Donnelly: Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy

Donnelly, J., 2006. Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society. European Journal Of International Relations, 12(2), 139-170.

“Is America an empire in fact or in the making? This article attempts to elaborate the conceptual resources required to answer such questions. I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality—concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical or even dismiss as self-contradictory” (139).

Empire in history: began through Roman usage, taken from a Greek word approximating rule. Adapted in the middle ages to create a separation between the power of the pope and the king. Empire: “…an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140).

Donnelly’s focus is highlighting traditional core-periphery polities, not exploring the more distinct and recent discussion of empire, for example, that of Hardt and Negri.

Hierarchy in Anarchy:

Waltz presents hierarchy and anarchy as dichotomous. “Rather than thinking of anarchy or hierarchy we should attend instead to hierarchy in anarchy” (141).

Figure 1: (143).



All quadrants except the bottom right are in anarchy.

“Confusion over hierarchy is exacerbated by the common association of anarchy with sovereign equality. As Waltz puts it, ‘formally, each is the equal of all others’ (1979: 88). Even David Lake, who is particularly sensitive to elements o hierarchy in international relations, equates anarchy with sovereign equality, describing ‘anarchic institutions’ as ‘those premised upon the full sovereignty of all members’ (2001: 130)” (144).

Historical account of the transformation and growth of sovereignty. Practices such as outlaw states, semi-sovereignty (servitudes, imperfect unions, financial controls, etc.) formal and informal inequalities, etc.

10 models of hierarchy in anarchy: balance of power, protection/guarantee, concert, collective security, hegemony, dominion, empire, pluralistic security, common security and amalgamated security (See Figure 2) (154).

“Contemporary America is indeed something of a colossus…It is not, however an empire” (157).

“Iraq can be read as a fairly conventional exercise in Quadrant III unipolar balance of power politics; self-help by the biggest ‘self’ on the block, without any special (formal or informal) rights” (159). “…consider the controversy over Guantanamo, which has appeared prominently in many arguments of American imperialism. In fact, it shows Quadrant III unipolar unilateralism. Empires set the rules. They do not need to assert awkward, implausible and almost universally rejected expectations for themselves. A state that cannot obtain widespread endorsement of its preferred international norms ins not an empire. A state that can’t even get grudging acquiescence by its leading ‘allies’ is not even much of a hegemon” (160).

Milner: The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory

Milner, H., 1991. The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique. Review of International Studies, 17(1), 67-85.

“In much current theorizing, anarchy has once again been declared to be the fundamental assumption about international politics” (67).

“First, I examine various concepts of ‘anarchy’ employed in the international relations literature. Second, I probe the sharp dichotomy between domestic and international politics that is associated with this assumption. As other have, I question the validity and utility of such a dichotomy. Finally, this article suggests that a more fruitful way to understand the international system is one that combines anarchy and interdependence” (67).

“It is once again time for a reminder that anarchy is an ambiguous concept and that dangers exist when it is exaggeratedly seen as the central fact of world politics” (67).

“Anarchy ahs at least two meanings. The first meaning that anarchy carries is a lack of order. IT implies chaos or disorder…But are chaos, lack of order and constant threat of war what scholars mean by the anarchic nature of the system? It does not seem to be. Persistent elements of order in international politics have been noted by many” (69). “The second definition of anarchy is the lack of government. It is the first meaning of anarchy given in the Oxford English Dictionary and is common among political scientists” (70). The distinction drawn by those who highlight the a-governmental nature of international society tends to breakdown into the understanding of government as being a monopoly, the legitimate use of force or a conflation of domestic and international policies.

Government then gets represented distinctly whether it is domestic or international. Domestic government is highlighted by hierarchy. International government is primarily dominated by concepts of anarchy.

Milner argues that this dichotomy is false and that there are different degrees of hierarchy in domestic and international politics.

“Overall, the sharp distinction between the two realms are difficult to maintain empirically. More importantly, any dichotomous treatment of domestic and international politics may have heuristic disadvantages. First, the isolation of international politics as a realm of anarchy with nothing in common with other types of politics is a step backward conceptually…A second and related heuristic problem is the tendency implicit in this separation of the two fields to view all states as being the same…” (80-1).

The Assumption of Interdependence: “As other scholars have points out, such reductionism overlooks another central fact about international politics, namely the interdependence of the actors” (81-2).

