Layne, C., 2007. Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.
Layne begins, as many do, by highlighting how deeply embedded the concept of the democratic peace has become in international politics and foreign policy. For example, he highlights Russett’s statement that it may actually be possible to overcome the traditional realist constraints of anarchy and a self-help international society through the democratic peace.
Layne explores whether or not realist theory or democratic peace theory is actually more able to describe and explain behavior. The author presents democratic peace as being either structural or normative. The structural account deals with, “…the restraining effects of public opinion, or of the checks and balances embedded in the democratic state’s domestic politics structure” (6). The account of the normative driver of democratic peace is also explored. This driver posits that, “…democratic norms and culture—a shared commitment to the peaceful adjudication of political disputes—that accounts for the absence of war between democratic states” (6). Layne argues that the structural account is weak, and that this puts the onus of explanation on the normative account.
“This article’s centerpiece is a test of the competing explanations of international outcomes offered by democratic peace theory and by realism. This test is based on case studies of four ‘near misses’—crises where two democratic states almost went to war with each other” (7).
“I conclude that realism is superior to democratic peace theory as a predictor of international outcomes. Indeed, democratic peace theory appears to have extremely little explanatory power in the cases studied…I conclude by discussing democratic peace theory’s troublesome implications for post-Cold War American foreign policy” (8).
The four case studies explored are those of near-misses among democratic great powers.
Showing posts with label Democratic Peace. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Democratic Peace. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 8, 2008
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Faber and Gowa: Politics and Peace
Faber, H. & Gowa, J., 1995. Politics and Peace. International Security, 20(2), 123-146.
“First, we find that there is no statistically significant relationship between democracy and war before 1914…Our analysis shows that it is only after 1945 that the probability of war or serious disputes is significantly lower between democratic states than between members of other pairs of states” (124).
“the democratic peace literature advances two explanations for the distinctive behavior of democracies. One is based on norms, the other on checks and balances. In this section, we argue that neither provides a compelling explanation of the peace that is said to prevail between democracies” (126).
“The evidence we analyzed suggests that the democratic peace is of relatively recent origin. Indeed, it coincides with the Cold War. Whether the post-1945 result is the product of common polities is, at best, unclear. The onset of the Cold War precipitated strong common interests among a relatively large number of democratic states” (145).
“First, we find that there is no statistically significant relationship between democracy and war before 1914…Our analysis shows that it is only after 1945 that the probability of war or serious disputes is significantly lower between democratic states than between members of other pairs of states” (124).
“the democratic peace literature advances two explanations for the distinctive behavior of democracies. One is based on norms, the other on checks and balances. In this section, we argue that neither provides a compelling explanation of the peace that is said to prevail between democracies” (126).
“The evidence we analyzed suggests that the democratic peace is of relatively recent origin. Indeed, it coincides with the Cold War. Whether the post-1945 result is the product of common polities is, at best, unclear. The onset of the Cold War precipitated strong common interests among a relatively large number of democratic states” (145).
Mansfield and Snyder: Democratization and the Danger of War
Mansfield, E. & Snyder, J., 1995. Democratization and the Danger of War. International Security, 20, 5-38.
It is generally held that democracies do not go to war with one another. It is such a cornerstone of common sense that the concepts finds itself embedded in foreign policy decisions and explanation. While it is more than likely true that a world of stable and mature democracies is generally more peaceful for all, these authors contend, it is not the case that simply a democratic regime necessitates stability. The authors argue that democratic transitions are actually quite dangerous periods of instability. “In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states” (5).
Transitioning democracies are generally more likely to fight wars than either mature autocracies or mature democracies.
“Much of the research on the democratic peace has relied on statistical tests, which indicate that democracies become involved in wars about as frequently as other states, but that by reasonably restrictive definitions, they have never fought each other” (9).
These authors use the same database and argue that there is statistical significance that democratizing states do go to war. The distinction between democratic and democratizing states is crucial. “We consider states to be democratizing if, during a given period of time, they change from autocracy to either anocracy or democracy, or if they change from anocracy to democracy. Conversely, states are autocratizing if they change from democracy to autocracy or anocracy, or from anocracy to autocracy” (9). “We found that democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no regime change” (12).
