Rose, A., 1995. Input-output economics and computable general equilibrium models. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 6(3), 295-304.
“My experience is that economists trained before the mid-1970s readily appreciate and acknowledge Leontief’s work, while many of those trained scine, including those standing on his broad shoulders, have distanced themselves from input-output analysis. I refer primarily to those working in the area of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models” (296).
I-O models are crucial for the development of CGE models. Also, I-O models offer a different kind of analysis of market interaction and dependencies and are not based on assumptions of equilibrium or certain kind of actor behavior.
Footnote 3: “Most CGE models are based on a social accounting matrix (SAM), a framework developed by Stone (1966). A SAM is a matrix of interactions in the spirit of the production relationships of I-O, with a much greater emphasis on institution accounts” (296).
“Several features of I-O analysis clearly distinguish it form its precursors and continue to be of lasting value to its direct descendants and to other models” (297).
It is rooted in technological development. It bridges the divide between economists and business people/factory people. The simplicity of the table is a strength. Help facilitate discussions between private and public sector interactions. I-O accounting is used globally and is not political. I-O analysis accounts for all input factors in production, something that many neoclassical accounts do not.
I-O Myths:
I-O has no role for prices.
I-O is static.
*plus more, but I was only interested in the above
“One of the major areas of the relative advantage of CGE is international and interregional competition…Other areas of advantage of CGE models include tax policy, where behavioral considerations are crucial” (301).
Monday, August 11, 2008
Sunday, August 10, 2008
Gulick: Europe's Classical Balance of Power
Gulick, E., 1955. Europe's classical balance of power: a case history of the theory and practice of one of the great concepts of European statecraft, New York: Norton.
Ch. 1: Assumptions:
Writers on balance of power issues have made a variety of assumptions. “They have assumed, for example, the initial existence of the state, a unit of power based upon land and people, which was capable of exerting influence beyond its own borders; they have assumed also that power existed; that it could be measured by men; that men, having measured it, could balance it; that their balancing policies could affect the lives of states and the movement of history; and that the state system could be, and would be, perpetuated through human analysis, direction, and action” (3-4).
Gulick then explores four of these assumptions.
State System:
The state system is an assumption about the world, and it is a relatively new assumption, all things considered. Gulick warns not to under emphasize the relative importance of this assumption.
Relative homogeneity:
Kant assumed relative homogeneity in the interactions of states in a state system. This was important for instrumental purposes. This provided a kind of uniformity of assumptions and a standardization of practices. “The absence of homogeneity…could be described more accurately as crippling to the balance of power, not destructive of it” (24).
Rational System of Estimating Power:
“By and large, a statesman in 1750 or 1815, if he possessed in formation on the size of armies, on the men who led them, and on the relative wealth of the rulers, probably had a better chance of estimating the power of a foreign state than he would have today” (28).
*missing some pages and thus the fourth assumption
Ch. 2: Aims:
Preserve Independence and Secure Survival
“The basic aim of the balance of power was to insure the survival of independent states” (30).
Preserve the State System
Best way to preserve the state was to preserve the system.
No One State Shall Preponderate
Straight forward.
*skipped rest of chapter
Ch. 3: Means:
“We can now discern the basic assumptions and aims of the balance of power, and we have scraped off some of the obscurities which encrusted it. Given the assumptions and aims, it is possible to enumerate the means and show their proper relationship to the foregoing, must as the Euclidian geometrist, having made assumptions with regard to points, lines, p-lanes and numbers can build with corollaries and entire theoretical system, self-consistent and demonstrable” (52).
Vigilance
Alliances
Intervention
Holding the Balance
Need for Mobility
Reciprocal Compensation
Preservation of Components: Moderation
Coalitions
War
Ch. 1: Assumptions:
Writers on balance of power issues have made a variety of assumptions. “They have assumed, for example, the initial existence of the state, a unit of power based upon land and people, which was capable of exerting influence beyond its own borders; they have assumed also that power existed; that it could be measured by men; that men, having measured it, could balance it; that their balancing policies could affect the lives of states and the movement of history; and that the state system could be, and would be, perpetuated through human analysis, direction, and action” (3-4).
Gulick then explores four of these assumptions.
State System:
The state system is an assumption about the world, and it is a relatively new assumption, all things considered. Gulick warns not to under emphasize the relative importance of this assumption.
Relative homogeneity:
Kant assumed relative homogeneity in the interactions of states in a state system. This was important for instrumental purposes. This provided a kind of uniformity of assumptions and a standardization of practices. “The absence of homogeneity…could be described more accurately as crippling to the balance of power, not destructive of it” (24).
Rational System of Estimating Power:
“By and large, a statesman in 1750 or 1815, if he possessed in formation on the size of armies, on the men who led them, and on the relative wealth of the rulers, probably had a better chance of estimating the power of a foreign state than he would have today” (28).
*missing some pages and thus the fourth assumption
Ch. 2: Aims:
Preserve Independence and Secure Survival
“The basic aim of the balance of power was to insure the survival of independent states” (30).
Preserve the State System
Best way to preserve the state was to preserve the system.
No One State Shall Preponderate
Straight forward.
*skipped rest of chapter
Ch. 3: Means:
“We can now discern the basic assumptions and aims of the balance of power, and we have scraped off some of the obscurities which encrusted it. Given the assumptions and aims, it is possible to enumerate the means and show their proper relationship to the foregoing, must as the Euclidian geometrist, having made assumptions with regard to points, lines, p-lanes and numbers can build with corollaries and entire theoretical system, self-consistent and demonstrable” (52).
Vigilance
Alliances
Intervention
Holding the Balance
Need for Mobility
Reciprocal Compensation
Preservation of Components: Moderation
Coalitions
War
Wendt: Anarchy is What States Make of It
Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46:391-425.
Claims that debates in IR have been focused heavily on whether or not anarchy is amenable to change. Is it an overarching structure whose influence remains static? Or, is it a process variable that takes different forms at different space/time points?
This debate has been largely between neorealists and neoliberals, who are both rationalists. These theories, as with all theories, allow for the asking of certain questions and obscure other questions. Rationalist theories treat identities and interests as imposed from the outside, as exogenous, as opposed to developing internally to the theory itself. Therefore, questions of identity and interest formation are not of interest to rationalists.
Liberals have taken issue with the Realist formulation of state behavior in anarchy, where structure is privileged and process is treated secondarily. “’Strong’ liberals should be troubled by the dichotomous privileging of structure over process, since transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations of structure” (393).
Argues for making interest and identities the dependent variable in the analysis. Does this by looking at anarchy as a structural force. “I argue that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure” (394). “…structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process” (395).
Argues that the treatment of interests and identities as exogenous variables is not instrumentally very useful. It does not tell us whether or not states will respect each others sovereignty, etc. Also, there are different results from the same sort of material capacity change, US military power is different for Vietnam than it is for Spain, for example. Also, agents taken on a variety of different identities at any one given point. Also, “Identities are the basis of interests” (398).
