Luhmann, Niklas. (1995). Social systems. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
"What distinguishes autopoietic systems from machines and the closed systems of classical equilibrium thermodynamics is the recursivity of their operations: they ‘not only produce and change their own structures’ but ‘everything that is used as a unit by the system is produced as a unit by the system itself’” (xx).
“The theory of self-referential systems maintains that systems can differentiate only by self-reference, which is to say, only insofar as systems refer to themselves…in constituting their elements and their elemental operations” (9). “The…distinction between ‘closed’ and ‘open’ systems is replaced by the question of how self-referential closure can create openness” (9).
“Our thesis, namely, that there are systems, can now be narrowed down to: there are self-referential systems…there are systems that have the ability to establish relations with themselves and to differentiate these relations from relations with their environment” (13).
“There is agreement within the discipline today that the point of departure for all systems-theoretical analysis must be the difference between system and environment” (16). “The environment receives its unity through the system and only in relation to the system…Accordingly, the environment has no self-reflection or capacity to act” (17).
“As a paradigm, the difference between system and environment forces systems theory to replace the difference between the whole and its parts with a theory of system differentiation. System differentiation is nothing more than the repetition of system formation within systems” (18) “…the entire system multiplies itself as a multiplicity of system/environment differences” (18).
“The difference between system and environment must be distinguished from a second, equally constitutive difference: namely, the difference between element and relation” (20).
“Just as there are no systems without environments or environments without systems, there are no elements without relational connections or relations without elements” (20).
“Whether the unity of an element should be 0065lained as emergence ‘from below’ or as constitution ‘from above’ seems to be a matter of theoretical dispute. We opt decisively for the latter. Elements are elements only for the system that employs them as units and they are such only through this system. This is formulated in the concept of autopoiesis. One of the most important consequences is that systems of a higher (emergent) order can possess less complexity than systems of a lower order because they determine the unity and number of the elements that compose them’ thus in their own complexity they are independent of their material substratum…Thus emergence is not simply an accumulation of complexity, but rather an interruption and new beginning in the constitution of complexity” (22-3).
“We will call an interconnected collection of elements ‘complex’ when, because of immanent constraints in the elements’ connective capacity, it is no longer possible at any moment to connect every element with every other element” (24).
Autopoiesis: Self referent systems are systems ‘for themselves’, that are, “…independent of the cut of observation by others” (33). “ON the level of this self-referential organization, self-referential systems are closed systems, for they allow no other forms of processing in their self-determination. Thus. Social systems have no use for consciousness, and personal systems no use for frequency changes in the neuronal system” (34).
“The living system is inaccessible to the psychic system; it must itch, hurt, or in some other way attract attention in order to stir another level of system formation—the consciousness of the psychic system into operation” (40).
Chapter 2: Meaning
This chapter only concerns psychic and social systems.
“Psychic and social systems have evolved together. At any time the one kind of system is the necessary environment of the other…Persons cannot emerge and continue to exist without social systems, nor can social systems without persons…Both kinds of systems are ordered according to it [a common achievement, namely, meaning], and for both it si binding as the indispensable, undeniable form of their complexity and self-reference. We call this evolutionary achievement ‘meaning’” (59). Meaning forces a narrowing down of options and leads directly to selection. Anything of importance is perceived vis-à-vis meaning.
Meaning exists on the plane between what should be and what is. “…meaning processing constantly shapes anew the meaning-constitutive difference between actuality and potentiality. Meaning is the continual actualization of potentialities” (65).
Information is the key to allowing meaning to be understood as beyond a mere tautology. Meaning is a tautology because it defines itself by the system in that it exists. Meaning is, “…processing of itself by itself” (67). Information is, “…an event that selects system states” (67).
Information is, by definition, something that informs. Thus, once it has been digested by a system, is ceases to be information and essentially dies. Information selects system states, that is, new data that enters the system allows the system to reiterate itself.
“Thus no meaning-constituting system can escape the meaningfulness of all its own processes. But meaning refers to further meaning. The circular closure of these references appears in its unity as the ultimate horizon of all meaning: as the world” (69). The world takes on a character that is transcendent, god-like: “The historical semantics of different concepts of ‘world’ has reflected in many ways this double status of the world as simultaneously containing and transcending itself as description: …the relationship to a God who can be experienced everywhere as the center of the world, but nowhere as its boundary” (69).
Chapter 3: Double Contingency
“…action cannot take place if alter makes his action dependent on how ego acts, and ego wants to connect his action to alter’s. A pure circle of self-referential determination, lacking any further elaboration, leaves action indeterminate, makes it indeterminable. This is not a matter of mere behavioral agreement, nor of coordinating the interests of intentions of different actors. Instead, it concerns a basic condition of possibility for social actions as such. No action can occur without first solving this problem of double contingency…” (103).
The basic situation of double contingency is then simple: two black boxes, by whatever accident, come to have dealing with one another” (109). This situation is very reminiscent of Sartre’s construction of the self’s relation to the other.
Chapter 4: Communication and Action
Are social systems made up of actions, or communications? What is the relationship between the two? “…the basal process of social systems, which produces their elements, can only be communication” (138).
Action is necessary for interpreting communication; communication does not imply action. “The difference between constitution and observation can and must e built back into the theory. In this chapter, the concepts of communication and action accomplished that. Communication is the elemental unit of self-constitution; action is the elemental unit of social systems; self-observation and self-description…Therefore the question of which individuals, atoms, and elements compose social systems cannot be answered more simply. Any simplification at this point would mean a loss in the wealth of references, which a general theory of social systems can hardly afford” (175).
Chapter 5: System and Environment
“Everything that happens belongs to a system (or to many systems) and always at the same time to the environment of other systems...every increase in complexity in one place increases the complexity of the environment for all other systems (177).
Chapter 6: Interpenetration
“This chapter deals with a specific environment of social systems: human beings and their relations to social systems” (210). Relations of interpenetration and binding are a core feature of the relationship between human beings and social systems, as well as human beings and other human beings.
“The foregoing theoretical preparations allow us to formulate a question. We distinguished social interpenetration from interhuman interpenetration. Moreover, by examining problems of complexity and relationships of interpenetration, we explained the advantages of binary schematisms. Our question now is: is there a binary schematism that can serve both kinds of interpenetration at once, that works in a way functionally diffuse enough to reduce the complexity of both social interpenetration and interhuman interpenetration? The answer is yes. This is the special function of morality” (234). “Morality is a symbolic generalization that reduces the full reflexive complexity of doublely contingent ego/alter relations to expressions of esteem and by this generalization open up (1) room for the freeplay of conditionings and (2) the possibility of reconstructing complexity through the binary schematism esteem/distain [seen as the effect of morality on subjects’ view of other, or ego’s view of alter]” (236).
“To be sure, legs remain leg and ears remain ears, despite all sociocultural evolution. As environment, the body is given in advance to society…But as a highly complex agglomeration of systems, one that can therefore be conditioned, the body has a meaning that allows complexity in social systems to appear as available: one immediately sees, takes into account, and anticipates that one can behave in one way or another. But this unity of complexity, as well as this immediacy in orienting to it, are not the body itself; they become a unity and an immediacy only in the difference schemata produced by interpenetration” (251).
Chapter 7: The Individuality of Psychic Systems
Social systems represent the environment for psychic systems. While individualists believe that the psychic system can be observed sans the social system, this account clearly claims that this is not possible. “Every versions of individualist reductionism has encountered the objection that, as reductionism, it cannot be fair to the ‘emergent’ properties of social systems” (256).
“The contention that social systems are not composed of individuals and cannot be created out of bodily or psychic processes does not mean, of course, that there are not individuals in the world of social systems. On the contrary, a theory of self-referential autopoietic social systems provokes the question of psychic systems’ self-referential autopoiesis and with it the question of how psychic systems can establish their self-reproduction, the ‘stream’ of their ‘conscious life,’ from one moment to the next so that its closure is compatible with an environment of social systems” (257).
Chapter 8: Structure and Time
Structure is not a sensible way for a theory of autopoietic systems to develop. Self-referential theories to not fall into the structuralist or structuralist functionalist realm of sociological theories. That structure is being discussed in chapter 8 of this book indicates its relative importance to the theory.
Chapter 9: Contradiction and Conflict
Chapter 10: Society and Interaction
Chapter 11: Self-Reference and Rationality
Chapter 12: Consequences for Epistemology
Monday, March 17, 2008
Sunday, March 16, 2008
Sawyer: Social Emergence
Sawyer, R. Keith. (2005). Social emergence : societies as complex systems. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
This account examines the history of sociological thought relating to micro-macro issues and presents the concept of emergence as the third-wave of sociology. Additionally, this account attempts to map out the place that emergence plays in both psychology and sociology. Also, there is an examination of the ability to model emergent behavior using agent-based models.
The first distinction that is made examines the descriptions of societies that have existed throughout history. For example, early in the study of sociology, there was what Sawyer terms a mechanistic interpretation of history. Later on, there developed an organic view of social interaction that, “…compared the various institutions of society to the organs of the human body” (1). Later, there appeared a structural-functional approach which was based on studies of cybernetics and that was promoted by Talcott Parsons. “Common to all of these approaches is the basic insight that societies are complex configurations of many people engaged in overlapping and interlocking patterns of relationships with one another” (1).
Sawyer argues that there is a third-wave of sociological approaches that goes a long way to resolve long-standing debates in the field. For example, this new approach takes an agent based computer simulation to create artificial societies. These can be used to explore emergent phenomena. Later in the book, he refers to this third-wave as providing a synthesis of the first two waves.
