Cameron, D., 1988. Distributional Coalitions and Other Sources of Economic Stagnation: On Olson’s Rise and Decline of Nations. International Organization, 42(4), 561-603.
“During the last decade, the study of politics has been infused with a concern with economics” (561). “Yet, in spite of the proliferation of scholarship concerned with American, comparative, and international political economy, and important lacuna exists. Apparently accepting a disciplinary division of labor and willing to leave the subject to economists, most political scientists have neglected the systematic, theoretical and empirical analysis of why growth rates differ among nations and, within nations, over time. As a result, economic growth has been and remains, as Whiteley notes, ‘one of the most neglected topics in the emerging literature of modern political economy;” (561).
“In the first section, I question some of the major assumptions upon which Olson builds his ‘logic’ of collective action. The second section considers each of the nine ‘implications’ drawn from that ‘logic’ that Olson describes…Particular attention is given to those implications which are essential to an explanation of variations across time and space in rates of economic growth. In the third section, I review some of the empirical evidence that Olson claims supports his theory, especially his application of the theory to account for differences in growth rates among five nations…in the post-World War II era” (563).
Part of the claim is that, along with most literature that focuses on economic growth, Olson identifies the source of that growth domestically, while Cameron claims that it has much to do with the position of the country in the world economy, and the policy responses of countries in response to the relative of the country and the global economy.
“…Olson’s analysis of collective behavior rests on an apparent paradox: individuals, firms, or other units sharing a common interest that can be furthered by working together will decide rationally not to act as a group” (564).
For one thing, Olson’s analysis relies too heavily on a simplistic notion of society divided into groups, and these groups representing some kind of core societal function. Also, it also ignores the possibility of groups acting in the interest of other groups, or at least not acting in their own interest with rational maximizing being the predominant qualification. A second assumption of Olson’s analysis is that groups are able to achieve their objectives based entirely on whether or not they are internally structured to achieve these goals. There is not an emphasis on the relationship between groups, or of other more structural conditions that would hamper group action.
However, for Cameron, the weakest assumption of Olson can be drawn back to neoclassical economic assumptions: “Instead, the weakest assumption behind the ‘logic’ involves the nature of the costs and benefits obtained from group action. The logic is grounded, like the neo-classical economic theory from which It derives, on the assumptions that: 1) the relevant unit of analysis is the individual, 2) the costs and benefits of collective action are divisible and capable of being allocated among individuals, and 3) that individuals can, and do (assuming some form of rationality), determine the formation and behavior of groups through their calculations of cost and benefit” (566).
Cameron then goes through each of the 9 separate conclusions that Olson draws from his original logic and attempts to show how they are wrong-headed. I will not detail them here, though they represent a bulk of this article. Specifically, Cameron picks apart Olson’s account of different rates of growth of five key industrialized countries. Cameron concludes that the myopic focus on internal descriptions of different patterns of economic growth should be supplemented with an external, international perspective on different patterns of economic growth. “…I suggested that rather than reflecting only such internal, domestic characteristics as the structure and behavior of distributional collations, the variation among nations in growth rates may reflect the impact of external, international factors. In particular, the discussion of the German, Japanese, and British experiences suggested that a nation’s rate of economic growth may have less to do with the purely domestic social-organization characteristics and activities considered by Olson than with the nation’s historic an devolving position in the world economy, the policy responses through which government attempts to maintain or improve that position, and, finally, the constraints on (or, conversely, opportunities for) growth-orientated domestic economic policy that derive from that position” (603).
Friday, October 31, 2008
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Olson: The Rise and Deline of Nations
Olson, M., 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, Yale University Press.
The author begins by arguing that there has been a consistent historical pattern of previously insignificant groups becoming more significant, and previously powerful and mighty groups falling to the way side. Olson does not want to write broad based histories of these accounts, but simply wants to provide a theoretical framework for helping understand how these shifts in history could occur. He claims that some of the underlying trends of these power shifts are poorly understood.
In the same way that the rise and fall of many civilizations has not been adequately explained, many large economic events have also had inadequate explanations. For example, the rise of the common European market in 1957 and the subsequent growth of Italy, France, West Germany and Benelux vis-à-vis other nations that one would have expected to grow more quickly (the UK, US, for example) provides a case of an economic phenomena that has not been adequately explained. Additionally, general economic phenomena have not been fully given accord by some of the major economic schools of thought. For example, while Keynes presents a good macro-level account of unemployment, it lacks on the micro level. Neo-classical/rationalist models, on the other hand, claim that all unemployment is voluntary. Olsen attempts to put forward a theory that provides an adequate account of unemployment while still using rational maximizing individuals.
Another question put forth to explore: “Why are some modern societies to some degree ungovernable? That is, Why has it seemed that governments in some countries did not govern or control their societies as well as they had in the past?” (8).
Olson warns against ad hoc explanations for economic phenomena, though some of it may be right. It tends to be not-falsifiable, and hindsight tends to be such that conclusions can be drawn that would have been specious with foresight. Theories must be evaluated on the degree and precision of their explanations.
Ch. 2:
This chapter begins by exploring the differences between the actions of large groups and the actions of small groups. “The paradox, then, is that (in the absence of special arrangements or circumstances to which we shall turn later) large groups, at least if they are composed of rational individuals, will not act in their group interest” (18).
In a footnote, Olsen claims, “Rational need not imply self-interested. The argument in the text can hold even where there is altruistic behavior, although, if particular types of altruistic behavior are strong enough it will not hold” (19).
Incentives can be either negative or positive, and small groups experience these more acutely than large groups. Homogenous groups are more easy to organize. Large groups can experience many who remain rationally ignorant. “In particular, when the costs of individual contributions to collective action are very small, the individual has little incentive to investigate whether or not to make a contribution or even to exercise initiation. If the individual knows the costs of a contribution to collective action in the interest of a group of which he is a part are trivially small, he may rationally not take the trouble to consider whether the gains are smaller still” (28).
“…the larger the number of individuals or firms that would benefit from a collective good, the smaller the share of the gains from action in the group interest that will accrue to the individual or firm that undertakes the action. Thus, in the absence of selective incentives, the incentive for group action diminishes as group size increases, so that large groups are less able to act in their common interest than small ones” (31).
“The argument in this chapter predicts that those groups that have access to selective incentives will be more likely to act collectively to obtain collective goods than those that do not, and that smaller groups will have a greater likelihood of engaging in collective action than larger ones” (34).
The author begins by arguing that there has been a consistent historical pattern of previously insignificant groups becoming more significant, and previously powerful and mighty groups falling to the way side. Olson does not want to write broad based histories of these accounts, but simply wants to provide a theoretical framework for helping understand how these shifts in history could occur. He claims that some of the underlying trends of these power shifts are poorly understood.
In the same way that the rise and fall of many civilizations has not been adequately explained, many large economic events have also had inadequate explanations. For example, the rise of the common European market in 1957 and the subsequent growth of Italy, France, West Germany and Benelux vis-à-vis other nations that one would have expected to grow more quickly (the UK, US, for example) provides a case of an economic phenomena that has not been adequately explained. Additionally, general economic phenomena have not been fully given accord by some of the major economic schools of thought. For example, while Keynes presents a good macro-level account of unemployment, it lacks on the micro level. Neo-classical/rationalist models, on the other hand, claim that all unemployment is voluntary. Olsen attempts to put forward a theory that provides an adequate account of unemployment while still using rational maximizing individuals.
Another question put forth to explore: “Why are some modern societies to some degree ungovernable? That is, Why has it seemed that governments in some countries did not govern or control their societies as well as they had in the past?” (8).
Olson warns against ad hoc explanations for economic phenomena, though some of it may be right. It tends to be not-falsifiable, and hindsight tends to be such that conclusions can be drawn that would have been specious with foresight. Theories must be evaluated on the degree and precision of their explanations.
Ch. 2:
This chapter begins by exploring the differences between the actions of large groups and the actions of small groups. “The paradox, then, is that (in the absence of special arrangements or circumstances to which we shall turn later) large groups, at least if they are composed of rational individuals, will not act in their group interest” (18).
In a footnote, Olsen claims, “Rational need not imply self-interested. The argument in the text can hold even where there is altruistic behavior, although, if particular types of altruistic behavior are strong enough it will not hold” (19).
Incentives can be either negative or positive, and small groups experience these more acutely than large groups. Homogenous groups are more easy to organize. Large groups can experience many who remain rationally ignorant. “In particular, when the costs of individual contributions to collective action are very small, the individual has little incentive to investigate whether or not to make a contribution or even to exercise initiation. If the individual knows the costs of a contribution to collective action in the interest of a group of which he is a part are trivially small, he may rationally not take the trouble to consider whether the gains are smaller still” (28).
“…the larger the number of individuals or firms that would benefit from a collective good, the smaller the share of the gains from action in the group interest that will accrue to the individual or firm that undertakes the action. Thus, in the absence of selective incentives, the incentive for group action diminishes as group size increases, so that large groups are less able to act in their common interest than small ones” (31).
“The argument in this chapter predicts that those groups that have access to selective incentives will be more likely to act collectively to obtain collective goods than those that do not, and that smaller groups will have a greater likelihood of engaging in collective action than larger ones” (34).
Monday, October 27, 2008
Pasinetti: Structural Change and Economic Growth
Pasinetti, L., Structural change and economic growth, Cambridge University Press.
Pasenetti beings his book by exploring a broad overview of economic theory historically. At its broadest, he distinguished between trade and industrialization in the development of the science of economics. Initially, there was trade, which is a relatively static phenomena. Then, out of the growth that trade created, the more dynamic process of industrialization took place.
Merchantilism is the school of economic thought that believes that countries must trade with other countries, but that exports should be larger than imports. Trade is a weapon to be used to strengthen nations.
Physiocracy, alternatively, explored economic production from the perspective that promoted the idea that agricultural production was the core of all economic production. This school of thought also produced the first table representing economic inputs and outputs (Quesnay).
Smith and Ricardo represent the core of the classical approach to understanding economic growth. Smith paints a picture of growth that is highly determined by different levels of technology and productivity. Ricardo explores two different kinds of goods, those whose value is determined solely (or mostly) by their scarcity, and those whose value can fluctuate greatly based on productivity.
Marginal economic theory emerged from criticisms of classical economic theory: the later didn’t take into consideration demand side economic issues. These theories, most notably, those of Walras and equilibrium seeking, price driven models, stood as a contrast to radical takes on classical economic systems of production. For example, economists could rely in a Walsrasian analysis of the economy as it took production of the equation, and thus castrated Marxist analysis.
Marginal production theory was another transition that occurred in the late 19th century. This theory brought together all of the factors of the production process and produced relative production curves (in contrast to utility curves) to demonstrate the relative productive capabilities of different allotments of factors of production in an economy to overall production.
From here on, there have been many different foci of economic theory, though Pasenetti argues that the focus on scarcity should be less heavily emphasized because there has been a structural change in productive capabilities.
Pasenetti beings his book by exploring a broad overview of economic theory historically. At its broadest, he distinguished between trade and industrialization in the development of the science of economics. Initially, there was trade, which is a relatively static phenomena. Then, out of the growth that trade created, the more dynamic process of industrialization took place.
Merchantilism is the school of economic thought that believes that countries must trade with other countries, but that exports should be larger than imports. Trade is a weapon to be used to strengthen nations.
Physiocracy, alternatively, explored economic production from the perspective that promoted the idea that agricultural production was the core of all economic production. This school of thought also produced the first table representing economic inputs and outputs (Quesnay).
Smith and Ricardo represent the core of the classical approach to understanding economic growth. Smith paints a picture of growth that is highly determined by different levels of technology and productivity. Ricardo explores two different kinds of goods, those whose value is determined solely (or mostly) by their scarcity, and those whose value can fluctuate greatly based on productivity.
Marginal economic theory emerged from criticisms of classical economic theory: the later didn’t take into consideration demand side economic issues. These theories, most notably, those of Walras and equilibrium seeking, price driven models, stood as a contrast to radical takes on classical economic systems of production. For example, economists could rely in a Walsrasian analysis of the economy as it took production of the equation, and thus castrated Marxist analysis.
Marginal production theory was another transition that occurred in the late 19th century. This theory brought together all of the factors of the production process and produced relative production curves (in contrast to utility curves) to demonstrate the relative productive capabilities of different allotments of factors of production in an economy to overall production.
From here on, there have been many different foci of economic theory, though Pasenetti argues that the focus on scarcity should be less heavily emphasized because there has been a structural change in productive capabilities.
Friday, October 24, 2008
Blinder: Hard Heads, Soft Hearts
Blinder, A., 1987. Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Economics for a Just Society, Addison Wesley Publishing Company.
“Murphy’s Law of Economic Policy: Economists have the least influence on policy where they know the most and are most agreed; they have the most influence on policy where they know the least and disagree most vehemently” (1).
Blinder argues that issues upon which a vast majority of economists agree are things like the link between high tariffs and decreased economic welfare, the bridge between rent controls and decreased housing quality and the connection between decreased taxes and increased employment (2).
An example of bad policy decisions being taken is given relating to Laffer and his intuition that there is a point where too much taxes will actually decrease tax revenue because it will reduce incentives to produce. Laffer used this logic to argue that the US could increase tax revenue by decreasing taxes. Blinder argues that this was uncontroversially seen as being improbably by economists.
“O’Connor’s Corollary: When conflicting economic advice is offered, only the worst will be taken” (4).
Another example of the above corollary is good advice that was not taken: in the early 80s, Reagan grew the federal deficit greatly. This, many argued, would increase interest rates, push the value of the dollar up and hurt exports. This good advice did little to affect policy.
“To economists, the theoretical case for free trade is as natural as mother’s milk” (7).
Blinder presents the case against tariffs against Japanese auto-makers. Then he presents a case for how economists can solve pollution problems by reducing incentives to pollute.
Is there a chance that this trend can be turned around? Maybe. Part of the problem is that economists have not been as eloquent as they possibly could be. Another seems to be a public’s desire for parsimonious answers when the “right” answer might involve a good degree of nuance.
“Murphy’s Law of Economic Policy: Economists have the least influence on policy where they know the most and are most agreed; they have the most influence on policy where they know the least and disagree most vehemently” (1).
Blinder argues that issues upon which a vast majority of economists agree are things like the link between high tariffs and decreased economic welfare, the bridge between rent controls and decreased housing quality and the connection between decreased taxes and increased employment (2).
An example of bad policy decisions being taken is given relating to Laffer and his intuition that there is a point where too much taxes will actually decrease tax revenue because it will reduce incentives to produce. Laffer used this logic to argue that the US could increase tax revenue by decreasing taxes. Blinder argues that this was uncontroversially seen as being improbably by economists.
“O’Connor’s Corollary: When conflicting economic advice is offered, only the worst will be taken” (4).
Another example of the above corollary is good advice that was not taken: in the early 80s, Reagan grew the federal deficit greatly. This, many argued, would increase interest rates, push the value of the dollar up and hurt exports. This good advice did little to affect policy.
“To economists, the theoretical case for free trade is as natural as mother’s milk” (7).
Blinder presents the case against tariffs against Japanese auto-makers. Then he presents a case for how economists can solve pollution problems by reducing incentives to pollute.
Is there a chance that this trend can be turned around? Maybe. Part of the problem is that economists have not been as eloquent as they possibly could be. Another seems to be a public’s desire for parsimonious answers when the “right” answer might involve a good degree of nuance.
Thursday, October 23, 2008
Abramovitz: Catching Up, Forging Ahead and Falling Behind
Abramovitz, M., 1986. Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind. Journal of Economic History, 46(2), 385-406.
“A widely entertained hypothesis holds that, in comparisons among countries, productivity growth rates tend to vary inversely with productivity levels” (385). Convergence happened most clearly in the quarter century following WWII. This article puts forth a hypothesis that convergence takes place because of catch-up phenomena.