“There are two related notions of interdependence. First, the notion of ‘strategic interdependence’; implies…a situation in which ‘the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make’…Interdependence is not the opposite of anarchy…this definition of interdependence also does not imply either that the actors’ interests are in harmony or that power relations are unimportant…if the international system is viewed as characterized by structural interdependence, then the mechanisms of the system look different from those in the neo-realist model” (82-4).

Axelrod and Keohane: Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy

Axelrod, R. & Keohane, R., 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. World Politics, 38(1), 226-254.

“Achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics” (226).

Cooperation is not the same as harmony. Harmony means that interests align. For Axelrod and Keohane, anarchy means the absence of a common government in international relations. “To say that world politics is anarchic does not imply that it entirely lacks organization” (226).

It is often noted that security relationships seems to conform more closely to the standard predictions of what will happen in anarchy than do political or economic relations. Specifically, Lipson noted that the later relationships are clearly more internationally institutionalized.

The Effects of Structure on Cooperation: Three factors can lead to cooperation in the international system. These are mutuality of interests (issue linkage), the shadow of the future, and the number of players (in a game theory situation).

Points to Jervis’ work on cooperation and game theory, which shows that cooperation is differently possible with different kinds of interactions among actors.

Stag hunt is less conflictual than prisoner’s dilemma. The difference in the two is the relative actor perception of interests. These game theory presentations are done using a metric of payoff structure, which is a way of determining or describing the results of the cost/benefit analysis. The payoff structure can be used to analyze both political/economic and military/security situations and international relations.

Oye talks about blackmailing and backscratching as being techniques to increase cooperation.

Axelrod and Keohane conclude this piece by focusing on the importance of actor perception. Also, the importance of institutions and reciprocity: institutions do not substitute for reciprocity, but they institutionalize it.

Wendt: Anarchy is What States Make of It

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46:391-425.

Claims that debates in IR have been focused heavily on whether or not anarchy is amenable to change. Is it an overarching structure whose influence remains static? Or, is it a process variable that takes different forms at different space/time points?

This debate has been largely between neorealists and neoliberals, who are both rationalists. These theories, as with all theories, allow for the asking of certain questions and obscure other questions. Rationalist theories treat identities and interests as imposed from the outside, as exogenous, as opposed to developing internally to the theory itself. Therefore, questions of identity and interest formation are not of interest to rationalists.

Liberals have taken issue with the Realist formulation of state behavior in anarchy, where structure is privileged and process is treated secondarily. “’Strong’ liberals should be troubled by the dichotomous privileging of structure over process, since transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations of structure” (393).

Argues for making interest and identities the dependent variable in the analysis. Does this by looking at anarchy as a structural force. “I argue that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure” (394). “…structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process” (395).

Argues that the treatment of interests and identities as exogenous variables is not instrumentally very useful. It does not tell us whether or not states will respect each others sovereignty, etc. Also, there are different results from the same sort of material capacity change, US military power is different for Vietnam than it is for Spain, for example. Also, agents taken on a variety of different identities at any one given point. Also, “Identities are the basis of interests” (398).

“Self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy. Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or ‘security’ of the self. Concepts of security therefore differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other, and, I want to suggest, it is upon this cognitive variation that the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power depends” (399-400). Then compares competitive, individualistic and cooperative international systems that could all emerge in relation to the institution of self-help anarchy.

So, what is left if we remove any vestige of assumptions about the interaction of states in anarchy? Wendt proposes two things: firstly, there is the structure of the state, the governing institution. Secondly, there is a desire to survive. These do not logically proceed to a self-help system of relative gains.

Waltz claims that structure conditions and socializes. “As James Morrow points out, Waltz’s two mechanisms condition behavior, not identity and interest. This explains how Waltz can be accused of both ‘individualism’ and ‘structuralism.’ He is the former with respect to systemic constitutions of identity and interest, the later with respect to systemic determinations of behavior” (403).

Wendt then explores what would happen if two actors with the above characteristics would meet for the first time. Would they necessarily attack one another out of their own desire for relative power gains? He explores this partially through a hypothetical encounter between us and aliens. If an outside being came and destroyed a major city, that would illicit a certain kind of response. If an outside power came with gifts, that would illicit a different kind of response. This takes place by one group signaling intentions to another group. “This process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a ‘social act’ and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings” (406).

Social configuration are not ‘objective’ like mountains or forests, but neither are they ‘subjective’ like dreams or flights of speculative fancy. They are, as most social scientists concede at the theoretical level, intersubjective constructions” (406).