The concept of emergence is contentious for Sawyer. He explores how it has been used in sociology and psychology and finds usages to be contradictory. He attempts to correct this problem in the later chapters of his book by exploring a concept of social emergence. Emergence is typically understood as being phenomena that exist as “higher level properties” (2) that emerge from lower level properties. Emergence also refers to “complex phenomena are those that reside between simplicity and randomness” (3). Some theorists (Kauffman 1993) refer to this as being at the “edge of randomness (3). “In complex systems so conceived, relatively simple higher-level order ‘emerges’ from relatively complex lower-level processes” (3).
Emergent phenomena are seen by many as necessarily being unpredictable, irreducible to regular laws and novel (4). Typically, this paradigm is associated with complexity theory. Complexity theory is seen as being the opposite of reductionist theories. In terms of the relative preponderance of emergent phenomena, the nature of the system is important. Four characteristics have been identified that make emergent phenomena more likely: many components in density, global functions are distributed not to individuals but broadly, global system is impossible to fully decompose into smaller systems, and that communication plays a crucial role (4-5).
There has been a traditional divide between atomism and holism. Emergentism bridges this divide. It, “…is a form of nonreductionism that accepts the ontological position of materialism…[it] accepts that nothing exists except the component parts and their interactions, and thus avoids the ontological problem of holism [how can holist features have an ontology if they are merely the sum of lower-level interactions?]. However, the emergentist also rejects atomism and argues that reductionism, physicalism, mechanism, and epiphenomenalism are not necessary consequences of materialism. Some complex natural phenomena cannot be studied with reductionism methods; these phenomena are complex systems in which more comple4x and differentiated ‘higher-level’ structures emerge from the organization and interaction of simpler, ‘lower-level’ component parts” (29).
Sawyer also touches on the study of economics and argues that it holds the position as the core of social science approaches because it deals with emergent phenomena. He briefly mentions Hayek, Arrow and Menger. They all explain emergent phenomena and believe that, while it can not be reduced to the agency of individual actors, it can be explained by looking at individual action. Sawyer would like sociology to take the place as the zenith discipline in the social sciences. By deploying a theory of social emergence, Sawyer believes that this will become possible.
In the 10th chapter, our author becomes very explicit about his long-term goals for the study of emergence in the social sciences. “Social emergence is the central phenomenon of the social sciences” (189). “In th4e second half of the twentieth century, economics has made the best case for being the foundational social science, by making social emergence central to its theory and practice” (189). Sociology can play this role, if it develops the emergence paradigm.
He explores the three waves of sociology, once again, and finds that the first wave was too rigid and simple, the second wave built on the first wave by highlighting the interaction between structure and agent (and Sawyer considers Luhmann to be a second-wave sociological theorist). Sawyer has three problems with second-wave theories: they do not theorize between social structure and interaction, between individual and interaction and they have not conceptualization of social emergence (206-7).
The emergence paradigm is then launched. It involves five stages of development between the micro and macro levels. The stages proceed in the following order: individual (agency, etc.), interaction (communication, etc.), ephemeral emergents (things that emerge from agent and communication that are unlikely to remain), stable emergents (subcultures, slang, social practices, etc.) and then social structure (laws, infrastructure, etc.).
Sociology should be considered with the “circle of emergence” (220). This circle cuts through all five levels of the emergence paradigm, but does not dive as deeply down into the first level or as high into the fifth level. The implication is that sociology can be the theory that links together all of the social sciences: it does not do psychology (bottom of the first level) nor does it do law (top of the fifth level). However, it does link these schools together by providing a framework for understanding how phenomena move between the bottom and top levels. It is, in essence, the tool that mitigates the levels of analysis problem.
This account examines the history of sociological thought relating to micro-macro issues and presents the concept of emergence as the third-wave of sociology. Additionally, this account attempts to map out the place that emergence plays in both psychology and sociology. Also, there is an examination of the ability to model emergent behavior using agent-based models.
The first distinction that is made examines the descriptions of societies that have existed throughout history. For example, early in the study of sociology, there was what Sawyer terms a mechanistic interpretation of history. Later on, there developed an organic view of social interaction that, “…compared the various institutions of society to the organs of the human body” (1). Later, there appeared a structural-functional approach which was based on studies of cybernetics and that was promoted by Talcott Parsons. “Common to all of these approaches is the basic insight that societies are complex configurations of many people engaged in overlapping and interlocking patterns of relationships with one another” (1).
Sawyer argues that there is a third-wave of sociological approaches that goes a long way to resolve long-standing debates in the field. For example, this new approach takes an agent based computer simulation to create artificial societies. These can be used to explore emergent phenomena. Later in the book, he refers to this third-wave as providing a synthesis of the first two waves.
The concept of emergence is contentious for Sawyer. He explores how it has been used in sociology and psychology and finds usages to be contradictory. He attempts to correct this problem in the later chapters of his book by exploring a concept of social emergence. Emergence is typically understood as being phenomena that exist as “higher level properties” (2) that emerge from lower level properties. Emergence also refers to “complex phenomena are those that reside between simplicity and randomness” (3). Some theorists (Kauffman 1993) refer to this as being at the “edge of randomness (3). “In complex systems so conceived, relatively simple higher-level order ‘emerges’ from relatively complex lower-level processes” (3).
Emergent phenomena are seen by many as necessarily being unpredictable, irreducible to regular laws and novel (4). Typically, this paradigm is associated with complexity theory. Complexity theory is seen as being the opposite of reductionist theories. In terms of the relative preponderance of emergent phenomena, the nature of the system is important. Four characteristics have been identified that make emergent phenomena more likely: many components in density, global functions are distributed not to individuals but broadly, global system is impossible to fully decompose into smaller systems, and that communication plays a crucial role (4-5).
There has been a traditional divide between atomism and holism. Emergentism bridges this divide. It, “…is a form of nonreductionism that accepts the ontological position of materialism…[it] accepts that nothing exists except the component parts and their interactions, and thus avoids the ontological problem of holism [how can holist features have an ontology if they are merely the sum of lower-level interactions?]. However, the emergentist also rejects atomism and argues that reductionism, physicalism, mechanism, and epiphenomenalism are not necessary consequences of materialism. Some complex natural phenomena cannot be studied with reductionism methods; these phenomena are complex systems in which more comple4x and differentiated ‘higher-level’ structures emerge from the organization and interaction of simpler, ‘lower-level’ component parts” (29).
Sawyer also touches on the study of economics and argues that it holds the position as the core of social science approaches because it deals with emergent phenomena. He briefly mentions Hayek, Arrow and Menger. They all explain emergent phenomena and believe that, while it can not be reduced to the agency of individual actors, it can be explained by looking at individual action. Sawyer would like sociology to take the place as the zenith discipline in the social sciences. By deploying a theory of social emergence, Sawyer believes that this will become possible.
In the 10th chapter, our author becomes very explicit about his long-term goals for the study of emergence in the social sciences. “Social emergence is the central phenomenon of the social sciences” (189). “In th4e second half of the twentieth century, economics has made the best case for being the foundational social science, by making social emergence central to its theory and practice” (189). Sociology can play this role, if it develops the emergence paradigm.
He explores the three waves of sociology, once again, and finds that the first wave was too rigid and simple, the second wave built on the first wave by highlighting the interaction between structure and agent (and Sawyer considers Luhmann to be a second-wave sociological theorist). Sawyer has three problems with second-wave theories: they do not theorize between social structure and interaction, between individual and interaction and they have not conceptualization of social emergence (206-7).
The emergence paradigm is then launched. It involves five stages of development between the micro and macro levels. The stages proceed in the following order: individual (agency, etc.), interaction (communication, etc.), ephemeral emergents (things that emerge from agent and communication that are unlikely to remain), stable emergents (subcultures, slang, social practices, etc.) and then social structure (laws, infrastructure, etc.).
Sociology should be considered with the “circle of emergence” (220). This circle cuts through all five levels of the emergence paradigm, but does not dive as deeply down into the first level or as high into the fifth level. The implication is that sociology can be the theory that links together all of the social sciences: it does not do psychology (bottom of the first level) nor does it do law (top of the fifth level). However, it does link these schools together by providing a framework for understanding how phenomena move between the bottom and top levels. It is, in essence, the tool that mitigates the levels of analysis problem.
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Epstein: The Social Context in Conditionality
Epstein, Rachel. (2008). "The Social Context in Conditionality: Internationalizing Finance in Postcommunist Europe". Journal of European Public Policy.
Eastern European countries have been more effective than their Western European counter-parts in building the framework for the united European financial markets system. This paper asks why this is the case. It builds a framework of international institutional influence that requires a certain societal milieu in order to be effective.
“…I argue that CEE (Central and Eastern European) susceptibility to international institutions’ pressure, including conditionality, hinged on a particular social context. Where domestic actors viewed international institutions as authoritative sources of information and potential imprimaturs of their political platforms, post communist countries were likely to heed their advice and fulfill the terms of their conditionality…By contrast, where international institutions were unable to displace domestic sources of authority, namely nationalist striving and the desire for autonomy, international institutions’ recommendations and conditionality wielded much less power, resulting in lower levels of foreign ownership in CEE banks” (2).
The dependent variable being explained is why there is such high levels of foreign ownership of banks and other moves that are in line with the financial standardization promoted by the EU. The independent variables are the forces applied by the international institutions that are mediated by the specific social milieu that the author puts forth. This social context is claimed to be a “new mechanism” of understanding the influence of international organizations and institutions.
The social context in that the IV is mediated are described. Three features are highlighted: “the discontinuity of sectors and regimes, domestic actors’ perceived subordinated status vis-à-vis international institutions and the normative consistency underpinning the policies in question” (6). These three variables are all operationalized (6), and, where they are congruently high, it is expected that a country’s openness to advice from international institutions will also be great.