The story of convergence is quite a simple one, especially after WWII: The US had amassed such a degree of technology that was not available in other countries and, once the peace was established, other nations were able to achieve the gains from that technology without having to go up the steep learning curve of an initial adopter. When you are further back in your “technological age” (which correlates to the actual age of the technology chronologically), you have more potential to catch up. As you get closer to the hegemon, this growth slows.
Four extensions to the basic idea of technological convergence are listed:
1.) “The same technological opportunity that permits rapid progress by modernization encourages rapid growth of the capital stock parly because of the returns to modernization itself…So—besides a reduction of technological age towards chronological age, the rate of rise of the capital-labor ratio tends to be higher”
2.) “Growth of productivity also makes for increase in aggregate output”
3.) “Backwardness carries an opportunity for modernization in disembodied, as well as in embodied, technology”
4.) “If countries at relatively low levels of industrialization contain large numbers of redundant workers in farming and petty trade, as is normally the case, there is also an opportunity for productivity growth by improving the allocation of labor” (387).
Countries who have the greatest opportunity to gain from technological convergence are those that are “socially advanced” but technologically backwards.
Restatement of hypothesis: “Countries that are technologically backward have a potentiality for generating growth more rapid than that of more advanced countries, providing their social capabilities are sufficiently developed to permit successful exploitation of technologies already employed by the technological leaders. The pace at which potential for catch-up is actually realized in a particular period depends on factors limiting the diffusion of knowledge, the rate of structural change, the accumulation of capital, and the expansion of demand. The process of catching up tends to be self-limiting, but the strength of the tendency may be weakened or overcome, at least for limited periods, by advantages connected with the convergence of production patterns as followers advance towards leaders or by an endogenous enlargement of social capabilities” (391).
Abramovits then explores historical data related to the phenomena of catching up.
Catching-up is a phenomena that occurs when some are behind technologically but where they have achieved sufficient social capital to make the adoption of new technologies feasible.
“A widely entertained hypothesis holds that, in comparisons among countries, productivity growth rates tend to vary inversely with productivity levels” (385). Convergence happened most clearly in the quarter century following WWII. This article puts forth a hypothesis that convergence takes place because of catch-up phenomena.
The story of convergence is quite a simple one, especially after WWII: The US had amassed such a degree of technology that was not available in other countries and, once the peace was established, other nations were able to achieve the gains from that technology without having to go up the steep learning curve of an initial adopter. When you are further back in your “technological age” (which correlates to the actual age of the technology chronologically), you have more potential to catch up. As you get closer to the hegemon, this growth slows.
Four extensions to the basic idea of technological convergence are listed:
1.) “The same technological opportunity that permits rapid progress by modernization encourages rapid growth of the capital stock parly because of the returns to modernization itself…So—besides a reduction of technological age towards chronological age, the rate of rise of the capital-labor ratio tends to be higher”
2.) “Growth of productivity also makes for increase in aggregate output”
3.) “Backwardness carries an opportunity for modernization in disembodied, as well as in embodied, technology”
4.) “If countries at relatively low levels of industrialization contain large numbers of redundant workers in farming and petty trade, as is normally the case, there is also an opportunity for productivity growth by improving the allocation of labor” (387).
Countries who have the greatest opportunity to gain from technological convergence are those that are “socially advanced” but technologically backwards.
Restatement of hypothesis: “Countries that are technologically backward have a potentiality for generating growth more rapid than that of more advanced countries, providing their social capabilities are sufficiently developed to permit successful exploitation of technologies already employed by the technological leaders. The pace at which potential for catch-up is actually realized in a particular period depends on factors limiting the diffusion of knowledge, the rate of structural change, the accumulation of capital, and the expansion of demand. The process of catching up tends to be self-limiting, but the strength of the tendency may be weakened or overcome, at least for limited periods, by advantages connected with the convergence of production patterns as followers advance towards leaders or by an endogenous enlargement of social capabilities” (391).
Abramovits then explores historical data related to the phenomena of catching up.
Catching-up is a phenomena that occurs when some are behind technologically but where they have achieved sufficient social capital to make the adoption of new technologies feasible.
Friday, October 17, 2008
Becker: The Economic Approach to Human Behavior
Becker, G., 1976. The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, University of Chicago Press.
Ch. 1: The Economic Approach to Human Behavior
“The following essays use an ‘economic’ approach in seeking to understand human behavior in a variety of contexts and situations. Although few persons would dispute the distinctiveness of an economic approach, it is not easy to states exactly what distinguished the economic approach from the sociological, psychological, anthropological, political or even genetical approaches” (3).
“Economics is said to be the study of (1) the allocation of material goods to satisfy material wants, (2) the market sector, and (3) the allocation of scarce means to satisfy competing ends” (3).
The first definition, according to Becker, is wrong because the logic of economics can be applied much more broadly than simply material goods. The third definition is the most broad, and does more to identify the nature of a problem to be solved and little to identify what it is that economists do. “All of these definitions of economics simply define the scope, and none tells us one iota about what the ‘economic’ approach is” (4). Becker argues that the economic approach, or method, is what makes this study unique, and not the subject-matter in question.
“Everyone recognizes that the economic approach assumes maximizing behavior more explicitly and extensively than other approaches…Moreover, the economic approach assumes the existence of markets that with varying degrees of efficiency coordinate the actions of different participants…Prices and other market instruments allocate the scarce resources within a society and thereby constrain the desires of participants and coordinate their actions. In the economic approach, these market instruments perform most, if not all, of the functions assigned to ‘structure’ in sociological theories…The preferences that are assumed to be stable do not refer to market goods and services, but to underlying objects of choice that are produced by each household using market goods and services…The combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as I see it” (5).
He then goes on to explain why these core assumptions of the economic approach are appropriate. Becker also explains how the economic approach can be applied to really any problem facing the social sciences. That being said, however, he ends this chapter by claiming that the economic approach provides a certain kind of knowledge about the world and that other approaches are quite useful in explaining different kinds of human behavior. In the end, there is a role for approaches that theorize actors to be rational maximizers with stable preferences operating in equilibrium seeking markets.
Ch. 1: The Economic Approach to Human Behavior
“The following essays use an ‘economic’ approach in seeking to understand human behavior in a variety of contexts and situations. Although few persons would dispute the distinctiveness of an economic approach, it is not easy to states exactly what distinguished the economic approach from the sociological, psychological, anthropological, political or even genetical approaches” (3).
“Economics is said to be the study of (1) the allocation of material goods to satisfy material wants, (2) the market sector, and (3) the allocation of scarce means to satisfy competing ends” (3).
The first definition, according to Becker, is wrong because the logic of economics can be applied much more broadly than simply material goods. The third definition is the most broad, and does more to identify the nature of a problem to be solved and little to identify what it is that economists do. “All of these definitions of economics simply define the scope, and none tells us one iota about what the ‘economic’ approach is” (4). Becker argues that the economic approach, or method, is what makes this study unique, and not the subject-matter in question.
“Everyone recognizes that the economic approach assumes maximizing behavior more explicitly and extensively than other approaches…Moreover, the economic approach assumes the existence of markets that with varying degrees of efficiency coordinate the actions of different participants…Prices and other market instruments allocate the scarce resources within a society and thereby constrain the desires of participants and coordinate their actions. In the economic approach, these market instruments perform most, if not all, of the functions assigned to ‘structure’ in sociological theories…The preferences that are assumed to be stable do not refer to market goods and services, but to underlying objects of choice that are produced by each household using market goods and services…The combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as I see it” (5).
He then goes on to explain why these core assumptions of the economic approach are appropriate. Becker also explains how the economic approach can be applied to really any problem facing the social sciences. That being said, however, he ends this chapter by claiming that the economic approach provides a certain kind of knowledge about the world and that other approaches are quite useful in explaining different kinds of human behavior. In the end, there is a role for approaches that theorize actors to be rational maximizers with stable preferences operating in equilibrium seeking markets.
Friday, October 10, 2008
Gilpin: A Realist Perspective on International Governance
Gilpin, R., 2002. A Realist Perspective on International Governance. Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, 237-248.
Realist believe that the territorial state continues to be the primary actor in both domestic and international affairs. While there are other players, the state makes the most important decisions. Realist reject the popular belief that economic and technological forces have eclipsed the nation state and are creating a global economy and society in which political boundaries and national loyalties are no longer relevant. Even in a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favorable to their own national interests and the interests of their citizenry. There is no evidence that a transformation in human affairs has yet occurred or is even occurring. It is unlikely that, if the state does disappear, that it will be replaced by a global governance structure. Gilpin argues that, even though econ and tech advances lead to more world order, they do not overcome the fundamental anarchic nature of the int’l system.
Three views of global governance: Focus on new medievalism. Based on the assumption that the state and the state system have been undermined by economic, technological and other developments; the state and state system are being eclipse by non-governmental actors and by the emergence of an int’l civil society.
They conclude that such changes erode hierarchical organizations and undermine centralized power structures. The once dominant hierarchic order of nation states is being supplanted by horizontal networks composed of states, non governmental organizations and international institutions.
Counter with the fact that the nation state has been around for over three centuries and that NGO activity only begin heavily two decades ago. No one can know the future nature of NGOs. Could be that there are bad NGOs that develop. The Basel accord achieved much, but it does not prove that governance can replace government. The US used the Basel Accords and drove them to their personal ends. Governance without teeth is not effective.
Realist believe that the territorial state continues to be the primary actor in both domestic and international affairs. While there are other players, the state makes the most important decisions. Realist reject the popular belief that economic and technological forces have eclipsed the nation state and are creating a global economy and society in which political boundaries and national loyalties are no longer relevant. Even in a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favorable to their own national interests and the interests of their citizenry. There is no evidence that a transformation in human affairs has yet occurred or is even occurring. It is unlikely that, if the state does disappear, that it will be replaced by a global governance structure. Gilpin argues that, even though econ and tech advances lead to more world order, they do not overcome the fundamental anarchic nature of the int’l system.
Three views of global governance: Focus on new medievalism. Based on the assumption that the state and the state system have been undermined by economic, technological and other developments; the state and state system are being eclipse by non-governmental actors and by the emergence of an int’l civil society.
They conclude that such changes erode hierarchical organizations and undermine centralized power structures. The once dominant hierarchic order of nation states is being supplanted by horizontal networks composed of states, non governmental organizations and international institutions.
Counter with the fact that the nation state has been around for over three centuries and that NGO activity only begin heavily two decades ago. No one can know the future nature of NGOs. Could be that there are bad NGOs that develop. The Basel accord achieved much, but it does not prove that governance can replace government. The US used the Basel Accords and drove them to their personal ends. Governance without teeth is not effective.
Falk: World Order between Interstate Law and the Law of Humanity
Falk, R., 1995. World Order between Interstate Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil Society Institutions, The. International Legal Theory, 1, 14.
Richard Faulk presents a notion of world order that is situated between inter-state law and the law of humanity. Law of humanity must be understood in two senses: firstly, the transnational non-governmental sense, and secondly as the activation of peoples to pursue their emancipation from oppressive structures of governance, social movements legitimated by their aspirations being embodied in interstate law. World order is a composite reality of Inter-state law and the Law of Humanity. Law of Humanity must be distinguished from globalization, though there are connections. Throughout history, inter-state law was seen as the best vehicle by which to achieve the objectives of the law of humanity. There is an erosion of territoriality that has undermined the major premise of inter-state law and its derivative claim to operate as the guardian of human well being. Matters of vulnerability: state has lost the capacity to uphold security in light of nuclear weaponry, state cannot safeguard its territory from adverse effects of extra-terrestrial behavior (oceans; atmosphere), economic viability: can no longer provide an adequate framework for economic activity and is being superseded by an array of international regimes and the regionalization and globalization of capital markets. There is a place for the Law of Humanity to take over, thought it is only in its dreaming phase. Often, only civil society initiatives are helpful in these settings (Bosnia, Somalia) and then in ways that do not address the underlying conflict, as by providing humanitarian relief on a daily basis and seeking to identify and strengthen reconciling and democratically oriented social forces. Similar with environmentalism.
Many instances of globalization-from-above: world trade, investment, GATT, (list goes on and on). The law implications of globalization-from-above would tend to supplant interstate law with a species of global law, but one at odds in most respects with the law of humanity.
Transnational social forces provide the only vehicle for the promotion of the law of humanity. Globalization from below used to identify transnational democratic forces and their implicit dedication to the creation of a global civil society that is an alternative scenario of the future to that of the global political economy being shaped by transnational market forces.
Interstate law latently recognizes important ingredients of the Law of Humanity: Article 25 and 28 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Nuremberg principles, Preamble to the UN charter and Articles 1 and 2 of the charter. Must move from inter-state law to the Law of Humanity. Governance of environmental and market operations are two key areas.
States that UN must give greater weight to global civil society perspectives. Giver Germany and Japan permanent seats in the Security Council, possibly India, Brazil and Nigeria. Structural reform
Realizing the Law of Humanity is complex, though main energy must come from civil society.
Richard Faulk presents a notion of world order that is situated between inter-state law and the law of humanity. Law of humanity must be understood in two senses: firstly, the transnational non-governmental sense, and secondly as the activation of peoples to pursue their emancipation from oppressive structures of governance, social movements legitimated by their aspirations being embodied in interstate law. World order is a composite reality of Inter-state law and the Law of Humanity. Law of Humanity must be distinguished from globalization, though there are connections. Throughout history, inter-state law was seen as the best vehicle by which to achieve the objectives of the law of humanity. There is an erosion of territoriality that has undermined the major premise of inter-state law and its derivative claim to operate as the guardian of human well being. Matters of vulnerability: state has lost the capacity to uphold security in light of nuclear weaponry, state cannot safeguard its territory from adverse effects of extra-terrestrial behavior (oceans; atmosphere), economic viability: can no longer provide an adequate framework for economic activity and is being superseded by an array of international regimes and the regionalization and globalization of capital markets. There is a place for the Law of Humanity to take over, thought it is only in its dreaming phase. Often, only civil society initiatives are helpful in these settings (Bosnia, Somalia) and then in ways that do not address the underlying conflict, as by providing humanitarian relief on a daily basis and seeking to identify and strengthen reconciling and democratically oriented social forces. Similar with environmentalism.
Many instances of globalization-from-above: world trade, investment, GATT, (list goes on and on). The law implications of globalization-from-above would tend to supplant interstate law with a species of global law, but one at odds in most respects with the law of humanity.
Transnational social forces provide the only vehicle for the promotion of the law of humanity. Globalization from below used to identify transnational democratic forces and their implicit dedication to the creation of a global civil society that is an alternative scenario of the future to that of the global political economy being shaped by transnational market forces.
Interstate law latently recognizes important ingredients of the Law of Humanity: Article 25 and 28 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Nuremberg principles, Preamble to the UN charter and Articles 1 and 2 of the charter. Must move from inter-state law to the Law of Humanity. Governance of environmental and market operations are two key areas.
States that UN must give greater weight to global civil society perspectives. Giver Germany and Japan permanent seats in the Security Council, possibly India, Brazil and Nigeria. Structural reform
Realizing the Law of Humanity is complex, though main energy must come from civil society.
Held and McGrew: Governing Globalization
Held, D. & McGrew, A., 2002. Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, Polity.
David Held’s theory of cosmopolitan society notes that globalization has caused an increase in social, political and economic activity across political boundaries, growth in networks and flows of finance, trace and culture, a speeding up of global interactions and a deepening of impacts from these global interactions. These four factors create a milieu that thus changes the nature and character of the nation-state. Held points out five distinct changes that globalization brings upon the nation-state:
1.) A self-determining national collectivity can no longer be simply located within the borders of a single nation-state;
2.) It cannot be presupposed that the locus of effective political power is synonymous with national governments;
3.) The practical nature of political authority and the capacity to rule are changing shape;
4.) The nurturing and enhancement of the public good increasingly requires coordinated multilateral action;
5.) Distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs, international political issues and external questions are no longer clear cut.
