Adler: The Emergence of Cooperation

Adler, Emanuel. The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control, International Organization 46 (Winter 1992): 101-146.

Adler approaches the study of nuclear arms control from the perspective of evolutionary changes made on two levels: domestically and internationally. This study emphasizes the causal force of epistemic communities in shaping the rules of the nuclear game. This approach also claims that material accounts of this story can not be fully explanatory as they are lacking a substantive causal driver.

“The epistemic community approach has some clear ‘comparative advantages.’ First, it allows us to understand why superpower cooperation was conceptualized via arms control in the first place. Second, it increases our sensitivity to domestic political factors, especially to the notion that within each national actor different interpretations of the national interest compete for the shaping of international agendas as well as international practices. Third, in ways that allow for empirical research, focusing on an epistemic community draws our attention to the impact of scientific knowledge on international cooperation processes. Fourth, it helps us to see that, in spite of or even because of superpower disagreement over political interests and visions, the fact that [Soviets also understood ideational drivers to be important] was not inconsequential for peaceful change…Sixth, common epistemic understandings proved to be more lasting than disagreements over long-term goals” (104).

Adler then deploys an “evolutionary research framework” for exploring this issue. This framework involves the use of five variables: units of variation, innovation, selection, diffusion and units of effective modification (104).

Who represent the epistemic community for arms control? “Two subgroups constituted this community. One group of experts…considered the underlying cause of international conflict to be the clash between the interests of nations as they pursue their seperat4e goals…The other group…believed that armaments were indeed a serious cause of international tension and that therefore reducing weapons would reduce tensions…These two groups converged into an epistemic community because, surprising as it may seem, they were in agreement about the short-term advantages and necessity of arms control and there was scarcely member of either group who did not concede the validity of the recommendations of the other” (111).

Conclusion:

“First, the community created an intellectual climate favorable to arms control…Second, the members produced the technical knowledge required to deal with nuclear arms control…Third, the community focused attention on cooperative phenomena and helped provide the superpowers with reasons why…it as important that they cooperate…Forth, it paved the way for the creation of vested interests in arms control…Fifth,…[it] helped generate an awareness about arms control that eventually led to public support for it…Sixth, arms controllers helped persuade Congress about the value of specific arms control agreements…Seventh, members were able to propose a logically coherent arms control negotiation agenda and helped think through the bargaining positions to be taken in the ABM negotiations…Eighth, the community helped formulate specific norms and rules, researched and proposed verification means, and suggested posttreaty reviews and conditions for withdrawal from agreements…Ninth, arms controllers in many cases became what Robert Gilpin called ‘full partners with politicians, administration, and military officers in the formulations of policy’…Finally, the community was instrumental in transmitting arms control ideas to the Soviet Union” (140-2).

Notermans: Policy Continuity, Poilcy Change, and the Political Power fo Economic Ideas

Notermans, Ton. (1999). "Policy Continuity, Policy Change, and the Political Power of Economic Ideas". Acta Poiltica, 34(3), 22-48.

Notermans argues that changes in economic policy stem not from ideational forces, but from material forces. Ideational forces are brought into the picture to simply justify the policy decision. Additionally, different theoretical frameworks can be manipulated in various ways to justify the needed policy response to the material drivers that a nation confronts.

“This article argues that the view that new economic ideas determine the character of new policies reverses cause and effect. More specifically, three hypotheses are advanced: 1.) Ideas exert n independent causal influence on policies by providing for continuity rather than change because economic policy-makers cling to the ideas and policies that were adopted in response to a traumatic event, even if the original constellation justifying such policies has long disappeared. 2.) The changes in macroeconomic policy regimes during this century have been driven by the need to correct cumulative price level disturbances… 3.) Because the timing and character of a regime change is determined by developments in financial and labour markets, it is largely exogenous to the political system” (23).

“In spite of fundamental theoretical differences between the two approaches, it is possible to derive Keynesian-type policies from neoclassical views and vice versa” (26). Notermans believes that, no matter what ideational approach you use, you will be able to manipulate that to produce any economic policy result. This means that people are just responding to material forces, and that ideational forces are tossed about. Eventually, this can be seen as securing economic policy that is more in line with neoclassical models, which tend to reflect reality more accurately. “Hence, policy convergence with the (long-term) neoclassical model is complete: macroeconomic policies need to prioritize price stability, and unemployment is to be tackled by supply-side policies” (27).

Notermans posits in section 4 of his article that ideas do not have a causal influence, even if different policy makers who hold different ideas posit different policies. This could simply mean that their interests diverge and that they are responding to material forces that they encounter. After making this claim, Notermans goes on to say that, since ideas are insufficient to explain macroeconomic change within the economic policies of Europe, he will propose a Darwinian approach. This approach claims that ideas are not of interest, and only policies that respond to price stability will have any worth.