“Self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy. Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or ‘security’ of the self. Concepts of security therefore differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other, and, I want to suggest, it is upon this cognitive variation that the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power depends” (399-400). Then compares competitive, individualistic and cooperative international systems that could all emerge in relation to the institution of self-help anarchy.
So, what is left if we remove any vestige of assumptions about the interaction of states in anarchy? Wendt proposes two things: firstly, there is the structure of the state, the governing institution. Secondly, there is a desire to survive. These do not logically proceed to a self-help system of relative gains.
Waltz claims that structure conditions and socializes. “As James Morrow points out, Waltz’s two mechanisms condition behavior, not identity and interest. This explains how Waltz can be accused of both ‘individualism’ and ‘structuralism.’ He is the former with respect to systemic constitutions of identity and interest, the later with respect to systemic determinations of behavior” (403).
Wendt then explores what would happen if two actors with the above characteristics would meet for the first time. Would they necessarily attack one another out of their own desire for relative power gains? He explores this partially through a hypothetical encounter between us and aliens. If an outside being came and destroyed a major city, that would illicit a certain kind of response. If an outside power came with gifts, that would illicit a different kind of response. This takes place by one group signaling intentions to another group. “This process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a ‘social act’ and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings” (406).
Social configuration are not ‘objective’ like mountains or forests, but neither are they ‘subjective’ like dreams or flights of speculative fancy. They are, as most social scientists concede at the theoretical level, intersubjective constructions” (406).
A more persuasive argument would be one about there only being one predatory state in the international system. This state would signal to other states that it is out to destroy these states. This would cause other states to possibly respond as if some of the neorealist assumptions were correct. However, this is not a structural explanation of the formation of conflictual relations internationally. This is a unit-level explanation. Also, if there is a world of war of all against all that is socially constructed, that does not also infer that it is easy to change.
“For both systemic and ‘psychological’ reasons, then, intersubjective understandings and expectations may have a self-perpetuating quality, constituting path-dependencies that new ideas about self and other must transcend” (412).
Wendt then provides three examples of, “…three institutional transformations of identity and security interest through which states might escape a Hobbesian world of their own making” (412).
Sovereignty provides a socially constructed institution that provides a framework for state interaction. Sovereigns always must have a counter, an opposite, that recognizes them as sovereign. There are rights and responsibilities coffered upon those who are sovereign. “Sovereignty norms are now so taken for granted, so natural, that it is easy to overlook the extent to which they are both presupposed by and an ongoing artifact of practice” (413).
Cooperation is another field in that the Hobbsian would can be supervened. In a one-iteration Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the incentive is to defect. However, in a game with multiple iterations and a clearly established shadow of the future, cooperative regimes can be established. “A constructivist analysis of cooperation…would concentrate on how the expectations produced by behavior affect identities and interests” (417).
Claims that debates in IR have been focused heavily on whether or not anarchy is amenable to change. Is it an overarching structure whose influence remains static? Or, is it a process variable that takes different forms at different space/time points?
This debate has been largely between neorealists and neoliberals, who are both rationalists. These theories, as with all theories, allow for the asking of certain questions and obscure other questions. Rationalist theories treat identities and interests as imposed from the outside, as exogenous, as opposed to developing internally to the theory itself. Therefore, questions of identity and interest formation are not of interest to rationalists.
Liberals have taken issue with the Realist formulation of state behavior in anarchy, where structure is privileged and process is treated secondarily. “’Strong’ liberals should be troubled by the dichotomous privileging of structure over process, since transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations of structure” (393).
Argues for making interest and identities the dependent variable in the analysis. Does this by looking at anarchy as a structural force. “I argue that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure” (394). “…structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process” (395).
Argues that the treatment of interests and identities as exogenous variables is not instrumentally very useful. It does not tell us whether or not states will respect each others sovereignty, etc. Also, there are different results from the same sort of material capacity change, US military power is different for Vietnam than it is for Spain, for example. Also, agents taken on a variety of different identities at any one given point. Also, “Identities are the basis of interests” (398).
“Self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy. Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or ‘security’ of the self. Concepts of security therefore differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other, and, I want to suggest, it is upon this cognitive variation that the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power depends” (399-400). Then compares competitive, individualistic and cooperative international systems that could all emerge in relation to the institution of self-help anarchy.
So, what is left if we remove any vestige of assumptions about the interaction of states in anarchy? Wendt proposes two things: firstly, there is the structure of the state, the governing institution. Secondly, there is a desire to survive. These do not logically proceed to a self-help system of relative gains.
Waltz claims that structure conditions and socializes. “As James Morrow points out, Waltz’s two mechanisms condition behavior, not identity and interest. This explains how Waltz can be accused of both ‘individualism’ and ‘structuralism.’ He is the former with respect to systemic constitutions of identity and interest, the later with respect to systemic determinations of behavior” (403).
Wendt then explores what would happen if two actors with the above characteristics would meet for the first time. Would they necessarily attack one another out of their own desire for relative power gains? He explores this partially through a hypothetical encounter between us and aliens. If an outside being came and destroyed a major city, that would illicit a certain kind of response. If an outside power came with gifts, that would illicit a different kind of response. This takes place by one group signaling intentions to another group. “This process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a ‘social act’ and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings” (406).
Social configuration are not ‘objective’ like mountains or forests, but neither are they ‘subjective’ like dreams or flights of speculative fancy. They are, as most social scientists concede at the theoretical level, intersubjective constructions” (406).
A more persuasive argument would be one about there only being one predatory state in the international system. This state would signal to other states that it is out to destroy these states. This would cause other states to possibly respond as if some of the neorealist assumptions were correct. However, this is not a structural explanation of the formation of conflictual relations internationally. This is a unit-level explanation. Also, if there is a world of war of all against all that is socially constructed, that does not also infer that it is easy to change.
“For both systemic and ‘psychological’ reasons, then, intersubjective understandings and expectations may have a self-perpetuating quality, constituting path-dependencies that new ideas about self and other must transcend” (412).
Wendt then provides three examples of, “…three institutional transformations of identity and security interest through which states might escape a Hobbesian world of their own making” (412).
Sovereignty provides a socially constructed institution that provides a framework for state interaction. Sovereigns always must have a counter, an opposite, that recognizes them as sovereign. There are rights and responsibilities coffered upon those who are sovereign. “Sovereignty norms are now so taken for granted, so natural, that it is easy to overlook the extent to which they are both presupposed by and an ongoing artifact of practice” (413).
Cooperation is another field in that the Hobbsian would can be supervened. In a one-iteration Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the incentive is to defect. However, in a game with multiple iterations and a clearly established shadow of the future, cooperative regimes can be established. “A constructivist analysis of cooperation…would concentrate on how the expectations produced by behavior affect identities and interests” (417).