Four rival approaches for explaining the variation in the adoption of influence from international institutions are then explored. The first is domestic preferences (8). The second is economic constraints or opportunities (9). The third is external demand for foreign owned banks (10). The fourth is conditionality (10-1). The main drivers are then examined for various transitioning CEE countries with an eye to social context.
Eastern European countries have been more effective than their Western European counter-parts in building the framework for the united European financial markets system. This paper asks why this is the case. It builds a framework of international institutional influence that requires a certain societal milieu in order to be effective.
“…I argue that CEE (Central and Eastern European) susceptibility to international institutions’ pressure, including conditionality, hinged on a particular social context. Where domestic actors viewed international institutions as authoritative sources of information and potential imprimaturs of their political platforms, post communist countries were likely to heed their advice and fulfill the terms of their conditionality…By contrast, where international institutions were unable to displace domestic sources of authority, namely nationalist striving and the desire for autonomy, international institutions’ recommendations and conditionality wielded much less power, resulting in lower levels of foreign ownership in CEE banks” (2).
The dependent variable being explained is why there is such high levels of foreign ownership of banks and other moves that are in line with the financial standardization promoted by the EU. The independent variables are the forces applied by the international institutions that are mediated by the specific social milieu that the author puts forth. This social context is claimed to be a “new mechanism” of understanding the influence of international organizations and institutions.
The social context in that the IV is mediated are described. Three features are highlighted: “the discontinuity of sectors and regimes, domestic actors’ perceived subordinated status vis-à-vis international institutions and the normative consistency underpinning the policies in question” (6). These three variables are all operationalized (6), and, where they are congruently high, it is expected that a country’s openness to advice from international institutions will also be great.
Four rival approaches for explaining the variation in the adoption of influence from international institutions are then explored. The first is domestic preferences (8). The second is economic constraints or opportunities (9). The third is external demand for foreign owned banks (10). The fourth is conditionality (10-1). The main drivers are then examined for various transitioning CEE countries with an eye to social context.
Elkins et. al.: On Waves, Clusters and Diffusion
Elkins, Zachary, & Simmons, Beth. (2005). "On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598, 33-51.
This article begins by making a distinction between diffusion in general, and specific instances where the term may not be applicable. For example if reform, “…lacks an exchange of some sort between actors, it is not diffusion as scholars have come to use the term” (32).
Clustering of idea diffusion is a characteristic of policy reform. One reason that it happens at a similar, yet independent streak, is because countries have similar domestic constraints and structures to that they are responding. Another reason is coordination: this can occur through epistemic communities, or through more explicitly vertical or horizontal arrangements. Another reason may combine aspects of the first two: “…governments are independent in the sense that they make their own decisions without cooperation or coercion but interdependent in the sense that they factor in the choices of other governments. In other words, uncoordinated interdependence” (35).
The next section of the articles wonders whether or not the concept of diffusion should be thought of as an independent or a dependent variable.
The drivers of diffusion are then examined, with three conditions of/for diffusion explored: cultural norms, support groups and competition (39). Then, different forms of learning are identified. The goal of this article was to present a set of terms and a framework for further empirical research.
This article begins by making a distinction between diffusion in general, and specific instances where the term may not be applicable. For example if reform, “…lacks an exchange of some sort between actors, it is not diffusion as scholars have come to use the term” (32).
Clustering of idea diffusion is a characteristic of policy reform. One reason that it happens at a similar, yet independent streak, is because countries have similar domestic constraints and structures to that they are responding. Another reason is coordination: this can occur through epistemic communities, or through more explicitly vertical or horizontal arrangements. Another reason may combine aspects of the first two: “…governments are independent in the sense that they make their own decisions without cooperation or coercion but interdependent in the sense that they factor in the choices of other governments. In other words, uncoordinated interdependence” (35).
The next section of the articles wonders whether or not the concept of diffusion should be thought of as an independent or a dependent variable.
The drivers of diffusion are then examined, with three conditions of/for diffusion explored: cultural norms, support groups and competition (39). Then, different forms of learning are identified. The goal of this article was to present a set of terms and a framework for further empirical research.
Meseguer: Poilcy Learning, Policy Diffusion and the Making of a New Order
Meseguer, Covadonga. (2005). "Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598, 67-82.
"This article surveys the role of learning as mechanism of policy diffusion in the context of the creation of a new political order” (67).
Mexeguer examines how learning from the examples of others may have contributed to policy diffusion and liberalization in the later decades of the 20th century. Specifically, the author examines whether or not countries and polities learned from failed collectivization and interventionism policies. This article attempts to more broadly contextualize the idea of learning as a tool of policy diffusion, examine alternative perspectives and explain the difficulties of testing this empirically.
“I argue that although learning is suggested as a fundamental mechanism of diffusion of the previous wave of deregulation and privatization and of the current wave of regulatory reforms, we still lack the empirical tests to evaluate the impact that learning may have had on these two trends” (68).
Learning is a voluntary act (71). It also implies an adaptation of beliefs (72). “Rational learning, in short, would imply convergence i9n policy choices. This is a model of learning that seems to match the sort of trend this chapter seeks to explain” (72).
Bounded learning is placed in contrast to rational learning. “Rather than scanning all information, governments look at relevant information” (72).
“Empirically, there is a strong evidence for the hypothesis that emulation has driven the adoption of a wide range of economic and social policy reforms. There is also strong evidence that emulation is behind the very recent ascendance of the regulatory state…The truth is that the empirical evidence we can rely on is still limited and partial (79).
"This article surveys the role of learning as mechanism of policy diffusion in the context of the creation of a new political order” (67).
Mexeguer examines how learning from the examples of others may have contributed to policy diffusion and liberalization in the later decades of the 20th century. Specifically, the author examines whether or not countries and polities learned from failed collectivization and interventionism policies. This article attempts to more broadly contextualize the idea of learning as a tool of policy diffusion, examine alternative perspectives and explain the difficulties of testing this empirically.
“I argue that although learning is suggested as a fundamental mechanism of diffusion of the previous wave of deregulation and privatization and of the current wave of regulatory reforms, we still lack the empirical tests to evaluate the impact that learning may have had on these two trends” (68).
Learning is a voluntary act (71). It also implies an adaptation of beliefs (72). “Rational learning, in short, would imply convergence i9n policy choices. This is a model of learning that seems to match the sort of trend this chapter seeks to explain” (72).
Bounded learning is placed in contrast to rational learning. “Rather than scanning all information, governments look at relevant information” (72).
“Empirically, there is a strong evidence for the hypothesis that emulation has driven the adoption of a wide range of economic and social policy reforms. There is also strong evidence that emulation is behind the very recent ascendance of the regulatory state…The truth is that the empirical evidence we can rely on is still limited and partial (79).
Deudney: Bounding Power: Chapter 1: Republican Security Theory
Deudney, Daniel. (2007). Bounding power : republican security theory from the polis to the global village. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chapter 1: Republican Security Theory
“From its inception, republican security theory has been concerned with what might be termed the security-political question: what kinds of political arrangements are necessary for security?” (27). This focus on security first and foremost assumes that the freedom from violence is the most political issue. Later, Deudney identifies this approach to security as normative survivalism (31).
“In the broadest terms, insecurity results from the absence of restraint on violent power, and security results from the presence of restraints on violent power” (27). This is the double meaning of “bounding power”: firstly, violent power continues to bound upwards in its material capability and secondly, political power must discover ways in which it is possible to bound this power.
The other problem of republican security strategy is that neither anarchy or hierarchy are suitable: “…the extremes of anarchy and hierarchy are fundamentally alike because neither provides adequate restraints upon the application of violence to the human body” (31). This is problematic, and requires that republican security strategy find a middle ground between these two extremes.
These two extremes are then highlighted in more detail. “The main argument of the anarchy-interdependence problematique, as we have seen, is that situations of intense violence interdependence combined with anarchy are a first anarchy. First anarchies are incompatible with security, and the size of the space with intense violence interdependence has expanded over time with far-reaching implications for security” (41). The second extreme is the hierarchy-restraint problematique. “The animating insight of the second problematique is the realization that governments can themselves pose as severe a security threat as first anarchy” (46).
Deudney deploys the concept of negarchy to explain the set of Republican negative constraints that comprise a triad between hierarchy and anarchy. This negative forces mutually restrain, while also providing for freedom. This involves, “balances all the way up and down” (49).
Chapter 1: Republican Security Theory
“From its inception, republican security theory has been concerned with what might be termed the security-political question: what kinds of political arrangements are necessary for security?” (27). This focus on security first and foremost assumes that the freedom from violence is the most political issue. Later, Deudney identifies this approach to security as normative survivalism (31).
“In the broadest terms, insecurity results from the absence of restraint on violent power, and security results from the presence of restraints on violent power” (27). This is the double meaning of “bounding power”: firstly, violent power continues to bound upwards in its material capability and secondly, political power must discover ways in which it is possible to bound this power.
The other problem of republican security strategy is that neither anarchy or hierarchy are suitable: “…the extremes of anarchy and hierarchy are fundamentally alike because neither provides adequate restraints upon the application of violence to the human body” (31). This is problematic, and requires that republican security strategy find a middle ground between these two extremes.
These two extremes are then highlighted in more detail. “The main argument of the anarchy-interdependence problematique, as we have seen, is that situations of intense violence interdependence combined with anarchy are a first anarchy. First anarchies are incompatible with security, and the size of the space with intense violence interdependence has expanded over time with far-reaching implications for security” (41). The second extreme is the hierarchy-restraint problematique. “The animating insight of the second problematique is the realization that governments can themselves pose as severe a security threat as first anarchy” (46).
Deudney deploys the concept of negarchy to explain the set of Republican negative constraints that comprise a triad between hierarchy and anarchy. This negative forces mutually restrain, while also providing for freedom. This involves, “balances all the way up and down” (49).
