Doyle: Liberalism and World Politics

Doyle, M., 1986. Liberalism and World Politics. American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1151-1169.

Doyle explores three traditions of liberal theory: Schumpeter, Machiavelli and Kant. While there are some conflict within the liberal tradition, ie., a conflict between liberal imperialism and liberal pacifism, Doyle believes that there is a recurrent theme that can be found within liberal states. “Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. T hey are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace…and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression…” (1151).

“What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all” (1152).

Schumpeter’s liberalism is one that stands in contrast to imperialism. Democracies who are capitalistic will be peaceful. Democratic capitalist countries do not benefit from expansionist policies. Also, their citizens are gainfully employed and busy themselves producing, which implicitly keeps them away from jingoism.

Machiavelli has a different argument. He claims that republics are actually quite good and useful at pursuing expansionist policies. Machiavelli does not advocate radical democracy; that he believed would eventually digress into tyranny. He does, however, explore the relationship of citizens in a republic, which he finds to be quite satisfactory.

Machiavelli and Schumpeter stand in contrast. “We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism—pacifism and imperialism—indicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics” (1155).

“Kant’s citizens…are diverse in their goals and individualized and rationalized, but most importantly, they are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals and of treating other individuals as ends rather than as means” (1162).