Saturday, August 9, 2008
Haas: The Balance of Power
Haas, E., 1953. The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda. World Politics, 5(4), 442-477.
Haas explores the reemergence of the balance of power concept. This wouldn’t be problematic if the term was well defined, but it is not. “The term is defined differently by different writers; it is used in varying senses, even if not defined exactly at all; and, finally, it is the focal concept in several quite distinct theories of international relations” (442).
“Professor Hans Morgenthau, himself a well-known exponent of the balance of power theory, states that the term may carry these meanings in technical discussion: (1) a policy aimed at bringing about a certain power distribution; (2) a description of any actual state of affairs in international politics; (3) an approximately equal distribution of power internationally; and (4) a term describing any distribution of political power in international relations” (445).
Haas then highlights different verbal usages associated with the balance of power:
-distribution of power
-equilibrium
-hegemony
-stability/peace
-instability/war
-power politics
-as universal law of history
-as a system, or guide
Different ways that the balance of power is put to meaning:
-as a description
-as ideology
-as analytical tool
-as a prescription
Haas explores the reemergence of the balance of power concept. This wouldn’t be problematic if the term was well defined, but it is not. “The term is defined differently by different writers; it is used in varying senses, even if not defined exactly at all; and, finally, it is the focal concept in several quite distinct theories of international relations” (442).
“Professor Hans Morgenthau, himself a well-known exponent of the balance of power theory, states that the term may carry these meanings in technical discussion: (1) a policy aimed at bringing about a certain power distribution; (2) a description of any actual state of affairs in international politics; (3) an approximately equal distribution of power internationally; and (4) a term describing any distribution of political power in international relations” (445).
Haas then highlights different verbal usages associated with the balance of power:
-distribution of power
-equilibrium
-hegemony
-stability/peace
-instability/war
-power politics
-as universal law of history
-as a system, or guide
Different ways that the balance of power is put to meaning:
-as a description
-as ideology
-as analytical tool
-as a prescription
Friday, August 8, 2008
Walt: Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power
Walt, S.M., 1985. Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. International Security, 9(4), 3-43.
This article, clearly from a Cold War perspective, explores alliances in relation to balance of power. Alliances form in response to threats. These alliances can cause bandwagoning or balancing practices.
“First, states risk their own survival if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong. To ally with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can” (5). Also, if they join “the more vulnerable side”, the new state’s relative influence is greater (6).
The literature on balancing and bandwagoning is not clear in its dissemination of the different forms of power. It is a certain kind of power that states will bandwagon or balance with/against and that is threatening power.
States also must consider aggregate power as well as proximate power, offensive power.
He then explores the conditions under which states will either bandwagon or balance, and the effects that this will have on the character of the international system. For example, a heavily bandwagoning world is very competitive. A world of heavy balancing is less so, and states attempt not to be the chicken with the long neck.
There is a discussion of the role of ideology in alliance formation. Also, the role that international aid (referred to as bribery) plays in alliance formation.
“The analysis above may be summarized as follows. First, states form alliances to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with them. Threats, in turn, are the product of several different sources. Second, ideology is a weaker cause of alliance formation, and ideological movements that strive for tight central authority are more likely to lead to conflict than cooperation. Third, the instruments of ‘bribery’ and penetration are by themselves weak determinants of alignment; they make existing alliances more effective, but rarely create them in the absence of common interests” (33).
This article, clearly from a Cold War perspective, explores alliances in relation to balance of power. Alliances form in response to threats. These alliances can cause bandwagoning or balancing practices.
“First, states risk their own survival if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong. To ally with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can” (5). Also, if they join “the more vulnerable side”, the new state’s relative influence is greater (6).
The literature on balancing and bandwagoning is not clear in its dissemination of the different forms of power. It is a certain kind of power that states will bandwagon or balance with/against and that is threatening power.
States also must consider aggregate power as well as proximate power, offensive power.
He then explores the conditions under which states will either bandwagon or balance, and the effects that this will have on the character of the international system. For example, a heavily bandwagoning world is very competitive. A world of heavy balancing is less so, and states attempt not to be the chicken with the long neck.
There is a discussion of the role of ideology in alliance formation. Also, the role that international aid (referred to as bribery) plays in alliance formation.
“The analysis above may be summarized as follows. First, states form alliances to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with them. Threats, in turn, are the product of several different sources. Second, ideology is a weaker cause of alliance formation, and ideological movements that strive for tight central authority are more likely to lead to conflict than cooperation. Third, the instruments of ‘bribery’ and penetration are by themselves weak determinants of alignment; they make existing alliances more effective, but rarely create them in the absence of common interests” (33).
Thursday, August 7, 2008
Archer: Morphogenesis versus Structuration
Archer, M., 1982. Morphogenesis versus structuration: on combining structure and action. British Journal of Sociology, 33(4), 455-83.
“The fundamental problem of linking human agency and social structure stalks through the history of sociological theory. Basically it concerns how to develop an adequate theoretical account which deals simultaneously with men constituting society and the social formation of human agents” (455). Archer makes the claim that different approaches to this problem are shifting either more towards structure or more towards agency, which she believes is becoming more pronounced over time.
This article explores two approaches to the agent-structure problem that attempt to find a more thorough balance between the two competing variables: the morphogenesis approach and the structuration approach. The former approach was most strongly advocated by Walter Buckley, and it traces its genealogy back to revisions in sociology, and can also be seen through cybernetics. The second approach is that of structuration, most clearly addressed by Anthony Giddens.
“Both the ‘morphogenetic’ and ‘structuration’ approaches concur that ‘action’ and ‘structure’ presuppose one another: structural patterning is inextricably grounded in practical interaction. Simultaneously both acknowledge that social practice is ineluctably shaped by the unacknowledged conditions of action and generates unintended consequences which form the context of subsequent interaction. The two perspectives thus endorse the credo that the ‘escape of human history from human intentions, and the return of the consequences of that escape as causal influences upon human action, is a chronic feature of social life’” (456).
For the discussion of structuration, Archer uses Giddens. “Giddens’s whole approach hinges on overcoming three dichotomies and it is these dualisms which he strips away from a variety of sources, then recombining their residues” (456). Firstly, he views human action as being deeply embedded within actions in society, transcending the dichotomy between voluntarism and determinism. Secondly, he promotes the subject’s knowledgeability in her creation of society, while also keeping in mind that the subject is aware that they employ societal processes in this process, thus transcending the subject/object dualism. Thirdly, he rejects theories that separate static and dynamic treatments of time, thus transcending the synchrony/diachrony dualism. Structuration is mainly concerned with, “…amalgamating the two sides of each divide” (457).
“’Morphogenesis’ is also a process, referring to the complex interchanges that produce change in a system’s given form, structure or state…, but it has an end-product, structural elaboration, which is quite different from Gidden's social system as merely a Visible pattern” (458).