Held points out that, “the new circumstances of cosmopolitanism give us little choice but to consider the possibility of a common framework of standards and political action, given shape and form by a common framework of institutional arrangements (Held 2002:308)
Held goes on to point out three distinct schools of cosmopolitan thought.
The Stoics were the first to refer to themselves as cosmopolitans. This cosmopolitan thought was developed by emphasizing that we lived in two worlds: one which is local and given to us by birth and another which is “truly great and truly common.” Each person lives in a local community and a wider community of human ideals, aspirations and argument. The Stoics’ perspective does not require that we relinquish local concerns, but they must see these as morally contingent on the development as the human as a whole. The main point is that we are initially human beings in a world of human beings and secondary members of polities.
The second view of cosmopolitan society that Held proposes is that of the weltburger, the Enlightenment and specifically Kant’s writings. Kant specifically combined cosmopolitanism with the idea of “the public use of reason”. This view of reason can then generate a critical vantage point from which to scrutinize civil society. The advance of this goal was the escape from dogma and un-validated authority while also removing the constraints on “the public use of reason”. People were asked to step outside of the realm of “dictatorial authority.” This then asked the individual to learn to think of themselves as participants in a dialogue, through which they come to an understanding with others about the nature and appropriateness of the demands made upon them. (Held 2002:310) He advocated a cosmopolitan right to enter into un-coerced dialogue. Cosmopolitan right transcends the particular claims of nations and states and extends to all in the universal community.
The third view is that of Beitz, Pogge and Barry, among others. There are three key elements: Egalitarian individualism: the ultimate unit of moral concern are individual human beings. Reciprocal recognition: the status of equal worth should be acknowledged by everyone. If people are marginalized or fall outside this framework they suffer disadvantage not primarily because they have less than others in this instance, but because they can participate less in the processes and institutions that shape their lives. Impartialist reasoning: reasoning from the point of view of others. Each person should enjoy the impartial treatment of their claims – that is, treatment based on principles upon which all could act.
David Held’s theory of cosmopolitan society notes that globalization has caused an increase in social, political and economic activity across political boundaries, growth in networks and flows of finance, trace and culture, a speeding up of global interactions and a deepening of impacts from these global interactions. These four factors create a milieu that thus changes the nature and character of the nation-state. Held points out five distinct changes that globalization brings upon the nation-state:
1.) A self-determining national collectivity can no longer be simply located within the borders of a single nation-state;
2.) It cannot be presupposed that the locus of effective political power is synonymous with national governments;
3.) The practical nature of political authority and the capacity to rule are changing shape;
4.) The nurturing and enhancement of the public good increasingly requires coordinated multilateral action;
5.) Distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs, international political issues and external questions are no longer clear cut.
Held points out that, “the new circumstances of cosmopolitanism give us little choice but to consider the possibility of a common framework of standards and political action, given shape and form by a common framework of institutional arrangements (Held 2002:308)
Held goes on to point out three distinct schools of cosmopolitan thought.
The Stoics were the first to refer to themselves as cosmopolitans. This cosmopolitan thought was developed by emphasizing that we lived in two worlds: one which is local and given to us by birth and another which is “truly great and truly common.” Each person lives in a local community and a wider community of human ideals, aspirations and argument. The Stoics’ perspective does not require that we relinquish local concerns, but they must see these as morally contingent on the development as the human as a whole. The main point is that we are initially human beings in a world of human beings and secondary members of polities.
The second view of cosmopolitan society that Held proposes is that of the weltburger, the Enlightenment and specifically Kant’s writings. Kant specifically combined cosmopolitanism with the idea of “the public use of reason”. This view of reason can then generate a critical vantage point from which to scrutinize civil society. The advance of this goal was the escape from dogma and un-validated authority while also removing the constraints on “the public use of reason”. People were asked to step outside of the realm of “dictatorial authority.” This then asked the individual to learn to think of themselves as participants in a dialogue, through which they come to an understanding with others about the nature and appropriateness of the demands made upon them. (Held 2002:310) He advocated a cosmopolitan right to enter into un-coerced dialogue. Cosmopolitan right transcends the particular claims of nations and states and extends to all in the universal community.
The third view is that of Beitz, Pogge and Barry, among others. There are three key elements: Egalitarian individualism: the ultimate unit of moral concern are individual human beings. Reciprocal recognition: the status of equal worth should be acknowledged by everyone. If people are marginalized or fall outside this framework they suffer disadvantage not primarily because they have less than others in this instance, but because they can participate less in the processes and institutions that shape their lives. Impartialist reasoning: reasoning from the point of view of others. Each person should enjoy the impartial treatment of their claims – that is, treatment based on principles upon which all could act.
Gibson-Graham: The End of Capitalism (as we knew it)
Gibson-Graham, J., The end of capitalism (as we knew it), Blackwell Publishers.
Gibson and Graham provide a post-structural, feminist critique of orthodox Marxism. They conclude that Marxists have actually hurt their chances of overthrowing capitalism because they have engaged in a discourse that allows capitalism to be something larger, stronger and more intimidating that it actually is. The capitalist beast is not as imposing a beast as Marxism has painted it out to be. “Marxism has produced a discourse of Capitalism that ostensibly delineates as object of transformative class politics but that operates more powerfully to discourage and marginalize projects of class transformation…Marxism has contributed to the socialist absence through the very way in which it has theorized the capitalist presence” (Gibson and Graham 1997:252) Gibson and Graham provide a scathing critique of Marxist interpretation of globalization. These two authors fall into the Held and McGrew globalization skeptics position as they do not believe that the “penetration” or “immanent penetration” of capital into every corner of the earth is a reality, or that if such a reality did start to occur, that it could not be stopped.
They compare the “rape-script” with the “globalization-script” in one of their more striking passages. The “rape-script” allows all of us to see women as being rape-able and men as being possible rapists. Gibson and Graham take parts of the rape-script from Sharon Marcus where she, “challenges the inevitability of the claim that rape is one of the ‘real, clear facts of women’s lives’” (Gibson Graham 1997:121). We, by extension, are to challenge the reality that globalization/capitalism is one of the real, clear facts about the existence of citizens throughout the world.
This understanding of how the discourse surrounding rape has reinforced the idea that women are rape-able, open and vulnerable while men are hard, strong and potential violators helped to shape Gibson and Graham’s ideas surrounding globalization. The penetrating power of globalization has become, in many circles, an inevitability. Global capital will permeate and enter into any of the open, vulnerable developing countries. This has created a discourse that speaks us and shapes us; the globalization-script, and the eventualities it implies, may not be a reality. We are asked by the authors to reevaluate the potential for community based exchange that do not reinforce the dominant, globalization-script.
We must not become the victim of capitalism, we must make ourselves powerful. Even if our power is not initially evident, it becomes something greater as we reclaim the dialogue and shape it to our ends. This is how we make globalization lose its erection. This is how we create a world that is not dominated by one homogenizing economic system and dialogue.
Gibson and Graham then encourage us to go out and foster community based economic systems that value people. We are not to become subjects in the dominant discourse, but rather work on being stewards of our rhetoric and speak ourselves into a new discourse that does not build capitalism up into something that it is not. Gibson and Graham see globalization not as a real phenomenon that is inevitably creating one economic playing field where we will all gather. It is, on the other hand, a real phenomenon with limited scope whose real size has been artificially, and perversely, enlarged through an inaccurate discourse. The power to reshape our world does not lie in the hands of a few elite capitalists shaping the world in the interest of capital mobility, or politicians shaping the world in the interests of national capital or of global stability. The power to shape the world lies in the hands of individuals who are stewards of their rhetoric.
Gibson and Graham provide a post-structural, feminist critique of orthodox Marxism. They conclude that Marxists have actually hurt their chances of overthrowing capitalism because they have engaged in a discourse that allows capitalism to be something larger, stronger and more intimidating that it actually is. The capitalist beast is not as imposing a beast as Marxism has painted it out to be. “Marxism has produced a discourse of Capitalism that ostensibly delineates as object of transformative class politics but that operates more powerfully to discourage and marginalize projects of class transformation…Marxism has contributed to the socialist absence through the very way in which it has theorized the capitalist presence” (Gibson and Graham 1997:252) Gibson and Graham provide a scathing critique of Marxist interpretation of globalization. These two authors fall into the Held and McGrew globalization skeptics position as they do not believe that the “penetration” or “immanent penetration” of capital into every corner of the earth is a reality, or that if such a reality did start to occur, that it could not be stopped.
They compare the “rape-script” with the “globalization-script” in one of their more striking passages. The “rape-script” allows all of us to see women as being rape-able and men as being possible rapists. Gibson and Graham take parts of the rape-script from Sharon Marcus where she, “challenges the inevitability of the claim that rape is one of the ‘real, clear facts of women’s lives’” (Gibson Graham 1997:121). We, by extension, are to challenge the reality that globalization/capitalism is one of the real, clear facts about the existence of citizens throughout the world.
This understanding of how the discourse surrounding rape has reinforced the idea that women are rape-able, open and vulnerable while men are hard, strong and potential violators helped to shape Gibson and Graham’s ideas surrounding globalization. The penetrating power of globalization has become, in many circles, an inevitability. Global capital will permeate and enter into any of the open, vulnerable developing countries. This has created a discourse that speaks us and shapes us; the globalization-script, and the eventualities it implies, may not be a reality. We are asked by the authors to reevaluate the potential for community based exchange that do not reinforce the dominant, globalization-script.
We must not become the victim of capitalism, we must make ourselves powerful. Even if our power is not initially evident, it becomes something greater as we reclaim the dialogue and shape it to our ends. This is how we make globalization lose its erection. This is how we create a world that is not dominated by one homogenizing economic system and dialogue.
Gibson and Graham then encourage us to go out and foster community based economic systems that value people. We are not to become subjects in the dominant discourse, but rather work on being stewards of our rhetoric and speak ourselves into a new discourse that does not build capitalism up into something that it is not. Gibson and Graham see globalization not as a real phenomenon that is inevitably creating one economic playing field where we will all gather. It is, on the other hand, a real phenomenon with limited scope whose real size has been artificially, and perversely, enlarged through an inaccurate discourse. The power to reshape our world does not lie in the hands of a few elite capitalists shaping the world in the interest of capital mobility, or politicians shaping the world in the interests of national capital or of global stability. The power to shape the world lies in the hands of individuals who are stewards of their rhetoric.
van der Pijl: Transnational Classes and International Relations
van der Pijl, K., 1998. Transnational Classes and International Relations, Routledge.
Van der Pijl provides a Marxist cut on globalization and capital accumulation. He looks at how the structure of international capitalism has grown and changed over time. He begins by looking at original accumulation and moves on through liberal internationalism, state monopoly tendency, corporate liberalism eventually landing us in our current state of neo-liberal organization. In this understanding of globalization, we can see that fractions of capital eventually create class fractions with one fraction being the hegemonic system of structuring and organizing global capitalism due to contingent circumstances.
Van der Pijl analyses systems of capitalism using two tools: commodification and socialization. The commodification of things is what originally created classes and is what shapes capitalism. In original accumulation, the earliest form of capitalism, van der Pijl points out that, “the primordial process in which capital itself crystallizes as a quasi-independent social force, imposing its discipline on a pre-existing social infrastructure by penetrating and transforming it, is commodification…This implies that the use value aspect of an element or item of social production…has to be subordinated to the exchange value aspect” (van der Pijl 1998:37). This initial subordination of use value to exchange value is the very first movement towards a globalized world.
Van der Pijl would claim that commodification has become ubiquitous in our society. When coupled with fetishism, defined as the phenomenon in which modern society resembles the most primitive community and the ascription of animate spirit and magical powers to dead objects, commodification becomes a divine tool allowing people to justify and ethically adjudicate between decisions using the mana and taboo of the market (van der Pijl 1998 11-4). This is a world where everything is either already commodified or in the process of being commodified, a world where everything is a product and every decisions comes from the deified market. This creates an atomized society.
This process of commodification also creates classes. Van der Pijl notes that classes form from exploitative social relationships. With the increasing intensity of commodification, there are more opportunities to create wealth. Through these increased opportunities to create wealth, there are also increased opportunities to exploit workers through the appropriation of unpaid labor. This process of increasing ability to exploit workers and appropriate unpaid labor is a class producing process.
The ameliorating response to this atomized society is socialization . This is defined as, “the planned or otherwise normatively unified interdependence of functionally divided social activity” (van der Pijl 1998:138). This planned activity must be carried out to reunite society again after the commodification of everything. Van der Pijl points out that the result of commodifying, land, labor and money, the three most difficult things to commodify, a process of socialization must occur to bring unity, calm and balance to society. Van der Pijl sees the process of socialization to be undertaken by a group of people that he refers to as the cadres. These people seem to fulfill two functions in van der Pijl’s account: they are the technicians who run the increasingly complicated process of capitalist production and those who, from a position of elite authority (though under the authority of the capitalist), control the mitigating processes of socialization.
Van der Pijl’s interpretation of the increasing speed and intensity of global interconnection has to do with his fractions of capital creating class fractions. “It is our thesis that the capacity of fractions of capital to appropriate a share of the total mass of profits shapes the sense of identity of a particular segment of collective capital with the momentary functioning of the system, short-circuiting the general interest with the special one” (van der Pijl 1998:58). When this general interest is short-circuited with a special one, a hegemonic economic structure emerges. This is taken, in van der Pijl’s example, to then be represented in the Lockean heartland. However, there are also contender states that question the legitimacy and challenging the preeminence of the hegemonic states. This dance between the hegemonic and contender states is represented in what van der Pijl calls a natural tendency, “towards global unification represented by capital, and by the fact that every concrete state/society complex is ultimately held together by a specific structure of power and authority mediating its relations with other such complexes” (van der Pijl 1998:64).
The Lockean heartland, representing the hegemonic economic structure of the time, is not entirely contingent or deterministic. Van der Pijl says that, “the internationalization of capital, then, historically does not evolve as an economic process in a fixed landscape of sovereign states. It is an aspect of a process of expansion of the state/society complex in which capital crystallized under what proved to be the most favorable conditions” (van der Pijl 1998:83 emphasis added). Whatever the most favorable conditions for capital at the time were contingent on the prevailing fraction of capital. The deterministic aspect of this function is that capital will always flourish and be attracted to the most favorable conditions for its reproduction.
The van der Pijl view of increasing speed and intensity of global interconnection, or globalization, can be seen as a mixture of determistic and contingent factors. Fractions of capital create class fractions which end up controlling hegemonic economic regimes and thus Lockean states. Their control is contingent on whatever fraction of capital is hegemonic at the time. Their control is also determistic because the logic of capital accumulation is such that it will always search out increasingly complex forms of exploitation and appropriation of unpaid labor, thus, in van der Pijl’s model, creating class distinction and class conflict. Also, the determistic process of commodification leading to fetishism creates the need for the quasi-contingent process of socialization undertaken by the cadre class. This cadre class is the ultimate protector and technician working for the global capitalist order, but also, in the eyes of van der Pijl, the class that can eventually lead us beyond the natural contradictions that occur within a global system of capitalism.
Van der Pijl provides a Marxist cut on globalization and capital accumulation. He looks at how the structure of international capitalism has grown and changed over time. He begins by looking at original accumulation and moves on through liberal internationalism, state monopoly tendency, corporate liberalism eventually landing us in our current state of neo-liberal organization. In this understanding of globalization, we can see that fractions of capital eventually create class fractions with one fraction being the hegemonic system of structuring and organizing global capitalism due to contingent circumstances.