Rossbach: Corpus Mysticism
Rossbach, Stefan. (2004). ""Corpus Mysticum": Nicklas Luhmann's evocation of world society". In M. Albert & L. Hilkermeier (Eds.), Observing international relations : Niklas Luhmann and world politics (pp. xiv, 254 p.). London ; New York: Routledge.
The thrust of this chapter is that Luhmann’s creation of international society was through speculation, vision and mysticism. “I will argue that Luhmann is representative of a tradition of thought known as ‘contemplative gnosis’…I will argue that there is a fundamental flaw in Luhmann’s understanding of society because he failed to explain how the ‘totality of communication’ could possibly constitute a ‘system’” (44).
Rossbach looks at how Luhmann’s theory may have been heavily influenced by mystical thinkers, specifically Nicholas of Cusa. Luhmann’s thoughts vis-à-vis autopoiesis originated after his possible influence by this mystical thinker. Theories were meant to help people see the ‘blind spots’ in history. Cusa called the oneness of observer and observation God. Rossbach claims that Luhmann calls this “world” (47).
Rossbach claims that Luhmann himself understands that his approach is devoid of any foundation. He also claims that such universal theorizing has a long history in mysticism. He concludes by claiming that the theory is flawed, rooted in mysticism, though incredibly complex.
The thrust of this chapter is that Luhmann’s creation of international society was through speculation, vision and mysticism. “I will argue that Luhmann is representative of a tradition of thought known as ‘contemplative gnosis’…I will argue that there is a fundamental flaw in Luhmann’s understanding of society because he failed to explain how the ‘totality of communication’ could possibly constitute a ‘system’” (44).
Rossbach looks at how Luhmann’s theory may have been heavily influenced by mystical thinkers, specifically Nicholas of Cusa. Luhmann’s thoughts vis-à-vis autopoiesis originated after his possible influence by this mystical thinker. Theories were meant to help people see the ‘blind spots’ in history. Cusa called the oneness of observer and observation God. Rossbach claims that Luhmann calls this “world” (47).
Rossbach claims that Luhmann himself understands that his approach is devoid of any foundation. He also claims that such universal theorizing has a long history in mysticism. He concludes by claiming that the theory is flawed, rooted in mysticism, though incredibly complex.
Diez: Politics, Modern Systems Theory and the Critical Purpose of IR Theory
Diez, Thomas. (2004). "Politics, Modern Systems Theory and the critical purpose of International Relations Theory". In M. Albert & L. Hilkermeier (Eds.), Observing international relations : Niklas Luhmann and world politics (pp. xiv, 254 p.). London ; New York: Routledge.
Diez sees the added value of a Modern Systems Theory (MST) approach coupled with an IR approach in the following ways: “(a) the problemetization of the nation state as the basic unit of political organization and international politics, and especially the idea that nations are normatively integrated; (b) the provision of a global framework for the analysis of an increasingly functionally organized society in which territorial demarcations become less important; and (c) the advancement of a radically constructivist epistemology, which however enables scientific engagement in the form of second-order observations” (30). Diez does not believe that there is much to gain from any of this. “My argument in this chapter is that the similarities between work loosely grouped under the ‘poststructuralim’ label and MST mean that we can do most of what MST would enable us to do on the basis of a different set of approaches that is already present in IR theory, while we would lose the critical impetus provided by poststructuralism if we bought into MST wholesale” (30-1).
He then looks at Foucault and Luhmann and agrees that there must be a project that does not strive towards universal norms and that the job of the theorist is to open space for individuals to claim their own identities. “…there is a lot more room for agency in discursive accounts of international politics if they are conceptualized in a poststructuralist frame than there is in MST” (32). MST restricts the activist positions that are possible to take with Luhmann’s approach.
“In short, my suggestion is that a Foucauldian approach is not only able to illuminate the issues for which IR theorists of a critical persuasion may want to consult Luhmann, but that it is in fact better suited to doing so, since it does not come with a whole package of rather problematic assumptions” (42). The MST approach depoliticizes theory and removes the agent, according to Diez. Foucault already provided a critique of structure and overdetermined power. Luhmann just reiterates this with more constraints and a different set of language.
Diez sees the added value of a Modern Systems Theory (MST) approach coupled with an IR approach in the following ways: “(a) the problemetization of the nation state as the basic unit of political organization and international politics, and especially the idea that nations are normatively integrated; (b) the provision of a global framework for the analysis of an increasingly functionally organized society in which territorial demarcations become less important; and (c) the advancement of a radically constructivist epistemology, which however enables scientific engagement in the form of second-order observations” (30). Diez does not believe that there is much to gain from any of this. “My argument in this chapter is that the similarities between work loosely grouped under the ‘poststructuralim’ label and MST mean that we can do most of what MST would enable us to do on the basis of a different set of approaches that is already present in IR theory, while we would lose the critical impetus provided by poststructuralism if we bought into MST wholesale” (30-1).
He then looks at Foucault and Luhmann and agrees that there must be a project that does not strive towards universal norms and that the job of the theorist is to open space for individuals to claim their own identities. “…there is a lot more room for agency in discursive accounts of international politics if they are conceptualized in a poststructuralist frame than there is in MST” (32). MST restricts the activist positions that are possible to take with Luhmann’s approach.
“In short, my suggestion is that a Foucauldian approach is not only able to illuminate the issues for which IR theorists of a critical persuasion may want to consult Luhmann, but that it is in fact better suited to doing so, since it does not come with a whole package of rather problematic assumptions” (42). The MST approach depoliticizes theory and removes the agent, according to Diez. Foucault already provided a critique of structure and overdetermined power. Luhmann just reiterates this with more constraints and a different set of language.
Albert: On the Modern Systems Theory of Society and IR
Albert, Mathias. (2004). "On the Modern Systems Theory of society and IR: contacts and disjunctures between different kinds of theorizing". In M. Albert & L. Hilkermeier (Eds.), Observing international relations : Niklas Luhmann and world politics (pp. xiv, 254 p.). London ; New York: Routledge.
From Albert’s Introduction to the Volume:
From the onset, this volume concludes that Modern Systems Theory (MST) and IR are not well suited for each other: “The chapters in this volume are an attempt to provide possible answers to this question [why bring another approach to IR?], particularly also giving room to answers which in the end conclude that Modern Systems Theory and International Relations make uneasy bedfellows” (1).
Two reasons why IR hasn’t taken up MST are given: firstly, it has been late to be translated into English, and, secondly, that it is, “an extremely complex kind of theory; as a theory of society, it consists of three different sets of theories connected to each other: a theory of social systems, a theory of social differentiation, and a theory of social evolution” (2). Understanding the limited interactions between MST and IR, this volume attempts to, “…stage a number of encounters between element s of Luhmann’s theory of society and parts of contemporary IR theorizing” (3).
Chapter 2: On the Modern Systems Theory of society and IR: contacts and disjunctures between different kinds of theorizing
There are two reasons that Albert believes that a fruitful encounter with Luhmann may be ripe in IR: Firstly, ideas of international society are increasingly of importance and secondly, because MST provides a very through and all-encompassing theory of society.
The idea of globalization plays a major role in IR theory. Albert wonders whether or not MST is applicable to IR because it doen’t see national separation as being anything beyond a social construct. World Society is the largest iteration of human system organization, and the nation doesn’t play much of a role. Thus, the idea of “international relations”, “…becomes highly problematic” (16).
Albert then looks at classic sociological visions of society, initially focusing on the post-Westphalian version of state society. However, these models of society are limited because they do not see the global system as a whole.
“For MST, all social systems are constituted by a difference between system and environment and are communicative systems” (17). “…communication here is conceptualized as being produced and reproduced in recursive networks of communication…communication is thus seen as being produced within the system alone” (17). “If social systems are constituted by communication and by communication alone, then society is the highest-order social system which comprises all communication” (17).
Albert finds that the difference between MST and IR is not that one is more substantive than the other, but rather that it there is a qualitative difference: “It is different in kind regarding ‘what’ is observed and ‘how’ it is observed” (21). In MST, the observer is also observed.
Also, Albert believes that it may be possible to prove MST empirically wrong. Because MST believes that functional differentiation is the most important differentiation between lower and upper forms of organization, there is less of a focus on societal differentiation. If it can be shown that the world is comprised of different societies, then MST may be wrong. Put concisely by Albert: “…if world society is conceived in the Luhmannian sense of being constituted by the fact that all communication can connect to all other communication, that, so to speak, the ‘world’ is embedded or implied in each communication, and if this world society achieves its unity only through its internal differentiation which is primarily a functional differentiation between its subsystems, then it makes no sense to speak of societies in the plural” (24). From this reading of Luhmann, there are no interesting or meaningful readings of IR.
MST provides a comprehensive view of world society. IR provides a comprehensive view of international political relations. The two are, in a way, mutually exclusive (28-9).
From Albert’s Introduction to the Volume:
From the onset, this volume concludes that Modern Systems Theory (MST) and IR are not well suited for each other: “The chapters in this volume are an attempt to provide possible answers to this question [why bring another approach to IR?], particularly also giving room to answers which in the end conclude that Modern Systems Theory and International Relations make uneasy bedfellows” (1).
Two reasons why IR hasn’t taken up MST are given: firstly, it has been late to be translated into English, and, secondly, that it is, “an extremely complex kind of theory; as a theory of society, it consists of three different sets of theories connected to each other: a theory of social systems, a theory of social differentiation, and a theory of social evolution” (2). Understanding the limited interactions between MST and IR, this volume attempts to, “…stage a number of encounters between element s of Luhmann’s theory of society and parts of contemporary IR theorizing” (3).