Only firms who respond to the dictates of the market will survive. However, a Darwinistic approach must take into account the idea of path-dependency, as opposed to pure environmental determinism. “…because the behavior an individual market actor faces is largely determined by the behavior of the other market actors, the case for environmental determination of economic outcomes is much weaker than commonly assumed” (32).

However, this aside, the current nature of the market necessitates price stability as the mechanism of Darwinistic selection and adaptation. “In a world where money serves as a store of value, price flexibility no longer necessarily serve s as the device through which markets will quickly return to equilibrium Instead, excessive changes of the general price level may severely disrupt the willingness to engage in productive activity and hence precipitate rather than mitigate economic crises” (33). Therefore, price stability is the holy grail, and markets will orientate around that for material reasons.

“Whereas ideas play no significant role in explaining regime changes, they do play an important role in accounting for regime inertia” (37). “In sum, to the extent that ideas do influence the development of macroeconomic management their influence is generally moderate as they tend to perpetuate a given regime even if the conditions which gave rise to that regime have long disappeared” (37).

Notermans goes on to highlight this ascertain by looking at the cases of Britain, France and Sweden and highlighting how their transitions towards policies of price stability reinforce his theses. However, he also notes that these characteristics are not always going to necessarily be in play, and that a different set of material forces could come along and change the way that economic policy is made.

Wendt: Social Theory of International Politics

Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

This text is lengthy, dense and complex. This abstract will highlight the structure of the book, key arguments and will ignore pieces that are not of personal interest. Hopefully I note when I am skipping over something, but that’s not guaranteed either.

Firstly, this text is a decisive move on Wendt’s part to crystallize a broader movement within IR theory. His constructivist argument is clear, complex and dense. He attempts to bring together different ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies. Typically, positivists and post-positivists would have little to talk about; Wendt lets these two groups know that they may have more in common then they have believed in the past.

This bridging of divides also may be part of the problem with his analysis. In part, he oversteps and simplifies the divergent opinions of those who embrace distinct ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies. For example, he claims that post-positivists are tacit realists because they look at the world around them and theorize about it. This may not be highly persuasive to someone who is attempting to highlight the aspects of positivism that they find ethically problematic.

However, while he may overstep in areas, he does an incredible job of presenting a theoretical framework that can be applied to real, IR problems.

Four sociologies of international politics:

“…students of international politics have increasingly accepted two basic tenants of ‘constructivism’: 1.) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and 2.) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (1).

Went separates theoretical questions into first-order questions and second-order questions. First-order questions are those that are domain specific. “It involves choosing a social system (family, Congress, international system), identifying the relevant actors and how they are structured, and developing propositions about what is going on” (6). “Second-order questions are questions of social theory” (5).

The four sociologies that Went describes are really two pairs: materialist/idealist and agent/structure. He believes that these two pairs can help us structure how theories have typically organized themselves. Wendt highlights a materialist discourse that focuses on human nature, natural resources, geography, forces of production and forces of destruction (23). On the other hand, “idealisats believe the most fundamental fact about society is the nature a structure of social consciousness (what I later call the distribution of ideas of knowledge)” (24). Also, he claims that, “Idealist social theory embodies a very minimal claim: that the deep structure of society is constituted by ideas rather than material forces” (25).

The second pair, or debate, is between agent and structure, which Wendt describes as being between individualism and holism. “Individualsim tends to be associated with causal effects on behavior, but I shall argue that the individualist view is compatible in principle with more possibilities than its critics…typically acknowledge…” (27). Holist theories, on the other hand, tend to view structure as having a much more important impact on the nature of IR.

Wendt then places these two debates onto a 2x2 chart, where, starting at point 0,0, and moving up the y axis, we first have the individualists and then the holists. Moving positively from 0,0 on the x axis, we have materialism and then ideationalism. These four boxes can then be used to categorize different IR theories. On page 32 there is a very helpful chart that plots dominant discourses in IR into different boxes.

Methodology, Wendt claims, can become ontology, if the theorist is not careful. He explains that realists and constructivists have very different methodologies which leads to his next point. He then goes on to claim that ontology is something that is crucial to the IR debate, and that there are key distinctions between the ontology of realists and constructivists. The reality of this debate ends up being an empirical question, which will not be answered here. Secondly, he claims to support an idealist ontology, a view that is in line with most post-positivists. However, this does not mean he believes in a post-positivist epistemology. “I am a positivist” (39). This could hardly be more clear.