It is generally held that democracies do not go to war with one another. It is such a cornerstone of common sense that the concepts finds itself embedded in foreign policy decisions and explanation. While it is more than likely true that a world of stable and mature democracies is generally more peaceful for all, these authors contend, it is not the case that simply a democratic regime necessitates stability. The authors argue that democratic transitions are actually quite dangerous periods of instability. “In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states” (5).
Transitioning democracies are generally more likely to fight wars than either mature autocracies or mature democracies.
“Much of the research on the democratic peace has relied on statistical tests, which indicate that democracies become involved in wars about as frequently as other states, but that by reasonably restrictive definitions, they have never fought each other” (9).
These authors use the same database and argue that there is statistical significance that democratizing states do go to war. The distinction between democratic and democratizing states is crucial. “We consider states to be democratizing if, during a given period of time, they change from autocracy to either anocracy or democracy, or if they change from anocracy to democracy. Conversely, states are autocratizing if they change from democracy to autocracy or anocracy, or from anocracy to autocracy” (9). “We found that democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no regime change” (12).
Doyle: Liberalism and World Politics
Doyle, M., 1986. Liberalism and World Politics. American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1151-1169.
Doyle explores three traditions of liberal theory: Schumpeter, Machiavelli and Kant. While there are some conflict within the liberal tradition, ie., a conflict between liberal imperialism and liberal pacifism, Doyle believes that there is a recurrent theme that can be found within liberal states. “Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. T hey are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace…and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression…” (1151).
“What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all” (1152).
Schumpeter’s liberalism is one that stands in contrast to imperialism. Democracies who are capitalistic will be peaceful. Democratic capitalist countries do not benefit from expansionist policies. Also, their citizens are gainfully employed and busy themselves producing, which implicitly keeps them away from jingoism.
Machiavelli has a different argument. He claims that republics are actually quite good and useful at pursuing expansionist policies. Machiavelli does not advocate radical democracy; that he believed would eventually digress into tyranny. He does, however, explore the relationship of citizens in a republic, which he finds to be quite satisfactory.
Machiavelli and Schumpeter stand in contrast. “We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism—pacifism and imperialism—indicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics” (1155).
“Kant’s citizens…are diverse in their goals and individualized and rationalized, but most importantly, they are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals and of treating other individuals as ends rather than as means” (1162).
Doyle explores three traditions of liberal theory: Schumpeter, Machiavelli and Kant. While there are some conflict within the liberal tradition, ie., a conflict between liberal imperialism and liberal pacifism, Doyle believes that there is a recurrent theme that can be found within liberal states. “Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. T hey are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace…and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression…” (1151).
“What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all” (1152).
Schumpeter’s liberalism is one that stands in contrast to imperialism. Democracies who are capitalistic will be peaceful. Democratic capitalist countries do not benefit from expansionist policies. Also, their citizens are gainfully employed and busy themselves producing, which implicitly keeps them away from jingoism.
Machiavelli has a different argument. He claims that republics are actually quite good and useful at pursuing expansionist policies. Machiavelli does not advocate radical democracy; that he believed would eventually digress into tyranny. He does, however, explore the relationship of citizens in a republic, which he finds to be quite satisfactory.
Machiavelli and Schumpeter stand in contrast. “We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism—pacifism and imperialism—indicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics” (1155).
“Kant’s citizens…are diverse in their goals and individualized and rationalized, but most importantly, they are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals and of treating other individuals as ends rather than as means” (1162).
Friday, October 3, 2008
Maoz and Russett: Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace
Maoz, Z. & Russett, B., 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624-638.
“Democratic states are in general about as conflict—and war—prone as non-democracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other…” (624). They find that democracy has a mitigating effect on conflict, that both of their models support this causally and that the normative model is more robust.
Normative Model:
Two assumptions: “States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and instiotutions” and “The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former” (625).
Structural Model:
Two assumptions: “International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action” and “Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies” (626).
