Kirshner, J. 2008. Globalization, American Power, and International Security. Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 3: 363-389.
How will increasing globalization affect American security? "Switching from polo on horseback to water polo does not change the principals or the objectives, but the contest is still profoundly transformed by the change in setting. Some players, for example, might have been much better riders than they are swimmers" (363).
"This paper draws three principal conclusions: First, globalization, in aggregate and on average tends to reduce the autonomy and capacity of states, although in some ways states may find their powers enhanced. Second, because the processes of globalization affect various states (and their relative capacities) differently, globalization affects the balance of power between states. In particular, as the biggest fish in a more open pond, the United States emerges as relatively more powerful than other states. However, and third, the United States, nevertheless, finds its own autonomy and capacity encroached upon by the processes of globalization, and will attract both more violent resistance and political opposition to its international ambitions" (363).
Definition: "...an array of phenomena that derive from unorganized and stateless forces but that generate pressures that are felt by states" (364).
This paper argues that globalization is a contingent phenomena that is not unique to history in the broadest sense. However, while it may not be unique, that does not mean that it is not one of the most pressing issues of the day.
This article in an excellent overview of globalization and security issues, though it does not focus enough on what I am currently working. ABSOLUTELY read this if you are interested in globalization, conflict, balance of power, the US and the changing nature of power politics.
Showing posts with label Security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Security. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Saturday, October 4, 2008
Booth: Theory of World Security
Booth, K., 2007. Theory of World Security, Cambridge University Press.
Booth claims that we live in a world that is quite different from the worlds that had existed before. We have the capability to destroy on a larger scale than is easily conceivable. We have the ability to work with precision in our destruction. All of this operates within a milieu of globalization, regionalization and generally conflictual trends.
The author claims, echoing EH Carr’s famous text, that we are living in a new Twenty Years’ Crisis that he calls The Great Reckoning. “If a series of key decisions about world security are not made in the first two decades of the century, and are not made sensibly, then by mid-century human society faces the prospect of a concatenation of global turmoil unlike anything in the past” (2). “In other words, a critical theory of security seeks to be both realistic and emancipator” (2). “The framework of the theory to be elaborated derives from a body of ideas I call critical global theorizing” (3). “…world security refers to the structures and processes within human society, locally and globally, that work towards the reduction of the threats and risks that determine individual and group lives. The greater the level of security enjoyed, the more individuals and groups (including human society as a whole) can have an existence beyond the instinctual animal struggle merely to survive. The idea of world security is synonymous with the freedom of individuals and groups compatible with reasonable freedom of others and universal moral equality compatible with justifiable pragmatic inequalities” (4-5).
The book consists of four sections: Context, Theory, Dimensions and Futures. In the first section, the author expands upon the concept of the Great Reckoning and how this relates to Carr’s earlier work. In the second section, Booth explores in more depth what is meant by critical theory of world security. In the third section, the theory is applied empirically, specifically as a critique of US power, violence, human security and the state4 of nature (6). In the final section, there is a call for urgent action to mitigate the dilemmas highlighted.
Ch. 1:
“This chapter introduces six themes that carry through the book: a world that is not working for most of its inhabitants; a body of regressive ideas that continue to dominate politics, economics, and society globally; a growing world crisis that is not being attended to by the globally powerful; a particular set of challenges resulting from the convergence of traditional ideas and new material conditions created by environmental despoliation and population expansion; a regressive realist hegemony in the way policymakers and academics think about security; and the need to reconceptualise world security in the light of a self-consciously critical perspective with an emancipator orientation” (12).
Ch. 2:
“The previous chapter identified where a critical theory of security should start…A radically different world politics is conceivable, though is complete achievement may ultimately elude humankind. International politics must become the art of the impossible, for the alternative is almost too unpleasant to contemplate. With this in mind, the present chapter begins to sketch a map of sites of ideas to help create the political conditions for a more secure future. These ideas are not to be found in the national ghettos of realism, but in the cosmopolitan spirit of the unfinished work of the enlightenment” (37).
The following represent the core of a critical global theory: universalist, inclusive, normative, emancipatory, progressive and critical (38-9).
Booth claims that we live in a world that is quite different from the worlds that had existed before. We have the capability to destroy on a larger scale than is easily conceivable. We have the ability to work with precision in our destruction. All of this operates within a milieu of globalization, regionalization and generally conflictual trends.