A more persuasive argument would be one about there only being one predatory state in the international system. This state would signal to other states that it is out to destroy these states. This would cause other states to possibly respond as if some of the neorealist assumptions were correct. However, this is not a structural explanation of the formation of conflictual relations internationally. This is a unit-level explanation. Also, if there is a world of war of all against all that is socially constructed, that does not also infer that it is easy to change.

“For both systemic and ‘psychological’ reasons, then, intersubjective understandings and expectations may have a self-perpetuating quality, constituting path-dependencies that new ideas about self and other must transcend” (412).

Wendt then provides three examples of, “…three institutional transformations of identity and security interest through which states might escape a Hobbesian world of their own making” (412).

Sovereignty provides a socially constructed institution that provides a framework for state interaction. Sovereigns always must have a counter, an opposite, that recognizes them as sovereign. There are rights and responsibilities coffered upon those who are sovereign. “Sovereignty norms are now so taken for granted, so natural, that it is easy to overlook the extent to which they are both presupposed by and an ongoing artifact of practice” (413).

Cooperation is another field in that the Hobbsian would can be supervened. In a one-iteration Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the incentive is to defect. However, in a game with multiple iterations and a clearly established shadow of the future, cooperative regimes can be established. “A constructivist analysis of cooperation…would concentrate on how the expectations produced by behavior affect identities and interests” (417).

Jervis: Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma

Jervis, R. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30:167-214.

“The lack of international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest” (167). This is generally referred to as the security dilemma, where states want to improve their security position, but find that their defensive fortification actually represents a threat to other countries. This is possible because of the lack of a global archy.

A similar situation can be observed in Rousseau’s Stag Hunt. The article uses a game theory approach to understanding the preference ordering of states in the security dilemma. States first want to cooperate, secondly want to defect, thirdly want everyone to defect and fourthly want to be stuck hunting the stag when someone else chases the rabbit.

“Given this gloomy picture, the obvious question is, why are we not all dead? Or, to put it less starkly, what kinds of variables ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma?” (170). You can improve the gains that result from mutual cooperation. You can increase the cost of defecting. You can also improve the reliability and robustness of information flow to make sure that both sides are more reasonably assured that the other will cooperate.

Jervis also highlights a subjective nature security: states may subjectively approach issues such as the amount of defense they need, or the amount of countries they feel threatened by. Additionally, states may be unsure as to the degree that other states will or will not cooperate, i.e., they may have a subjective understanding of the nature of the threat posed by others.

Jervis additionally points out that different kinds of war can emerge from situations where either “offense” or “defense” predominates, i.e., whether or not it is more likely to be successful being defensive or offensive. These variables, along with others, create the “Four Worlds” of Jervis that divide on two axes of uncertainty: whether offense or defense has the advantage, and whether or not the two positions are distinguishable from one another.

Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

Mearsheimer, JJ. 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. WW Norton & Company.

Ch. 1: Introduction:

This book begins as a response to those (utopianists? Idealists?) who believe that the fall of the USSR marked the end of history. This can not be the case because the nature of the international system make it such that states continually have to search for their own survival through offensive realism. This account is a break from classical realism and defensive structural realism. Mearsheimer positions himself as an offensive realist.

“The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system” (2). “Simply put, great powers are primed for offence” (3). “Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (3).

“This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, in genuinely tragic” (3).

He applies this approach to US/China relations: “Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail” (4).

“…I argue that multipolar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar systems that contain especially powerful states—potential hegemons—are the most dangerous systems of all” (5).

“Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability” (5).

“In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists” (12).

The book is organized around six questions:
1—why do great powers want power?
2—how much power?
3—what is power?
4—how do they go after power?
5—what are the causes of war?
6—when do threatened powers balance and when do they band-wagon/buck-pass? (12-3)

Contrasts liberalism with realism:

Liberalism: States the actor, internal characteristic of states vary considerably, calculations of power not important (15-6).

Realism: states the actor, behavior of great powers influenced by external environment, and power calculations crucial.

Two kinds of realism: “human nature realism” (aka classical realism) through Morgenthau and defensive realism, through Waltz.

For Morgenthau, human nature instills a “limitless lust for power” and thus creates the international system in a certain kind of way (19).

For Waltz, states do not want power, but survival. “For Waltz, balancing checkmates offence” (20).

“Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want” (21).