Van der Pijl analyses systems of capitalism using two tools: commodification and socialization. The commodification of things is what originally created classes and is what shapes capitalism. In original accumulation, the earliest form of capitalism, van der Pijl points out that, “the primordial process in which capital itself crystallizes as a quasi-independent social force, imposing its discipline on a pre-existing social infrastructure by penetrating and transforming it, is commodification…This implies that the use value aspect of an element or item of social production…has to be subordinated to the exchange value aspect” (van der Pijl 1998:37). This initial subordination of use value to exchange value is the very first movement towards a globalized world.
Van der Pijl would claim that commodification has become ubiquitous in our society. When coupled with fetishism, defined as the phenomenon in which modern society resembles the most primitive community and the ascription of animate spirit and magical powers to dead objects, commodification becomes a divine tool allowing people to justify and ethically adjudicate between decisions using the mana and taboo of the market (van der Pijl 1998 11-4). This is a world where everything is either already commodified or in the process of being commodified, a world where everything is a product and every decisions comes from the deified market. This creates an atomized society.
This process of commodification also creates classes. Van der Pijl notes that classes form from exploitative social relationships. With the increasing intensity of commodification, there are more opportunities to create wealth. Through these increased opportunities to create wealth, there are also increased opportunities to exploit workers through the appropriation of unpaid labor. This process of increasing ability to exploit workers and appropriate unpaid labor is a class producing process.
The ameliorating response to this atomized society is socialization . This is defined as, “the planned or otherwise normatively unified interdependence of functionally divided social activity” (van der Pijl 1998:138). This planned activity must be carried out to reunite society again after the commodification of everything. Van der Pijl points out that the result of commodifying, land, labor and money, the three most difficult things to commodify, a process of socialization must occur to bring unity, calm and balance to society. Van der Pijl sees the process of socialization to be undertaken by a group of people that he refers to as the cadres. These people seem to fulfill two functions in van der Pijl’s account: they are the technicians who run the increasingly complicated process of capitalist production and those who, from a position of elite authority (though under the authority of the capitalist), control the mitigating processes of socialization.
Van der Pijl’s interpretation of the increasing speed and intensity of global interconnection has to do with his fractions of capital creating class fractions. “It is our thesis that the capacity of fractions of capital to appropriate a share of the total mass of profits shapes the sense of identity of a particular segment of collective capital with the momentary functioning of the system, short-circuiting the general interest with the special one” (van der Pijl 1998:58). When this general interest is short-circuited with a special one, a hegemonic economic structure emerges. This is taken, in van der Pijl’s example, to then be represented in the Lockean heartland. However, there are also contender states that question the legitimacy and challenging the preeminence of the hegemonic states. This dance between the hegemonic and contender states is represented in what van der Pijl calls a natural tendency, “towards global unification represented by capital, and by the fact that every concrete state/society complex is ultimately held together by a specific structure of power and authority mediating its relations with other such complexes” (van der Pijl 1998:64).
The Lockean heartland, representing the hegemonic economic structure of the time, is not entirely contingent or deterministic. Van der Pijl says that, “the internationalization of capital, then, historically does not evolve as an economic process in a fixed landscape of sovereign states. It is an aspect of a process of expansion of the state/society complex in which capital crystallized under what proved to be the most favorable conditions” (van der Pijl 1998:83 emphasis added). Whatever the most favorable conditions for capital at the time were contingent on the prevailing fraction of capital. The deterministic aspect of this function is that capital will always flourish and be attracted to the most favorable conditions for its reproduction.
The van der Pijl view of increasing speed and intensity of global interconnection, or globalization, can be seen as a mixture of determistic and contingent factors. Fractions of capital create class fractions which end up controlling hegemonic economic regimes and thus Lockean states. Their control is contingent on whatever fraction of capital is hegemonic at the time. Their control is also determistic because the logic of capital accumulation is such that it will always search out increasingly complex forms of exploitation and appropriation of unpaid labor, thus, in van der Pijl’s model, creating class distinction and class conflict. Also, the determistic process of commodification leading to fetishism creates the need for the quasi-contingent process of socialization undertaken by the cadre class. This cadre class is the ultimate protector and technician working for the global capitalist order, but also, in the eyes of van der Pijl, the class that can eventually lead us beyond the natural contradictions that occur within a global system of capitalism.
Panitch and Gindin: Global Capitalism and American Empire
Panitch, L. & Gindin, S., 2004. Global Capitalism and American Empire, Merlin Press.
The causes of globalization are seen by Panitch and Gindin to be fairly standard for Marxist scholars. In the beginning of their “Rethinking Imperialism” chapter, they note that, “There is a structural logic to capitalism that tends to its expansion and internationalization. This was famously captured in Marx’s description in the communist Manifesto of a future that stunningly matches our present” (Panitch and Gindin 2004:13). They then go on to quote Marx’s explanation of the international nature of capital expansion. However, this standard, initial accumulation of capital is complicated by the tool of capitalist accumulation: imperialism and the theory of inter-imperial rivalry.
The authors contrast the traditional account of inter-imperial rivalry with an account that takes the capitalist state to be the most important actor in the consolidation of capital as opposed to theories of economic states or crises. In the traditional account, imperialism was the tool of capitalist nations to internationalize capital. This was the result of a theory of crisis being seen as the impetus for capital expansion beyond national borders. Because this dynamic was occurring in a number of different countries, there would be a number of different imperial powers. The new markets would also eventually be saturated, thus causing home markets to suffer an exhaustion of consumption and the imperial nations would turn against one another. This is the space that inter-imperial rivalry occurred.
Panich and Gindin explain why this interpretation of inter-imperial rivalry was misinformed. In the opinion of these authors, the inter-imperial rivalry theorists were wrong because they were defective in their treatment of the dynamics of capital accumulation, they mistakenly used the theory of crisis to explain capital expansion, they failed to understand the spatial dimensions of internationalization, they mistakenly assumed that exhaustion of consumption within capitalist countries would lead to crisis and finally they wrongly stated that the deepening of capital would lead to less choice (Panich and Gindin 2004:17-8). What the authors conclude is that these theories of inter-imperial rivalry were only looking at very early stages of capitalism. This current iteration of capitalism that we are experiencing is based on a different set of drivers.
The authors then go on to explain how the capitalist state must be a more vital aspect of theorizing capitalist imperialism. They say that, “Capitalist imperialism, then, needs to be understood through an extension of the theory of the capitalist state, rather than derived directly from the theory of economic stages or crises” (Panich and Gindin 2004:18). Panich and Gindin focus on the contingent aspects of capital accumulation and adaptation to contradictions in capitalism. They see earlier Marxist thought as relying on a much too simple understanding of the separation of the economic and the political. The true nature of the interaction between the economy and politics is much more nuanced.
The inter-imperialist rivalry paradigm was changed by Panich and Gindin to incorporate global capitalist expansion without tension occurring between major capitalist nations. This global capitalist order needed a hegemonic power that drove the expansion and the unification of the capitalist states and, in this current iteration of capitalism, this leader was found in the United States. In Panich and Gindin’s version of globalization, there are two realms of capital: domestic and international. The interest of domestic capital was trumpeted by proponents of the old inter-imperialist rivalry theory of capitalist expansion. However, in this new version of capitalist expansion, the tension is not between the interests of capital from two industrialized nations, but rather the expansion of capital is in the interest of global capital more generally. This is seen as being a response to the instability that occurred after the first occurrence of globalization .
Therefore, we see national interest undermined by global capital interests. The U.S. takes control of the operation and standardization of rules for this capital, but not entirely in their own interest. Other nations are willing to submit to the leadership of the United States because order is valued more highly than domestic capital interests. Two world wars and a global depression allowed nations to see the value of a stabilizing, international capital order controlled through one hegemonic leader. “The point is that we need to distinguish between the expansive tendency of capitalism and its actual history. A global capitalist order is always a contingent social construct: the actual development and continuity of such an order must be problematized” (Panich and Gindin 2004:14-5).
Through this account of capital expansion, Panich and Gindin show us how a contemporary, Marxist account of globalization takes into consideration the changes brought about by the increased intensity and speed of global connections. The rules and structure of international capital changed in the last half of the 20th century. Before this time, they were primarily controlled by the interest of certain nations. Now, they have moved into the realm of post-national control. Still, capital accumulation is seen as being a deterministic driver of international affairs, but the structure and the rules that it follows are to be contingent. If capital does not deterministically create the rules and structure that govern capitalism, we have opened up the possibility for substantial change that has little to do with initial capital accumulation.
The causes of globalization are seen by Panitch and Gindin to be fairly standard for Marxist scholars. In the beginning of their “Rethinking Imperialism” chapter, they note that, “There is a structural logic to capitalism that tends to its expansion and internationalization. This was famously captured in Marx’s description in the communist Manifesto of a future that stunningly matches our present” (Panitch and Gindin 2004:13). They then go on to quote Marx’s explanation of the international nature of capital expansion. However, this standard, initial accumulation of capital is complicated by the tool of capitalist accumulation: imperialism and the theory of inter-imperial rivalry.
The authors contrast the traditional account of inter-imperial rivalry with an account that takes the capitalist state to be the most important actor in the consolidation of capital as opposed to theories of economic states or crises. In the traditional account, imperialism was the tool of capitalist nations to internationalize capital. This was the result of a theory of crisis being seen as the impetus for capital expansion beyond national borders. Because this dynamic was occurring in a number of different countries, there would be a number of different imperial powers. The new markets would also eventually be saturated, thus causing home markets to suffer an exhaustion of consumption and the imperial nations would turn against one another. This is the space that inter-imperial rivalry occurred.
Panich and Gindin explain why this interpretation of inter-imperial rivalry was misinformed. In the opinion of these authors, the inter-imperial rivalry theorists were wrong because they were defective in their treatment of the dynamics of capital accumulation, they mistakenly used the theory of crisis to explain capital expansion, they failed to understand the spatial dimensions of internationalization, they mistakenly assumed that exhaustion of consumption within capitalist countries would lead to crisis and finally they wrongly stated that the deepening of capital would lead to less choice (Panich and Gindin 2004:17-8). What the authors conclude is that these theories of inter-imperial rivalry were only looking at very early stages of capitalism. This current iteration of capitalism that we are experiencing is based on a different set of drivers.
The authors then go on to explain how the capitalist state must be a more vital aspect of theorizing capitalist imperialism. They say that, “Capitalist imperialism, then, needs to be understood through an extension of the theory of the capitalist state, rather than derived directly from the theory of economic stages or crises” (Panich and Gindin 2004:18). Panich and Gindin focus on the contingent aspects of capital accumulation and adaptation to contradictions in capitalism. They see earlier Marxist thought as relying on a much too simple understanding of the separation of the economic and the political. The true nature of the interaction between the economy and politics is much more nuanced.
The inter-imperialist rivalry paradigm was changed by Panich and Gindin to incorporate global capitalist expansion without tension occurring between major capitalist nations. This global capitalist order needed a hegemonic power that drove the expansion and the unification of the capitalist states and, in this current iteration of capitalism, this leader was found in the United States. In Panich and Gindin’s version of globalization, there are two realms of capital: domestic and international. The interest of domestic capital was trumpeted by proponents of the old inter-imperialist rivalry theory of capitalist expansion. However, in this new version of capitalist expansion, the tension is not between the interests of capital from two industrialized nations, but rather the expansion of capital is in the interest of global capital more generally. This is seen as being a response to the instability that occurred after the first occurrence of globalization .
Therefore, we see national interest undermined by global capital interests. The U.S. takes control of the operation and standardization of rules for this capital, but not entirely in their own interest. Other nations are willing to submit to the leadership of the United States because order is valued more highly than domestic capital interests. Two world wars and a global depression allowed nations to see the value of a stabilizing, international capital order controlled through one hegemonic leader. “The point is that we need to distinguish between the expansive tendency of capitalism and its actual history. A global capitalist order is always a contingent social construct: the actual development and continuity of such an order must be problematized” (Panich and Gindin 2004:14-5).
Through this account of capital expansion, Panich and Gindin show us how a contemporary, Marxist account of globalization takes into consideration the changes brought about by the increased intensity and speed of global connections. The rules and structure of international capital changed in the last half of the 20th century. Before this time, they were primarily controlled by the interest of certain nations. Now, they have moved into the realm of post-national control. Still, capital accumulation is seen as being a deterministic driver of international affairs, but the structure and the rules that it follows are to be contingent. If capital does not deterministically create the rules and structure that govern capitalism, we have opened up the possibility for substantial change that has little to do with initial capital accumulation.
Held and McGrew: The Global Transformations Reader
Held, D. & McGrew, A., 2000. The global transformations reader.
The meaning of globalization is not universally held. It is seen by some to be increased interdependence, by others to be improved networking and transportation technology and by others to be increased interconnectedness.
“It (globalization) is characterized by four types of change. First, it involves a stretching of social, political and economic activities across frontiers, regions and continents. Second, it is marked by the intensification, or the growing magnitude, of interconnectedness and flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, culture, etc. Third, it can be linked to a speeding up of global interactions and processes, as the development of world-wide systems of transport and communication increases the velocity of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people. And, fourth, the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions can be associated with their deepening impact such that the effects of distant events can be highly significant elsewhere and specific local developments can come to have considerable global consequences…Globalization, in short, can be thought of as the widening, intensifying, speeding up, and growing impact of world-wide interconnectedness." (Held and McGrew 2000:67-8)
Held and McGrew also distinguish two schools of thought in the globalization debate: the globalists and the skeptics. The globalists believe that the world is changing, that the stretching, intensification, speeding up, growing extensity, intensity and velocity are all creating a very different world. The skeptics, on the other hand, do not believe that anything substantively new is coming about from the above changes associated with globalization. Two groups of people that Held and McGrew explicitly highlight who fall into the globalization skeptics are IR Realists and Marxists (Held and McGrew 2000:3-42).
Marxism and Realism are grouped together under the umbrella of globalization skeptics because they both rely on underlying assumptions about power that do not allow for much flexibility. For the Realist, power lies in the state. Globalization, from this perspective, may be changing the nature of state interaction, but it is not making any inroads onto the state monopoly on power. Realism, as a theory of IR, is very rigid and does not easily allow for substantive change, structural or otherwise. It is not possible that institutions or regimes that are not nationally controlled to exert any power over the sovereignty of the state.
Marxism is considered a globalization skeptic because the theory ultimately believes that capital drives power, be that power political, business or other. Traditional Marxist scholarship does not see a radically different world emerging with the increased intensity and speed of world-wide interconnectedness. They see the continued, historic drive of capital to accumulate, for that is the logic of capitalism. As globalization skeptics, Held and McGrew claim that Marxists do not allow for substantive global change. The drive for globalization is ultimately controlled by the logic of capital and class relations.
The meaning of globalization is not universally held. It is seen by some to be increased interdependence, by others to be improved networking and transportation technology and by others to be increased interconnectedness.
“It (globalization) is characterized by four types of change. First, it involves a stretching of social, political and economic activities across frontiers, regions and continents. Second, it is marked by the intensification, or the growing magnitude, of interconnectedness and flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, culture, etc. Third, it can be linked to a speeding up of global interactions and processes, as the development of world-wide systems of transport and communication increases the velocity of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people. And, fourth, the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions can be associated with their deepening impact such that the effects of distant events can be highly significant elsewhere and specific local developments can come to have considerable global consequences…Globalization, in short, can be thought of as the widening, intensifying, speeding up, and growing impact of world-wide interconnectedness." (Held and McGrew 2000:67-8)
Held and McGrew also distinguish two schools of thought in the globalization debate: the globalists and the skeptics. The globalists believe that the world is changing, that the stretching, intensification, speeding up, growing extensity, intensity and velocity are all creating a very different world. The skeptics, on the other hand, do not believe that anything substantively new is coming about from the above changes associated with globalization. Two groups of people that Held and McGrew explicitly highlight who fall into the globalization skeptics are IR Realists and Marxists (Held and McGrew 2000:3-42).