Chapter 2: On the Modern Systems Theory of society and IR: contacts and disjunctures between different kinds of theorizing
There are two reasons that Albert believes that a fruitful encounter with Luhmann may be ripe in IR: Firstly, ideas of international society are increasingly of importance and secondly, because MST provides a very through and all-encompassing theory of society.
The idea of globalization plays a major role in IR theory. Albert wonders whether or not MST is applicable to IR because it doen’t see national separation as being anything beyond a social construct. World Society is the largest iteration of human system organization, and the nation doesn’t play much of a role. Thus, the idea of “international relations”, “…becomes highly problematic” (16).
Albert then looks at classic sociological visions of society, initially focusing on the post-Westphalian version of state society. However, these models of society are limited because they do not see the global system as a whole.
“For MST, all social systems are constituted by a difference between system and environment and are communicative systems” (17). “…communication here is conceptualized as being produced and reproduced in recursive networks of communication…communication is thus seen as being produced within the system alone” (17). “If social systems are constituted by communication and by communication alone, then society is the highest-order social system which comprises all communication” (17).
Albert finds that the difference between MST and IR is not that one is more substantive than the other, but rather that it there is a qualitative difference: “It is different in kind regarding ‘what’ is observed and ‘how’ it is observed” (21). In MST, the observer is also observed.
Also, Albert believes that it may be possible to prove MST empirically wrong. Because MST believes that functional differentiation is the most important differentiation between lower and upper forms of organization, there is less of a focus on societal differentiation. If it can be shown that the world is comprised of different societies, then MST may be wrong. Put concisely by Albert: “…if world society is conceived in the Luhmannian sense of being constituted by the fact that all communication can connect to all other communication, that, so to speak, the ‘world’ is embedded or implied in each communication, and if this world society achieves its unity only through its internal differentiation which is primarily a functional differentiation between its subsystems, then it makes no sense to speak of societies in the plural” (24). From this reading of Luhmann, there are no interesting or meaningful readings of IR.
MST provides a comprehensive view of world society. IR provides a comprehensive view of international political relations. The two are, in a way, mutually exclusive (28-9).
Hayek: Law, Legislation and Liberty: Chapter 2: Cosmos and Taxis
Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. (1982). Law, legislation, and liberty : a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy (New pbk. ed.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Chapter 2: Cosmos and Taxis
Hayek spends this chapter distinguishing between two types of orders: those that are made and those that are grown. “By ‘order’ we shall throughout describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct” (36). He claims that the concept of order has been hijacked by those who favor authoritarianism, as they see it relating to command and obedience. “A spontaneous order…has in many respects properties different from those of a made order” (36).
Spontaneous orders have been studied for a long time in the field of economics and biology, claims Hayek. These orders focus on self-organization and self-generation. These orders are endogenous to a system. On the other hand, made orders are exogenously controlled; these are constructions and can be called organizations.
The title of this chapter derives from Greek words that separate made orders from spontaneous orders. “Taxis” is an order that is constructed, much like, “an order of battle”. “Kosmos”, on the other hand, is a grown order, or a spontaneous order.
“One of our main contentions will be that very complex orders, comprising more particular facts than any brain could ascertain or manipulate, can be brought about only through forces inducing the formation of spontaneous orders” (38). These systems have drivers that abstractly relate to one another. To preserve these orders, all one needs, “…is that a certain structure of relationships be maintained…” (39). These orders have no overarching purpose, or telos (not his words), though they can prove very handy for individuals and groups of people. These orders involve the regular interaction of small units that are relatively consistent. “The important point is that the regularity of the conduct of the elements will determine the general character of the resulting order but not all the detail of its particular manifestation” (40). And, to prediction: “…we shall be able to predict only the general character of the order that will form itself, and not the particular position which any particular element will occupy relatively to any other element” (40).
Spontaneous orders arise because all of the elements that are compromise these orders obey simple sets of rules in their, “…responses to their immediate environment” (43). Some of these rules, for example, can be seen in human interaction in the market place. “In a modern society based on exchange, one of the chief regularities in individual behavior will result from the similarity of situations in which most individuals find themselves in working to earn an income; which means that they will normally prefer a larger return from their efforts to a smaller one, and often that they will increase their efforts in a particular direction if the prospects of return improve. This is a rule that will be followed at least with sufficient frequency to impress u8pon such a society an order of a certain kind” (45).
While society has the features of a spontaneous order, a government, or made order, also exists. These two orders co-exist. The example of a cell and a cell’s nucleus is used to explain this relationship. The government is meant to fill the role of a, “maintenance squad of a factory” (47), or the group that keeps everything free to operate smoothly on its own.
Organizations, just like spontaneous orders, also rely on rules. This is so that the corporate knowledge can exceed that of any individual. This knowledge is far and above what any one individual can possess, and thus it is impossible to constrain through made orders. A spontaneous order, “…arises from each element balancing all the various factors operating on it and by adjusting all its various actions to each other, a balance which will be destroyed if some of the actions are determined by another agency on the basis of different knowledge and in the service of different ends. What the general argument against ‘interference’ thus amounts to is that, although we can endeavor to improve a spontaneous order by revising the general rules on which it rests, and can supplement its results by the efforts of various organizations, we cannot improve the results by specific commands that deprive its members of the possibility of using their knowledge for their purposes” (51).
Humans can not know the effects of their policy interventions. Thus, “…the only possibility of transcending the capacity of individual minds is to rely on those super-personal ‘self-organizing’ forces which create spontaneous orders” (54).
Chapter 2: Cosmos and Taxis
Hayek spends this chapter distinguishing between two types of orders: those that are made and those that are grown. “By ‘order’ we shall throughout describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct” (36). He claims that the concept of order has been hijacked by those who favor authoritarianism, as they see it relating to command and obedience. “A spontaneous order…has in many respects properties different from those of a made order” (36).
Spontaneous orders have been studied for a long time in the field of economics and biology, claims Hayek. These orders focus on self-organization and self-generation. These orders are endogenous to a system. On the other hand, made orders are exogenously controlled; these are constructions and can be called organizations.
The title of this chapter derives from Greek words that separate made orders from spontaneous orders. “Taxis” is an order that is constructed, much like, “an order of battle”. “Kosmos”, on the other hand, is a grown order, or a spontaneous order.
“One of our main contentions will be that very complex orders, comprising more particular facts than any brain could ascertain or manipulate, can be brought about only through forces inducing the formation of spontaneous orders” (38). These systems have drivers that abstractly relate to one another. To preserve these orders, all one needs, “…is that a certain structure of relationships be maintained…” (39). These orders have no overarching purpose, or telos (not his words), though they can prove very handy for individuals and groups of people. These orders involve the regular interaction of small units that are relatively consistent. “The important point is that the regularity of the conduct of the elements will determine the general character of the resulting order but not all the detail of its particular manifestation” (40). And, to prediction: “…we shall be able to predict only the general character of the order that will form itself, and not the particular position which any particular element will occupy relatively to any other element” (40).
Spontaneous orders arise because all of the elements that are compromise these orders obey simple sets of rules in their, “…responses to their immediate environment” (43). Some of these rules, for example, can be seen in human interaction in the market place. “In a modern society based on exchange, one of the chief regularities in individual behavior will result from the similarity of situations in which most individuals find themselves in working to earn an income; which means that they will normally prefer a larger return from their efforts to a smaller one, and often that they will increase their efforts in a particular direction if the prospects of return improve. This is a rule that will be followed at least with sufficient frequency to impress u8pon such a society an order of a certain kind” (45).
While society has the features of a spontaneous order, a government, or made order, also exists. These two orders co-exist. The example of a cell and a cell’s nucleus is used to explain this relationship. The government is meant to fill the role of a, “maintenance squad of a factory” (47), or the group that keeps everything free to operate smoothly on its own.
Organizations, just like spontaneous orders, also rely on rules. This is so that the corporate knowledge can exceed that of any individual. This knowledge is far and above what any one individual can possess, and thus it is impossible to constrain through made orders. A spontaneous order, “…arises from each element balancing all the various factors operating on it and by adjusting all its various actions to each other, a balance which will be destroyed if some of the actions are determined by another agency on the basis of different knowledge and in the service of different ends. What the general argument against ‘interference’ thus amounts to is that, although we can endeavor to improve a spontaneous order by revising the general rules on which it rests, and can supplement its results by the efforts of various organizations, we cannot improve the results by specific commands that deprive its members of the possibility of using their knowledge for their purposes” (51).
Humans can not know the effects of their policy interventions. Thus, “…the only possibility of transcending the capacity of individual minds is to rely on those super-personal ‘self-organizing’ forces which create spontaneous orders” (54).
Luisi: The Emergence of Life: Autopoiesis: The Logic of Cellular Life
Luisi, P. L. (2006). The emergence of life : from chemical origins to synthetic biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 8: Autopoiesis: The Logic of Cellular Life
Autopoiesis was coined by Varela and Maturana in the early 1970’s . It did not initially receive much attention, but slowly began to creep into scientific discourse. Probably most notably, it would used by Luhmann (1984) to describe social systems.
Initially, it was used as an analysis of cellular life. Cells are one of the basic building blocks of life on earth, and the simplest cells can be incredibly complex. On the outside of the cell lies the membrane, which is semi-permeable. “The notion of boundary is, in fact, one central concept in the theory of autopoiesis. Inside the boundary of a cell, many reactions and correspondingly many chemical transformations occur. However, despite all these chemical processes, the cell always maintains its own identity during its homeostasis period. This is because the cell…regenerates within its own boundary all those chemicals that are being destroyed or transformed…” (158). “The chain of processes occurring inside the boundary essentially serves the purpose of self-sustenance, or auto-maintenance. Of course, this takes pace at the expense of nutrients and energy coming from the medium. …the cell is a dissipative, open system” (158).
