Wheller and Booth: The Security Dilemma

Wheeler, N. & Booth, K., 1992. The Security Dilemma. Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, 29-60.

“Any serious school or theory of International Relations must have a conception of the security dilemma. This is because the security dilemma gets to the very heart of politics among nations: the existential condition of uncertainty in human affairs” (1).

The authors then explore the etymology of “dilemma”. Evidently, in logic, a “lemma” is something that is valid. Therefore, a di-lemma represents a situation where someone must choose between to substantively valid options (or in the case of the security dilemma, two options that are valid in their disagreeability). “What puts the lemmas into the security dilemma are two apparently inescapable predicaments in international politics. The first is the inability of the decision-makers in one state ever to get fully into the minds of their counterparts in other states, and so understand their motives and intentions with confidence…The second is the inherent ambiguity of weapons. The policy-planners of one state can never predict with complete certainty when and how weapons might be employed by other states” (4).

The authors then separate the dilemma into two dilemmas: there is initially the dilemma of interpretations, which is an attempt to divine the goals of the other country, and secondly there is the dilemma of the response, which is a decision about how best one should respond. “When leaders resolve their dilemma of response in a manner that creates a spiral of mutual hostility, when neither wanted it, a situation has developed which we call the security paradox” (5).

“The inquiry we are undertaking into the meaning, significance and implications of the security dilemma is organized around three a priori logical positions” (10). First, there are the fatalists who believe that there will always be insecurity in the international realm. Next, there are the mitigators, those who believe that security dilemma type situations can be ameloriated over time, but never totally erased. Finally, there are the transcenders, or those who believe that we can become what we want to be through contingent action.

The authors are very clear that they are not interested in categorizing people as being representatives of any one of these “ideal-types”, but rather are most interested in characterizing ideals.

Jervis: Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma

Jervis, R. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30:167-214.

“The lack of international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest” (167). This is generally referred to as the security dilemma, where states want to improve their security position, but find that their defensive fortification actually represents a threat to other countries. This is possible because of the lack of a global archy.

A similar situation can be observed in Rousseau’s Stag Hunt. The article uses a game theory approach to understanding the preference ordering of states in the security dilemma. States first want to cooperate, secondly want to defect, thirdly want everyone to defect and fourthly want to be stuck hunting the stag when someone else chases the rabbit.

“Given this gloomy picture, the obvious question is, why are we not all dead? Or, to put it less starkly, what kinds of variables ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma?” (170). You can improve the gains that result from mutual cooperation. You can increase the cost of defecting. You can also improve the reliability and robustness of information flow to make sure that both sides are more reasonably assured that the other will cooperate.

Jervis also highlights a subjective nature security: states may subjectively approach issues such as the amount of defense they need, or the amount of countries they feel threatened by. Additionally, states may be unsure as to the degree that other states will or will not cooperate, i.e., they may have a subjective understanding of the nature of the threat posed by others.

Jervis additionally points out that different kinds of war can emerge from situations where either “offense” or “defense” predominates, i.e., whether or not it is more likely to be successful being defensive or offensive. These variables, along with others, create the “Four Worlds” of Jervis that divide on two axes of uncertainty: whether offense or defense has the advantage, and whether or not the two positions are distinguishable from one another.