Friday, August 8, 2008

Walt: Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power

Walt, S.M., 1985. Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. International Security, 9(4), 3-43.

This article, clearly from a Cold War perspective, explores alliances in relation to balance of power. Alliances form in response to threats. These alliances can cause bandwagoning or balancing practices.

“First, states risk their own survival if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong. To ally with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can” (5). Also, if they join “the more vulnerable side”, the new state’s relative influence is greater (6).

The literature on balancing and bandwagoning is not clear in its dissemination of the different forms of power. It is a certain kind of power that states will bandwagon or balance with/against and that is threatening power.

States also must consider aggregate power as well as proximate power, offensive power.

He then explores the conditions under which states will either bandwagon or balance, and the effects that this will have on the character of the international system. For example, a heavily bandwagoning world is very competitive. A world of heavy balancing is less so, and states attempt not to be the chicken with the long neck.

There is a discussion of the role of ideology in alliance formation. Also, the role that international aid (referred to as bribery) plays in alliance formation.

“The analysis above may be summarized as follows. First, states form alliances to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with them. Threats, in turn, are the product of several different sources. Second, ideology is a weaker cause of alliance formation, and ideological movements that strive for tight central authority are more likely to lead to conflict than cooperation. Third, the instruments of ‘bribery’ and penetration are by themselves weak determinants of alignment; they make existing alliances more effective, but rarely create them in the absence of common interests” (33).