“An autopoietic unit is a system that is capable of sustaining itself due to an inner network of reaction that regenerate the system’s components” (158). A definition by Maturana: “When you regard a living system you always find a network of processes or molecules that interact in such a way as to produce the very network that produced them and that determine its boundary. Such a network I call autopoietic. Whenever you encounter a network whose operations eventually produce itself as a result, you are facing an autopoietic system. It produces itself. The system is open to the input of matter but closed with regard to the dynamics of the relations that generate it” (158).
Varela identifies three criterion for autopoietic systems: it must have a semi-permeable boundary, the boundary must have been produced by the system and that this boundary must encompass reactions, “that regenerate the components of the system” (159). This excludes viruses, for example, as being able to be defined as autopoietic, nor is a crystal.
There is then a discussion of autopoiesis and cognition/consciousness.
Social autopoiesis is then explored. “Consider, for example, a political party, or a family, whereby the rules that define a party o a family can be seen as a kind of boundary given by the social structure itself. The whole system enjoys a dynamic equilibrium, as certain members leave the structure, and new people come in, and are transformed into steady members by the binding rules of the party or of the family. There is a regeneration from within, there is the defense of the self-identity; the metaphor of the living cell applies. Also, in all these systems, certain characteristic features of biology can be recognized, such as the notion of emergence—the family being an emergent property arising from the organization of single individuals, etc” (175-6).
Chapter 8: Autopoiesis: The Logic of Cellular Life
Autopoiesis was coined by Varela and Maturana in the early 1970’s . It did not initially receive much attention, but slowly began to creep into scientific discourse. Probably most notably, it would used by Luhmann (1984) to describe social systems.
Initially, it was used as an analysis of cellular life. Cells are one of the basic building blocks of life on earth, and the simplest cells can be incredibly complex. On the outside of the cell lies the membrane, which is semi-permeable. “The notion of boundary is, in fact, one central concept in the theory of autopoiesis. Inside the boundary of a cell, many reactions and correspondingly many chemical transformations occur. However, despite all these chemical processes, the cell always maintains its own identity during its homeostasis period. This is because the cell…regenerates within its own boundary all those chemicals that are being destroyed or transformed…” (158). “The chain of processes occurring inside the boundary essentially serves the purpose of self-sustenance, or auto-maintenance. Of course, this takes pace at the expense of nutrients and energy coming from the medium. …the cell is a dissipative, open system” (158).
“An autopoietic unit is a system that is capable of sustaining itself due to an inner network of reaction that regenerate the system’s components” (158). A definition by Maturana: “When you regard a living system you always find a network of processes or molecules that interact in such a way as to produce the very network that produced them and that determine its boundary. Such a network I call autopoietic. Whenever you encounter a network whose operations eventually produce itself as a result, you are facing an autopoietic system. It produces itself. The system is open to the input of matter but closed with regard to the dynamics of the relations that generate it” (158).
Varela identifies three criterion for autopoietic systems: it must have a semi-permeable boundary, the boundary must have been produced by the system and that this boundary must encompass reactions, “that regenerate the components of the system” (159). This excludes viruses, for example, as being able to be defined as autopoietic, nor is a crystal.
There is then a discussion of autopoiesis and cognition/consciousness.
Social autopoiesis is then explored. “Consider, for example, a political party, or a family, whereby the rules that define a party o a family can be seen as a kind of boundary given by the social structure itself. The whole system enjoys a dynamic equilibrium, as certain members leave the structure, and new people come in, and are transformed into steady members by the binding rules of the party or of the family. There is a regeneration from within, there is the defense of the self-identity; the metaphor of the living cell applies. Also, in all these systems, certain characteristic features of biology can be recognized, such as the notion of emergence—the family being an emergent property arising from the organization of single individuals, etc” (175-6).
Luisi: The Emergence of Life: Chapter 6: The Notion of Emergence
Luisi, P. L. (2006). The emergence of life : from chemical origins to synthetic biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 6: The Notion of Emergence
This book attempts to make a bridge from chemistry to biology, and deploys the concept of emergence and self-organizing systems in that process.
“The term ‘emergence’ describes the onset of novel properties that arise when a higher level of complexity is formed from components of lower complexity, where those properties are not present. This is often summarized in the popular assertion that the ‘whole is more than the sum of the parts’, and/or with the vague term ‘holism’” (112).
Luisi then distinguishes between two forms of discussions relating to emergence: the ontic and the epistemological (113). He claims that his argument will deal with the epistemological argument, as it is more practical and applicable.
Luisi also approaches the concept of complexity theory. He also claims that he will not pursue this in much depth but does provide a simple definition: “…a complex system is seen as a hierarchic system, i.e., a system composed of subsystems, which in turn have their own subsystems, and so on” (113).
He then looks at the relationship between emergence and reductionism. Typically, “reductionism and emergence are presented as two opposite fronts: whereas emergence deals with the onset of novel properties, which are not present in the basic components, and as such has an upwards direction, reductionism generally looks down from a certain level of complexity claiming to explain each level on the basis of the lower ones” (116). “…the main point of opposition between emergence and reductionism concerns the problem of properties. There is nothing wrong, in principle, with reductionism when it stops at the level of structure: we can all agree that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen. The problem with reductionism is with the claim that the properties of water can be reduced to the properties of hydrogen and oxygen, and those to the properties of more elementary particles” (117).
Luisi then moves onto prediction: is it possible to foresee the emergence of water from hydrogen and oxygen either a priori or a posteriori? Some see the relationship between emergent properties and original properties as being unexplainable. This, Luisi calls either strong emergence or radical emergence (118). Weak emergence, on the other hand, “…the relationship between the whole and the parts may not be established because of technical difficulties, such as the lack of computational power or insufficient progress of our skills” (118). Some are critical of strong emergence because it seems to associate “magical” powers in the realm of causation between lower and upper levels of organization. Luisi chimes in: “Personally, I believe that the discrimination between a matter of principle (strong emergence), and a matter of practical difficulty (weak emergence), is not always possible—and perhaps it does not always make sense” (118). “…weak emergence si not distinguishable from strong emergence” (118-9). We can accept the premise of strong emergence and avoid the necessary reference to mysterious causality, if we address it in terms of our limited capabilities.
The discussion then moves to downward causation, which is seen as being the counterpart of emergence. “It is generally accepted that the development of emergent properties, which is an upward (or bottom-up) causality, is attended by a downward—or top-down—causality stream” (119). Some associate this with cyclical causality.
Non-linear systems of development are explored. Prigogine is said to present a system of development referred to as dissipative structures. These structures are understood as, “…an open system that is in itself far from equilibrium, maintaining, however, a form of stability…In more complex systems, depending on the initial conditions and fluctuations of the energy flow, the system in its dynamic behavior may encounter a point of instability—the bifurcation point—at which it can branch off with the emergence of new forms of structure and properties” (120).
In conclusion: “The reason why this [non-predictability] is important lies win the fact that novel, unpredicted properties can arise from the constitution of complexity. In other words, the fact that we cannot foresee novel emergent properties also means…that there might be a vast arsenal of unforeseeable properties that may arise from the intelligent or serendipitous assemblage of components” (125).
“We have looked previously at a rose, and claimed that one would learn nothing about a rose by saying that it is composed solely of atoms and molecules. A better approach to the essence of the rose, would be to describe at least the various levels of hierarchic structural complexity and the corresponding emergent properties—up to the various cells and cell organelles, up to the different tissues; and then add possibility the history of biological evolution. This is certainly a more complete view of a rose. It is a departure from the simplistic reductionistic approach to see all in terms of atoms—but is it enough to catch the essence of a rose? (126).
“Most of the cognitive scientists mentioned above would add that what is still missing is the ‘ovswerver0—the one who really gives meaning to the rose in terms of history, literature, poetry, …Obviously the notion of a rose is different depending on whether the observer is a Western educated in romantic literature or a Eskimo who has never seen a rose. Here is where the notion of emergence may become co-emergence between the object and the observer throughout his/her consciousness” (127).
Chapter 6: The Notion of Emergence
This book attempts to make a bridge from chemistry to biology, and deploys the concept of emergence and self-organizing systems in that process.
“The term ‘emergence’ describes the onset of novel properties that arise when a higher level of complexity is formed from components of lower complexity, where those properties are not present. This is often summarized in the popular assertion that the ‘whole is more than the sum of the parts’, and/or with the vague term ‘holism’” (112).
Luisi then distinguishes between two forms of discussions relating to emergence: the ontic and the epistemological (113). He claims that his argument will deal with the epistemological argument, as it is more practical and applicable.
Luisi also approaches the concept of complexity theory. He also claims that he will not pursue this in much depth but does provide a simple definition: “…a complex system is seen as a hierarchic system, i.e., a system composed of subsystems, which in turn have their own subsystems, and so on” (113).
He then looks at the relationship between emergence and reductionism. Typically, “reductionism and emergence are presented as two opposite fronts: whereas emergence deals with the onset of novel properties, which are not present in the basic components, and as such has an upwards direction, reductionism generally looks down from a certain level of complexity claiming to explain each level on the basis of the lower ones” (116). “…the main point of opposition between emergence and reductionism concerns the problem of properties. There is nothing wrong, in principle, with reductionism when it stops at the level of structure: we can all agree that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen. The problem with reductionism is with the claim that the properties of water can be reduced to the properties of hydrogen and oxygen, and those to the properties of more elementary particles” (117).