“…I think that post-positivists put too much emphasis on epistemology, and that positivist should be more open-minded about questions and methodology” (40).

Scientific realisim and social kinds:

“How is it possible to adopt an idealist and holist ontology while maintaining a commitment to science, or positivism broadly understood? This chapter constructs the ‘via media’ that grounds my modernist constructivism” (47). How indeed.

This is accomplished by positing that, while the world is unobservable, it is still knowable. This supports his positivism. Theories also provide knowledge about things that are unknowable. He also posits an “Ultimate Argument for Realism” that claims that we are slowly approaching the deep, real structure of the world out there. Also, science has allowed us to control the world around us in ways that were not possible earlier. Also, this is where post-positivists are actually positivist, because they look at empirical facts about the world as opposed to positing…purple. “In the end, we are all realists in practice, it would seem that epistemological anxiety makes little difference to our study of the world” (67).

Also, Wendt believes and makes the case in this chapter that social life is social life ‘all the way down’ (90), though he will make this case more forcefully in subsequent chapters.

An important quote from this chapter, and one that helps to highlight his intention in building bridges, or, in his terms, creating “via media”: “But the point is that everyone gets to do what they do: from a realist stance epistemology cannot legislate scientific practice” (91).

“Ideas all the way down?”:

“…the goal of this chapter is to show that much of the apparent explanatory power of ostensibly ‘materialist’ explanations is actually constituted by suppressed constructivist assumptions about the content and distribution of ideas” (95-6). “…I argue that brute material forces have some effects on the constitution of power and interests, and as such my thesis is not ideas all the way down…my defense of this ‘rump’ materialism is rooted in scientific realism’s naturalistic approach to society…” (96). “In my view it cannot be ideas all the way down because scientific realism shows that ideas are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical reality” (110). “…proposing a rule o thumb for idealists: when confronted by ostensibly ‘material’ explanations, always inquire into the discursive conditions which make them work” (135).

He argues here that interests are mainly a construction of decisions that are made by agents that are forged by mostly ideational drivers. However, while the ideational driver is very important, it does not, as some post-positivists claim, go “all the way down”. This means that there are root material forces that construct situations in certain ways. There are 5 material forces that he highlights in this chapter.

Structure, agency and culture:

Wendt claims that any social system will contain the three characters in this chapter’s title. A social system is analyzable on these three axes. He looks at much in this chapter, including culture, micro and macro structure as well as the causal or constitutive effects of culture. He wants to give both agency and structure, or, if you’ll remember from the earlier chapter, both holism and individualism, equal weight in the understanding of culture. “…structure exists, has effects, and evolves only because of agents and their practices” (185). I did not read this chapter in great detail.

The state and the problems of corporate agency:

“In this chapter I argue that states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs and intentionality” (197). “The essential state has five properties: 1.) an institutional-legal order, 2.) an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, 3.) an organization with sovereignty, 4.) a society and, 5.) territory” (202). Wendt goes through these five characteristics fleshing each out.

This chapter also attempted to highlight the interests of these bodies as well as the continued problems of anthropomorphizing states.

Three cultures of anarchy:

Wendt has previously written about the international system of anarchy in the journal article “Anarchy is what states make of it”. Anarchy can have multiple logics in Wendt’s construction, and this it, “is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside them” (249).

He looks at the Hobbsian, Kantian and Lokean version of the world and thus you have your three anarchies. I will not go into them, though they are quite interesting.

He ends this chapter with this odd statement: “But with respect to its endogenous dynamic, the argument suggests that the history of international politics will be unidirectional: if there are any structural changes, they will be historically progressive. Thus, even if there is no guarantee that the future of the international system will be better than its past, at least there is reason to think it will not be worse” (312). I <3>

Process and structural change:

“Agents and structures are themselves processes, in other words, on-going ‘accomplishments of practice.’ Ultimately this is the basis for the claim that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’” (313). “This chapter is organized into three main parts. Drawing on interactionist social theory, in the first section I develop a general, evolutionary model of identity formation, showing how identities are produced and reproduced in the social process. In the next section I argue that structural change in international politics involves collective identity formation. Putting these two sections together, I then advance a simple causal theory of collective identity formation under anarchy, containing four ‘master’ variables that can be realized in multiple ways in real world international systems: interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-restraint” (317).

Gramsci: Selections from the Prison Notebooks (pp. 245-76)

Gramsci, A., Hoare, Q., & Nowell-Smith, G. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. London,: Lawrence & Wishart.

“…there exists an art as well as a science of politics" (251).