The author claims, echoing EH Carr’s famous text, that we are living in a new Twenty Years’ Crisis that he calls The Great Reckoning. “If a series of key decisions about world security are not made in the first two decades of the century, and are not made sensibly, then by mid-century human society faces the prospect of a concatenation of global turmoil unlike anything in the past” (2). “In other words, a critical theory of security seeks to be both realistic and emancipator” (2). “The framework of the theory to be elaborated derives from a body of ideas I call critical global theorizing” (3). “…world security refers to the structures and processes within human society, locally and globally, that work towards the reduction of the threats and risks that determine individual and group lives. The greater the level of security enjoyed, the more individuals and groups (including human society as a whole) can have an existence beyond the instinctual animal struggle merely to survive. The idea of world security is synonymous with the freedom of individuals and groups compatible with reasonable freedom of others and universal moral equality compatible with justifiable pragmatic inequalities” (4-5).
The book consists of four sections: Context, Theory, Dimensions and Futures. In the first section, the author expands upon the concept of the Great Reckoning and how this relates to Carr’s earlier work. In the second section, Booth explores in more depth what is meant by critical theory of world security. In the third section, the theory is applied empirically, specifically as a critique of US power, violence, human security and the state4 of nature (6). In the final section, there is a call for urgent action to mitigate the dilemmas highlighted.
Ch. 1:
“This chapter introduces six themes that carry through the book: a world that is not working for most of its inhabitants; a body of regressive ideas that continue to dominate politics, economics, and society globally; a growing world crisis that is not being attended to by the globally powerful; a particular set of challenges resulting from the convergence of traditional ideas and new material conditions created by environmental despoliation and population expansion; a regressive realist hegemony in the way policymakers and academics think about security; and the need to reconceptualise world security in the light of a self-consciously critical perspective with an emancipator orientation” (12).
Ch. 2:
“The previous chapter identified where a critical theory of security should start…A radically different world politics is conceivable, though is complete achievement may ultimately elude humankind. International politics must become the art of the impossible, for the alternative is almost too unpleasant to contemplate. With this in mind, the present chapter begins to sketch a map of sites of ideas to help create the political conditions for a more secure future. These ideas are not to be found in the national ghettos of realism, but in the cosmopolitan spirit of the unfinished work of the enlightenment” (37).
The following represent the core of a critical global theory: universalist, inclusive, normative, emancipatory, progressive and critical (38-9).
Friday, September 26, 2008
Waever: Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community
Waever, O., 1998. Insecurity, security and asecurity in the West European non-war community. In Security Communities. Cambridge University Press.
“Western Europe is a security community. In contrast to the expectations of most contemporary theorists of security communities, this has not been achieved by erecting common security structures or institutions, but primarily through a process of ‘desecuritization’, a progressive marginalization of mutual security concerns in favor of other issues” (69).
Waever claims that Europe went through a period of unsecurity to over security to desecuritization and then a potential situation in the 90s of resecuritization. Security communities, a concept that stems from Deutsch, are non-war communities. Thus, there can be security tensions that do not escalate to the level of war, but the community will not be tempted to militarize disputes. Waever also posits that other issues have become painted as security issues (economic, environmental, etc.), and that this has the possibility to raise tensions, but that these will not result in war, but may be discussed in terms of security.
Waever explores the Scandinavian security community, one that he claims would not be contested by many scholars as being a security community (Europe is likely to be contested, and the US-Canada relationship is likely not to be contested, though it is substantively different). He finds that this community has not always been, and has resulted from a long and bloody history between groups. However, this community emerged over 100 years ago and this can be identified by the peaceful resolution of tensions that would have been previously only solved militarily.
Waever then explores the emergence of the European security community from WWII to the late 90s.
“Western Europe is a security community. In contrast to the expectations of most contemporary theorists of security communities, this has not been achieved by erecting common security structures or institutions, but primarily through a process of ‘desecuritization’, a progressive marginalization of mutual security concerns in favor of other issues” (69).
Waever claims that Europe went through a period of unsecurity to over security to desecuritization and then a potential situation in the 90s of resecuritization. Security communities, a concept that stems from Deutsch, are non-war communities. Thus, there can be security tensions that do not escalate to the level of war, but the community will not be tempted to militarize disputes. Waever also posits that other issues have become painted as security issues (economic, environmental, etc.), and that this has the possibility to raise tensions, but that these will not result in war, but may be discussed in terms of security.
Waever explores the Scandinavian security community, one that he claims would not be contested by many scholars as being a security community (Europe is likely to be contested, and the US-Canada relationship is likely not to be contested, though it is substantively different). He finds that this community has not always been, and has resulted from a long and bloody history between groups. However, this community emerged over 100 years ago and this can be identified by the peaceful resolution of tensions that would have been previously only solved militarily.
Waever then explores the emergence of the European security community from WWII to the late 90s.
Monday, September 8, 2008
Adler: The Spread of Security Communities
Adler, E., 2008. The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post--Cold War Transformation. European Journal of International Relations, 14(2), 195.