Luisi then moves onto prediction: is it possible to foresee the emergence of water from hydrogen and oxygen either a priori or a posteriori? Some see the relationship between emergent properties and original properties as being unexplainable. This, Luisi calls either strong emergence or radical emergence (118). Weak emergence, on the other hand, “…the relationship between the whole and the parts may not be established because of technical difficulties, such as the lack of computational power or insufficient progress of our skills” (118). Some are critical of strong emergence because it seems to associate “magical” powers in the realm of causation between lower and upper levels of organization. Luisi chimes in: “Personally, I believe that the discrimination between a matter of principle (strong emergence), and a matter of practical difficulty (weak emergence), is not always possible—and perhaps it does not always make sense” (118). “…weak emergence si not distinguishable from strong emergence” (118-9). We can accept the premise of strong emergence and avoid the necessary reference to mysterious causality, if we address it in terms of our limited capabilities.
The discussion then moves to downward causation, which is seen as being the counterpart of emergence. “It is generally accepted that the development of emergent properties, which is an upward (or bottom-up) causality, is attended by a downward—or top-down—causality stream” (119). Some associate this with cyclical causality.
Non-linear systems of development are explored. Prigogine is said to present a system of development referred to as dissipative structures. These structures are understood as, “…an open system that is in itself far from equilibrium, maintaining, however, a form of stability…In more complex systems, depending on the initial conditions and fluctuations of the energy flow, the system in its dynamic behavior may encounter a point of instability—the bifurcation point—at which it can branch off with the emergence of new forms of structure and properties” (120).
In conclusion: “The reason why this [non-predictability] is important lies win the fact that novel, unpredicted properties can arise from the constitution of complexity. In other words, the fact that we cannot foresee novel emergent properties also means…that there might be a vast arsenal of unforeseeable properties that may arise from the intelligent or serendipitous assemblage of components” (125).
“We have looked previously at a rose, and claimed that one would learn nothing about a rose by saying that it is composed solely of atoms and molecules. A better approach to the essence of the rose, would be to describe at least the various levels of hierarchic structural complexity and the corresponding emergent properties—up to the various cells and cell organelles, up to the different tissues; and then add possibility the history of biological evolution. This is certainly a more complete view of a rose. It is a departure from the simplistic reductionistic approach to see all in terms of atoms—but is it enough to catch the essence of a rose? (126).
“Most of the cognitive scientists mentioned above would add that what is still missing is the ‘ovswerver0—the one who really gives meaning to the rose in terms of history, literature, poetry, …Obviously the notion of a rose is different depending on whether the observer is a Western educated in romantic literature or a Eskimo who has never seen a rose. Here is where the notion of emergence may become co-emergence between the object and the observer throughout his/her consciousness” (127).
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
Donnelly: Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society
Donnelly, Jack. (2006). "Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society". European Journal Of International Relations, 12(2), 139-170. http://www.csa.com/ids70/gateway.php?mode=pdf&doi=10.1177%2F1354066106064505&db=sagepol-set-c&s1=80ee883868977a98ef5390896262f864&s2=aba9bbf7ab98695f11b9924f219fa0de
“I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality — concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical, or even dismiss as selfcontradictory” (139).
Donnelly argues in this piece that most current understandings of US power and empire are lacking. He deploys an approach that seeks to examine a more nuanced view of international society, one that allows for hierarchy to exist in international anarchy and one that sees sovereign states as not always participating with the same bundle of basic rights. He is also critical of views of American empire, which tend to lightly gloss over important traditional definitions and understandings that emphasize rule over others.
He begins by tracing out the etymology of the word empire and finding that it is derived from the Latin “imperium”, which was translated into the Greek arche (rule). Initially, this was used to describe the Roman republic as it moved away from its earlier republic status.
He claims that we still need the concept: “But we still need ‘empire’ to describe an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140). His definition of empire requires a central rule over previously autonomous international agents and states. He dismisses the Hardt and Negri empire account as missing the broader point derived from the original meaning.
Waltz then makes an appearance in this text. Donnelly highlights Waltz’s account of hierarchy and anarchy operating as ordering principles. Instead, Donnelly claims that we should not focus on hierarchy or anarchy, but rather that we should be looking for hierarchy in anarchy. Also, he claims that Waltz is formally wrong in that he identifies hierarchy as being the opposite of anarchy, when it is really archy, or rule.
The nature of the distinction between hierarchy and anarchy is then explored. Waltz’s approach presents hierarchy and anarchy as being polar opposites. This, Donnelly claims, is empirically false and problematic. Firstly, hierarchy is not the opposite of anarchy, but rather its opposite is archy, or simply rule/governance. Donnelly explores a domestic government situation to make a comparison: the congress is not subordinate to the executive branch, though there is hierarchy in different realms. There is hierarchy, but clearly there is not rule.
He then creates a 2x2 quadrant that examines the current realities of empire. The x axis is authority, whether it is coordinated or not. The y axis is system polarity. The highly coordinated authority and low polarity system represents an empire like Rome/Athens. The highly coordinated multi-polarity, in Donnelly’s example, the Concert of Rome, represents a situation that is similar to the current US relation vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
Different forms of sovereign inequality are examined in order to make a clear distinction between un-equal measures and international arrangements from empire. There have been myriad cases and examples of nations that did not enjoy fully sovereign status. These nations were not able to exercise the same amount of sovereign rights as were fully sovereign nations. However, this does not signify that these nations were being fully controlled by the more fully sovereign nations. Instead, this simply signified that there was international inequality.
There is then an examination of the typological movement from hegemony to domination to empire. There is much in this section detailing different possible characteristics of international society. In terms of an overview of possible international systems, it is quite helpful.
Donnelly then examines the recent war in Iraq with an eye towards the arguments that it involves an exercise of empirical powers. He finds that the justification for the war relied on standard non-proliferation discussions, though they were followed up with physical intervention, which has not been the norm. This could simply represent a change in the international regime of non-proliferation from a static, sanction imposition institution to one with more teeth and more propensity for action. Additionally, some critics of US policy in Iraq point to the Coalition of the Willing as an example of US empiric powers. This is simply false, as, while some nations were bribed and broadly coerced, none were ruled or directed to join. This is not an example of empirical rule, but simply hegemonic dominance and coercion. Regional control is another metric used to evaluate the degree of empirical power by some, but Iraq is again a poor example of this. The US is unable to gain influence in this region to really any degree, as this can be seen by Syria and Iran’s explicit refusal to bow to US interest. Most interestingly, this lack of influence can be seen in Iraq’s refusal to support the US in its policy towards Israel. This is not an empire, but a materially rich, ideationally weak nation trying to impose its will upon others with limited success.
“I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality — concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical, or even dismiss as selfcontradictory” (139).
Donnelly argues in this piece that most current understandings of US power and empire are lacking. He deploys an approach that seeks to examine a more nuanced view of international society, one that allows for hierarchy to exist in international anarchy and one that sees sovereign states as not always participating with the same bundle of basic rights. He is also critical of views of American empire, which tend to lightly gloss over important traditional definitions and understandings that emphasize rule over others.
He begins by tracing out the etymology of the word empire and finding that it is derived from the Latin “imperium”, which was translated into the Greek arche (rule). Initially, this was used to describe the Roman republic as it moved away from its earlier republic status.
He claims that we still need the concept: “But we still need ‘empire’ to describe an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140). His definition of empire requires a central rule over previously autonomous international agents and states. He dismisses the Hardt and Negri empire account as missing the broader point derived from the original meaning.
Waltz then makes an appearance in this text. Donnelly highlights Waltz’s account of hierarchy and anarchy operating as ordering principles. Instead, Donnelly claims that we should not focus on hierarchy or anarchy, but rather that we should be looking for hierarchy in anarchy. Also, he claims that Waltz is formally wrong in that he identifies hierarchy as being the opposite of anarchy, when it is really archy, or rule.
The nature of the distinction between hierarchy and anarchy is then explored. Waltz’s approach presents hierarchy and anarchy as being polar opposites. This, Donnelly claims, is empirically false and problematic. Firstly, hierarchy is not the opposite of anarchy, but rather its opposite is archy, or simply rule/governance. Donnelly explores a domestic government situation to make a comparison: the congress is not subordinate to the executive branch, though there is hierarchy in different realms. There is hierarchy, but clearly there is not rule.
He then creates a 2x2 quadrant that examines the current realities of empire. The x axis is authority, whether it is coordinated or not. The y axis is system polarity. The highly coordinated authority and low polarity system represents an empire like Rome/Athens. The highly coordinated multi-polarity, in Donnelly’s example, the Concert of Rome, represents a situation that is similar to the current US relation vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
Different forms of sovereign inequality are examined in order to make a clear distinction between un-equal measures and international arrangements from empire. There have been myriad cases and examples of nations that did not enjoy fully sovereign status. These nations were not able to exercise the same amount of sovereign rights as were fully sovereign nations. However, this does not signify that these nations were being fully controlled by the more fully sovereign nations. Instead, this simply signified that there was international inequality.
There is then an examination of the typological movement from hegemony to domination to empire. There is much in this section detailing different possible characteristics of international society. In terms of an overview of possible international systems, it is quite helpful.
Donnelly then examines the recent war in Iraq with an eye towards the arguments that it involves an exercise of empirical powers. He finds that the justification for the war relied on standard non-proliferation discussions, though they were followed up with physical intervention, which has not been the norm. This could simply represent a change in the international regime of non-proliferation from a static, sanction imposition institution to one with more teeth and more propensity for action. Additionally, some critics of US policy in Iraq point to the Coalition of the Willing as an example of US empiric powers. This is simply false, as, while some nations were bribed and broadly coerced, none were ruled or directed to join. This is not an example of empirical rule, but simply hegemonic dominance and coercion. Regional control is another metric used to evaluate the degree of empirical power by some, but Iraq is again a poor example of this. The US is unable to gain influence in this region to really any degree, as this can be seen by Syria and Iran’s explicit refusal to bow to US interest. Most interestingly, this lack of influence can be seen in Iraq’s refusal to support the US in its policy towards Israel. This is not an empire, but a materially rich, ideationally weak nation trying to impose its will upon others with limited success.