They also explore other possible explanations for the observed peace between certain countries. It could be determined by relative wealth. It could also have to do with alliances since WWII. These are taken into consideration in their statistical model.
They then explore the IV of democracy using Polity IV numbers and the DV of war using COW numbers. They find that their three hypotheses stand up to scrutiny (H1: general Dem Peace, H2: Norm model, H3: Structure model) and that the normative model is more robust than the structural model.
“Democratic states are in general about as conflict—and war—prone as non-democracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other…” (624). They find that democracy has a mitigating effect on conflict, that both of their models support this causally and that the normative model is more robust.
Normative Model:
Two assumptions: “States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and instiotutions” and “The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former” (625).
Structural Model:
Two assumptions: “International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action” and “Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies” (626).
They also explore other possible explanations for the observed peace between certain countries. It could be determined by relative wealth. It could also have to do with alliances since WWII. These are taken into consideration in their statistical model.
They then explore the IV of democracy using Polity IV numbers and the DV of war using COW numbers. They find that their three hypotheses stand up to scrutiny (H1: general Dem Peace, H2: Norm model, H3: Structure model) and that the normative model is more robust than the structural model.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Spiro: The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace
Spiro, D., 1994. The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 19, 50.
“Ever since Michael Doyle’s 1983 essay pointed out that no liberal democracy has ever fought a war with another liberal democracy, scholars have treated pacifism between democracies as ‘the closest thing we have to a law in international politics…The purpose of this article is to raise critical questions about newly rediscovered law of peace among democracies” (50).
“I will argue that the absence of wars between liberal democracies is not, in fact, as significant pattern for most of the past two centuries. Studies that do claim significance for the absence of wars between democracies are based on analyses that are highly sensitive to the ways that they select definitions of the key terms of democracy and war, and to the methods they choose for statistical analysis. I argue that much of the quantitative literature on democracy and war has little to do with the theories it seeks to confirm, and that the results rest on methods and operationalization of variables that undergo contortions before they yield apparently significant results” (51).
Spiro argues that “democracy” is a term that is difficult to measure, and those who try to create a taxonomy of democratic countries eventually end up with conflictual lists. This is the same for war, as Mansfield argued in 1988.
Spiro then examines the statistical significance of zero, by that, the author means to question the significance of only exploring dyadic groupings that are not at war. Because dyadic war is such a rare occurance in the international system, it is not unexpected to not find war between countries labeled as democratic. He finds a generally that, through random probabilities, and because the cases of international war are so slim, the odds of two states randomly not going to war are great, barring some historical outliers (WWI, WWI, etc.).
There is also a specific critique of Maoz and Russett.
“Ever since Michael Doyle’s 1983 essay pointed out that no liberal democracy has ever fought a war with another liberal democracy, scholars have treated pacifism between democracies as ‘the closest thing we have to a law in international politics…The purpose of this article is to raise critical questions about newly rediscovered law of peace among democracies” (50).
“I will argue that the absence of wars between liberal democracies is not, in fact, as significant pattern for most of the past two centuries. Studies that do claim significance for the absence of wars between democracies are based on analyses that are highly sensitive to the ways that they select definitions of the key terms of democracy and war, and to the methods they choose for statistical analysis. I argue that much of the quantitative literature on democracy and war has little to do with the theories it seeks to confirm, and that the results rest on methods and operationalization of variables that undergo contortions before they yield apparently significant results” (51).
Spiro argues that “democracy” is a term that is difficult to measure, and those who try to create a taxonomy of democratic countries eventually end up with conflictual lists. This is the same for war, as Mansfield argued in 1988.
Spiro then examines the statistical significance of zero, by that, the author means to question the significance of only exploring dyadic groupings that are not at war. Because dyadic war is such a rare occurance in the international system, it is not unexpected to not find war between countries labeled as democratic. He finds a generally that, through random probabilities, and because the cases of international war are so slim, the odds of two states randomly not going to war are great, barring some historical outliers (WWI, WWI, etc.).
There is also a specific critique of Maoz and Russett.
