Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

Mearsheimer, JJ. 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. WW Norton & Company.

Ch. 1: Introduction:

This book begins as a response to those (utopianists? Idealists?) who believe that the fall of the USSR marked the end of history. This can not be the case because the nature of the international system make it such that states continually have to search for their own survival through offensive realism. This account is a break from classical realism and defensive structural realism. Mearsheimer positions himself as an offensive realist.

“The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system” (2). “Simply put, great powers are primed for offence” (3). “Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (3).

“This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, in genuinely tragic” (3).

He applies this approach to US/China relations: “Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail” (4).

“…I argue that multipolar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar systems that contain especially powerful states—potential hegemons—are the most dangerous systems of all” (5).

“Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability” (5).

“In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists” (12).

The book is organized around six questions:
1—why do great powers want power?
2—how much power?
3—what is power?
4—how do they go after power?
5—what are the causes of war?
6—when do threatened powers balance and when do they band-wagon/buck-pass? (12-3)

Contrasts liberalism with realism:

Liberalism: States the actor, internal characteristic of states vary considerably, calculations of power not important (15-6).

Realism: states the actor, behavior of great powers influenced by external environment, and power calculations crucial.

Two kinds of realism: “human nature realism” (aka classical realism) through Morgenthau and defensive realism, through Waltz.

For Morgenthau, human nature instills a “limitless lust for power” and thus creates the international system in a certain kind of way (19).

For Waltz, states do not want power, but survival. “For Waltz, balancing checkmates offence” (20).

“Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want” (21).

“The key difference between the two perspectives [human nature realism and offensive realism] is that offensive realists reject Morgenthau’s claim that states are naturally endowed with Type A personalities. ON the contrary, they believe that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security” (21).

There is then a bizarre explanation of why Americans don’t like realism because it’s too negative and they’re all optimists.

Ch. 2: Anarchy and the Struggle for Power:

Great powers want to be the hegemon.

Five assumptions underly his view of the world:
1—anarchy is an ordering principle
2—great powers have some military capability
3—states can never be certain about other states’ intentions
4—states primarily want to survive
5—states are rational actors

“Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power” (35).

“A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system” (40).

“My argument, which I develop at length in subsequent chapters, is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony” (41).

“The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon” (41).