“Emergent properties which characterize socio-cultural systems imply discontinuity between initial interactions and their product, the complex system. In turn this invites analytical dualism when dealing with structure and action” (458). There are infinite patterns of interaction between structural conditioning/social interactions/structural elaboration (458).
“Hence Giddnes’s whole approach turns on overcoming the dichotomies with the morphogenetic perspective retains and utilizes—between voluntarism and determinism, between synchrony and diachrony, and between individual and society” (458).
“The morphogenetic argument that structure and action operate over different time periods is based on two simple propositions:
-that structure logically predates the action(s) which transform it,
-that structural elaboration logically postdates those actions, which can be represented as shown in Figure 1” (468).
(468).
“The fundamental problem of linking human agency and social structure stalks through the history of sociological theory. Basically it concerns how to develop an adequate theoretical account which deals simultaneously with men constituting society and the social formation of human agents” (455). Archer makes the claim that different approaches to this problem are shifting either more towards structure or more towards agency, which she believes is becoming more pronounced over time.
This article explores two approaches to the agent-structure problem that attempt to find a more thorough balance between the two competing variables: the morphogenesis approach and the structuration approach. The former approach was most strongly advocated by Walter Buckley, and it traces its genealogy back to revisions in sociology, and can also be seen through cybernetics. The second approach is that of structuration, most clearly addressed by Anthony Giddens.
“Both the ‘morphogenetic’ and ‘structuration’ approaches concur that ‘action’ and ‘structure’ presuppose one another: structural patterning is inextricably grounded in practical interaction. Simultaneously both acknowledge that social practice is ineluctably shaped by the unacknowledged conditions of action and generates unintended consequences which form the context of subsequent interaction. The two perspectives thus endorse the credo that the ‘escape of human history from human intentions, and the return of the consequences of that escape as causal influences upon human action, is a chronic feature of social life’” (456).
For the discussion of structuration, Archer uses Giddens. “Giddens’s whole approach hinges on overcoming three dichotomies and it is these dualisms which he strips away from a variety of sources, then recombining their residues” (456). Firstly, he views human action as being deeply embedded within actions in society, transcending the dichotomy between voluntarism and determinism. Secondly, he promotes the subject’s knowledgeability in her creation of society, while also keeping in mind that the subject is aware that they employ societal processes in this process, thus transcending the subject/object dualism. Thirdly, he rejects theories that separate static and dynamic treatments of time, thus transcending the synchrony/diachrony dualism. Structuration is mainly concerned with, “…amalgamating the two sides of each divide” (457).
“’Morphogenesis’ is also a process, referring to the complex interchanges that produce change in a system’s given form, structure or state…, but it has an end-product, structural elaboration, which is quite different from Gidden's social system as merely a Visible pattern” (458).
“Emergent properties which characterize socio-cultural systems imply discontinuity between initial interactions and their product, the complex system. In turn this invites analytical dualism when dealing with structure and action” (458). There are infinite patterns of interaction between structural conditioning/social interactions/structural elaboration (458).
“Hence Giddnes’s whole approach turns on overcoming the dichotomies with the morphogenetic perspective retains and utilizes—between voluntarism and determinism, between synchrony and diachrony, and between individual and society” (458).
“The morphogenetic argument that structure and action operate over different time periods is based on two simple propositions:
-that structure logically predates the action(s) which transform it,
-that structural elaboration logically postdates those actions, which can be represented as shown in Figure 1” (468).
(468).
Wednesday, August 6, 2008
Archer: For Structure
Archer, M., 2000. For structure: its reality, properties and powers: A reply to Anthony King. The Sociological Review, 48(3), 464-472.
“As Bhaskar wrote, ‘the real problem appears to be not so much that of how one could give an individualistic explanation of social behaviour, but that of how one could ever give a non-social (ie, strictly individualistic) explanation of individual, at least characteristically human behaviour! For the predicates designating properties special to persons all pre-suppose a social context for other employment. A tribesman implies a tribe, the cashing of a cheque a banking system. Explanation, whether by subsummption under general laws, advertion to motives and rules, or redescription…alw3ays involves irreducibly social predicates’” (464).
Realist social theory uses analytical dualism and not philosophical dualism, as stated by King. It is analytical for very instrumental reasons. The interaction: Structural Conditioning -> Social Interaction -> Structural Elaboration never allow for structure and agency to interact simultaneously, but they do provide for analytical tools for exploring the behavior of the micro/macro.
Archer re-presents the three kinds of emergence: numerical emergence, relational emergence and bureaucratic emergence.
Numerical Emergence: It is not simply that individuals can change things if they want to and if they possess enough information, as stated by Watkins. It is also the result of the social structure surrounding them. For example, if a small part of a population is literate and tries to improve the literacy rates for others, it will take longer than if a larger part of the population was in their shoes.
Relational Emergence: uses the example of the division of labor and how collective productive activity was on aggregate more than individual action. First order emergence, more efficient pin making, leads to second order emergence, wealthier nations, leads to third order emergence, current advantages in education, for example.
Bureaucratic Emergence: the emergent nature of roles.
UPDATE: Distinguishing emergence from aggregation: "has the generative capacity to modify the powers of its constituents in fundamental ways and to exercise causal influences sui generis. This is the litmus test which differentiates between emergence on the one hand and aggregation and combination on the other" (466)
“As Bhaskar wrote, ‘the real problem appears to be not so much that of how one could give an individualistic explanation of social behaviour, but that of how one could ever give a non-social (ie, strictly individualistic) explanation of individual, at least characteristically human behaviour! For the predicates designating properties special to persons all pre-suppose a social context for other employment. A tribesman implies a tribe, the cashing of a cheque a banking system. Explanation, whether by subsummption under general laws, advertion to motives and rules, or redescription…alw3ays involves irreducibly social predicates’” (464).
Realist social theory uses analytical dualism and not philosophical dualism, as stated by King. It is analytical for very instrumental reasons. The interaction: Structural Conditioning -> Social Interaction -> Structural Elaboration never allow for structure and agency to interact simultaneously, but they do provide for analytical tools for exploring the behavior of the micro/macro.
Archer re-presents the three kinds of emergence: numerical emergence, relational emergence and bureaucratic emergence.
Numerical Emergence: It is not simply that individuals can change things if they want to and if they possess enough information, as stated by Watkins. It is also the result of the social structure surrounding them. For example, if a small part of a population is literate and tries to improve the literacy rates for others, it will take longer than if a larger part of the population was in their shoes.
Relational Emergence: uses the example of the division of labor and how collective productive activity was on aggregate more than individual action. First order emergence, more efficient pin making, leads to second order emergence, wealthier nations, leads to third order emergence, current advantages in education, for example.
Bureaucratic Emergence: the emergent nature of roles.
UPDATE: Distinguishing emergence from aggregation: "has the generative capacity to modify the powers of its constituents in fundamental ways and to exercise causal influences sui generis. This is the litmus test which differentiates between emergence on the one hand and aggregation and combination on the other" (466)
King: Against Structure
King, A., 1999. Against Structure: A Critique of Morphogenetic Social Theory. The Sociological Review, 47(2), 199-227.