“The key difference between the two perspectives [human nature realism and offensive realism] is that offensive realists reject Morgenthau’s claim that states are naturally endowed with Type A personalities. ON the contrary, they believe that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security” (21).

There is then a bizarre explanation of why Americans don’t like realism because it’s too negative and they’re all optimists.

Ch. 2: Anarchy and the Struggle for Power:

Great powers want to be the hegemon.

Five assumptions underly his view of the world:
1—anarchy is an ordering principle
2—great powers have some military capability
3—states can never be certain about other states’ intentions
4—states primarily want to survive
5—states are rational actors

“Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power” (35).

“A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system” (40).

“My argument, which I develop at length in subsequent chapters, is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony” (41).

“The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon” (41).

Keohane: Neorealism and Its Critics

Keohane, R., 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press.

Ch 3: Reductionist and Systemic Theories

“A reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts” (47).

“Analysts who confine their attention to interacting units, without recognizing that systemic causes are in play, compensate for the omissions by assigning such causes arbitrarily to the level of interacting units and parceling them out among actors” (49).

Looks at inside-out theories of international politics that attempt to explain system level behavior by looking at the activities occurring within a unit. “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states” (52).

“The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent. Why then do we find such a persistent pull toward reduction [specifically citing Morgenthau, Kissinger and Levy]? The answer is that usually reduction results not from a scholar’s intent but from his errors” (53).

Changes in structure can be separated from changes in units (55).

“From the first part of this article, we know that the theory we want to construct has to be a systemic one” (56).

“What do I mean by explain? I mean explain in these senses: to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to say why patterns of behavior recur; to say why events repeat themselves, including events that none or few of the actors may like” (57).

“A theory has explanatory and predictive power. A theory also has elegance. Elegance in social-science theories means that explanations and predictions will be general” (57).

“Structures, moreover, may suddenly change. A structural change is a revolution, whether or not violently produced, and it is so because it gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the system varied with changes in structure. Across systems, a theory explains change. A theory of international politics can succeed only if political structures are defined in ways that identify their causal effects and show how those effects vary as structural changes” (58).

“In a systems theory, some part of the explanation of behaviors and outcomes is found in the system’s structure. A political structure is akin to a field of forces in physics interactions within a field have properties as the field affects the objects, so the objects affect the field” (62).

Structure: will unify outputs with a variety of inputs; also, “…a set of constraining conditions” (62). “Agents and agencies act; systems as a whole do not” (63).

“The first way in which structures work their effects is through a process of socialization that limits and molds behavior” (65).

“Order may prevail without an borderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator. The mayor of New York City does not phone the gardeners of southern New Jersey and tell them to grow more tomatoes next year because too few were recently supplied” (67).

Ch 4: Political Structures

“A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” (70).

“’Relation’ is used to mean both the interaction of units and the positions they occupy vis-à-vis each other…To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system” (71).

“A structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting parts” (72).

“Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system. Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them” (73). There is an exploration of the structure of domestic politics to juxtapose with international politics. “A domestic political structure is thus defined, first, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second, by specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units” (74).

“Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long as a strubu8re endures…Structure operates as a cause, but it is not the only cause in play” (80).

“I defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capabilities across units” (81).

Ordering Principles:

“Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic” (81). Whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability” (81-2).
“If structure is an organizational concept, the terms ‘structure’ and ‘anarchy’ seem to be in contradiction. If international politics is ‘politics in the absence of government,’ what are we in the presence of? In looking for international structure, one is brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable position to be in. The problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking” (82). Draws parallels w/ microeconomic theory.

“International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units” (84).

“I assume that states seek to ensure their survival” (85).

The Character of the Units:

“The second term in the definition of domestic political structure specifies the functions performed by differentiated units. Hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation…The second term is not needed in defining international-political structure, because so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units. International structures vary only through a change of organizing principle, or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units” (87).

“Just as economists define markets in terms of firms, so I define international-political structures in terms of states” (88).

The units are all sovereign; the units tend not to die; the units vary widely in terms of power, etc.

Distribution of Capabilities:

“The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks” (92).

“I have not defined the two essential elements of a systems theory of international politics—the structure of the system and its interacting units” (94).

“Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered…second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units… third, by the distribution of capabilities across units” (96).

Ch 5: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power

“The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (98).

“The distinction between international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or the nonuse of force but in their different structures” (99).