Monday, July 28, 2008
Oneal and Russett: Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications
Oneal, JR, and B Russett. 1999. “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 36:423.
This article deals with attacks coming from scholars who claim that trade interdependence does not have pacifying effects. These two claims, specifically from Beck et al. (1998) and Barbieri (1998), address potential effects that were not taken into consideration by the earlier work of Russett and Oneal (and Moaz). The authors find that, by extending the analysis to all dyads, there is not a “relationship between interdependence and peace, but the pacific benefits of trade become evident among the politically relevant dyads (those including a major power, or two contiguous states), among whom the great majority of disputes occur…With these sequential modifications we find increasingly strong support for the liberals’ belief that economic interdependence and democracy have important pacific benefits” (423). “We find no evidence that asymmetric trade increases conflict” (423).
“Beck et al. argue that simple logistic regression analysis is inappropriate for cross-sectional and time-series data because observations are not temporally independent. They suggest a method to correct for this problem and show that, with their technique, the beneficial influence of economic interdependence…becomes statistically insignificant” (423-4). “In this article, we address the concerns of our colleagues by adopting their suggestions for testing liberal theory, although we do not regard all of their proposed procedures as appropriate. Nevertheless, when we adopt their methods, we find that interdependence did significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict during the years 1950-92” (424).
“Beck et al. (1998) propose that researchers using logistic regression remedy temporal dependence in their time-series by creating a variable marks the number of years that have elapsed from the most recent occurrence of a dispute and by generating a spline function of the years of peace” (427).
They use COW data.
“We found that interdependence significantly reduced the likelihood of conflict…among contiguous and major-power pairs” (439).
This article deals with attacks coming from scholars who claim that trade interdependence does not have pacifying effects. These two claims, specifically from Beck et al. (1998) and Barbieri (1998), address potential effects that were not taken into consideration by the earlier work of Russett and Oneal (and Moaz). The authors find that, by extending the analysis to all dyads, there is not a “relationship between interdependence and peace, but the pacific benefits of trade become evident among the politically relevant dyads (those including a major power, or two contiguous states), among whom the great majority of disputes occur…With these sequential modifications we find increasingly strong support for the liberals’ belief that economic interdependence and democracy have important pacific benefits” (423). “We find no evidence that asymmetric trade increases conflict” (423).
“Beck et al. argue that simple logistic regression analysis is inappropriate for cross-sectional and time-series data because observations are not temporally independent. They suggest a method to correct for this problem and show that, with their technique, the beneficial influence of economic interdependence…becomes statistically insignificant” (423-4). “In this article, we address the concerns of our colleagues by adopting their suggestions for testing liberal theory, although we do not regard all of their proposed procedures as appropriate. Nevertheless, when we adopt their methods, we find that interdependence did significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict during the years 1950-92” (424).
“Beck et al. (1998) propose that researchers using logistic regression remedy temporal dependence in their time-series by creating a variable marks the number of years that have elapsed from the most recent occurrence of a dispute and by generating a spline function of the years of peace” (427).
They use COW data.
“We found that interdependence significantly reduced the likelihood of conflict…among contiguous and major-power pairs” (439).
Oneal, Oneal, Maoz and Russett: The Liberal Peace
Oneal, JR, FH Oneal, Z Maoz, and B Russett. 1996. “The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85.” Journal of Peace Research 33:11.
Classic liberals believed that interdependence rooted in trade as well as similar political systems based on majority rule would lead to increased levels of international peace. This article uses economic interdependence variables to augment the democratic peace studies of Maoz and Russett (1993). “Our logistic regression analyses of politically relevant dyads…indicate that the benefits of the liberals’ economic program have not been sufficiently appreciated. Trade is a powerful influence for peace, especially among the war-prone, contiguous pairs of states…international conflict is less likely when external economic relations are important, executives are constrained, and societies are governed by non-violent norms of conflict resolution” (11).
There is initially a very thorough review of literature relating to trade, liberalism, peace and international interdependence.