This represents a criticism of Archer’s morphogenetic social theory because of its “autonomous social structure” (199). This, King finds contradictory. King tries to, “re-habilitate the interpretive tradition which Archer dismisses…” (199).
“The central claim of Archer’s morphogenetic social theory is to maintain a stratified social ontology. Society must be understood and analyzed as the interaction over time of objective structure and individual, subjective agency or of the macro and the micro” (199).
Archer argues for the ontological separation of society from individuals. “As a consequence of her insistence upon the dual nature of social reality, Archer is vehement in her rejection of any social theory which seems to threaten to collapse social reality into either the structural and objective or individual and subjective dimensions because these approaches will necessarily involve either the exaggeration or elimination of human freedom and the misrepresentation of the Janus-faced nature of society” (202).
Archer uses structural, agential and cultural emergence to tread the fine line between a theory of structure that is not reducible to individualist interpretations. King takes issue with this and explores the claims of structural emergence claiming that these can all be traced back to actions taken by individuals at one moment in time. Discusses three types of structural emergence: numerical, relational and bureaucratic.
Argues against these structurally emergent properties. Argues against relational emergence by saying that the interpretive tradition does not reduce all effects to an individual, but to individuals, and that all emergent properties can be reduced to individuals.
Archer also explores numerical emergence through literacy in Cuba.
Archer explores bureaucratic emergence through the concept of roles.
“This article has tried to demonstrate the interpretive tradition’s rejection of the concept of structure on the grounds that structure is not autonomous, pre-existent or causal” (222).
This represents a criticism of Archer’s morphogenetic social theory because of its “autonomous social structure” (199). This, King finds contradictory. King tries to, “re-habilitate the interpretive tradition which Archer dismisses…” (199).
“The central claim of Archer’s morphogenetic social theory is to maintain a stratified social ontology. Society must be understood and analyzed as the interaction over time of objective structure and individual, subjective agency or of the macro and the micro” (199).
Archer argues for the ontological separation of society from individuals. “As a consequence of her insistence upon the dual nature of social reality, Archer is vehement in her rejection of any social theory which seems to threaten to collapse social reality into either the structural and objective or individual and subjective dimensions because these approaches will necessarily involve either the exaggeration or elimination of human freedom and the misrepresentation of the Janus-faced nature of society” (202).
Archer uses structural, agential and cultural emergence to tread the fine line between a theory of structure that is not reducible to individualist interpretations. King takes issue with this and explores the claims of structural emergence claiming that these can all be traced back to actions taken by individuals at one moment in time. Discusses three types of structural emergence: numerical, relational and bureaucratic.
Argues against these structurally emergent properties. Argues against relational emergence by saying that the interpretive tradition does not reduce all effects to an individual, but to individuals, and that all emergent properties can be reduced to individuals.
Archer also explores numerical emergence through literacy in Cuba.
Archer explores bureaucratic emergence through the concept of roles.
“This article has tried to demonstrate the interpretive tradition’s rejection of the concept of structure on the grounds that structure is not autonomous, pre-existent or causal” (222).
Treverton and Jones: Measuring National Power
Treverton, G. & Jones, S., 2005. Measuring National Power, Rand Corporation.
This is a summary of RAND conference proceedings with SAG and IFs.
The conference was designed to explore the changing nature of power. It initially explored power from three perspectives: the power of outcomes, the power of processes and the power of being. This is applied in a brief way to the changing nature of the US’ power in relation to other rising (and falling) international powers.
It also then explored the relationship between soft and hard power. This relationship is not entirely clear, and the distinction is not always very helpful.
It also looked at non-state actors and the power that they can wield. Specifically, it mentioned the land-mine ban as well as the Kyoto protocol.
Six kinds of non-state actors were mentioned: corporations, NGOs and civil society, IOs (WTO, IMF, WB, UN), regional economic associations, terrorists/criminals, virtual networks (hackers).
A different break-out group assessed different goals of non-state actors: change policy, disrupt state, work with state.
A third group identified ways in which ‘soft power’ could be changed to be more useful. They highlighted a range from coercion to attraction along economic, ideational and cultural lines. One way to determine soft power would be to poll a population and ask, “where would you like to live?”
This is a summary of RAND conference proceedings with SAG and IFs.
The conference was designed to explore the changing nature of power. It initially explored power from three perspectives: the power of outcomes, the power of processes and the power of being. This is applied in a brief way to the changing nature of the US’ power in relation to other rising (and falling) international powers.
It also then explored the relationship between soft and hard power. This relationship is not entirely clear, and the distinction is not always very helpful.
It also looked at non-state actors and the power that they can wield. Specifically, it mentioned the land-mine ban as well as the Kyoto protocol.
Six kinds of non-state actors were mentioned: corporations, NGOs and civil society, IOs (WTO, IMF, WB, UN), regional economic associations, terrorists/criminals, virtual networks (hackers).
A different break-out group assessed different goals of non-state actors: change policy, disrupt state, work with state.
A third group identified ways in which ‘soft power’ could be changed to be more useful. They highlighted a range from coercion to attraction along economic, ideational and cultural lines. One way to determine soft power would be to poll a population and ask, “where would you like to live?”
Monday, August 4, 2008
Doty: A Reply to Colin Wight
Doty, RL. 1999. “A Reply to Colin Wight.” European Journal of International Relations 5:387.
Doty defends the article that Wight criticizes. Firstly, by identifying that a plurality of readings is possible, and that one reading of a given text is not necessarily the only possible reading. This is a broad point about the texts in that he criticizes her, and his reading of her text. She also criticizes him putting her in the “post-structural” category. She said that she was proving “a post-structural gaze” and nothing definitive.
Also, Doty criticizes Wight’s understanding of “undecidablitiy” as derived from Derrida. Wight seems to think that undecidability is a non-decision, when Doty argues that it is infact most helpfully understood as a present.
Doty defends the article that Wight criticizes. Firstly, by identifying that a plurality of readings is possible, and that one reading of a given text is not necessarily the only possible reading. This is a broad point about the texts in that he criticizes her, and his reading of her text. She also criticizes him putting her in the “post-structural” category. She said that she was proving “a post-structural gaze” and nothing definitive.
Also, Doty criticizes Wight’s understanding of “undecidablitiy” as derived from Derrida. Wight seems to think that undecidability is a non-decision, when Doty argues that it is infact most helpfully understood as a present.
Wight: They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They?
Wight, C. 1999. “They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They?: Locating Agency in the Agent-Structure Problematique.” European Journal of International Relations 5:109.
Doty’s article attempted to do many things vis-Ã -vis the agent-structure debate in IR. One of these things was to make the claim that structures have been overwhelmingly emphasized while agents have received relatively less attention. Another claim is to, in the words of Wight, shoot right to the heart of the dead horse by identifying the relationship between agent-structure as an aporia.