Marxism and Realism are grouped together under the umbrella of globalization skeptics because they both rely on underlying assumptions about power that do not allow for much flexibility. For the Realist, power lies in the state. Globalization, from this perspective, may be changing the nature of state interaction, but it is not making any inroads onto the state monopoly on power. Realism, as a theory of IR, is very rigid and does not easily allow for substantive change, structural or otherwise. It is not possible that institutions or regimes that are not nationally controlled to exert any power over the sovereignty of the state.
Marxism is considered a globalization skeptic because the theory ultimately believes that capital drives power, be that power political, business or other. Traditional Marxist scholarship does not see a radically different world emerging with the increased intensity and speed of world-wide interconnectedness. They see the continued, historic drive of capital to accumulate, for that is the logic of capitalism. As globalization skeptics, Held and McGrew claim that Marxists do not allow for substantive global change. The drive for globalization is ultimately controlled by the logic of capital and class relations.
Thursday, October 9, 2008
Drezner: Globalization and Policy Convergence
Drezner, D., 2001. Globalization and Policy Convergence. The International Studies Review, 3(1), 53-78.
“Globalization is the cluster of technological, economic, and political innovations that have drastically reduced the barriers to economic, political, and cultural exchange” (53).
“An implicit assumption of most policy analysts and some academics is that globalization leads to a convergence of traditionally national policies governing environmental regulation, consumer health and safety, the regulation of labor, and the ability to tax capital. Convergence is the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of increasing similarity in structures, processes and performances” (53).
The author believes that globalization is a phenomena that, because it broadly affects so many different aspects of life, is tackled differently, and potentially redundantly, but different disciplines. The author explores to what degree globalization is effecting the ability to gather taxes, and regulatory frameworks, specifically those of labor and the environment. “Two conclusions follow. First, theories of policy convergence diverge on whether the driving force is economic or ideational, and whether states retain agency in the face of globalization or are dominated by structural determinants. These divergences mirror the divisions among international relations paradigms. Globalization therefore has not led to the development of new theories of international relations, but merely transported existing theories to new issue areas of the global political economy. Second, the evidence on policy convergence across multiple issue areas suggests that the structurally based theories lack support. Globalization cannot be reduced to a set of deterministic forces. This suggests that the transnational economic and ideational forces commonly cited are not as powerful as previously suggested” (54).
“Most discussions of globalization stress two facets. The first is the magnitude of private economic forces such as capital flows and traded goods. The second is the deterministic quality of the phenomena; once states decide to lower their barriers to exchange, a Pandora’s box is unleashed that cannot be reversed. A review of the policy convergence literature suggests that both claims have been exaggerated. Although globalization has increased the size of transnational economic flows, it has not forced a race to the bottom in regulatory standards. Ideational forces have played an equally significant role in determining the rate and location of policy convergence on labor and environmental standards. Where harmonization has occurred, it has been a conscious choice of states made under the aegis of an international organization” (75).
“Globalization has led to the emergence of new issues to be analyzed by international relations scholars; it does not imply that new paradigms are needed to explain these issues” (78).
“Globalization is the cluster of technological, economic, and political innovations that have drastically reduced the barriers to economic, political, and cultural exchange” (53).
“An implicit assumption of most policy analysts and some academics is that globalization leads to a convergence of traditionally national policies governing environmental regulation, consumer health and safety, the regulation of labor, and the ability to tax capital. Convergence is the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of increasing similarity in structures, processes and performances” (53).
The author believes that globalization is a phenomena that, because it broadly affects so many different aspects of life, is tackled differently, and potentially redundantly, but different disciplines. The author explores to what degree globalization is effecting the ability to gather taxes, and regulatory frameworks, specifically those of labor and the environment. “Two conclusions follow. First, theories of policy convergence diverge on whether the driving force is economic or ideational, and whether states retain agency in the face of globalization or are dominated by structural determinants. These divergences mirror the divisions among international relations paradigms. Globalization therefore has not led to the development of new theories of international relations, but merely transported existing theories to new issue areas of the global political economy. Second, the evidence on policy convergence across multiple issue areas suggests that the structurally based theories lack support. Globalization cannot be reduced to a set of deterministic forces. This suggests that the transnational economic and ideational forces commonly cited are not as powerful as previously suggested” (54).
“Most discussions of globalization stress two facets. The first is the magnitude of private economic forces such as capital flows and traded goods. The second is the deterministic quality of the phenomena; once states decide to lower their barriers to exchange, a Pandora’s box is unleashed that cannot be reversed. A review of the policy convergence literature suggests that both claims have been exaggerated. Although globalization has increased the size of transnational economic flows, it has not forced a race to the bottom in regulatory standards. Ideational forces have played an equally significant role in determining the rate and location of policy convergence on labor and environmental standards. Where harmonization has occurred, it has been a conscious choice of states made under the aegis of an international organization” (75).
“Globalization has led to the emergence of new issues to be analyzed by international relations scholars; it does not imply that new paradigms are needed to explain these issues” (78).
Wednesday, October 8, 2008
Gilpin: The Theory of Hegemonic War
Gilpin, R., 1988. The Theory of Hegemonic War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18(4), 591-613.
“The essential idea embodied in Thucydides’ theory of hegemonic war is that fundamental changes in the international system are the basic determinants of such wars. The structure of the system or distribution of power among the states in the system can be stable or unstable. A stable system is one in which changes can take place if they do not threaten the vital interests of the dominant states and thereby cause a war among them…An unstable system is one in which economic, technological, and other changes are eroding the international hierarchy and undermining the position of the hegemonic state” (592).
Gilpin highlights three characteristics of hegemonic stability theory from the above quotation. The first, is that hegemonic stability theory relies on a different set of drivers than does other systemic level theories of the cause of war: it relies on exploring the broader changes in political and economic drivers. Secondly, states in an international system, broadly speaking, will interact strategically. Finally, hegemonic war does change and threaten the stability and structure of the international system.
“In summary, according to Thucydides, a great or hegemonic war, like a disease, follows a discernible and recurrent course. The initial phase is a relatively stable international system characterized by a hierarchical ordering of states with a dominant or hegemonic power. Over time, the power of some subordinate state begins to grow disproportionately; as this development occurs, it comes into conflict with the hegemonic state. The struggle between these contenders for preeminence and their accumulating alliances leads to a bipolarization of the system…As this bipolarization occurs the system becomes increasingly unstable, and a monic war, like a disease, displays discernible symptoms and follows an inevitable course.” (594-5).
“The essential idea embodied in Thucydides’ theory of hegemonic war is that fundamental changes in the international system are the basic determinants of such wars. The structure of the system or distribution of power among the states in the system can be stable or unstable. A stable system is one in which changes can take place if they do not threaten the vital interests of the dominant states and thereby cause a war among them…An unstable system is one in which economic, technological, and other changes are eroding the international hierarchy and undermining the position of the hegemonic state” (592).
Gilpin highlights three characteristics of hegemonic stability theory from the above quotation. The first, is that hegemonic stability theory relies on a different set of drivers than does other systemic level theories of the cause of war: it relies on exploring the broader changes in political and economic drivers. Secondly, states in an international system, broadly speaking, will interact strategically. Finally, hegemonic war does change and threaten the stability and structure of the international system.
“In summary, according to Thucydides, a great or hegemonic war, like a disease, follows a discernible and recurrent course. The initial phase is a relatively stable international system characterized by a hierarchical ordering of states with a dominant or hegemonic power. Over time, the power of some subordinate state begins to grow disproportionately; as this development occurs, it comes into conflict with the hegemonic state. The struggle between these contenders for preeminence and their accumulating alliances leads to a bipolarization of the system…As this bipolarization occurs the system becomes increasingly unstable, and a monic war, like a disease, displays discernible symptoms and follows an inevitable course.” (594-5).
Nye: Toward a Liberal Realist Foreign Policy
Nye, J., 2008. Toward a Liberal Realist Foreign Policy: The next president can advance American interests by putting global challenges in strategic context-and refocusing the United States as a "smart power''. Harvard Magazine, 110(4), 36.
“The old distinction between realists and liberals needs to give way to a new synthesis that you might choose to call ‘liberal realism’. What should a liberal realist foreign policy comprise? First, it would start w2ith an understanding of the strength and limits of American power. WE are the only superpower, but preponderance is not empire or hegemony” ( 36).
The world is currently divided into three chess-boards. The top layer involves the military, and that is clearly unipolar and dominated by the US. The middle board is economic, and that is currently multipolar with no clear dominant force. The lower board represents transnational forces, such as climate change, intellectual property rights, etc. That board is chaotic.
“Second, a liberal realist policy would stress the importance of developing an integrated grand strategy that combines hard military power with soft ‘attractive power’ to create smart power of the sort that won the Cold War. In a war on terrorism, we need to use hard power against the hard-core terrorists, but we cannot hope to win unless we gain the hearts and minds of the moderates” (38).
“Third, the objective of a liberal realist policy should be to advance the principle of ‘life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness’ that has long constituted American political culture. Such a grand strategy would have four key pillars: providing security for the United states and its allies; maintaining a strong domestic and international economy; avoiding environmental disasters; and encouraging liberal democracy and hu8man rights at home and abroad where feasible at reasonable levels of cost…This does not mean imposing American values by force” (38).
Nye then identifies five areas that present pressing challenges to the US: terrorism/nukes, political islam, the rise of an Asian hegemon, an economic depression and an ecological disaster.
“The old distinction between realists and liberals needs to give way to a new synthesis that you might choose to call ‘liberal realism’. What should a liberal realist foreign policy comprise? First, it would start w2ith an understanding of the strength and limits of American power. WE are the only superpower, but preponderance is not empire or hegemony” ( 36).
The world is currently divided into three chess-boards. The top layer involves the military, and that is clearly unipolar and dominated by the US. The middle board is economic, and that is currently multipolar with no clear dominant force. The lower board represents transnational forces, such as climate change, intellectual property rights, etc. That board is chaotic.
“Second, a liberal realist policy would stress the importance of developing an integrated grand strategy that combines hard military power with soft ‘attractive power’ to create smart power of the sort that won the Cold War. In a war on terrorism, we need to use hard power against the hard-core terrorists, but we cannot hope to win unless we gain the hearts and minds of the moderates” (38).
“Third, the objective of a liberal realist policy should be to advance the principle of ‘life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness’ that has long constituted American political culture. Such a grand strategy would have four key pillars: providing security for the United states and its allies; maintaining a strong domestic and international economy; avoiding environmental disasters; and encouraging liberal democracy and hu8man rights at home and abroad where feasible at reasonable levels of cost…This does not mean imposing American values by force” (38).
Nye then identifies five areas that present pressing challenges to the US: terrorism/nukes, political islam, the rise of an Asian hegemon, an economic depression and an ecological disaster.
Philpott: Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations
Philpott, D., 2001. Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations, Princeton University Press.
“My central claim: Revolutions in sovereignty result from prior revolutions in ideas about justice and political authority…My claim…is about what revolutions in sovereignty are not. That is, they are not merely the aftereffects of the rise and fall of great powers, or of slow shifts in class structure or political structure, in technology, commerce or industrial production, or in the division of labor, methods of warfare, or population size…It takes a revolution in ideas to bring a revolution in sovereignty” (4).
“A polity’s practice of its authority on the inside requires the recognition of this authority from the outside” (13).
“We need to see, I propose, that international authority appears in three faces. All constitutions contain all three faces; every constitution’s depiction of them is its unique signature. Each face answers a different question about authority. The first face answers, What are the polities in a given international society? The second face answers, Which polities may belong to the society? And who may become one of these legitimate polities? The third face answers, What are the essential prerogatives of these polities? Together these faces define constitutional authority for any international society. They allow us to distinguish constitutions, and provide a criterion for change. A revolution in the constitution of international relations, I will argue, involves a change in at least one of these three faces” (15).
“My central claim: Revolutions in sovereignty result from prior revolutions in ideas about justice and political authority…My claim…is about what revolutions in sovereignty are not. That is, they are not merely the aftereffects of the rise and fall of great powers, or of slow shifts in class structure or political structure, in technology, commerce or industrial production, or in the division of labor, methods of warfare, or population size…It takes a revolution in ideas to bring a revolution in sovereignty” (4).
“A polity’s practice of its authority on the inside requires the recognition of this authority from the outside” (13).
“We need to see, I propose, that international authority appears in three faces. All constitutions contain all three faces; every constitution’s depiction of them is its unique signature. Each face answers a different question about authority. The first face answers, What are the polities in a given international society? The second face answers, Which polities may belong to the society? And who may become one of these legitimate polities? The third face answers, What are the essential prerogatives of these polities? Together these faces define constitutional authority for any international society. They allow us to distinguish constitutions, and provide a criterion for change. A revolution in the constitution of international relations, I will argue, involves a change in at least one of these three faces” (15).
Layne: Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace
Layne, C., 2007. Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.
Layne begins, as many do, by highlighting how deeply embedded the concept of the democratic peace has become in international politics and foreign policy. For example, he highlights Russett’s statement that it may actually be possible to overcome the traditional realist constraints of anarchy and a self-help international society through the democratic peace.
Layne explores whether or not realist theory or democratic peace theory is actually more able to describe and explain behavior. The author presents democratic peace as being either structural or normative. The structural account deals with, “…the restraining effects of public opinion, or of the checks and balances embedded in the democratic state’s domestic politics structure” (6). The account of the normative driver of democratic peace is also explored. This driver posits that, “…democratic norms and culture—a shared commitment to the peaceful adjudication of political disputes—that accounts for the absence of war between democratic states” (6). Layne argues that the structural account is weak, and that this puts the onus of explanation on the normative account.
“This article’s centerpiece is a test of the competing explanations of international outcomes offered by democratic peace theory and by realism. This test is based on case studies of four ‘near misses’—crises where two democratic states almost went to war with each other” (7).
“I conclude that realism is superior to democratic peace theory as a predictor of international outcomes. Indeed, democratic peace theory appears to have extremely little explanatory power in the cases studied…I conclude by discussing democratic peace theory’s troublesome implications for post-Cold War American foreign policy” (8).
The four case studies explored are those of near-misses among democratic great powers.
Layne begins, as many do, by highlighting how deeply embedded the concept of the democratic peace has become in international politics and foreign policy. For example, he highlights Russett’s statement that it may actually be possible to overcome the traditional realist constraints of anarchy and a self-help international society through the democratic peace.
Layne explores whether or not realist theory or democratic peace theory is actually more able to describe and explain behavior. The author presents democratic peace as being either structural or normative. The structural account deals with, “…the restraining effects of public opinion, or of the checks and balances embedded in the democratic state’s domestic politics structure” (6). The account of the normative driver of democratic peace is also explored. This driver posits that, “…democratic norms and culture—a shared commitment to the peaceful adjudication of political disputes—that accounts for the absence of war between democratic states” (6). Layne argues that the structural account is weak, and that this puts the onus of explanation on the normative account.
“This article’s centerpiece is a test of the competing explanations of international outcomes offered by democratic peace theory and by realism. This test is based on case studies of four ‘near misses’—crises where two democratic states almost went to war with each other” (7).
“I conclude that realism is superior to democratic peace theory as a predictor of international outcomes. Indeed, democratic peace theory appears to have extremely little explanatory power in the cases studied…I conclude by discussing democratic peace theory’s troublesome implications for post-Cold War American foreign policy” (8).
The four case studies explored are those of near-misses among democratic great powers.
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Van Evera: Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict
Van Evera, S., 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, Cornell University Press.
“What caused the great wars of modern times? Of those causes, which h were preventable? What are the likely causes of future wars, and how can those wars best be prevented?” (1).
Van Evera puts fourth 5 hypotheses that are followed up upon in distinct chapters:
“H1. War is more likely when states fall prey to false optimism about its outcome.
H2. War is more likely when the advantage lies with the first side to mobilize or attack.
H3. War is more likely when the relative power of states fluctuates sharply—that is, when windows of opportunity and vulnerability are large.