“This article invokes a combination of analytical and normative arguments that highlight the leading role of practices in explaining the expansion of security communities” (195).
Adler begins by exploring different reasons where by international institutions spread. He highlights explanations including, the rhetorical, normative imitation, socialization, persuasion. “While these theories are not mutually exclusive and while the different mechanisms are important at particular stages, they may not be sufficient because they do not make practices a central focus or let them carry the major causal and constitutive weight in the explanation” (196). “…security communities…spread by the co-evolution of background knowledge and subjectivities of self-restraint. The combined effect of communities of practice and the institutionalization of self-restraint accounts both for the social construction of rationality, in the sense that cooperative-security practices related to self-restraint help constitute dependable expectations of peaceful change, and for normative evolution, in the sense that self-restraint brings about security through cooperation” (196).
Illustrates this argument by exploring NATO expansion.
“Practices are knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that structure experience” (198).
Communities of practice are the nexus between agent and structure. These communities shape the identities of their members, facilitate learning, socialize, etc. They grow and change through “cognitive evolution”. Some communities of practice can become self-restraint communities. Violence becomes unnecessary amongst these communities for resolving conflict.
Much on NATO and how NATO is an example of communities of practice.
“This article invokes a combination of analytical and normative arguments that highlight the leading role of practices in explaining the expansion of security communities” (195).
Adler begins by exploring different reasons where by international institutions spread. He highlights explanations including, the rhetorical, normative imitation, socialization, persuasion. “While these theories are not mutually exclusive and while the different mechanisms are important at particular stages, they may not be sufficient because they do not make practices a central focus or let them carry the major causal and constitutive weight in the explanation” (196). “…security communities…spread by the co-evolution of background knowledge and subjectivities of self-restraint. The combined effect of communities of practice and the institutionalization of self-restraint accounts both for the social construction of rationality, in the sense that cooperative-security practices related to self-restraint help constitute dependable expectations of peaceful change, and for normative evolution, in the sense that self-restraint brings about security through cooperation” (196).
Illustrates this argument by exploring NATO expansion.
“Practices are knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that structure experience” (198).
Communities of practice are the nexus between agent and structure. These communities shape the identities of their members, facilitate learning, socialize, etc. They grow and change through “cognitive evolution”. Some communities of practice can become self-restraint communities. Violence becomes unnecessary amongst these communities for resolving conflict.
Much on NATO and how NATO is an example of communities of practice.
Monday, July 28, 2008
Jervis: Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma
Jervis, R. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30:167-214.
“The lack of international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest” (167). This is generally referred to as the security dilemma, where states want to improve their security position, but find that their defensive fortification actually represents a threat to other countries. This is possible because of the lack of a global archy.
A similar situation can be observed in Rousseau’s Stag Hunt. The article uses a game theory approach to understanding the preference ordering of states in the security dilemma. States first want to cooperate, secondly want to defect, thirdly want everyone to defect and fourthly want to be stuck hunting the stag when someone else chases the rabbit.
“Given this gloomy picture, the obvious question is, why are we not all dead? Or, to put it less starkly, what kinds of variables ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma?” (170). You can improve the gains that result from mutual cooperation. You can increase the cost of defecting. You can also improve the reliability and robustness of information flow to make sure that both sides are more reasonably assured that the other will cooperate.
Jervis also highlights a subjective nature security: states may subjectively approach issues such as the amount of defense they need, or the amount of countries they feel threatened by. Additionally, states may be unsure as to the degree that other states will or will not cooperate, i.e., they may have a subjective understanding of the nature of the threat posed by others.
Jervis additionally points out that different kinds of war can emerge from situations where either “offense” or “defense” predominates, i.e., whether or not it is more likely to be successful being defensive or offensive. These variables, along with others, create the “Four Worlds” of Jervis that divide on two axes of uncertainty: whether offense or defense has the advantage, and whether or not the two positions are distinguishable from one another.
“The lack of international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest” (167). This is generally referred to as the security dilemma, where states want to improve their security position, but find that their defensive fortification actually represents a threat to other countries. This is possible because of the lack of a global archy.
A similar situation can be observed in Rousseau’s Stag Hunt. The article uses a game theory approach to understanding the preference ordering of states in the security dilemma. States first want to cooperate, secondly want to defect, thirdly want everyone to defect and fourthly want to be stuck hunting the stag when someone else chases the rabbit.
“Given this gloomy picture, the obvious question is, why are we not all dead? Or, to put it less starkly, what kinds of variables ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma?” (170). You can improve the gains that result from mutual cooperation. You can increase the cost of defecting. You can also improve the reliability and robustness of information flow to make sure that both sides are more reasonably assured that the other will cooperate.