“…I will argue that Doty’s treatment of the agent-structure writers is highly problematic and that the manner in which she sets up the agent-structure writers facilitates their easy refutation. In particular, I will argue that Doty’s treatment of the idea of resolution of the agent-structure problematic. Doty treats resolution in oppositional either/or terms; problems are either totally resolved or there is no resolution. Contrary to this I argue that approaches to the agent-structure problem should be viewed from the perspective of better or worse than prevailing alternatives. Indeed, I argue that it is her failure to contextualize the agent-structure problem in terms of the dominant alternatives—methodological individualism and methodological strucdturalism—that leads Doty to view the agent-structure writers as presenting the ‘final solution’ to this problem. Contra this, I argue that the agent-structure writers do not conceive of their theoretical articulations as ‘final solutions’, but as differing complex social ontologies. Given this, the agent-structure writers should be viewed not as advancing solutions, but alternatives—alternatives, that is, to the dominant ways of conceptualizing complex social ontologies” (111).
Wight spends some time trying to situate himself within a “gang” of ontological disposition. He is not sure exactly where he fits, as he reads Derrida, Foucault, but also Bakshar. He claims that he is a critical realist, and that the above authors can be read as critical realists. He also says that what he is will be displayed in his practice.
The distinction between agent and structure is a long-standing one with clear sociological roots. There are two main-line approaches to this problem, the methodological individualism and methodological structuralism (this is highlighted in Wendt’s article about agents and structure, but Wend asks for a structuration (originating with Giddens) solution to the problem (is it a final solution?!?!)).
Must go beyond Doty’s prescription for an agency based on an understanding of subject positions and create a more nuanced, “multi-layered perspective” (125). This approach can not anthropormophise the state.
Taken from Spivak, there are three forms of agency that form in the social world: “…accountability, intentionality and subjectivity…” (130).
Separates three kinds of agency: 1, 2 and 3. 1 involves the core-make-up of a person. 2 involves the position in that the find themselves (diplomat, is an example). 3 is the specific way that 1 and 2 interact from person to person.
Doty’s article attempted to do many things vis-Ã -vis the agent-structure debate in IR. One of these things was to make the claim that structures have been overwhelmingly emphasized while agents have received relatively less attention. Another claim is to, in the words of Wight, shoot right to the heart of the dead horse by identifying the relationship between agent-structure as an aporia.
“…I will argue that Doty’s treatment of the agent-structure writers is highly problematic and that the manner in which she sets up the agent-structure writers facilitates their easy refutation. In particular, I will argue that Doty’s treatment of the idea of resolution of the agent-structure problematic. Doty treats resolution in oppositional either/or terms; problems are either totally resolved or there is no resolution. Contrary to this I argue that approaches to the agent-structure problem should be viewed from the perspective of better or worse than prevailing alternatives. Indeed, I argue that it is her failure to contextualize the agent-structure problem in terms of the dominant alternatives—methodological individualism and methodological strucdturalism—that leads Doty to view the agent-structure writers as presenting the ‘final solution’ to this problem. Contra this, I argue that the agent-structure writers do not conceive of their theoretical articulations as ‘final solutions’, but as differing complex social ontologies. Given this, the agent-structure writers should be viewed not as advancing solutions, but alternatives—alternatives, that is, to the dominant ways of conceptualizing complex social ontologies” (111).
Wight spends some time trying to situate himself within a “gang” of ontological disposition. He is not sure exactly where he fits, as he reads Derrida, Foucault, but also Bakshar. He claims that he is a critical realist, and that the above authors can be read as critical realists. He also says that what he is will be displayed in his practice.
The distinction between agent and structure is a long-standing one with clear sociological roots. There are two main-line approaches to this problem, the methodological individualism and methodological structuralism (this is highlighted in Wendt’s article about agents and structure, but Wend asks for a structuration (originating with Giddens) solution to the problem (is it a final solution?!?!)).
Must go beyond Doty’s prescription for an agency based on an understanding of subject positions and create a more nuanced, “multi-layered perspective” (125). This approach can not anthropormophise the state.
Taken from Spivak, there are three forms of agency that form in the social world: “…accountability, intentionality and subjectivity…” (130).
Separates three kinds of agency: 1, 2 and 3. 1 involves the core-make-up of a person. 2 involves the position in that the find themselves (diplomat, is an example). 3 is the specific way that 1 and 2 interact from person to person.
Doty: Aporia
Doty, RL. 1997. “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory.” European Journal of International Relations 3:365.
As the name “aporia” suggests, there is much that is undecidable, unknowable and undefinable in the description of the agent-structure problem by Doty.
The article begins by addressing the complexity of the agent-structure problem, first brought to the forefront by Wendt (1987). His solution took the form of structuration theory, a mixture of agent-driven theory and structure-driven theory.
“In this article I examine some significant problems found in this very important conversation, and suggest that they result in serious gaps and silences. However, I also propose that important openings can be found that point to a more critical, if unsettling, way of conceptualizing agents and structures and the relation between them. Specifically I suggest that claims to have resolved the dualism between agents and structures are unwarranted. The ‘solutions’ that have been proposed to this problem either end up reverting to a structural determinism or alternatively to an understanding of agency which presumes pregiven, autonomous individuals. Both of these positions come full circle back to the very dilemma that gives rise to the agent-structure problem in the first place. Despite the failure to resolve the agent-structure problem, however, the conversations that have taken place contain some important insights and openings that raise just the kind of questions that can lead to a more critical understanding of International Relations. These openings have not, however, been pursued by the framers of the agent-structure problematique. Because of this, serious gaps, silences and foreclosures of possibilities remain” (366).
“I make the following arguments. (1) Scientific realism, the philosophy of science which either explicitly or implicitly underpins the various ‘solutions’ to the agent-structure problem, remains wedded to an essentialist notion of structure which is at odds with attempts to give equal ontological and explanatory priority to the practices of agents. (2) Structuration theory contains contradictions that are most manifest in its resort to ‘bracketing’… (3) Far from transcending the subject-object dualism, the proposed solutions to the agent-structure problem merely replicate it” (366).
“One popular story is that of agents whose practices produce, reproduce and sometimes transform the structures that make up society. The other story is that of the structures themselves which enable, constrain and make possible the practices of agents…Dressler…frames the issue as involving two uncontentious truths—(1) human agency is the only moving force behind actions, events and outcomes; and (2) agency can only be realized in concrete historical circumstances. Wendt…suggests that the agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life—(1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and (2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (367).
“The difficulty…is the oppositional logic within which the agent-structure problem has been articulated, i.e. the agent-structure problem has been formulated within a system of thought that defines structures and agents as two distinct, fully constituted and opposed entities each with essential properties, while the central feature of structures, as defined in the agent-structure problematique, makes problematic this very distinction” (371-2).