H4. War is more likely when resources are cumulative—that is, when control of resources enables a state to protect or acquire other resources.
H5. War is more likely when conquest is easy.” (4).
H1: “…war is more likely when governments exaggerate their own chances of winning crises and wars, or when they underestimate the cost of war. If the losing side could foresee the outcome, it would often decline to fight” (5).
H2: “…war is markedly more likely when the first side to mobilize or attack has the advantage…It leads states to launch preemptive attacks to prevent an opponent from getting in the first blow. It also leads states to conceal their capabilities and grievances, from fear that open displays of strength or grievance could trigger another’s preemptive attack” (5).
H3: “…fluctuations in the relative power of states…cause war by tempting states to launch preventative attack, by accelerating diplomacy to unsafe speeds, and by making agreements less valuable” (5).
H4: “…war is more likely when resources are cumulative…Some resources are highly cumulative…Others are less so…States must compete more fiercely for control of more cumulative resources, because their gain or loss spells further gains or losses. Hence the greater the cumulatively of conquerable resources, the greater the risk of war” (5).
H5: “…war is far more likely when conquest is easy” (5).
“How much war can these five hypotheses explain? I argue that the causes of war they identify are potent when presented, but four of the five [all except false optimism] are rather rare in the real world, especially in the modern world. Thus they explain only a moderate amount of history as such. They explain a great deal of history, however, if they are recast as hypotheses on the effects of false exceptions of the dangers they frame. In fact, these misperceptions are common: states often exaggerate the size of first-move advantages, the size of windows of opportunity and vulnerability, the degree of resource cumulatively, and the ease of conquest. They then adopt war causing policies in response to these illusions” (6).
The author then discusses the difference between gross power and fine-grained power.
“What caused the great wars of modern times? Of those causes, which h were preventable? What are the likely causes of future wars, and how can those wars best be prevented?” (1).
Van Evera puts fourth 5 hypotheses that are followed up upon in distinct chapters:
“H1. War is more likely when states fall prey to false optimism about its outcome.
H2. War is more likely when the advantage lies with the first side to mobilize or attack.
H3. War is more likely when the relative power of states fluctuates sharply—that is, when windows of opportunity and vulnerability are large.
H4. War is more likely when resources are cumulative—that is, when control of resources enables a state to protect or acquire other resources.
H5. War is more likely when conquest is easy.” (4).
H1: “…war is more likely when governments exaggerate their own chances of winning crises and wars, or when they underestimate the cost of war. If the losing side could foresee the outcome, it would often decline to fight” (5).
H2: “…war is markedly more likely when the first side to mobilize or attack has the advantage…It leads states to launch preemptive attacks to prevent an opponent from getting in the first blow. It also leads states to conceal their capabilities and grievances, from fear that open displays of strength or grievance could trigger another’s preemptive attack” (5).
H3: “…fluctuations in the relative power of states…cause war by tempting states to launch preventative attack, by accelerating diplomacy to unsafe speeds, and by making agreements less valuable” (5).
H4: “…war is more likely when resources are cumulative…Some resources are highly cumulative…Others are less so…States must compete more fiercely for control of more cumulative resources, because their gain or loss spells further gains or losses. Hence the greater the cumulatively of conquerable resources, the greater the risk of war” (5).
H5: “…war is far more likely when conquest is easy” (5).
“How much war can these five hypotheses explain? I argue that the causes of war they identify are potent when presented, but four of the five [all except false optimism] are rather rare in the real world, especially in the modern world. Thus they explain only a moderate amount of history as such. They explain a great deal of history, however, if they are recast as hypotheses on the effects of false exceptions of the dangers they frame. In fact, these misperceptions are common: states often exaggerate the size of first-move advantages, the size of windows of opportunity and vulnerability, the degree of resource cumulatively, and the ease of conquest. They then adopt war causing policies in response to these illusions” (6).
The author then discusses the difference between gross power and fine-grained power.
Faber and Gowa: Politics and Peace
Faber, H. & Gowa, J., 1995. Politics and Peace. International Security, 20(2), 123-146.
“First, we find that there is no statistically significant relationship between democracy and war before 1914…Our analysis shows that it is only after 1945 that the probability of war or serious disputes is significantly lower between democratic states than between members of other pairs of states” (124).
“the democratic peace literature advances two explanations for the distinctive behavior of democracies. One is based on norms, the other on checks and balances. In this section, we argue that neither provides a compelling explanation of the peace that is said to prevail between democracies” (126).
“The evidence we analyzed suggests that the democratic peace is of relatively recent origin. Indeed, it coincides with the Cold War. Whether the post-1945 result is the product of common polities is, at best, unclear. The onset of the Cold War precipitated strong common interests among a relatively large number of democratic states” (145).
“First, we find that there is no statistically significant relationship between democracy and war before 1914…Our analysis shows that it is only after 1945 that the probability of war or serious disputes is significantly lower between democratic states than between members of other pairs of states” (124).
“the democratic peace literature advances two explanations for the distinctive behavior of democracies. One is based on norms, the other on checks and balances. In this section, we argue that neither provides a compelling explanation of the peace that is said to prevail between democracies” (126).
“The evidence we analyzed suggests that the democratic peace is of relatively recent origin. Indeed, it coincides with the Cold War. Whether the post-1945 result is the product of common polities is, at best, unclear. The onset of the Cold War precipitated strong common interests among a relatively large number of democratic states” (145).
Mansfield and Snyder: Democratization and the Danger of War
Mansfield, E. & Snyder, J., 1995. Democratization and the Danger of War. International Security, 20, 5-38.
It is generally held that democracies do not go to war with one another. It is such a cornerstone of common sense that the concepts finds itself embedded in foreign policy decisions and explanation. While it is more than likely true that a world of stable and mature democracies is generally more peaceful for all, these authors contend, it is not the case that simply a democratic regime necessitates stability. The authors argue that democratic transitions are actually quite dangerous periods of instability. “In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states” (5).
Transitioning democracies are generally more likely to fight wars than either mature autocracies or mature democracies.
“Much of the research on the democratic peace has relied on statistical tests, which indicate that democracies become involved in wars about as frequently as other states, but that by reasonably restrictive definitions, they have never fought each other” (9).
These authors use the same database and argue that there is statistical significance that democratizing states do go to war. The distinction between democratic and democratizing states is crucial. “We consider states to be democratizing if, during a given period of time, they change from autocracy to either anocracy or democracy, or if they change from anocracy to democracy. Conversely, states are autocratizing if they change from democracy to autocracy or anocracy, or from anocracy to autocracy” (9). “We found that democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no regime change” (12).
It is generally held that democracies do not go to war with one another. It is such a cornerstone of common sense that the concepts finds itself embedded in foreign policy decisions and explanation. While it is more than likely true that a world of stable and mature democracies is generally more peaceful for all, these authors contend, it is not the case that simply a democratic regime necessitates stability. The authors argue that democratic transitions are actually quite dangerous periods of instability. “In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states” (5).
Transitioning democracies are generally more likely to fight wars than either mature autocracies or mature democracies.
“Much of the research on the democratic peace has relied on statistical tests, which indicate that democracies become involved in wars about as frequently as other states, but that by reasonably restrictive definitions, they have never fought each other” (9).
These authors use the same database and argue that there is statistical significance that democratizing states do go to war. The distinction between democratic and democratizing states is crucial. “We consider states to be democratizing if, during a given period of time, they change from autocracy to either anocracy or democracy, or if they change from anocracy to democracy. Conversely, states are autocratizing if they change from democracy to autocracy or anocracy, or from anocracy to autocracy” (9). “We found that democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no regime change” (12).
Doyle: Liberalism and World Politics
Doyle, M., 1986. Liberalism and World Politics. American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1151-1169.
Doyle explores three traditions of liberal theory: Schumpeter, Machiavelli and Kant. While there are some conflict within the liberal tradition, ie., a conflict between liberal imperialism and liberal pacifism, Doyle believes that there is a recurrent theme that can be found within liberal states. “Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. T hey are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace…and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression…” (1151).
“What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all” (1152).
Schumpeter’s liberalism is one that stands in contrast to imperialism. Democracies who are capitalistic will be peaceful. Democratic capitalist countries do not benefit from expansionist policies. Also, their citizens are gainfully employed and busy themselves producing, which implicitly keeps them away from jingoism.
Machiavelli has a different argument. He claims that republics are actually quite good and useful at pursuing expansionist policies. Machiavelli does not advocate radical democracy; that he believed would eventually digress into tyranny. He does, however, explore the relationship of citizens in a republic, which he finds to be quite satisfactory.
Machiavelli and Schumpeter stand in contrast. “We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism—pacifism and imperialism—indicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics” (1155).
“Kant’s citizens…are diverse in their goals and individualized and rationalized, but most importantly, they are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals and of treating other individuals as ends rather than as means” (1162).
Doyle explores three traditions of liberal theory: Schumpeter, Machiavelli and Kant. While there are some conflict within the liberal tradition, ie., a conflict between liberal imperialism and liberal pacifism, Doyle believes that there is a recurrent theme that can be found within liberal states. “Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. T hey are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace…and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression…” (1151).
“What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all” (1152).
Schumpeter’s liberalism is one that stands in contrast to imperialism. Democracies who are capitalistic will be peaceful. Democratic capitalist countries do not benefit from expansionist policies. Also, their citizens are gainfully employed and busy themselves producing, which implicitly keeps them away from jingoism.
Machiavelli has a different argument. He claims that republics are actually quite good and useful at pursuing expansionist policies. Machiavelli does not advocate radical democracy; that he believed would eventually digress into tyranny. He does, however, explore the relationship of citizens in a republic, which he finds to be quite satisfactory.
Machiavelli and Schumpeter stand in contrast. “We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism—pacifism and imperialism—indicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics” (1155).
“Kant’s citizens…are diverse in their goals and individualized and rationalized, but most importantly, they are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals and of treating other individuals as ends rather than as means” (1162).
Monday, October 6, 2008
Munkler: Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Angient Rome to the United States
Munkler, H., 2007. Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States, Cambridge: Polity Press.
What is the difference between empire and state? What is the difference between empire and imperialism? What is the difference between hegemony and empire? Is the US an empire?
Munkler begins by exploring what is not an empire. “First, an empire must be distinguished from a state…which operates according to completely different imperatives and a completely different action logic” (4-5). “Empires have no neighbours which they recognize as equals, that is, as possessing equal rights; with states, by contrast, this is the rule” (5). “Whoever thinks of imperiality as simply an alternative to statehood will come to the conclusion that no empires exist today. Whoever, on the contrary, proceeds from the superimposition of imperial structures on the state order will encounter structures of power and influence not identical to those of the state” (6).
“Second, empire must be delineated in contrast to hegemonic structures of dominance…Hegemony is supr3emacy within a group of formally equal political players; imperiality, by contrast, dissolves this…equality and reduces subordinates to the status of client states or satellites” (6).
“Third…empire may be delineated in contrast to what has since the nineteenth century been called imperialism…’Imperialism’ means that there is a will to empire” (8).
In addition, one must consider both spatial and temporal factors before determining whether or not something is an empire. If it doesn’t last, and if it doesn’t cover enough territory, it is not an empire. This is one important and difficult set of factors to distinguish between when asking questions about US empire in comparison to other historical instances of empire. For example, the world of the British was much “smaller” when they were an empire, the world of Athens, much smaller still.
“How does this [the distinction between empire, imperialism and hegemony] relate to the question of whether the United States is now an empire or a hegemon? The first point to be made is that the distinction between the two is much more fluid than it I soften assumed. If we take interference in the internal affairs of smaller states as the only hallmark of imperiality, and a basic lack of interest in their internal affairs as integral to hegemony, then the United States has been an empire since President Carter launched his human rights offensive, but was a hegemon in the preceding period when it tolerated military dictatorships even within NATO” (46).
The Augustan Threshold: The period when an empire goes from ascent to decline and when it moves from plundering the periphery to “civilizing” it.
What is the difference between empire and state? What is the difference between empire and imperialism? What is the difference between hegemony and empire? Is the US an empire?
Munkler begins by exploring what is not an empire. “First, an empire must be distinguished from a state…which operates according to completely different imperatives and a completely different action logic” (4-5). “Empires have no neighbours which they recognize as equals, that is, as possessing equal rights; with states, by contrast, this is the rule” (5). “Whoever thinks of imperiality as simply an alternative to statehood will come to the conclusion that no empires exist today. Whoever, on the contrary, proceeds from the superimposition of imperial structures on the state order will encounter structures of power and influence not identical to those of the state” (6).
“Second, empire must be delineated in contrast to hegemonic structures of dominance…Hegemony is supr3emacy within a group of formally equal political players; imperiality, by contrast, dissolves this…equality and reduces subordinates to the status of client states or satellites” (6).
“Third…empire may be delineated in contrast to what has since the nineteenth century been called imperialism…’Imperialism’ means that there is a will to empire” (8).
In addition, one must consider both spatial and temporal factors before determining whether or not something is an empire. If it doesn’t last, and if it doesn’t cover enough territory, it is not an empire. This is one important and difficult set of factors to distinguish between when asking questions about US empire in comparison to other historical instances of empire. For example, the world of the British was much “smaller” when they were an empire, the world of Athens, much smaller still.
“How does this [the distinction between empire, imperialism and hegemony] relate to the question of whether the United States is now an empire or a hegemon? The first point to be made is that the distinction between the two is much more fluid than it I soften assumed. If we take interference in the internal affairs of smaller states as the only hallmark of imperiality, and a basic lack of interest in their internal affairs as integral to hegemony, then the United States has been an empire since President Carter launched his human rights offensive, but was a hegemon in the preceding period when it tolerated military dictatorships even within NATO” (46).
The Augustan Threshold: The period when an empire goes from ascent to decline and when it moves from plundering the periphery to “civilizing” it.
Saturday, October 4, 2008
Holsti: Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy
Holsti, K., 2000. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 1(01), 157-172.
Krasner highlights four different kinds of sovereignty: domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty (157).
Krasner has historically been a proponent of arguments that center around power and the interests of the powerful being those that driver international relations. In this book, he offers an account of norms, and tries to undermine the belief that sovereignty in a norm that stands above the workings of power. Krasner talks about durable norms, which are norms that have become deeply embedded within the action of state actors. “Organized hypocrisy, in contrast, is the situation where a norm is durable, but where behavior frequently violates it” (158).
Krasner makes his case through a rich documentation of historical case studies. Holsti argues that, “The frequent violations of sovereignty seriously challenge constructivist, liberal institutionalist, and English school positions about the importance of norms in international relations” (159). However, Holsti argues that there is a fundamental distinction that is lacking in this work: that between influence and authority. “Influence and power concern capabilities and outcomes…In contrast, authority concerns rights, obligations and status” (159). Additionally, Krasner does not allow for states to be constrained in any reasonable way.
“The theoretical contribution of this study is nevertheless prominent. Krasner offers a robust argument—one consistent throughout his career—that the ‘logic of consequences’ better explains outcomes in international relations than does a ‘logic of appropriateness’” (161). Holsti, however, argues that he goes too far in negating the influence of interest, norms or identities.
Krasner highlights four different kinds of sovereignty: domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty (157).
Krasner has historically been a proponent of arguments that center around power and the interests of the powerful being those that driver international relations. In this book, he offers an account of norms, and tries to undermine the belief that sovereignty in a norm that stands above the workings of power. Krasner talks about durable norms, which are norms that have become deeply embedded within the action of state actors. “Organized hypocrisy, in contrast, is the situation where a norm is durable, but where behavior frequently violates it” (158).
Krasner makes his case through a rich documentation of historical case studies. Holsti argues that, “The frequent violations of sovereignty seriously challenge constructivist, liberal institutionalist, and English school positions about the importance of norms in international relations” (159). However, Holsti argues that there is a fundamental distinction that is lacking in this work: that between influence and authority. “Influence and power concern capabilities and outcomes…In contrast, authority concerns rights, obligations and status” (159). Additionally, Krasner does not allow for states to be constrained in any reasonable way.
