Wight: They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They?

Wight, C. 1999. “They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They?: Locating Agency in the Agent-Structure Problematique.” European Journal of International Relations 5:109.

Doty’s article attempted to do many things vis-à-vis the agent-structure debate in IR. One of these things was to make the claim that structures have been overwhelmingly emphasized while agents have received relatively less attention. Another claim is to, in the words of Wight, shoot right to the heart of the dead horse by identifying the relationship between agent-structure as an aporia.

“…I will argue that Doty’s treatment of the agent-structure writers is highly problematic and that the manner in which she sets up the agent-structure writers facilitates their easy refutation. In particular, I will argue that Doty’s treatment of the idea of resolution of the agent-structure problematic. Doty treats resolution in oppositional either/or terms; problems are either totally resolved or there is no resolution. Contrary to this I argue that approaches to the agent-structure problem should be viewed from the perspective of better or worse than prevailing alternatives. Indeed, I argue that it is her failure to contextualize the agent-structure problem in terms of the dominant alternatives—methodological individualism and methodological strucdturalism—that leads Doty to view the agent-structure writers as presenting the ‘final solution’ to this problem. Contra this, I argue that the agent-structure writers do not conceive of their theoretical articulations as ‘final solutions’, but as differing complex social ontologies. Given this, the agent-structure writers should be viewed not as advancing solutions, but alternatives—alternatives, that is, to the dominant ways of conceptualizing complex social ontologies” (111).

Wight spends some time trying to situate himself within a “gang” of ontological disposition. He is not sure exactly where he fits, as he reads Derrida, Foucault, but also Bakshar. He claims that he is a critical realist, and that the above authors can be read as critical realists. He also says that what he is will be displayed in his practice.

The distinction between agent and structure is a long-standing one with clear sociological roots. There are two main-line approaches to this problem, the methodological individualism and methodological structuralism (this is highlighted in Wendt’s article about agents and structure, but Wend asks for a structuration (originating with Giddens) solution to the problem (is it a final solution?!?!)).

Must go beyond Doty’s prescription for an agency based on an understanding of subject positions and create a more nuanced, “multi-layered perspective” (125). This approach can not anthropormophise the state.

Taken from Spivak, there are three forms of agency that form in the social world: “…accountability, intentionality and subjectivity…” (130).

Separates three kinds of agency: 1, 2 and 3. 1 involves the core-make-up of a person. 2 involves the position in that the find themselves (diplomat, is an example). 3 is the specific way that 1 and 2 interact from person to person.