Doty claims that the issue of agency has been underwhelmingly emphasized and tries to shed light on it.
The current treatment of the agent-structure problem does not allow for the undecidability of the aporia, that Doty puts forth. This post-structural approach, this rejection of decidability is not an embrace of nihilism or non-action, but rather is a problematization of the ability of scholars to truly identify whether causality takes place in the realm of structure or agency. In fact, the current treatment of the dichotomy, in its inadequacy to identify and highlight the interaction of structure/agent, actually makes quite clearly the case that the agent-structure issue has not, and cannot, be brought to clarity.
Doty then presents undecidability and paradoxes as a method for achieving three things:
“I do, however, claim that it is possible to take the undecidability of issues seriously and to press these paradoxes further than they have been pressed by IR theorists. The purpose of doing this are threefold—(1) to reconceptualize the nature and significance of practice; (2) to suggest an alternative way of understanding the agent-structure relationship; and (3) to point out how current ‘solutions’ foreclose important possibilities in terms of critical International Relations theory” (375).
Doty uses concepts like play and practice in determining the causal implications of either structure or agency.
Doty does not argue that the efforts of Wendt and others in re-associating the agent-structure problem with a contsructeivist method and ontology is wholely base. She makes the case that they could go much further. “Certainly, approaches which reject a priori assumptions about the givenness of either agents or structures enable the posing of a much wider range of questions than do those which give explanatory priority to either one of these. However, the current framing of the agent-structure problem precludes important critical moves and creates boundaries beyond which IR theory cannot go. At stake is the extent to which the inquiries enabled by particular framings of the issue are complicit with existing discourses, and the extent to which they make problematic these discourses, their underlying presuppositions and the power inherent in them” (383).
There is a discussion of practice informing identity, which is over determined, and the concept of subject-position, being discursively formed and uncentered (always already uncenterable?) as being important as well.
“If structures, meanings and identities are overdetermined and inherently undecidable, and the construction of all of these things results from practices which marginalize and exclude the excesses that would call into question the center of itself…, then we can reasonably suggest that power is fundamental to discursive constructions. There are no constructions in the absence of power” (386).
“Hollis and Smith…suggest that there are still two stories to tell, that of agency and that of structure. Wendt…also suggests that there are two stories to tell regarding the relationship between structure and process—one based exclusively on microeconomic analogies, and one based on sociological and social psychological analogies. In this article, I have attempted to show that there are also other stories to tell regarding agency, structure and the relationship between them and practices” (387).
As the name “aporia” suggests, there is much that is undecidable, unknowable and undefinable in the description of the agent-structure problem by Doty.
The article begins by addressing the complexity of the agent-structure problem, first brought to the forefront by Wendt (1987). His solution took the form of structuration theory, a mixture of agent-driven theory and structure-driven theory.
“In this article I examine some significant problems found in this very important conversation, and suggest that they result in serious gaps and silences. However, I also propose that important openings can be found that point to a more critical, if unsettling, way of conceptualizing agents and structures and the relation between them. Specifically I suggest that claims to have resolved the dualism between agents and structures are unwarranted. The ‘solutions’ that have been proposed to this problem either end up reverting to a structural determinism or alternatively to an understanding of agency which presumes pregiven, autonomous individuals. Both of these positions come full circle back to the very dilemma that gives rise to the agent-structure problem in the first place. Despite the failure to resolve the agent-structure problem, however, the conversations that have taken place contain some important insights and openings that raise just the kind of questions that can lead to a more critical understanding of International Relations. These openings have not, however, been pursued by the framers of the agent-structure problematique. Because of this, serious gaps, silences and foreclosures of possibilities remain” (366).
“I make the following arguments. (1) Scientific realism, the philosophy of science which either explicitly or implicitly underpins the various ‘solutions’ to the agent-structure problem, remains wedded to an essentialist notion of structure which is at odds with attempts to give equal ontological and explanatory priority to the practices of agents. (2) Structuration theory contains contradictions that are most manifest in its resort to ‘bracketing’… (3) Far from transcending the subject-object dualism, the proposed solutions to the agent-structure problem merely replicate it” (366).
“One popular story is that of agents whose practices produce, reproduce and sometimes transform the structures that make up society. The other story is that of the structures themselves which enable, constrain and make possible the practices of agents…Dressler…frames the issue as involving two uncontentious truths—(1) human agency is the only moving force behind actions, events and outcomes; and (2) agency can only be realized in concrete historical circumstances. Wendt…suggests that the agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life—(1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and (2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (367).
“The difficulty…is the oppositional logic within which the agent-structure problem has been articulated, i.e. the agent-structure problem has been formulated within a system of thought that defines structures and agents as two distinct, fully constituted and opposed entities each with essential properties, while the central feature of structures, as defined in the agent-structure problematique, makes problematic this very distinction” (371-2).
Doty claims that the issue of agency has been underwhelmingly emphasized and tries to shed light on it.
The current treatment of the agent-structure problem does not allow for the undecidability of the aporia, that Doty puts forth. This post-structural approach, this rejection of decidability is not an embrace of nihilism or non-action, but rather is a problematization of the ability of scholars to truly identify whether causality takes place in the realm of structure or agency. In fact, the current treatment of the dichotomy, in its inadequacy to identify and highlight the interaction of structure/agent, actually makes quite clearly the case that the agent-structure issue has not, and cannot, be brought to clarity.
Doty then presents undecidability and paradoxes as a method for achieving three things:
“I do, however, claim that it is possible to take the undecidability of issues seriously and to press these paradoxes further than they have been pressed by IR theorists. The purpose of doing this are threefold—(1) to reconceptualize the nature and significance of practice; (2) to suggest an alternative way of understanding the agent-structure relationship; and (3) to point out how current ‘solutions’ foreclose important possibilities in terms of critical International Relations theory” (375).
Doty uses concepts like play and practice in determining the causal implications of either structure or agency.
Doty does not argue that the efforts of Wendt and others in re-associating the agent-structure problem with a contsructeivist method and ontology is wholely base. She makes the case that they could go much further. “Certainly, approaches which reject a priori assumptions about the givenness of either agents or structures enable the posing of a much wider range of questions than do those which give explanatory priority to either one of these. However, the current framing of the agent-structure problem precludes important critical moves and creates boundaries beyond which IR theory cannot go. At stake is the extent to which the inquiries enabled by particular framings of the issue are complicit with existing discourses, and the extent to which they make problematic these discourses, their underlying presuppositions and the power inherent in them” (383).
There is a discussion of practice informing identity, which is over determined, and the concept of subject-position, being discursively formed and uncentered (always already uncenterable?) as being important as well.
“If structures, meanings and identities are overdetermined and inherently undecidable, and the construction of all of these things results from practices which marginalize and exclude the excesses that would call into question the center of itself…, then we can reasonably suggest that power is fundamental to discursive constructions. There are no constructions in the absence of power” (386).