Jervis also highlights a subjective nature security: states may subjectively approach issues such as the amount of defense they need, or the amount of countries they feel threatened by. Additionally, states may be unsure as to the degree that other states will or will not cooperate, i.e., they may have a subjective understanding of the nature of the threat posed by others.
Jervis additionally points out that different kinds of war can emerge from situations where either “offense” or “defense” predominates, i.e., whether or not it is more likely to be successful being defensive or offensive. These variables, along with others, create the “Four Worlds” of Jervis that divide on two axes of uncertainty: whether offense or defense has the advantage, and whether or not the two positions are distinguishable from one another.
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
Campbell: Writing Security
Campbell, D., 1998. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, University of Minnesota Press.
Ch 1: Provocations of Our Time
“The demise of the cold war has been much heralded. But the causzes, meaning, and implications of this political rupture (assuming its veracity) are much debated” (15).
“To proclaim the end of the cold war assumes that we know what the cold war was” (15).
“The interpretive approach…sees theory as practice: the theory of international relations is one instance of the pervasive cultural practices that serve to discipline ambiguity” (17).
He defines the “late modern period” as one of “the globalization of contingency, the, “increasing tendencies toward ambiguity, indeterminacy, and uncertainty on our horizon” (17). These are not just from the outside in, but they also come from within (or most importantly come from within?). “This globalization of contingency…renders problematic the discursive practices that have made those spatializations of power possible…The irruption of contingency opens up the possibility of observing that foundational discourses…work to constitute the identities in whose name they operate” (18).
The key to understanding “what was at stake” in the cold war is through the analysis of discourse. Other attempts to flesh out the subject-object continuum are less than helpful. “…if we accept that there is nothing possible outside of discourse…the way is open to reconsider what was at stake in the cold war” (22).
Examines some of the important national security documents that have been declassified and speeches given by leaders. There is a constant reiteration of the themes of the state, the moral justification for action, and the desire to fill an international void with order. There is a constant reminder of the dangers of global communism and their intention for global expansion. However, this threat is not the full reason that the US undertook certain aggressive policies; the desire to become a great power, an international leader, was a crucial aspect of foreign policy. The author argues that the “cold war” is much more than what it is traditionally thought to be, and the same mentality continues to prevail.
Ch 2: Rethinking Foreign Policy
The chapter begins by exploring questions of identity and difference. Firstly, it explores questions posed to immigrants to the US that are concerned with, “…the elimination of that which is alien, foreign, and perceived as a threat to a secure state” (36). “Does the inside of a state exist in marked contrast to the outside? What is at stake in the attempt to screen the strange, the unfamiliar, and the threatening associated with the outside from the familiar and safe, which are linked to the inside?” (36).
The etymology of foreign is explored. “How is it that we…came to understand foreign policy as the external deployment of instrumental reason on behalf of an unproblematic internal identity situated in an anarchic realm of necessity?” (37). “Thus, if one were operating in terms of the ‘levels-of-analysis’ metaphor found in traditional international relations literature, the argument here would need to be regarded at a level beyond that associated with either the state or the international system. The argument here is concerned with the representation of history that allows us to talk in terms of ‘the state’ and ‘the international system,’ and the impact that problematization has had on our understanding of foreign policy” (37). “[I]t is about how the conventional understanding of foreign policy was made possible via a discursive economy that gave value to representational practices associated with a particular problematization” (37-8).
He then explores the traditional IR definition and approach to thinking about the state and the international system. The traditional rupture between the early authority of the church that was said to transition to the state after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is used as a foundation for conceptualizing foreign policy today. Campbell claims that a (re)writing of history would provide space for possibly a new interpretation of foreign policy can emerge.
On Westphalia: “For international relations, this rendering of the We4stphalian moment constitutes the conditions of possibility for the discipline. IT establishes the point of origin necessary to suggest that, in contrast to the religious and political structures of the preceding millennia, the history of modern Europe since the Peace of Westphalia has been a history of sovereign states acting in a multistate system” (41).
Extensive discussion of Christianity as it relates to the traditional narrative of IR.
“To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and threats that about in it is thus not to offer a simple ethnographic description of our condition; it is to invoke a discourse of danger through which the incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the insistence of identity. Danger might therefore be thought of as the new god for the modern world of states, not because it is peculiar to our time, but because it replaces the logic of Christendom’s evangelism of fear” (50). Foreign policy disciplines the state. The state acts out of fear of violent death.
Ch 1: Provocations of Our Time
“The demise of the cold war has been much heralded. But the causzes, meaning, and implications of this political rupture (assuming its veracity) are much debated” (15).