“Differences between national and international structures are reflected in the ways the units of each system define their ends and develop the means for reaching them” (100).

“Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities” (101).

“The structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states in two ways” (101). “In a self-help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others” (101). “A state also worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. That is the second way in whi8ch the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states” (103).

Discussion of emergent phenomena, insecurity and freedom, organization costs in anarchy…

“National politcs is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation” (111).

“I have described anarchies and hierarchies as though every political order were of one type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write of structures allow for a greater, and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types” (112).

“Increasing the number of categories would bring the classification of societies closer to reality. But that would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy. One who wishes to explain rather than to describe should resist moving in that direction if resistance is reasonable” (113).

Realpolitik: “The ruler’s, and later the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; success is the ultimate test of policy; and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state” (115-6).

“A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: they are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (117).

States use means available to them: internal and external (117).

If one state is successful, others will emulate. The structure of the international system is the driver of balances of power recurring.

Hobbes: Leviathan XIII

Hobbes, Thomas. 1991. Leviathan. Cambridge University Press New York.

Nature is the source of equality amongst humans. While there is a discrepancy in some of their mental/physical abilities, these discrepancies are not so great as to make one person not able to kill another. Thus, the playing field is equal.

Men are also equally prudent; they all have a conservative desire to survive.

The world is set up so that there is always conflict because there is scarce resources.

This context leads to a world where people are concerned with “competition, diffidence and glory.”

Thus, we get the war of all against all. Thus we get life is nasty, brutish and short. Thus the state comes in to save the day.

Bull: The Anarchical Society

Bull, Hedley. (1977). The anarchical society : a study of order in world politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ch 1: The Nature of Order in World Politics:

Bull begins by defining the concept of order. Order is a set pattern that emerges in the interaction of different variables. While this is a crucial first step, it is not sufficient: order also needs a purpose, or an end. For Bull vis-à-vis society, order has three goals: safety, contractual honesty and legal security.

International Order: “…independent political communities each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relations to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population” (8).

System of States: “…is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave…as parts of a whole” (9).

Society of States: “…exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another” (13).

“An international society in this sense presupposes an international system, but an international system may exist that is not an international society” (13).

What are the goals of international order? Preservation of the system (16). Maintain independence and sovereignty of the states (16). Peace (17). The goals mentioned at the beginning of the chapter: life, truth, property (18).

World Order: “…those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole” (19).

International Order: “…order among states” (19).

Ch 2: Does Order Exist in World Politics?

“This present study takes as its starting-point the proposition that, on the contrary, order is part of the historical record of international relations and in particular, that modern states have formed, and continue to form, not only a system of states but also an international society” (22-3).

Bull goes on to identify three different logics, or traditions of thought that have dominated understandings of international systems: Hobbsian, Kantian and Grotian. Hobbisan: international politics is a constant state of war. Kantian: international politics is a community of humankind. Grotian: international politics takes place in an international society.

“A chief intellectual support of this doctrine is what I have called the domestic analogy, the argument from the experience of individual men in domestic society to the experience of states, according to which states, like individuals, are capable of orderly social life only if, as in Hobbe’s phrase, they stand in awe of a common power” (44). This is empirically false. The modern international system doesn’t compare to the Hobbsian world of war of all against all.

Ch 3: How is Order Maintained in World Politics?

In short, common interests that determine a common goal. These common interests are determined by rules that are constantly in flux. These rules facilitate more coordinated action between states.

Institutions: “…a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals” (71).

Ch 4: Order verses Justice in World Politics:

There is a trade off between the two, though not a zero-sum game.

Ch 5: The balance of Power and International Order:

BoP: “…a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others” (97).

There is simple and complex BoP arrangements. Simple arrangements are between two states. Complex arrangements involve many actors and many different kinds of power. In the complex arrangement, there is no need for all actors to be entirely equal in their ability to compete against one another; relative power can be emphasized in these situations.

Bull also draws a distinction between general BoP and local BoP. He also draws a distinction between subjective and objective BoP, the former being an accepted understanding of a country’s capabilities and the later being the actual capabilities of a country. Bull also draws a distinction between a fortuitous and a contrived BoP.

He then explores BoP through the medium of nuclear weapons.

Ch 9: The Great Powers and International Order:

Great Powers: must be two or more in the international system. They have great military strength. Have special rights and duties. These powers can contribute to international order in two ways: managing the relations with one another; impart a degree of central authority.