in devising formulas for weighted voting in the United Nations, which is now floundering on the 'one nation, one vote' principle" (335).  

They survey folks asking them to rank countries by "importance".  This is the dependent variable for their analysis.  

"We conclude, therefore, that perceived national power is some function of GNP or military expenditure (in purchasing-power-equivalent dollars) if none of the nations has been at war recently, but is a function of military expenditure alone if warring nations are included in the rating"  (342).

Two regressions that are salient:  Relative Power = -8.85 + 0.67 population + 0.47 GNP/cap
Relative power = 9.4 - 0.09 population + 0.93 GNP





Kugler and Arbetman:  Choosing Among Measures of Power


Kugler, Jacek, and Marina Arbetman. “Choosing Among Measures of Power:  A Review of the Empirical Record.” In Power in World Politics, edited by Richard J Stoll and Michael Don Ward. Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner Publishers, 1989.

"We show that, for major powers, a number of indicators used in international politics to index power are highly related.  Whether one chooses to use GNP, the COW Indexes, or adjust these for military expenditures is not critically relevant for the analysis of relations among major powers over time.  This choice affects cross-sectional analysis since rank varies at one point in time but even here the average disparity is on the order of 10%" (73-4).








Merritt and Zinnes:  Alternative Indexes of National Power


Merritt, Richard L, and Dina A Zinnes. “Alternative Indexes of National Power.” In Power in world politics, edited by Richard J Stoll and Michael Don Ward. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1989.


"Our task is threefold   first, to summarize the more prominent indexes of power that researches have proposed, highlighting both similarities and differences; second, to compare the empirical consequences of these alternative approaches; and third, to explore the implications of these findings" (12).  They define power in line with what others have said, "...how probable it is that X can exert d amount of influence over Y with respect to issue g" (12).

Referring to single variable models of power:  "A high national income...can imply a country's long-term ability to influence others, but not if it means that the population is less willing and even less able than others to engage in activities such as wars that might jeopardize its high standard of living.  A healthy, skilled population may be a capability; an equally large but disease ridden and illiterate population can diminish the government's capacities.  General s never tire of telling us that even the best-equipped army is ineffective without good leadership and high morale.  Is energy used to drive television sets and compact-disk players equivalent to energy used for industrial production?  Without strong evidence that a single-variable indicator predicts..relevant outcomes,k it is difficult to answer the complaints of 'realists' who point to a more complex world than any single indicator suggests" (14).

They list various contributions to measurements of power:

Knorr:  very early, measured potential military power

Alcock and Newcombe:  interested in perceptions, used Russet 1968 (in Singer Quantitative International Politics).  Find three equations that can be used to assess relative power.  The two they like are:

Relative Power = -8.85 + 0.67 population + 0.47 GNP/cap
Relative power = 9.4 - 0.09 population + 0.93 GNP

Singer:  COW.

Demographics:  Total population and urban population
Industrial:  energy consumption and iron and steel production
Military:  total spending and size of military

Fucks:  non linear formulas that combine population, energy, and steel.  In German.  "Fucks predicts that growth in US power will taper off and reach 200 [base 100 US in 1960] by 2040.  Meanwhile, China's power will outstrip that of the United States in about 1975 and reach a score of approximately 3000 in the year 2040" (17).

Cline:  measures "capabilities" (population, territory, income, resource production, military capabilities) as well as "commitment" (national strategy, national will).

German:  non-linear, and influenced by possession of nuclear weapons.

Lemke:  Regions of War and Peace



Lemke, Douglas. Regions of war and peace. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.


The book begins with an overview of power transition theory juxtaposed with balance of power theory.  "The critically important variables associated with war and peace within power transition theory are thus relative power relations and status quo evaluations" (25).

Lemke then applies the logic of power transition theory to regional levels.  He deploys a "multiple hierarchy model" which argues that a regional "status quo" and dominant power is common, and that global powers do not frequently interfere with these regional dynamics (Vietnam and Korea are exceptions).  "In spite of the fact that these authors variously use the terms lesser-, subordinate-, "inferiour"-, local-, or regional balances, they all seem to be suggesting the same thing; namely, the international balance or international system is a set of international systems arranged geographically, or in positions of relative inferiority/superiority, or both" (58).

He uses both COW CINC measures and GDP/GNP to measure relative power.  The threshold for parity is 70 percent of the power of the dominant.  He outlines regional groupings and and regional powers.  Does much more than I describe here.

Thursday, February 28, 2013

Levy, Jack.  Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China.  


In:  Ross, Robert S, and Feng Zhu. China’s ascent: power, security, and the future of international politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.



"I argue that applications of power transition theory to the rise of China are compromised by the failure to recognize both the theoretical limitations of power transition theory and the contextual differences between a potential Sino-American transition and past power transitions.  I give particular attention to the theory's focus on a single international hierarchy and its lack of a conceptual apparatus to deal with global-regional interactions, which are important because China is more likely to pose a threat to US interests in East and Southeast Asia than to US global interests, at least for many decades" (11).

