King: Against Structure

King, A., 1999. Against Structure: A Critique of Morphogenetic Social Theory. The Sociological Review, 47(2), 199-227.

This represents a criticism of Archer’s morphogenetic social theory because of its “autonomous social structure” (199). This, King finds contradictory. King tries to, “re-habilitate the interpretive tradition which Archer dismisses…” (199).

“The central claim of Archer’s morphogenetic social theory is to maintain a stratified social ontology. Society must be understood and analyzed as the interaction over time of objective structure and individual, subjective agency or of the macro and the micro” (199).

Archer argues for the ontological separation of society from individuals. “As a consequence of her insistence upon the dual nature of social reality, Archer is vehement in her rejection of any social theory which seems to threaten to collapse social reality into either the structural and objective or individual and subjective dimensions because these approaches will necessarily involve either the exaggeration or elimination of human freedom and the misrepresentation of the Janus-faced nature of society” (202).

Archer uses structural, agential and cultural emergence to tread the fine line between a theory of structure that is not reducible to individualist interpretations. King takes issue with this and explores the claims of structural emergence claiming that these can all be traced back to actions taken by individuals at one moment in time. Discusses three types of structural emergence: numerical, relational and bureaucratic.

Argues against these structurally emergent properties. Argues against relational emergence by saying that the interpretive tradition does not reduce all effects to an individual, but to individuals, and that all emergent properties can be reduced to individuals.

Archer also explores numerical emergence through literacy in Cuba.

Archer explores bureaucratic emergence through the concept of roles.

“This article has tried to demonstrate the interpretive tradition’s rejection of the concept of structure on the grounds that structure is not autonomous, pre-existent or causal” (222).