Gramsci begins this brief selection from Selections From the Prison Notebooks by making a comment about separations of powers: “…is a product of the struggle between civil society and political society in a specific historical period. This period is characterized by a certain unstable equilibrium between the classes, which is a result of the fact that certain categories of intellectuals…are still too closely tied to the old dominant classes” (245).

The process of socialization, or the important power of ideas, is one feature that shapes Gramsci’s thought. “If every State tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization and of citizen…and to eliminate certain customs and attitudes and to disseminate others, then the Law will be its instrument for this purpose” (246).

The State is controlled by those who are in power in civil society. “In reality, the State must be conceived of as an ‘educator’, in as much as it tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilization” (247). The power is exerted, when it can be, through socialization. When it can not be, it is imposed by Law. “The Law is the repressive and negative aspect of the entire positive, civilizing activity undertaken by the State” (247).

“Political intuition is not expressed through the artist, but through the ‘leader’; and ‘intuition’ must be understood to mean not ‘knowledge of men’, but swiftness in connecting seemingly disparate facts, and in conceiving the means adequate to particular ends—thus discovering the interests involved, and arousing the passions of men and directing them towards a particular action” (252). Power is not crude deployment of material resource, but rather though ideational influence.

The Ethical State: “…every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level…which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes” (258).

Ability of a group to have influence in society without having to take the power of the state is Gramscian hegemony. “State = political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (263).

“The expressions ‘ethical State’ or ‘civil society’ would thus mean that this ‘image’ o fa Satat without a State was present to the greatest political and legal thinkers, in so far as they placed themselves on the terrain of pure science…” (263).

“A totalitarian policy is aimed precisely: 1. at ensuring that the members of a particular party find in that party all the satisfaction that they formerly found in a multiplicity of organizations, i.e. at breaking all the threads that bind these members to extraneous cultural organisms; 2. at destroying all other organizations or at incorporating them into a system of which the party is the sole regulator. This occurs: 1. when the given party is the bearer of a new culture—then one has a progressive phase; 2. when the given party wishes to prevent another force, bearer of a new culture, from becoming itself ‘totalitarianism’—then one has an objectively regressive and reactionary phase, even if that reaction (as invariably happens) does not avow itself, and seeks itself to appear as a bearer of a new culture” (265).

“..hegemony and dictatorship are indistinguishable, force and consent are simply equivalent; one cannot distinguish political society from civil society; only the State, and of course the State-as-government, exists, etc” (271).

Chwieroth: Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets

Chwieroth, Jeffrey. (2007). "Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets". International Organization, 61(2), 443-463. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=25008468&site=ehost-live

This paper focuses on the rise of finance capital mobility and one aspect of ideational drivers that can account for this movement away from capital controls. “What this view overlooks [the view that the implementation of capital controls from a policy perspective is indeterminate] is that capital mobility—as with all material trends—must be socially mediated and interpreted by policymakers” (444). Chwieroth then attempts to map out the movement, increase and influence of groups of neoliberal economists as they are placed in positions of policy control in different countries and how this effects the relevance of capital controls. “When these economists form a coherent policy making team, capital account policy is more likely to be liberalized” (445).

The first stage of his methodology explores the drivers of job appointments. Here he finds, “that both credibility concerns and political interests matter” (445). The second stage of this methodology, “indicate[s] that formation of a coherent policymaking team of neoliberal economists significantly influenced the decision to liberalize” (445).

In explaining “epistemic communities and policy reforms”, Chwieroth highlights the beneficial process of orthodoxy in promoting policy: “In the absence of competing ideas to guide policy, coherence ensures consistent advice and increases the likelihood that the chief of government and other politicians will view the interpretations these economists offer as ‘correct’,” (447). “Coherence also increases the insulation of policymakers from societal demands by shielding the decision-making process from alternative views” (447).

There is then a brief sketch of the movement from a Keynesian approach which highlighted the possible necessity of capital controls and their historic benefit on developing countries to a neoliberal emphasis on the freedom of the restraint of capital controls. “Despite ambiguous empirical basis for capital account liberalization in emerging markets, neoliberal economists also often present their recommendations as the only ‘credible’ policy available to appease market sentiment” (450).

Chwieroth then goes on to test this hypothesis using mainly indicators of capital account openness as well as degree of neoliberalness in policy advocation. The methodology seems solid, though I skimmed over it mostly. The conclusion was that, basically, his hypothesis stood on solid ground. More neoclassical economists created a need for the appointment of more neoclassical economists and thus more neoliberal economic policy.

He concludes that, “the results suggest that existing explanations of capital account liberalization are incomplete” and that, “the results suggest the conclusion that economists are an important conduit through which ideas diffuse and are implemented into policy” (459).