Reviews Organski's contribution to power transition theory.  "Organski and his colleagues measure productivity in terms of GDP/capita.  Their aggregate measure of power is the product of GDP and political capacity.  If a great power increases in strength to the point that it acquires at least 80 percent of the power of the dominant state, it is defined as a 'challenger' to the dominant state and to that state's ability to control the international system" (13).

"It is the combination of parity, overtaking, and dissatisfaction that leads to war, though power transition theorists have been inconsistent regarding the precise relationship among these key causal variables.  In the most recent statement of the theory, it appears that dissatisfaction and parity each approximate a necessary condition for war between the dominant state and the challenger" (14).

"Thus, population has a critical impact on power in the long term; economic growth has a large impact in the medium term; and political capacity has its greatest impact in the short term" (16).

"The question, according to power transition theory, is not whether China will eventually overtake the United States, since that is practically inevitable once China completes its modernization and moves up its growth trajectory, but rather when and with what consequences.  Power transition theorists equivocate in their discussion of the timing of the transition  but not about the conditions determining whether the transition will be peaceful or warlike" (16).

"Power transition theory posits that national power is a function of population, economic productivity, and the political capacity to extract resources from society and transform them into national power.  Thus in most applications of the theory national power = population * GDP/capita * political capacity.  One problem with the emphasis on population and GDP is that while GDP captures quantitative changes in the growth of the economy as a whole it does not fully capture qualitative changes int eh form of technological innovations that generate new leading economic sectors and trigger paradigmatic shifts in economic production" (18).

"To summarize, although power transition theory suggests that China's overtaking of the United States is both inevitable and imminent sometime within the next generation, a focus on the leading economic sectors and technological innovations that drive them suggests a more cautious attitude in predicting a Sino-American power transition" (20).

"To summarize, although power transition theory claims to provide a theory of great power war at the top of the international hierarchy, a look at its application to historical cases reveals that in important respects the theory mis-specifies the causal mechanisms leading to war" (30).

Thursday, February 14, 2013

McNally: Sino-Capitalism


McNally, Christopher A. “Sino-Capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the International Political Economy.” World Politics 64, no. 4 (2012): 741–776.

Outlines the IR debate on the rise of China.  Then focuses on IPE interpretation of Sino-Capitalism in contrast to Anglo-Capitalism.  Sino-Capitalism:  "...relies on informal business networks rather than on legal codes and transparent rules.  It also assigns the Chinese state a leading role in fostering and guiding capitalist accumulation." (744)  "Central to Sino-capitalism's institutional structure is a unique duality that combines top-down state-led development with bottom-up entrepreneurial private capital accumulation" (744).

Piece goes on to place Sino-Capitalism within the varieties of capitalism literature.  It argues that the unique characteristics of this economic structure will be challenging to assimilate within the liberal economic order.  Author makes the interesting observation that China is entering the international system characterized by neoliberal globalization and other Asian countries that entered the system earlier did so  when it was more characterized by embedded liberalism.  

The article then goes on to document the moves that China is making to internationalize the yuan.  The further implications for the rise of China and US-China relations are ambiguous, but the author claims that the rise of Sino-Capitalism will continue to challenge the international financial order.

Ray and SInger: Measuring Concentration of Power

Ray, James Lee, J. David Singer. 1973. Measuring the concentration of power in the international system. Sociological Methods & Research. 1: 403.

"The purpose of this paper is to examine some earlier efforts to measure the inequality of distribution within several different substantive contexts, and to see how appropriate these different measures might be if they were applied to the distribution of 'power potential' in the international system or any of its subsystems" (405).

 "We should admit, and indeed will even emphasize, that the criteria for selection of an index will vary as research purposes change" (405).

Mearshimer: The Gathering Storm

Mearsheimer, John J. “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (December 21, 2010): 381–396.

 The argument here is that "China cannot rise peacefully" (382). This is because of power transition theory and standard Realist accounts of behavior in the international system. There are three arguments for why China will rise peacefully and Mearsheimer refutes each. 1. China will mitigate fears of it's revisionist nature by signaling to their neighbors that it will be peaceful. This isn't possible because states can have no truthful expectation about the behavior of other states. Cites Hobbes related work. Second, China could build defensive military capabilities in place of offensive. This isn't plausible because the line between defensive and offensive capabilities is blurry. 3. China's behavior to her neighbors has been peaceful lately. Problem with this thinking is that past behavior isn't predictive of future behavior.

 He also addresses the US role in the future and its desire to remain the global hegemon. This will further initiate conflict.

Then, after telling the reader that we can't understand the decisions of leaders in 2025 he goes on to tell us how we should expect countries to behave.