Hendrix, Cullen S., and Sarah M. Glaser. 2007. Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political Geography 26, no. 6 (August): 695-715. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.006.
The Abstract: "The conventional discourse relating climate change to conflict focuses on long term trends in temperature and precipitation that define ecosystems and their subsequent impact on access to renewable resources. Because these changes occur over long time periods they may not capture the proximate factors that trigger conflict. We estimate the impact of both long term trends in climate and short term climatic triggers on civil conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that both operationalizations have a significant impact. Climates more suitable for Eurasian agriculture are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict, while freshwater resources per capita are positively associated with the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, positive changes in rainfall are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict in the following year. We also assess the outlook for the future by analyzing simulated changes in precipitation means and variability over the period 2000-2099. We find few statistically significant, positive trends in our measure of interannual variability, suggesting that it is unlikely to be affected dramatically by changes in climate" (695).
There has been much assumed about the link between climate change and conflict, though, "The causal link between climate change and threats to security...is not specified" (696).
One set of literature argues that a decrease in renewable resources will lead to conflict. Another argues that variation in climate will lead to conflict. "We investigate these arguments from two complementary perspectives. First, the effects of climate change on the onset of conflict must be conceived of as (1) long term trends that may lead to a higher baseline probability of conflict, and (2) short term triggers that affect the interannual variability in that probability" (696).
They explore changes in precipitation using the NCAR-PCM model.
"These findings point to two conclusions. The first is that the future for Africa is not necessarily one defined by increasing interannual variability in rainfall, the most significant climatic variable in our analysis of conflict onset. The second regards policy. Our findings suggest that reducing dependence on rainwater for agriculture may mitigate conflict, even as rainfall variability is not predicted to increase over time" (696-7).
Lit Review:
Good review of literature on water availability and conflict.
"Thus framed, we address two open questions in the literature. The first is how to combine stationary trend measures with temporally variant trigger measures in order to model the environmental conditions that lead to conflict. The second regards the neo-Malthusian tendency to assume (a) that resources are dwindling and (b) that fewer resources lead inexorably to conflict" (698).
"...we can generate hypotheses regarding the effects of land degradation, climatic conditions, and freshwater abundance on the likelihood of conflict. Land degradation refers to processes that negatively affect land productivity. If productivity is defined as the expected benefit per unit of effort, then we expect higher levels of land degradation to be associated with lower returns to agriculture and therefore to higher likelihood of conflict, ceterus paribus" (699).
They use PRIO/Uppsala data for their dependent variable.
"Land degradation is defined as the temporary or permanent reduction in the reproductive capacity of land as a result of human action" (701)
"Our findings suggest that interannual variability in rainfall is a more significant determinant of conflict than our measures of climate, land degradation, and freshwater resources. Admittedly, these results may be biased due to stationary in the trend measures, a problem addressed critically in section two but which ultimately proves insurmountable in our analysis due to constraints on available data" (710).
The authors find that the future of Sub-Saharan stability vis-à-vis climate change is relatively positive, as the forecasts to not show large amounts of variability interannual pattern changes. They argue that this is due to a regional bias.
One key take-away from my perspective is that we need to look at interannual variability in forecasts of precipitation.
Showing posts with label Conflict (Territorial). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conflict (Territorial). Show all posts
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Nordas and Gleditsch: Climate Change and Conflict
Nordås, Ragnhild, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2007. Climate change and conflict. Political Geography 26, no. 6 (August): 627-638. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.003.
There is a widening consensus that the impacts of climate change will change the terrain of conflict. This article begins by noting IPCC reports, along with governmental reports issued by US, German, NGO and IO sources.
The authors then review the academic literature on climate change and conflict. They find it generally wanting, as many sources are not peer-reviewed and the total scope of work is sparse. Additionally, much of the literature that does exist is contentious: do nations cooperate around water resource issues, or come to blows?
The authors highlight five articles that help to form a backbone of the study of the relationship between climate change and conflict.
"This literature outlines several possible causal chains from climate change to conflict. The starting-point for most of these is that climate change results in a reduction of essential resources for livelihood, such as food or water, which can have one of two consequences: those affected by the increasing scarcity may start fighting over the remaining resources. Alternatively, people may be forced to leave the area, adding to the number of international refugees or internally displaced persons. Fleeing environmental destruction is at the outset a less violent response to adverse conditions than armed conflict or genocide. But when the migrants encroach on the territory of other people who may also be resource-constrained, the potential for violence arises" (631).
Drivers from climate change of conflict include changes in the availability of resources (food, fuel or water), forced migration, dramatic weather events, moves away from fossil fuels quickly, thus radically changing the price of oil and impacting dependent countries, or reduced economic output as a result of attempts to reduce carbon emissions.