“To proclaim the end of the cold war assumes that we know what the cold war was” (15).
“The interpretive approach…sees theory as practice: the theory of international relations is one instance of the pervasive cultural practices that serve to discipline ambiguity” (17).
He defines the “late modern period” as one of “the globalization of contingency, the, “increasing tendencies toward ambiguity, indeterminacy, and uncertainty on our horizon” (17). These are not just from the outside in, but they also come from within (or most importantly come from within?). “This globalization of contingency…renders problematic the discursive practices that have made those spatializations of power possible…The irruption of contingency opens up the possibility of observing that foundational discourses…work to constitute the identities in whose name they operate” (18).
The key to understanding “what was at stake” in the cold war is through the analysis of discourse. Other attempts to flesh out the subject-object continuum are less than helpful. “…if we accept that there is nothing possible outside of discourse…the way is open to reconsider what was at stake in the cold war” (22).
Examines some of the important national security documents that have been declassified and speeches given by leaders. There is a constant reiteration of the themes of the state, the moral justification for action, and the desire to fill an international void with order. There is a constant reminder of the dangers of global communism and their intention for global expansion. However, this threat is not the full reason that the US undertook certain aggressive policies; the desire to become a great power, an international leader, was a crucial aspect of foreign policy. The author argues that the “cold war” is much more than what it is traditionally thought to be, and the same mentality continues to prevail.
Ch 2: Rethinking Foreign Policy
The chapter begins by exploring questions of identity and difference. Firstly, it explores questions posed to immigrants to the US that are concerned with, “…the elimination of that which is alien, foreign, and perceived as a threat to a secure state” (36). “Does the inside of a state exist in marked contrast to the outside? What is at stake in the attempt to screen the strange, the unfamiliar, and the threatening associated with the outside from the familiar and safe, which are linked to the inside?” (36).
The etymology of foreign is explored. “How is it that we…came to understand foreign policy as the external deployment of instrumental reason on behalf of an unproblematic internal identity situated in an anarchic realm of necessity?” (37). “Thus, if one were operating in terms of the ‘levels-of-analysis’ metaphor found in traditional international relations literature, the argument here would need to be regarded at a level beyond that associated with either the state or the international system. The argument here is concerned with the representation of history that allows us to talk in terms of ‘the state’ and ‘the international system,’ and the impact that problematization has had on our understanding of foreign policy” (37). “[I]t is about how the conventional understanding of foreign policy was made possible via a discursive economy that gave value to representational practices associated with a particular problematization” (37-8).
He then explores the traditional IR definition and approach to thinking about the state and the international system. The traditional rupture between the early authority of the church that was said to transition to the state after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is used as a foundation for conceptualizing foreign policy today. Campbell claims that a (re)writing of history would provide space for possibly a new interpretation of foreign policy can emerge.
On Westphalia: “For international relations, this rendering of the We4stphalian moment constitutes the conditions of possibility for the discipline. IT establishes the point of origin necessary to suggest that, in contrast to the religious and political structures of the preceding millennia, the history of modern Europe since the Peace of Westphalia has been a history of sovereign states acting in a multistate system” (41).
Extensive discussion of Christianity as it relates to the traditional narrative of IR.
“To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and threats that about in it is thus not to offer a simple ethnographic description of our condition; it is to invoke a discourse of danger through which the incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the insistence of identity. Danger might therefore be thought of as the new god for the modern world of states, not because it is peculiar to our time, but because it replaces the logic of Christendom’s evangelism of fear” (50). Foreign policy disciplines the state. The state acts out of fear of violent death.
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Jepperson, et. al.: Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security
Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein. Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security. in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in International Politics
“First, we argue that the security environments in which states are embedded are in important part cultural and institutional, rather than just material.” “Second, we argue that cultural environments affect not only the incentives for different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of states-what we call state ‘identity’” (31).
They also argue that there are three different levels to international society. More specifically, “…three layers to the international cultural environments in which national security policies are made” (34). These are formal institutions/security regimes like NATO, or arms regimes like SALT, world political culture comprising international norms like sovereignty, etc., and lastly, “…international patterns of amity and enmity…” (34).
The identity of states is formed through these security regimes, “…as opposed to just the behavior of states” (34).
They do not claim to put forth a theory, but rather an “orientating framework that highlights a set of effects and mechanisms that have been neglected in mainstream security studies” (36).