“The theoretical contribution of this study is nevertheless prominent. Krasner offers a robust argument—one consistent throughout his career—that the ‘logic of consequences’ better explains outcomes in international relations than does a ‘logic of appropriateness’” (161). Holsti, however, argues that he goes too far in negating the influence of interest, norms or identities.
Booth: Theory of World Security
Booth, K., 2007. Theory of World Security, Cambridge University Press.
Booth claims that we live in a world that is quite different from the worlds that had existed before. We have the capability to destroy on a larger scale than is easily conceivable. We have the ability to work with precision in our destruction. All of this operates within a milieu of globalization, regionalization and generally conflictual trends.
The author claims, echoing EH Carr’s famous text, that we are living in a new Twenty Years’ Crisis that he calls The Great Reckoning. “If a series of key decisions about world security are not made in the first two decades of the century, and are not made sensibly, then by mid-century human society faces the prospect of a concatenation of global turmoil unlike anything in the past” (2). “In other words, a critical theory of security seeks to be both realistic and emancipator” (2). “The framework of the theory to be elaborated derives from a body of ideas I call critical global theorizing” (3). “…world security refers to the structures and processes within human society, locally and globally, that work towards the reduction of the threats and risks that determine individual and group lives. The greater the level of security enjoyed, the more individuals and groups (including human society as a whole) can have an existence beyond the instinctual animal struggle merely to survive. The idea of world security is synonymous with the freedom of individuals and groups compatible with reasonable freedom of others and universal moral equality compatible with justifiable pragmatic inequalities” (4-5).
The book consists of four sections: Context, Theory, Dimensions and Futures. In the first section, the author expands upon the concept of the Great Reckoning and how this relates to Carr’s earlier work. In the second section, Booth explores in more depth what is meant by critical theory of world security. In the third section, the theory is applied empirically, specifically as a critique of US power, violence, human security and the state4 of nature (6). In the final section, there is a call for urgent action to mitigate the dilemmas highlighted.
Ch. 1:
“This chapter introduces six themes that carry through the book: a world that is not working for most of its inhabitants; a body of regressive ideas that continue to dominate politics, economics, and society globally; a growing world crisis that is not being attended to by the globally powerful; a particular set of challenges resulting from the convergence of traditional ideas and new material conditions created by environmental despoliation and population expansion; a regressive realist hegemony in the way policymakers and academics think about security; and the need to reconceptualise world security in the light of a self-consciously critical perspective with an emancipator orientation” (12).
Ch. 2:
“The previous chapter identified where a critical theory of security should start…A radically different world politics is conceivable, though is complete achievement may ultimately elude humankind. International politics must become the art of the impossible, for the alternative is almost too unpleasant to contemplate. With this in mind, the present chapter begins to sketch a map of sites of ideas to help create the political conditions for a more secure future. These ideas are not to be found in the national ghettos of realism, but in the cosmopolitan spirit of the unfinished work of the enlightenment” (37).
The following represent the core of a critical global theory: universalist, inclusive, normative, emancipatory, progressive and critical (38-9).
Booth claims that we live in a world that is quite different from the worlds that had existed before. We have the capability to destroy on a larger scale than is easily conceivable. We have the ability to work with precision in our destruction. All of this operates within a milieu of globalization, regionalization and generally conflictual trends.
The author claims, echoing EH Carr’s famous text, that we are living in a new Twenty Years’ Crisis that he calls The Great Reckoning. “If a series of key decisions about world security are not made in the first two decades of the century, and are not made sensibly, then by mid-century human society faces the prospect of a concatenation of global turmoil unlike anything in the past” (2). “In other words, a critical theory of security seeks to be both realistic and emancipator” (2). “The framework of the theory to be elaborated derives from a body of ideas I call critical global theorizing” (3). “…world security refers to the structures and processes within human society, locally and globally, that work towards the reduction of the threats and risks that determine individual and group lives. The greater the level of security enjoyed, the more individuals and groups (including human society as a whole) can have an existence beyond the instinctual animal struggle merely to survive. The idea of world security is synonymous with the freedom of individuals and groups compatible with reasonable freedom of others and universal moral equality compatible with justifiable pragmatic inequalities” (4-5).
The book consists of four sections: Context, Theory, Dimensions and Futures. In the first section, the author expands upon the concept of the Great Reckoning and how this relates to Carr’s earlier work. In the second section, Booth explores in more depth what is meant by critical theory of world security. In the third section, the theory is applied empirically, specifically as a critique of US power, violence, human security and the state4 of nature (6). In the final section, there is a call for urgent action to mitigate the dilemmas highlighted.
Ch. 1:
“This chapter introduces six themes that carry through the book: a world that is not working for most of its inhabitants; a body of regressive ideas that continue to dominate politics, economics, and society globally; a growing world crisis that is not being attended to by the globally powerful; a particular set of challenges resulting from the convergence of traditional ideas and new material conditions created by environmental despoliation and population expansion; a regressive realist hegemony in the way policymakers and academics think about security; and the need to reconceptualise world security in the light of a self-consciously critical perspective with an emancipator orientation” (12).
Ch. 2:
“The previous chapter identified where a critical theory of security should start…A radically different world politics is conceivable, though is complete achievement may ultimately elude humankind. International politics must become the art of the impossible, for the alternative is almost too unpleasant to contemplate. With this in mind, the present chapter begins to sketch a map of sites of ideas to help create the political conditions for a more secure future. These ideas are not to be found in the national ghettos of realism, but in the cosmopolitan spirit of the unfinished work of the enlightenment” (37).
The following represent the core of a critical global theory: universalist, inclusive, normative, emancipatory, progressive and critical (38-9).
Wheller and Booth: The Security Dilemma
Wheeler, N. & Booth, K., 1992. The Security Dilemma. Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, 29-60.
“Any serious school or theory of International Relations must have a conception of the security dilemma. This is because the security dilemma gets to the very heart of politics among nations: the existential condition of uncertainty in human affairs” (1).
The authors then explore the etymology of “dilemma”. Evidently, in logic, a “lemma” is something that is valid. Therefore, a di-lemma represents a situation where someone must choose between to substantively valid options (or in the case of the security dilemma, two options that are valid in their disagreeability). “What puts the lemmas into the security dilemma are two apparently inescapable predicaments in international politics. The first is the inability of the decision-makers in one state ever to get fully into the minds of their counterparts in other states, and so understand their motives and intentions with confidence…The second is the inherent ambiguity of weapons. The policy-planners of one state can never predict with complete certainty when and how weapons might be employed by other states” (4).
The authors then separate the dilemma into two dilemmas: there is initially the dilemma of interpretations, which is an attempt to divine the goals of the other country, and secondly there is the dilemma of the response, which is a decision about how best one should respond. “When leaders resolve their dilemma of response in a manner that creates a spiral of mutual hostility, when neither wanted it, a situation has developed which we call the security paradox” (5).
“The inquiry we are undertaking into the meaning, significance and implications of the security dilemma is organized around three a priori logical positions” (10). First, there are the fatalists who believe that there will always be insecurity in the international realm. Next, there are the mitigators, those who believe that security dilemma type situations can be ameloriated over time, but never totally erased. Finally, there are the transcenders, or those who believe that we can become what we want to be through contingent action.
The authors are very clear that they are not interested in categorizing people as being representatives of any one of these “ideal-types”, but rather are most interested in characterizing ideals.
“Any serious school or theory of International Relations must have a conception of the security dilemma. This is because the security dilemma gets to the very heart of politics among nations: the existential condition of uncertainty in human affairs” (1).
The authors then explore the etymology of “dilemma”. Evidently, in logic, a “lemma” is something that is valid. Therefore, a di-lemma represents a situation where someone must choose between to substantively valid options (or in the case of the security dilemma, two options that are valid in their disagreeability). “What puts the lemmas into the security dilemma are two apparently inescapable predicaments in international politics. The first is the inability of the decision-makers in one state ever to get fully into the minds of their counterparts in other states, and so understand their motives and intentions with confidence…The second is the inherent ambiguity of weapons. The policy-planners of one state can never predict with complete certainty when and how weapons might be employed by other states” (4).
The authors then separate the dilemma into two dilemmas: there is initially the dilemma of interpretations, which is an attempt to divine the goals of the other country, and secondly there is the dilemma of the response, which is a decision about how best one should respond. “When leaders resolve their dilemma of response in a manner that creates a spiral of mutual hostility, when neither wanted it, a situation has developed which we call the security paradox” (5).
“The inquiry we are undertaking into the meaning, significance and implications of the security dilemma is organized around three a priori logical positions” (10). First, there are the fatalists who believe that there will always be insecurity in the international realm. Next, there are the mitigators, those who believe that security dilemma type situations can be ameloriated over time, but never totally erased. Finally, there are the transcenders, or those who believe that we can become what we want to be through contingent action.
The authors are very clear that they are not interested in categorizing people as being representatives of any one of these “ideal-types”, but rather are most interested in characterizing ideals.
de Mesquita: The War Trap Revisited
de Mesquita, B., 1985. The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model.”. The American Political Science Review, 79(1), 156-177.
“An expected utility approach to the study of international politics offers both the opportunity to deduce propositions about international conflict, and, through the application of admittedly crude indicators, to evaluate the usefulness of those propositions as explanations of actual behavior” (156).
“My main objective here is to reconstruct the model so that it reflects risk through the introduction of concavity or convexity into the utility functions. In doing so, it is imperative that the model give each actor the opportunity to have a differently shaped utility function, with the extremity of the function’s curvature embodying the extremity of the decision maker’s willingness (or reluctance) to take chances” (156). The second goal of this piece deals with the relative subjectivity of actor’s perceived utility: de Mesquita attempts to build the model to avoid interpersonal comparisons.
This addition to The War Trap was then explored through game theory rationalist models using both the convex and concave curves for either risk averse or risk acceptant actors to determine the relative utility different actors put in potentially conflictual contexts.
“An expected utility approach to the study of international politics offers both the opportunity to deduce propositions about international conflict, and, through the application of admittedly crude indicators, to evaluate the usefulness of those propositions as explanations of actual behavior” (156).
“My main objective here is to reconstruct the model so that it reflects risk through the introduction of concavity or convexity into the utility functions. In doing so, it is imperative that the model give each actor the opportunity to have a differently shaped utility function, with the extremity of the function’s curvature embodying the extremity of the decision maker’s willingness (or reluctance) to take chances” (156). The second goal of this piece deals with the relative subjectivity of actor’s perceived utility: de Mesquita attempts to build the model to avoid interpersonal comparisons.
This addition to The War Trap was then explored through game theory rationalist models using both the convex and concave curves for either risk averse or risk acceptant actors to determine the relative utility different actors put in potentially conflictual contexts.
Kirshner: Globalization and National Security
Kirshner, J., Globalization and national security, Routledge.
This text asks how globalization is changing national security. It acknowledges that there are myriad schools of thought on this issue, from the realist that believes that globalization is a fad or zeitgeist to the cosmopolitan thinker who sees it fundamentally changing the nature of the world. Kirshner argues that globalization, even if we completely retain the state-centered view of international relations, changes the rules of the game. He likens this to the difference in playing polo on horses to playing water polo: the overall objective of the game has not changed, but the context in which actors must operate is fundamentally different. “Some players…might have been much better riders than they are swimmers” (1).
Definitions:
Globalization: “…shorthand for an array of phenomena that derive from unorganized and stateless forces but that generate pressures that are felt by states…the forces of globalization…are in their purest incarnations disorganized and purposeless, the powerful but uncoordinated consequences of individual behavior and technological change” (1-2).
National Security: “…organized political violence that speaks to the vital interests of at least one state” (2).
The first chapter of this text approaches the question of globalization and national security from the perspective of three “conduits through which the pressures of globalization are transmitted through the system: via the intensification of economic exchange, the flow of information and marketization—the expansion of the set of social relations governed by market forces” (3).
Kirshner presents a figure for explaining how globalization affects national security. In it, there are three bubbles, or phenomenon with causal linkages posited: autonomy and capacity drive balance of power and balance of power drives axes of conflict. Globalization (as defined earlier as the decentered process of intensified economic exchange, flow of information and marketization) drives each of these three phenomena separately, thus one would assume that there is a compounding effect (6).
Kirshner also goes into the economic exchange, information flows and marketization in detail.
This text asks how globalization is changing national security. It acknowledges that there are myriad schools of thought on this issue, from the realist that believes that globalization is a fad or zeitgeist to the cosmopolitan thinker who sees it fundamentally changing the nature of the world. Kirshner argues that globalization, even if we completely retain the state-centered view of international relations, changes the rules of the game. He likens this to the difference in playing polo on horses to playing water polo: the overall objective of the game has not changed, but the context in which actors must operate is fundamentally different. “Some players…might have been much better riders than they are swimmers” (1).
Definitions:
Globalization: “…shorthand for an array of phenomena that derive from unorganized and stateless forces but that generate pressures that are felt by states…the forces of globalization…are in their purest incarnations disorganized and purposeless, the powerful but uncoordinated consequences of individual behavior and technological change” (1-2).
National Security: “…organized political violence that speaks to the vital interests of at least one state” (2).
The first chapter of this text approaches the question of globalization and national security from the perspective of three “conduits through which the pressures of globalization are transmitted through the system: via the intensification of economic exchange, the flow of information and marketization—the expansion of the set of social relations governed by market forces” (3).
Kirshner presents a figure for explaining how globalization affects national security. In it, there are three bubbles, or phenomenon with causal linkages posited: autonomy and capacity drive balance of power and balance of power drives axes of conflict. Globalization (as defined earlier as the decentered process of intensified economic exchange, flow of information and marketization) drives each of these three phenomena separately, thus one would assume that there is a compounding effect (6).
Kirshner also goes into the economic exchange, information flows and marketization in detail.
Friday, October 3, 2008
Friedman: The First Law of Petropolitics
Friedman, T., 2006. The First Law of Petropolitics. Foreign Policy, 154, 28-36.
Thesis: The price of oil and freedom move in opposite directions.
Friedman had a hunch. He saw Arab countries who were more likely to run out of oil increasing political freedoms (Bahrain). He also saw that the bellicoseness of other leaders increased as the price of oil increased. He wondered if this could be “graphed”. He assures us that this study is not scientific.
“The First Law of Petropolitics posits the following: The price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petrolist states” (31). Friedman cites Ross.
“Let me stress again that I know that the correlations suggested by these graphs are not perfect and, no double, there are exceptions that readers will surely point out. But I do believe they will illustrate a general trend that one can see reflected in the news every day: The rising price of oil clearly has a negative impact on the pace of freedom in many countries, and when you get enough countries with enough negative impacts, you start to poison global politics” (36).
Thesis: The price of oil and freedom move in opposite directions.
Friedman had a hunch. He saw Arab countries who were more likely to run out of oil increasing political freedoms (Bahrain). He also saw that the bellicoseness of other leaders increased as the price of oil increased. He wondered if this could be “graphed”. He assures us that this study is not scientific.
“The First Law of Petropolitics posits the following: The price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petrolist states” (31). Friedman cites Ross.
“Let me stress again that I know that the correlations suggested by these graphs are not perfect and, no double, there are exceptions that readers will surely point out. But I do believe they will illustrate a general trend that one can see reflected in the news every day: The rising price of oil clearly has a negative impact on the pace of freedom in many countries, and when you get enough countries with enough negative impacts, you start to poison global politics” (36).
Ross: Does Oil Hinder Democracy?
Ross, M., 2001. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53(3), 325-361.
As per the title of the article, Ross wonders whether or not reserves of natural resources, specifically oil, would act as an impediment to the democratic process. He explores this quantitatively. He asks three specific questions: is this phenomena real? How does this claim work along two axes: geographic and sectoral? And finally, what is the causal mechanism? For the last question, he tests three independent variables: the rentier effect, the repression effect and the modernization effect.