They end with a focus on five points to improve analysis of this relationship: 1. conflict models and climate change models need to be synthesized; 2. what kinds of violence do we expect to emerge from climate change?; 3. there needs to be an accounting of both the positive and negative impacts of climate change; 4. the impacts of climate change need to be increasingly disaggregated; and 5. consequences should not focus on rich countries alone, but the globe.
There is a widening consensus that the impacts of climate change will change the terrain of conflict. This article begins by noting IPCC reports, along with governmental reports issued by US, German, NGO and IO sources.
The authors then review the academic literature on climate change and conflict. They find it generally wanting, as many sources are not peer-reviewed and the total scope of work is sparse. Additionally, much of the literature that does exist is contentious: do nations cooperate around water resource issues, or come to blows?
The authors highlight five articles that help to form a backbone of the study of the relationship between climate change and conflict.
"This literature outlines several possible causal chains from climate change to conflict. The starting-point for most of these is that climate change results in a reduction of essential resources for livelihood, such as food or water, which can have one of two consequences: those affected by the increasing scarcity may start fighting over the remaining resources. Alternatively, people may be forced to leave the area, adding to the number of international refugees or internally displaced persons. Fleeing environmental destruction is at the outset a less violent response to adverse conditions than armed conflict or genocide. But when the migrants encroach on the territory of other people who may also be resource-constrained, the potential for violence arises" (631).
Drivers from climate change of conflict include changes in the availability of resources (food, fuel or water), forced migration, dramatic weather events, moves away from fossil fuels quickly, thus radically changing the price of oil and impacting dependent countries, or reduced economic output as a result of attempts to reduce carbon emissions.
They end with a focus on five points to improve analysis of this relationship: 1. conflict models and climate change models need to be synthesized; 2. what kinds of violence do we expect to emerge from climate change?; 3. there needs to be an accounting of both the positive and negative impacts of climate change; 4. the impacts of climate change need to be increasingly disaggregated; and 5. consequences should not focus on rich countries alone, but the globe.
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Zacher: The Territorial Integrity Norm
Zacher, Mark W. The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force. International Organization 55 (Spring 2001): 215-250.
“…the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries,” is an important change in the interactions of states internationally. This is referred to in this piece as the “territorial integrity norm” (215). This represents a dramatic shift from earlier periods of more intense and frequent territorial disputes that digressed into all out war.
Zacher outlines historical accounts of territorial wars and compares different time periods qualitatively and quantitatively.
Why did the territorial integrity norm become embedded?
“First, states have backed the norm for both instrumental and ideational reasons, though the former have dominated…Second, the reasons for such a change in beliefs and practices have varied among countries, and no single factor explains the support for the norm among a particular grouping of states” (238).
“Clearly, a central source of the norm ahs been the industrialized world’s fear that territorial revisionism could ignite a major war that would cause great human suffering” (245).
“Wars of territorial aggrandizement since 1945 have, for the most part, concerned developing states’ dissatisfaction with the boundaries they inherited from the colonial powers; but these quarrels are largely coming to an end” (245).
“One should not discount the contribution of economic trends in the strengthening of the territorial integrity norm, especially in recent decades” (245).
“There is not a simple answer to why the territorial integrity norm has emerged as a central pillar of the international order. Different reasons were key for two major groupings of states, and the coincidence of several factors seems to have been crucial to their backing” (246).
“…the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries,” is an important change in the interactions of states internationally. This is referred to in this piece as the “territorial integrity norm” (215). This represents a dramatic shift from earlier periods of more intense and frequent territorial disputes that digressed into all out war.
Zacher outlines historical accounts of territorial wars and compares different time periods qualitatively and quantitatively.
Why did the territorial integrity norm become embedded?
“First, states have backed the norm for both instrumental and ideational reasons, though the former have dominated…Second, the reasons for such a change in beliefs and practices have varied among countries, and no single factor explains the support for the norm among a particular grouping of states” (238).
“Clearly, a central source of the norm ahs been the industrialized world’s fear that territorial revisionism could ignite a major war that would cause great human suffering” (245).
“Wars of territorial aggrandizement since 1945 have, for the most part, concerned developing states’ dissatisfaction with the boundaries they inherited from the colonial powers; but these quarrels are largely coming to an end” (245).
“One should not discount the contribution of economic trends in the strengthening of the territorial integrity norm, especially in recent decades” (245).
“There is not a simple answer to why the territorial integrity norm has emerged as a central pillar of the international order. Different reasons were key for two major groupings of states, and the coincidence of several factors seems to have been crucial to their backing” (246).
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