They deploy a 2x2 box that highlights the distinction between the degree to that the environment shapes the identity of units (the x axis) and the degree to that the environment is culturally/institutionally dense. Marxism and sociological perspectives involve hi9gh degrees of unit/environment relations while realism and neoliberalism involve low degrees of unit relations with the environment (i.e., there is clearly a more material focus). Sociological and Neoliberal perspectives involve high cultural density and Marxist and Realist perspectives involve lower cultural/institutional densities (38).
The authors caution readers not to misread a focus on material forces to be solely about conflict and a focus on ideational forces to be solely about cooperation.
There is then a discussion of how this 2x2 grid can be applied to domestic policies.
The causal diagram that is presented on page 53 represents the effects of environmental structure on the construction of identity, interests and policies, and how these effects are then mostly over-determined. The first cause is that of the effects of norms: “cultural or institutional elements of states’ environment…shape the national security interests or the security policies of states” (52). Secondly, “cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or domestic environment…shape state identity” (52). Thirdly, “variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states” (52). Fourthly, “configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities” (52). Finally, “state policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure” (53).
“First, we argue that the security environments in which states are embedded are in important part cultural and institutional, rather than just material.” “Second, we argue that cultural environments affect not only the incentives for different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of states-what we call state ‘identity’” (31).
They also argue that there are three different levels to international society. More specifically, “…three layers to the international cultural environments in which national security policies are made” (34). These are formal institutions/security regimes like NATO, or arms regimes like SALT, world political culture comprising international norms like sovereignty, etc., and lastly, “…international patterns of amity and enmity…” (34).
The identity of states is formed through these security regimes, “…as opposed to just the behavior of states” (34).
They do not claim to put forth a theory, but rather an “orientating framework that highlights a set of effects and mechanisms that have been neglected in mainstream security studies” (36).
They deploy a 2x2 box that highlights the distinction between the degree to that the environment shapes the identity of units (the x axis) and the degree to that the environment is culturally/institutionally dense. Marxism and sociological perspectives involve hi9gh degrees of unit/environment relations while realism and neoliberalism involve low degrees of unit relations with the environment (i.e., there is clearly a more material focus). Sociological and Neoliberal perspectives involve high cultural density and Marxist and Realist perspectives involve lower cultural/institutional densities (38).
The authors caution readers not to misread a focus on material forces to be solely about conflict and a focus on ideational forces to be solely about cooperation.
There is then a discussion of how this 2x2 grid can be applied to domestic policies.
The causal diagram that is presented on page 53 represents the effects of environmental structure on the construction of identity, interests and policies, and how these effects are then mostly over-determined. The first cause is that of the effects of norms: “cultural or institutional elements of states’ environment…shape the national security interests or the security policies of states” (52). Secondly, “cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or domestic environment…shape state identity” (52). Thirdly, “variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states” (52). Fourthly, “configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities” (52). Finally, “state policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure” (53).
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Deudney: Bounding Power: Chapter 1: Republican Security Theory
Deudney, Daniel. (2007). Bounding power : republican security theory from the polis to the global village. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chapter 1: Republican Security Theory
“From its inception, republican security theory has been concerned with what might be termed the security-political question: what kinds of political arrangements are necessary for security?” (27). This focus on security first and foremost assumes that the freedom from violence is the most political issue. Later, Deudney identifies this approach to security as normative survivalism (31).
“In the broadest terms, insecurity results from the absence of restraint on violent power, and security results from the presence of restraints on violent power” (27). This is the double meaning of “bounding power”: firstly, violent power continues to bound upwards in its material capability and secondly, political power must discover ways in which it is possible to bound this power.
The other problem of republican security strategy is that neither anarchy or hierarchy are suitable: “…the extremes of anarchy and hierarchy are fundamentally alike because neither provides adequate restraints upon the application of violence to the human body” (31). This is problematic, and requires that republican security strategy find a middle ground between these two extremes.
These two extremes are then highlighted in more detail. “The main argument of the anarchy-interdependence problematique, as we have seen, is that situations of intense violence interdependence combined with anarchy are a first anarchy. First anarchies are incompatible with security, and the size of the space with intense violence interdependence has expanded over time with far-reaching implications for security” (41). The second extreme is the hierarchy-restraint problematique. “The animating insight of the second problematique is the realization that governments can themselves pose as severe a security threat as first anarchy” (46).
Deudney deploys the concept of negarchy to explain the set of Republican negative constraints that comprise a triad between hierarchy and anarchy. This negative forces mutually restrain, while also providing for freedom. This involves, “balances all the way up and down” (49).
Chapter 1: Republican Security Theory
“From its inception, republican security theory has been concerned with what might be termed the security-political question: what kinds of political arrangements are necessary for security?” (27). This focus on security first and foremost assumes that the freedom from violence is the most political issue. Later, Deudney identifies this approach to security as normative survivalism (31).