“Hollis and Smith…suggest that there are still two stories to tell, that of agency and that of structure. Wendt…also suggests that there are two stories to tell regarding the relationship between structure and process—one based exclusively on microeconomic analogies, and one based on sociological and social psychological analogies. In this article, I have attempted to show that there are also other stories to tell regarding agency, structure and the relationship between them and practices” (387).
Gibson and Seventer: A Tale of Two Models
Gibson, B. & Van Seventer, D., 2000. A Tale of Two Models: comparing structuralist and neoclassical computable general equilibrium models for South Africa. International Review of Applied Economics, 14(2), 149-171.
“This paper compares two working models of the South African economy, an orthodox, neoclassical computable general equilibrium model in which savings drive investment, and a more structuralist, eclectic, model for which there is an independent investment function” (149).
“It is seen that the neoclassical model fully supports the principles of the `Washington Consensus’ while the structuralist model requires a far more heterodox set of policies to avoid slow growth or high inflation” (149).
They calibrate both models to the same SAM. The regional focus is South Africa.
They make a distinction between structuralist and neoclassical models. In neoclassical, or orthodox models, government spending is always a problem at the macro level: there is a clear inverse relationship between government spending and economic growth. Government spending can lead to, “…current account deficits, real exchange rate appreciation and an accelerated decline in export performance” (150).
Structuralist models make different assumptions, and do not rely solely on state-based explanations. “It is not typically assumed that resources are fully utilized in structuralist models, thereby opening a range of demand-side, employment generating policy options, options that have little relevance in the orthodox setting. “What makes a structuralist model structuralist is the specific and path-dependent character of the economy under study” (150).
Orthodox modeling conceptions are derived from Dvarajan and Lewis (1990): “There are two sectors, traded and non-traded and three goods, counting imports. The exportable is not consumed at home and the home good is not exported” (151). “A second important assumption is that there is only one race and one class of consumers in the prototype version, even though there are 13 occupational categories, six income classes and four races in the base SAM” (151). “From the orthodox perspective, this model has many desirable properties.
The structuralist model takes time into account. In this way, it is dynamic and more useful than the static neoclassical model.
The authors find that the neoclassical model fits nicely with “Washington Consensus” conceptions of trade openness and taxation. The structuralist model is much more vague in its conclusions.
“This paper compares two working models of the South African economy, an orthodox, neoclassical computable general equilibrium model in which savings drive investment, and a more structuralist, eclectic, model for which there is an independent investment function” (149).
“It is seen that the neoclassical model fully supports the principles of the `Washington Consensus’ while the structuralist model requires a far more heterodox set of policies to avoid slow growth or high inflation” (149).
They calibrate both models to the same SAM. The regional focus is South Africa.
They make a distinction between structuralist and neoclassical models. In neoclassical, or orthodox models, government spending is always a problem at the macro level: there is a clear inverse relationship between government spending and economic growth. Government spending can lead to, “…current account deficits, real exchange rate appreciation and an accelerated decline in export performance” (150).
Structuralist models make different assumptions, and do not rely solely on state-based explanations. “It is not typically assumed that resources are fully utilized in structuralist models, thereby opening a range of demand-side, employment generating policy options, options that have little relevance in the orthodox setting. “What makes a structuralist model structuralist is the specific and path-dependent character of the economy under study” (150).
Orthodox modeling conceptions are derived from Dvarajan and Lewis (1990): “There are two sectors, traded and non-traded and three goods, counting imports. The exportable is not consumed at home and the home good is not exported” (151). “A second important assumption is that there is only one race and one class of consumers in the prototype version, even though there are 13 occupational categories, six income classes and four races in the base SAM” (151). “From the orthodox perspective, this model has many desirable properties.
The structuralist model takes time into account. In this way, it is dynamic and more useful than the static neoclassical model.
The authors find that the neoclassical model fits nicely with “Washington Consensus” conceptions of trade openness and taxation. The structuralist model is much more vague in its conclusions.
Devarajan et al.: Policy Lessons from Trade-Focused, Two-Sector Models
Devarajan, S., Lewis, J. & Robinson, S., 1990. Policy Lessons from Trade-Focused, Two-Sector Models. Journal of Policy Modeling, 12(4), 625-657.
These authors create a one country, two-sector, three good CGE trade model that is designed to be simple, or, in their words, minimalist. The benefits to this are clear: the CGE becomes much less of a black box. They call it the 1-2-3 model.
“The model has three actors: a producer, a household, and the rest of the world” (627).
“The 1-2-3 model is different from the standard neoclassical trade model with all goods tradable and all tradables perfect substitutes with domestic goods. The standard model, long a staple of trade theory, yields wildly implausible results in empirical applications” (630). One way to work around this is building on the word of Salter (1959) and Swan (1960) that separates tradables from non-tradables.
They claim that their 1-2-3 model is Walrasian, even though there are macro-level closures. “The additions of government, savings-investment, and the balance of trade are done in ways that retain the notion of flow equilibrium and do not strain the Walrasian paradigm” (642). They also highlight two different approaches on “macro closures”: in the first approach, macro-level factors are exogenous. “In the second approach, the CGE model is extended to include variables typically found in macro models…and to expand the notion of equilibrium to incorporate asset markets and expectations. The intent is to build CGE models that move beyond the Walrasian paradigm and directly incorporate macro phenomena” (642).
The started with the 1-2-3 model, then added macro-level factors like tariffs, subsidies, taxes, savings and investment. The addition of savings and investment brought up the need to discuss closure rules. Thus, a minimalist CGE model is built upon to make it more realistic.
These authors create a one country, two-sector, three good CGE trade model that is designed to be simple, or, in their words, minimalist. The benefits to this are clear: the CGE becomes much less of a black box. They call it the 1-2-3 model.
“The model has three actors: a producer, a household, and the rest of the world” (627).
“The 1-2-3 model is different from the standard neoclassical trade model with all goods tradable and all tradables perfect substitutes with domestic goods. The standard model, long a staple of trade theory, yields wildly implausible results in empirical applications” (630). One way to work around this is building on the word of Salter (1959) and Swan (1960) that separates tradables from non-tradables.
They claim that their 1-2-3 model is Walrasian, even though there are macro-level closures. “The additions of government, savings-investment, and the balance of trade are done in ways that retain the notion of flow equilibrium and do not strain the Walrasian paradigm” (642). They also highlight two different approaches on “macro closures”: in the first approach, macro-level factors are exogenous. “In the second approach, the CGE model is extended to include variables typically found in macro models…and to expand the notion of equilibrium to incorporate asset markets and expectations. The intent is to build CGE models that move beyond the Walrasian paradigm and directly incorporate macro phenomena” (642).
The started with the 1-2-3 model, then added macro-level factors like tariffs, subsidies, taxes, savings and investment. The addition of savings and investment brought up the need to discuss closure rules. Thus, a minimalist CGE model is built upon to make it more realistic.
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