Nexton et. al.: What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate

Nexon, Daniel H., & Wright, Thomas. (2007). What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate (Vol. 101, 253-271): Cambridge Journals Online.

“Empires, we argue, are characterized by rule through intermediaries and the existence of distinctive contractual relations between cores and their peripheries. These features endow them with a distinctive network-structure from those associated with unipolar and hegemonic orders. The existence of imperial relations alters the dynamics of international politics: processes of divide and rule supplant the balance-of-power mechanism; the major axis of relations shift from interstate to those among imperial authorities, local intermediaries, and other peripheral actors; and preeminent powers face special problems of legitimating their bargains across heterogeneous audiences” (253)

This article take the debate about empires and makes the case that America is not an empire because it does not exhibit many of the characteristics of previous empires, specifically those of direct, territorial rule. This argument is fleshed out by providing examples of different forms of organization in international society. “We argue that ideal-typical empires, contra Ferguson, differ from hegemonic and uni-polar orders because they combine two features: rule through intermediaries and heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities”(253). However, while it is not a formal empire, it does exhibit many characteristics of an informal empire.

The authors identify three types of approaches to understanding an international system with a dominant player. There is the uni-polar system, where one country represents the strongest player in the international system. Many who theorize about this feature of international organization do so with assumptions of anarchy and rational agency. Some believe that this represents a stable form of international societal organization. Another form of international organization is that of hegemony, which can be understood and theorized in many ways. Many see this form of organization requiring the hegemonic leader to control economic, military and technological aspects of global interaction. The third form of international control is empire.

The authors then expand upon the notion of empire and imperial rule. They claim that it focuses on policies of divide and rule. They use Moytl’s construction of empire as a hub and spokes with no rim between the core and periphery. This form of empire works well, until, that is, the periphery begins to communicate with one another and thus opens up the opportunity for increased resistance. They explain that empires can operate through channels of informal rule.

They then approach the American Empire question: “It follows that questions such as “is America an empire?” or “is the international system an imperial one?” obscure more than they reveal. The problem of contemporary empire (American or otherwise) hinges, rather, on the degree to which specific relations—–among polities, between polities and nonstate actors, and in specific policy arenas—–look more or less like those associated with ideal-typical empires” (266). And, “Whenever relations between or among two or more political organizations involve indirect rule and heterogeneous contracting, their interactions will develop at least some of the dynamics associated with imperial control” (266). And, “…influence, exercised routinely and consistently, becomes indistinguishable from indirect rule. In informal empires the lines between influence and rule necessarily blur. When actors believe that certain options are “off the table” because of an asymmetric (if tacit) contract, or consistently comply with the wishes of another
because they recognize steep costs from noncompliance, then the relationship between the two becomes effectively one between ruler and ruled” (266).

Also, there is a focus on institutional power. Units must be understood as something broader than states, as this is a limited metric. Intuitions have a clearly structural dimension. Predominant powers can choose to organize the world in different ways.