“In the broadest terms, insecurity results from the absence of restraint on violent power, and security results from the presence of restraints on violent power” (27). This is the double meaning of “bounding power”: firstly, violent power continues to bound upwards in its material capability and secondly, political power must discover ways in which it is possible to bound this power.
The other problem of republican security strategy is that neither anarchy or hierarchy are suitable: “…the extremes of anarchy and hierarchy are fundamentally alike because neither provides adequate restraints upon the application of violence to the human body” (31). This is problematic, and requires that republican security strategy find a middle ground between these two extremes.
These two extremes are then highlighted in more detail. “The main argument of the anarchy-interdependence problematique, as we have seen, is that situations of intense violence interdependence combined with anarchy are a first anarchy. First anarchies are incompatible with security, and the size of the space with intense violence interdependence has expanded over time with far-reaching implications for security” (41). The second extreme is the hierarchy-restraint problematique. “The animating insight of the second problematique is the realization that governments can themselves pose as severe a security threat as first anarchy” (46).
Deudney deploys the concept of negarchy to explain the set of Republican negative constraints that comprise a triad between hierarchy and anarchy. This negative forces mutually restrain, while also providing for freedom. This involves, “balances all the way up and down” (49).
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
Lake: Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations
Lake, David A. (1996). "Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations". International Organization, 50(1), 1. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=9602295562&site=ehost-live
Lake posits that realist theory can not fully explain the inconsistent actions of various super-powers historically. He uses an approach taken from economics: he compares countries to firms that produce security. These security production firms then engage in interactions with other nations. These interactions can either be more mutually accepted or more hierarchical. “The choice between these alternatives, I posit, is a function of two main variables: the expected costs of opportunism, which decline with relational hierarchy, and governance costs, which rise with relational hierarchy” (2).
He then examines alliance formation, with an eye towards the literature on this subject. He finds that the literature has been relatively poor at coalescing and finding commonalities in different independent variables. He also explicitly takes the position that it could be the result of countries. “…the range of possible variation in strategy--the dependent variable--commonly is abridged” (3).
Lake then defines security as the ability of a country to use their own wealth as they see fit without the constraints of use being imposed by another nation or group. For Lake, informal empire clearly exists. States exercise control over the actions of other states that are in their sphere of influence. Not only is there the positive aspect of empire, where the strong state imposes its will on the weak state, but there is a more coercive and invasive aspect. Informal empire also means that the subsumed country must anticipate the whims and wishes of the powerful.
Contract theory is then explored to determine the nature of the relationships in that states engage. Because his initial assumptions are economist and rational in nature, his approach is not surprising: “The central hypothesis of the contracting approach is that parties choose relations to economize on resources-in other words, to maximize benefits from exchange and minimize transaction costs. In short, actors choose the relationship that is most efficient for conducting the transaction. By doing so, the parties maximize the resources that can be used for other valued purposes; for firms, this implies profit maximization and for states…cost minimization” (10-1).
Lake then explains his assumptions. He begins by assuming rationality, which he acknowledges is heavily criticized. He defines this as, “…I mean simply that actors possess transitive preferences and act purposively” (12). Secondly, security only represents one aspect of policy, and the government acts perfectly in the interests of the selctorate. Thirdly, states have no preference whether or not their foreign relations are wealth seeking, power maximizing or something else. Imperialism may be used by a state and the selctorate understand this as a means to an end. “Together, these first three assumptions imply that states choose the relationship that minimizes their costs of producing a desired level of security” (12). Fourthly, threats faced by state dyads are exogenous. Fifthly, if there is a disagreement between groups as to which policy is preferred, the stronger nation will prevail.
States take part in opportunistic behavior. This can, at time, be costly and is a reflection of a system that does not possess an ultimate leader. “In anarchic relations, ceteris paribus, the probability that the partner will behave opportunistically is comparatively high. In an empire, at the other extreme, states merge their formerly autonomous decision-making processes and transfer rights of residual control to the dominant member. The dominant state now decides-to continue with the same example-who is the victim of any attack…who is the aggressor, and how many resources its partner
must mobilize” (14).
Supply/Demand curves are used to illustrate the relationship between opportunism, governance cost and the degree to which the international society is anarchical or hierarchical. “In equilibrium, we should observe anarchic relations most commonly when the expected costs of opportunism are low or governance costs are high, and hierarchic relations when the expected costs of opportunism are high or governance costs are low. These equilibrium conditions reconcile the apparent contradiction revealed in the discussion of opportunism in the literatures on alliance formation and imperialism above” (21).
