Nussbaum: Human Capabilities, Femal Human Beings

Nussbaum, Martha Craven, Jonathan Glover and World Institute for Development Economics Research. (1995). Women, culture, and development : a study of human capabilities. Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0605/94042602-d.html

Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings

“Women have rarely been kings, or nobles, or couriers, or rich. They have, on the other hand, frequently been poor and sick and dead” (62).

“My proposal is frankly universalist and ‘essentialist’. That is, it asks us to focus on what is common to all, rather than on differences…and to see some capabilities and functions as more central, more at the core of human life, than others” (63).

This account begins by telling stories that emerge from academic conferences. These stories involve interactions between “relativists” and “universalists”. The universalists present papers and the relativists take issue with their essentialist claims. The relativists do not want the universalists to fall into traps that do not respect basic levels of diversity and difference. The universalists want the relativists to understand that there are some underlying aspects of life that are not uniquely subjective, for example, the difference between life and death.

“For we see here highly-intelligent people, people deeply committed to the good of women and men in developing countries, people who think of themselves as progressive and feminist and anti-racist, people who correctly argue that the concept of development is an evaluative concept requiring normative argument—effectively eschewing normative argument and taking up positions that converge…with the positions of reaction, oppression, and sexism” (66).

“Many critics of universalism in ethics are really critics of metaphysical realism who assume that realism is a necessary basis for universalism. I shall argue that this assumption is false” (67-8).

“…the attack on realism has been sufficiently deep and sufficiently sustained that it would appear strategically wise for an ethical and political view that seeks broad support not to rely on the truth of metaphysical realism, if it can defend itself in some other ways” (69).

Nussbaum firstly tries to situate an argument about universality within a pragmatic framework. She understands that the relativist position does have something important to add to the broader discussion regarding the rights of women. She claims that she must be able to take her universalistic argument and defend it using different strategies than would normally be deployed. She tones down the universalist rhetoric and makes the case regarding subjective interpretation of sensory facts: the relativists believe that observations are tinged with subjectivity, and that this is what constructs narratives and discourses, etc. Nussbaum takes that position that she agrees, but she also argues that, while this may or may not be true, the history of development and academia has been a history of universals.

She also highlights some anecdotal accounts of universality among human beings, from Aristotle to a person with a broadly trans-national extended family.

She moves on to claim that she must examine her account with an eye towards more standard criticisms of universalism. She begins by looking at the, “neglect of historical and cultural differences” critique.

“The opposition charges that any attempt to pick out some elements of human life as more fundamental than others, even without appeal to a transhistorical reality, is bound to be insufficiently respectful of actual historical and cultural differences” (70). “It is far from clear what this objection shows” (71).

“Neglect of Autonomy”: This critique of universalism argues that the subject of development is not given the right to determine what they themselves want.

“Prejudicial Application”: “If we operate with a determinate conception of the human being that is meant to have some normative moral and political force, we must also, in applying it, ask which beings we shall take to fall under the concept” (71). The example of Aristotle is given: he didn’t believe that women or slaves were fully human.

However, Nussbaum argues that it is unclear whether or not we would be better off or worse off without these universal concepts: “For it could be plausibly argued that it would have been even easier to exclude women and slaves on a whim if one did not have such a concept to contend with” (72).

Nussbaum goes on to identify the central capabilities that make someone a human being.

She then lists 8 methodological points: the procedure is not ahistorical or a priori; it attempts to look across boundaries for similarities; the account is not biologtical or metaphysical; the account is open-ended; the account accepts that some accounts are constructed differently in different societies; this consensus must be reached by reasonable procedures; the list is heterogeneous; and the concept human being is normative and ethical.

Here is the account of human life:

Morality: we all die.
The Human Body: we all have one
Hunger and Thirst:
Shelter:
Sexual Desire:
Mobility:
Pain and Pleasure:
Cognitive Capacity:
Infant Development:
Practical Reason:
Affiliation with other Human Beings:
Related ness to other Species and Nature:
Humor and Play:
Separateness:
Strong Separateness:

“This is a working list. It is put out to generate debate. It has done so and will continue to do so, and it will be revised accordingly” (80). This list is composed of both capabilities and limits.

Nussbaum now attempts to identify two distinct thresholds: “…a threshold of capability to function beneath which all life will be so impoverished that it will not be human at all; and a somewhat higher threshold, beneath which those characteristic functions are available in such a reduced way that, although we may judge the form of life a human one, we will not think it a good human life. The latter threshold is the on that will eventually concern us when we turn to public policy: for we don’t want societies to make their citizens capable of the bare minimum” (81).

Nussbaum then argues that it should be capabilities and functioning that determine human well being. She lists these in section 4.1, and they are derivatives of her earlier account of what makes a human life. She then examines how well countries have been meeting the needs of their populations. She claims that there is a clear need for a conception of a human being in policy realms.