The research operationalization follows closely that of Maoz and Russett (1993) and is an attempt to quantify the variables identified by Kant. They look at “major powers” as defined by the Correlates of War project. Use MID data for dependent variable and a variety of independent variables. “Our logistic regression analyses of politically relevant dyads…indicate that the pacific benefits of interdependence have not been sufficiently appreciated. This is especially apparent in the analyses of contiguous pairs of states, where the potential for conflict is greatest. Countries that share a border have more issues, particularly territorial, over which to fight; and their proximity makes armed conflict feasible. Economic interdependence significantly counteracts these influences” (23).
Classic liberals believed that interdependence rooted in trade as well as similar political systems based on majority rule would lead to increased levels of international peace. This article uses economic interdependence variables to augment the democratic peace studies of Maoz and Russett (1993). “Our logistic regression analyses of politically relevant dyads…indicate that the benefits of the liberals’ economic program have not been sufficiently appreciated. Trade is a powerful influence for peace, especially among the war-prone, contiguous pairs of states…international conflict is less likely when external economic relations are important, executives are constrained, and societies are governed by non-violent norms of conflict resolution” (11).
There is initially a very thorough review of literature relating to trade, liberalism, peace and international interdependence.
The research operationalization follows closely that of Maoz and Russett (1993) and is an attempt to quantify the variables identified by Kant. They look at “major powers” as defined by the Correlates of War project. Use MID data for dependent variable and a variety of independent variables. “Our logistic regression analyses of politically relevant dyads…indicate that the pacific benefits of interdependence have not been sufficiently appreciated. This is especially apparent in the analyses of contiguous pairs of states, where the potential for conflict is greatest. Countries that share a border have more issues, particularly territorial, over which to fight; and their proximity makes armed conflict feasible. Economic interdependence significantly counteracts these influences” (23).
Gartzke et al.: Investing in Peace
Gartzke, E, Q Li, and C Boehmer. 2003. “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.” International Organization 55:391-438.
“Research appears to substantiate the liberal conviction that trade fosters global peace” (391). These studies are limited. There is an overemphasis on trade, while other transfers are quantitatively larger. “Second, the manner in which economics is said to inhibit conflict behavior is implausible in light of new analytical insights about the causes of war” (391).
“Our quantities results who that capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade, democracy, interest, and other variables (391).
“We begin with a theory of disputes. A valid explanation for the effect of economics on peace must be placed in the context of an account of why most states occasionally resort to military violence” (392).
The authors explore different kinds of interdependence, monetary, trade, democratic, capital, and thoroughly explore the literature.
They use MID data.
Dismisses Barbieri’s findings as being flawed because of the author’s metric for determining economic interdependence: trade share.
“We have reviewed arguments for the effect of economic interdependence on peace. We show that existing accounts do not adequately explain why liberal economies are less likely to fight, but that a signaling argument is consistent with the observation of a liberal peace. We also expand interdependence to include financial and monetary integration, offering a set of variables that measure these processes” (418). They key finding is that increased interdependence reduces the vagueness of information transfers in bargaining between states.
“Research appears to substantiate the liberal conviction that trade fosters global peace” (391). These studies are limited. There is an overemphasis on trade, while other transfers are quantitatively larger. “Second, the manner in which economics is said to inhibit conflict behavior is implausible in light of new analytical insights about the causes of war” (391).
“Our quantities results who that capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade, democracy, interest, and other variables (391).
“We begin with a theory of disputes. A valid explanation for the effect of economics on peace must be placed in the context of an account of why most states occasionally resort to military violence” (392).
The authors explore different kinds of interdependence, monetary, trade, democratic, capital, and thoroughly explore the literature.
They use MID data.
Dismisses Barbieri’s findings as being flawed because of the author’s metric for determining economic interdependence: trade share.
“We have reviewed arguments for the effect of economic interdependence on peace. We show that existing accounts do not adequately explain why liberal economies are less likely to fight, but that a signaling argument is consistent with the observation of a liberal peace. We also expand interdependence to include financial and monetary integration, offering a set of variables that measure these processes” (418). They key finding is that increased interdependence reduces the vagueness of information transfers in bargaining between states.
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