Lake then claims that it is nearly impossible to operationalize his construction. Firstly, his independent variables are nearly impossible to find proxies for. Secondly, these variables must necessarily be defined probabilistically, as states can not ever know exactly the costs of governance or opportunity. Finally, the theory can observe the chosen decisions made by actors, but it is impossible to fully understand the full range of their choices. However with the observation of some case studies, further information my become available. He goes on to examine the US/USSR relationship after WWII understanding that it is both abridged, and limited, but hoping that it will show that this approach is applicable.
He finds that the relationship between the US and its interests in Europe as well as the USSR’s relationship with their interests in Eastern Europe are fully consistent with his approach that focuses on the costs of informal empire being determined by the relative interaction of opportunity costs and governance levels. He sees this as being validation of his theoretical approach.
Lake posits that realist theory can not fully explain the inconsistent actions of various super-powers historically. He uses an approach taken from economics: he compares countries to firms that produce security. These security production firms then engage in interactions with other nations. These interactions can either be more mutually accepted or more hierarchical. “The choice between these alternatives, I posit, is a function of two main variables: the expected costs of opportunism, which decline with relational hierarchy, and governance costs, which rise with relational hierarchy” (2).
He then examines alliance formation, with an eye towards the literature on this subject. He finds that the literature has been relatively poor at coalescing and finding commonalities in different independent variables. He also explicitly takes the position that it could be the result of countries. “…the range of possible variation in strategy--the dependent variable--commonly is abridged” (3).
Lake then defines security as the ability of a country to use their own wealth as they see fit without the constraints of use being imposed by another nation or group. For Lake, informal empire clearly exists. States exercise control over the actions of other states that are in their sphere of influence. Not only is there the positive aspect of empire, where the strong state imposes its will on the weak state, but there is a more coercive and invasive aspect. Informal empire also means that the subsumed country must anticipate the whims and wishes of the powerful.
Contract theory is then explored to determine the nature of the relationships in that states engage. Because his initial assumptions are economist and rational in nature, his approach is not surprising: “The central hypothesis of the contracting approach is that parties choose relations to economize on resources-in other words, to maximize benefits from exchange and minimize transaction costs. In short, actors choose the relationship that is most efficient for conducting the transaction. By doing so, the parties maximize the resources that can be used for other valued purposes; for firms, this implies profit maximization and for states…cost minimization” (10-1).
Lake then explains his assumptions. He begins by assuming rationality, which he acknowledges is heavily criticized. He defines this as, “…I mean simply that actors possess transitive preferences and act purposively” (12). Secondly, security only represents one aspect of policy, and the government acts perfectly in the interests of the selctorate. Thirdly, states have no preference whether or not their foreign relations are wealth seeking, power maximizing or something else. Imperialism may be used by a state and the selctorate understand this as a means to an end. “Together, these first three assumptions imply that states choose the relationship that minimizes their costs of producing a desired level of security” (12). Fourthly, threats faced by state dyads are exogenous. Fifthly, if there is a disagreement between groups as to which policy is preferred, the stronger nation will prevail.
States take part in opportunistic behavior. This can, at time, be costly and is a reflection of a system that does not possess an ultimate leader. “In anarchic relations, ceteris paribus, the probability that the partner will behave opportunistically is comparatively high. In an empire, at the other extreme, states merge their formerly autonomous decision-making processes and transfer rights of residual control to the dominant member. The dominant state now decides-to continue with the same example-who is the victim of any attack…who is the aggressor, and how many resources its partner
must mobilize” (14).
Supply/Demand curves are used to illustrate the relationship between opportunism, governance cost and the degree to which the international society is anarchical or hierarchical. “In equilibrium, we should observe anarchic relations most commonly when the expected costs of opportunism are low or governance costs are high, and hierarchic relations when the expected costs of opportunism are high or governance costs are low. These equilibrium conditions reconcile the apparent contradiction revealed in the discussion of opportunism in the literatures on alliance formation and imperialism above” (21).
Lake then claims that it is nearly impossible to operationalize his construction. Firstly, his independent variables are nearly impossible to find proxies for. Secondly, these variables must necessarily be defined probabilistically, as states can not ever know exactly the costs of governance or opportunity. Finally, the theory can observe the chosen decisions made by actors, but it is impossible to fully understand the full range of their choices. However with the observation of some case studies, further information my become available. He goes on to examine the US/USSR relationship after WWII understanding that it is both abridged, and limited, but hoping that it will show that this approach is applicable.
He finds that the relationship between the US and its interests in Europe as well as the USSR’s relationship with their interests in Eastern Europe are fully consistent with his approach that focuses on the costs of informal empire being determined by the relative interaction of opportunity costs and governance levels. He sees this as being validation of his theoretical approach.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