Ross tests this using the Regime variable from polity data as a dependent variable. The independent variables are both oil and mineral stores. Ross then controls for income, Islam, the OECD, the dependent variable lagged 5 years and incorporates a variety of dummy variables.
“These tests support both the validity and the generality of the oil-impedes-democracy claim. They suggest the following: that a state’s reliance on either oil or mineral exports tends to make it less democratic; that this effect Is not caused by other types of primary exports; that this is not limited to the Arabian Peninsula, to the middle east, or to sub-Saharan Africa, and that it is not limited to small states. These findings are generally consistent with the theory of the rentier state” (346).
Ross then tests the hypothesis that the rentier state is the deeper driver of the oil-impedes democracy thesis.
There are four items that Ross claims to have found in this article: oil does impede democracy. This effect is not limited to the Middle East. Additionally, mineral gluts also have the effect of slowing democracy. Finally, Ross finds some support for each of the three possible causal drivers: rentier effects, repression and modernization.
As per the title of the article, Ross wonders whether or not reserves of natural resources, specifically oil, would act as an impediment to the democratic process. He explores this quantitatively. He asks three specific questions: is this phenomena real? How does this claim work along two axes: geographic and sectoral? And finally, what is the causal mechanism? For the last question, he tests three independent variables: the rentier effect, the repression effect and the modernization effect.
Ross tests this using the Regime variable from polity data as a dependent variable. The independent variables are both oil and mineral stores. Ross then controls for income, Islam, the OECD, the dependent variable lagged 5 years and incorporates a variety of dummy variables.
“These tests support both the validity and the generality of the oil-impedes-democracy claim. They suggest the following: that a state’s reliance on either oil or mineral exports tends to make it less democratic; that this effect Is not caused by other types of primary exports; that this is not limited to the Arabian Peninsula, to the middle east, or to sub-Saharan Africa, and that it is not limited to small states. These findings are generally consistent with the theory of the rentier state” (346).
Ross then tests the hypothesis that the rentier state is the deeper driver of the oil-impedes democracy thesis.
There are four items that Ross claims to have found in this article: oil does impede democracy. This effect is not limited to the Middle East. Additionally, mineral gluts also have the effect of slowing democracy. Finally, Ross finds some support for each of the three possible causal drivers: rentier effects, repression and modernization.
Barber: Jihad v McWorld
Barber, B., Jihad v McWorld. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199203/barber?ca=9B5pyrSUsZedqmnhhRKhf/BSnLWQXUfactosEkJZ21E%3D.
*Note: pagination from a word document
“Just beyond the horizon of current events lie two possible political futures—both bleak, neither democratic. The first is a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened Lebanonization of national states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe—a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality. The second is being borne in on us by the onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast food—with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce. The planet is falling precipitantly apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same moment” (1).
McWorld contains four imperatives: the market imperative, the resource imperative, the information-technology imperative and the ecological imperative. Each has a bearing on the changing nature of globalization.
Jihad is the other global power at work, and it represents a return to identity politics as can be seen in the myriad splinter-groups and break-away regions seeking independence.
Neither of these forces provides much room for democracy, as one is a totalizing and homogenizing power sweeping the world and the other is an authoritative, exclusive power rooted in identity politics.
*Note: pagination from a word document
“Just beyond the horizon of current events lie two possible political futures—both bleak, neither democratic. The first is a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened Lebanonization of national states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe—a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality. The second is being borne in on us by the onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast food—with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce. The planet is falling precipitantly apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same moment” (1).
McWorld contains four imperatives: the market imperative, the resource imperative, the information-technology imperative and the ecological imperative. Each has a bearing on the changing nature of globalization.
Jihad is the other global power at work, and it represents a return to identity politics as can be seen in the myriad splinter-groups and break-away regions seeking independence.
Neither of these forces provides much room for democracy, as one is a totalizing and homogenizing power sweeping the world and the other is an authoritative, exclusive power rooted in identity politics.
Kirshner: The Changing Calculus of Conflict?
Kirshner, J., 2007. The Changing Calculus of Conflict? Security Studies, 16(4), 583-597.
Kirshner addresses Brooks Producing Security text in four parts. Firstly, he looks at what the book has added to the field. Next, he critically evaluates those potential contributions. Thirdly, he questions the underlying theme of the book: that the globalization of production has altered the cost of conflict. His main contention is that the argument si oversold. Finally, Kirshner argues about how globalization may be possibly altering the changing nature of conflict.
Brooks argues that the globalization of production is fundamentally a more important and causal phenomena affecting the world today, more important, than, for example, international trade. “In particular, the fragmentation of the production process across some states is fundamentally different from simpler forms of transnational production (and an entirely different animal from overseas investments in extracting raw materials)” (584). Brooks also points out that the embellishment of truly autarchic defense production is now so costly as to be prohibitive. “Interdependence is not uniformly good or bad but influences international politics in different ways depending on its interactions with additional variables” (586).
Kirshner does not believe that Brooks is ultimately successful in explaining how much the calculus of conflict has changed in the face of globalization. While Brooks is clear that globalization of production does imply three problems: namely, the impossibility of fully autonomous defense production, reduced benefit economically for military adventure and deep regional economic integration, he doesn’t make the case for how strongly these three security questions may affect the changing calculus of conflict in globalization.
Kirshner addresses Brooks Producing Security text in four parts. Firstly, he looks at what the book has added to the field. Next, he critically evaluates those potential contributions. Thirdly, he questions the underlying theme of the book: that the globalization of production has altered the cost of conflict. His main contention is that the argument si oversold. Finally, Kirshner argues about how globalization may be possibly altering the changing nature of conflict.
Brooks argues that the globalization of production is fundamentally a more important and causal phenomena affecting the world today, more important, than, for example, international trade. “In particular, the fragmentation of the production process across some states is fundamentally different from simpler forms of transnational production (and an entirely different animal from overseas investments in extracting raw materials)” (584). Brooks also points out that the embellishment of truly autarchic defense production is now so costly as to be prohibitive. “Interdependence is not uniformly good or bad but influences international politics in different ways depending on its interactions with additional variables” (586).
Kirshner does not believe that Brooks is ultimately successful in explaining how much the calculus of conflict has changed in the face of globalization. While Brooks is clear that globalization of production does imply three problems: namely, the impossibility of fully autonomous defense production, reduced benefit economically for military adventure and deep regional economic integration, he doesn’t make the case for how strongly these three security questions may affect the changing calculus of conflict in globalization.
Huntington: Clash of Civilizations
Huntington, S., 1992. Clash of Civilizations, The. Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49.
“It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural…The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (22).
“What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity” (23-4).
The overall quantity of distinct civilizations have decreased over time. Huntington identifies 7-8 civilizations which remain and which will be in conflict in the future. This is because, firstly, these distinct groups of people have fundamental differences about key questions, like the relationship between god and man, or the relationship between the individual and the group. Secondly, our collective space is shrinking through improved interaction capacity. These technological pressures are also putting pressure on people to reject their local identities, which may have a back-lash effect. Fourthly, the hegemonic position of the West may also provide for a backlash of identity. Additionally, characteristics of civilization are much more difficult to strip away; one can become a democrat after they were a communist, but they will retain their ethnic heritage. Finally, the world is becoming increasingly defined by economic regionalism.
Huntington then explores fault lines between civilizations and the potential role that will be played by the West.
“It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural…The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (22).
“What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity” (23-4).
The overall quantity of distinct civilizations have decreased over time. Huntington identifies 7-8 civilizations which remain and which will be in conflict in the future. This is because, firstly, these distinct groups of people have fundamental differences about key questions, like the relationship between god and man, or the relationship between the individual and the group. Secondly, our collective space is shrinking through improved interaction capacity. These technological pressures are also putting pressure on people to reject their local identities, which may have a back-lash effect. Fourthly, the hegemonic position of the West may also provide for a backlash of identity. Additionally, characteristics of civilization are much more difficult to strip away; one can become a democrat after they were a communist, but they will retain their ethnic heritage. Finally, the world is becoming increasingly defined by economic regionalism.
Huntington then explores fault lines between civilizations and the potential role that will be played by the West.
Maoz and Russett: Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace
Maoz, Z. & Russett, B., 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624-638.
“Democratic states are in general about as conflict—and war—prone as non-democracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other…” (624). They find that democracy has a mitigating effect on conflict, that both of their models support this causally and that the normative model is more robust.
Normative Model:
Two assumptions: “States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and instiotutions” and “The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former” (625).
Structural Model:
Two assumptions: “International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action” and “Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies” (626).
They also explore other possible explanations for the observed peace between certain countries. It could be determined by relative wealth. It could also have to do with alliances since WWII. These are taken into consideration in their statistical model.
They then explore the IV of democracy using Polity IV numbers and the DV of war using COW numbers. They find that their three hypotheses stand up to scrutiny (H1: general Dem Peace, H2: Norm model, H3: Structure model) and that the normative model is more robust than the structural model.
“Democratic states are in general about as conflict—and war—prone as non-democracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other…” (624). They find that democracy has a mitigating effect on conflict, that both of their models support this causally and that the normative model is more robust.
Normative Model:
Two assumptions: “States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and instiotutions” and “The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former” (625).
Structural Model:
Two assumptions: “International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action” and “Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies” (626).
They also explore other possible explanations for the observed peace between certain countries. It could be determined by relative wealth. It could also have to do with alliances since WWII. These are taken into consideration in their statistical model.
They then explore the IV of democracy using Polity IV numbers and the DV of war using COW numbers. They find that their three hypotheses stand up to scrutiny (H1: general Dem Peace, H2: Norm model, H3: Structure model) and that the normative model is more robust than the structural model.
Mansfield: The Distribution of Wars Over Time
Mansfield, E., 1988. The Distribution of Wars Over Time. World Politics.
“Political scientists and other scholars have displayed a lively interest in the distribution of wars over time. A variety of research has been conducted on the subject, and the implications of these studies are important: only through empirical research can we hope to identify patterns, trends, and possible causes of warfare…In this paper, I shall try to determine the extent to which various well-known empirical findings concerning the distribution of war over time are sensitive to the particular data set employed. I then will present preliminary tests of some additional hypotheses concerning the factors influencing the probability of war, and ascertain whether—and, if so, how—the results depend on the inclusion of all wars or only of wars involving major powers” (21).
Mansfield makes the point that different data sets about war come to different conclusions about the causes of war and the conditions of peace based on what is coded as being a war and what is not coded as being a war. This clearly affects the results of different statistical analyses. The causes for this discrepancies lies with three things: how to define war, the level at which war is analyzed and finally how wars are dated (27-8).
He fits the data of the various authors to a Poisson distribution and finds that they mostly fit nicely, though de Mesquita’s did not.
Mansfield also compares Kondratieff cycles and the onset of great-power wars. Goldstein argues that there is no correlation between either upswings or downswings in the economy and the onset of war. Other authors disagree and argue that there is a correlation between upswings and war. Mansfield argues (briefly) that there is a correlation between long-range economic cycles and wars.
He tests the relationship between trade interdependence and war. Mansfield finds that there is an increased likelihood of war when a country moves either from being more open vis-à-vis trade or less open and conflict.
He tests the relationship between hegemony and war and finds that there is a correlation between the existence of a hegemon and the increased likelihood of war, though his overall finding is that this is not significant and that the existence of a hegemon nether necessitates peace or war.
“Political scientists and other scholars have displayed a lively interest in the distribution of wars over time. A variety of research has been conducted on the subject, and the implications of these studies are important: only through empirical research can we hope to identify patterns, trends, and possible causes of warfare…In this paper, I shall try to determine the extent to which various well-known empirical findings concerning the distribution of war over time are sensitive to the particular data set employed. I then will present preliminary tests of some additional hypotheses concerning the factors influencing the probability of war, and ascertain whether—and, if so, how—the results depend on the inclusion of all wars or only of wars involving major powers” (21).
Mansfield makes the point that different data sets about war come to different conclusions about the causes of war and the conditions of peace based on what is coded as being a war and what is not coded as being a war. This clearly affects the results of different statistical analyses. The causes for this discrepancies lies with three things: how to define war, the level at which war is analyzed and finally how wars are dated (27-8).
He fits the data of the various authors to a Poisson distribution and finds that they mostly fit nicely, though de Mesquita’s did not.
Mansfield also compares Kondratieff cycles and the onset of great-power wars. Goldstein argues that there is no correlation between either upswings or downswings in the economy and the onset of war. Other authors disagree and argue that there is a correlation between upswings and war. Mansfield argues (briefly) that there is a correlation between long-range economic cycles and wars.
He tests the relationship between trade interdependence and war. Mansfield finds that there is an increased likelihood of war when a country moves either from being more open vis-à-vis trade or less open and conflict.
He tests the relationship between hegemony and war and finds that there is a correlation between the existence of a hegemon and the increased likelihood of war, though his overall finding is that this is not significant and that the existence of a hegemon nether necessitates peace or war.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Spiro: The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace
Spiro, D., 1994. The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 19, 50.
“Ever since Michael Doyle’s 1983 essay pointed out that no liberal democracy has ever fought a war with another liberal democracy, scholars have treated pacifism between democracies as ‘the closest thing we have to a law in international politics…The purpose of this article is to raise critical questions about newly rediscovered law of peace among democracies” (50).
“I will argue that the absence of wars between liberal democracies is not, in fact, as significant pattern for most of the past two centuries. Studies that do claim significance for the absence of wars between democracies are based on analyses that are highly sensitive to the ways that they select definitions of the key terms of democracy and war, and to the methods they choose for statistical analysis. I argue that much of the quantitative literature on democracy and war has little to do with the theories it seeks to confirm, and that the results rest on methods and operationalization of variables that undergo contortions before they yield apparently significant results” (51).
Spiro argues that “democracy” is a term that is difficult to measure, and those who try to create a taxonomy of democratic countries eventually end up with conflictual lists. This is the same for war, as Mansfield argued in 1988.
Spiro then examines the statistical significance of zero, by that, the author means to question the significance of only exploring dyadic groupings that are not at war. Because dyadic war is such a rare occurance in the international system, it is not unexpected to not find war between countries labeled as democratic. He finds a generally that, through random probabilities, and because the cases of international war are so slim, the odds of two states randomly not going to war are great, barring some historical outliers (WWI, WWI, etc.).
There is also a specific critique of Maoz and Russett.
“Ever since Michael Doyle’s 1983 essay pointed out that no liberal democracy has ever fought a war with another liberal democracy, scholars have treated pacifism between democracies as ‘the closest thing we have to a law in international politics…The purpose of this article is to raise critical questions about newly rediscovered law of peace among democracies” (50).
“I will argue that the absence of wars between liberal democracies is not, in fact, as significant pattern for most of the past two centuries. Studies that do claim significance for the absence of wars between democracies are based on analyses that are highly sensitive to the ways that they select definitions of the key terms of democracy and war, and to the methods they choose for statistical analysis. I argue that much of the quantitative literature on democracy and war has little to do with the theories it seeks to confirm, and that the results rest on methods and operationalization of variables that undergo contortions before they yield apparently significant results” (51).
Spiro argues that “democracy” is a term that is difficult to measure, and those who try to create a taxonomy of democratic countries eventually end up with conflictual lists. This is the same for war, as Mansfield argued in 1988.
Spiro then examines the statistical significance of zero, by that, the author means to question the significance of only exploring dyadic groupings that are not at war. Because dyadic war is such a rare occurance in the international system, it is not unexpected to not find war between countries labeled as democratic. He finds a generally that, through random probabilities, and because the cases of international war are so slim, the odds of two states randomly not going to war are great, barring some historical outliers (WWI, WWI, etc.).
There is also a specific critique of Maoz and Russett.
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