Lake: Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations
Lake, David A. (1996). "Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations". International Organization, 50(1), 1. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=9602295562&site=ehost-live
Lake posits that realist theory can not fully explain the inconsistent actions of various super-powers historically. He uses an approach taken from economics: he compares countries to firms that produce security. These security production firms then engage in interactions with other nations. These interactions can either be more mutually accepted or more hierarchical. “The choice between these alternatives, I posit, is a function of two main variables: the expected costs of opportunism, which decline with relational hierarchy, and governance costs, which rise with relational hierarchy” (2).
He then examines alliance formation, with an eye towards the literature on this subject. He finds that the literature has been relatively poor at coalescing and finding commonalities in different independent variables. He also explicitly takes the position that it could be the result of countries. “…the range of possible variation in strategy--the dependent variable--commonly is abridged” (3).
Lake then defines security as the ability of a country to use their own wealth as they see fit without the constraints of use being imposed by another nation or group. For Lake, informal empire clearly exists. States exercise control over the actions of other states that are in their sphere of influence. Not only is there the positive aspect of empire, where the strong state imposes its will on the weak state, but there is a more coercive and invasive aspect. Informal empire also means that the subsumed country must anticipate the whims and wishes of the powerful.
Contract theory is then explored to determine the nature of the relationships in that states engage. Because his initial assumptions are economist and rational in nature, his approach is not surprising: “The central hypothesis of the contracting approach is that parties choose relations to economize on resources-in other words, to maximize benefits from exchange and minimize transaction costs. In short, actors choose the relationship that is most efficient for conducting the transaction. By doing so, the parties maximize the resources that can be used for other valued purposes; for firms, this implies profit maximization and for states…cost minimization” (10-1).
Lake then explains his assumptions. He begins by assuming rationality, which he acknowledges is heavily criticized. He defines this as, “…I mean simply that actors possess transitive preferences and act purposively” (12). Secondly, security only represents one aspect of policy, and the government acts perfectly in the interests of the selctorate. Thirdly, states have no preference whether or not their foreign relations are wealth seeking, power maximizing or something else. Imperialism may be used by a state and the selctorate understand this as a means to an end. “Together, these first three assumptions imply that states choose the relationship that minimizes their costs of producing a desired level of security” (12). Fourthly, threats faced by state dyads are exogenous. Fifthly, if there is a disagreement between groups as to which policy is preferred, the stronger nation will prevail.
States take part in opportunistic behavior. This can, at time, be costly and is a reflection of a system that does not possess an ultimate leader. “In anarchic relations, ceteris paribus, the probability that the partner will behave opportunistically is comparatively high. In an empire, at the other extreme, states merge their formerly autonomous decision-making processes and transfer rights of residual control to the dominant member. The dominant state now decides-to continue with the same example-who is the victim of any attack…who is the aggressor, and how many resources its partner
must mobilize” (14).
Supply/Demand curves are used to illustrate the relationship between opportunism, governance cost and the degree to which the international society is anarchical or hierarchical. “In equilibrium, we should observe anarchic relations most commonly when the expected costs of opportunism are low or governance costs are high, and hierarchic relations when the expected costs of opportunism are high or governance costs are low. These equilibrium conditions reconcile the apparent contradiction revealed in the discussion of opportunism in the literatures on alliance formation and imperialism above” (21).
Lake then claims that it is nearly impossible to operationalize his construction. Firstly, his independent variables are nearly impossible to find proxies for. Secondly, these variables must necessarily be defined probabilistically, as states can not ever know exactly the costs of governance or opportunity. Finally, the theory can observe the chosen decisions made by actors, but it is impossible to fully understand the full range of their choices. However with the observation of some case studies, further information my become available. He goes on to examine the US/USSR relationship after WWII understanding that it is both abridged, and limited, but hoping that it will show that this approach is applicable.
He finds that the relationship between the US and its interests in Europe as well as the USSR’s relationship with their interests in Eastern Europe are fully consistent with his approach that focuses on the costs of informal empire being determined by the relative interaction of opportunity costs and governance levels. He sees this as being validation of his theoretical approach.
Lake posits that realist theory can not fully explain the inconsistent actions of various super-powers historically. He uses an approach taken from economics: he compares countries to firms that produce security. These security production firms then engage in interactions with other nations. These interactions can either be more mutually accepted or more hierarchical. “The choice between these alternatives, I posit, is a function of two main variables: the expected costs of opportunism, which decline with relational hierarchy, and governance costs, which rise with relational hierarchy” (2).
He then examines alliance formation, with an eye towards the literature on this subject. He finds that the literature has been relatively poor at coalescing and finding commonalities in different independent variables. He also explicitly takes the position that it could be the result of countries. “…the range of possible variation in strategy--the dependent variable--commonly is abridged” (3).
Lake then defines security as the ability of a country to use their own wealth as they see fit without the constraints of use being imposed by another nation or group. For Lake, informal empire clearly exists. States exercise control over the actions of other states that are in their sphere of influence. Not only is there the positive aspect of empire, where the strong state imposes its will on the weak state, but there is a more coercive and invasive aspect. Informal empire also means that the subsumed country must anticipate the whims and wishes of the powerful.
Contract theory is then explored to determine the nature of the relationships in that states engage. Because his initial assumptions are economist and rational in nature, his approach is not surprising: “The central hypothesis of the contracting approach is that parties choose relations to economize on resources-in other words, to maximize benefits from exchange and minimize transaction costs. In short, actors choose the relationship that is most efficient for conducting the transaction. By doing so, the parties maximize the resources that can be used for other valued purposes; for firms, this implies profit maximization and for states…cost minimization” (10-1).
Lake then explains his assumptions. He begins by assuming rationality, which he acknowledges is heavily criticized. He defines this as, “…I mean simply that actors possess transitive preferences and act purposively” (12). Secondly, security only represents one aspect of policy, and the government acts perfectly in the interests of the selctorate. Thirdly, states have no preference whether or not their foreign relations are wealth seeking, power maximizing or something else. Imperialism may be used by a state and the selctorate understand this as a means to an end. “Together, these first three assumptions imply that states choose the relationship that minimizes their costs of producing a desired level of security” (12). Fourthly, threats faced by state dyads are exogenous. Fifthly, if there is a disagreement between groups as to which policy is preferred, the stronger nation will prevail.
States take part in opportunistic behavior. This can, at time, be costly and is a reflection of a system that does not possess an ultimate leader. “In anarchic relations, ceteris paribus, the probability that the partner will behave opportunistically is comparatively high. In an empire, at the other extreme, states merge their formerly autonomous decision-making processes and transfer rights of residual control to the dominant member. The dominant state now decides-to continue with the same example-who is the victim of any attack…who is the aggressor, and how many resources its partner
must mobilize” (14).
Supply/Demand curves are used to illustrate the relationship between opportunism, governance cost and the degree to which the international society is anarchical or hierarchical. “In equilibrium, we should observe anarchic relations most commonly when the expected costs of opportunism are low or governance costs are high, and hierarchic relations when the expected costs of opportunism are high or governance costs are low. These equilibrium conditions reconcile the apparent contradiction revealed in the discussion of opportunism in the literatures on alliance formation and imperialism above” (21).
Lake then claims that it is nearly impossible to operationalize his construction. Firstly, his independent variables are nearly impossible to find proxies for. Secondly, these variables must necessarily be defined probabilistically, as states can not ever know exactly the costs of governance or opportunity. Finally, the theory can observe the chosen decisions made by actors, but it is impossible to fully understand the full range of their choices. However with the observation of some case studies, further information my become available. He goes on to examine the US/USSR relationship after WWII understanding that it is both abridged, and limited, but hoping that it will show that this approach is applicable.
He finds that the relationship between the US and its interests in Europe as well as the USSR’s relationship with their interests in Eastern Europe are fully consistent with his approach that focuses on the costs of informal empire being determined by the relative interaction of opportunity costs and governance levels. He sees this as being validation of his theoretical approach.
Nexton et. al.: What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate
Nexon, Daniel H., & Wright, Thomas. (2007). What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate (Vol. 101, 253-271): Cambridge Journals Online.
“Empires, we argue, are characterized by rule through intermediaries and the existence of distinctive contractual relations between cores and their peripheries. These features endow them with a distinctive network-structure from those associated with unipolar and hegemonic orders. The existence of imperial relations alters the dynamics of international politics: processes of divide and rule supplant the balance-of-power mechanism; the major axis of relations shift from interstate to those among imperial authorities, local intermediaries, and other peripheral actors; and preeminent powers face special problems of legitimating their bargains across heterogeneous audiences” (253)
This article take the debate about empires and makes the case that America is not an empire because it does not exhibit many of the characteristics of previous empires, specifically those of direct, territorial rule. This argument is fleshed out by providing examples of different forms of organization in international society. “We argue that ideal-typical empires, contra Ferguson, differ from hegemonic and uni-polar orders because they combine two features: rule through intermediaries and heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities”(253). However, while it is not a formal empire, it does exhibit many characteristics of an informal empire.
The authors identify three types of approaches to understanding an international system with a dominant player. There is the uni-polar system, where one country represents the strongest player in the international system. Many who theorize about this feature of international organization do so with assumptions of anarchy and rational agency. Some believe that this represents a stable form of international societal organization. Another form of international organization is that of hegemony, which can be understood and theorized in many ways. Many see this form of organization requiring the hegemonic leader to control economic, military and technological aspects of global interaction. The third form of international control is empire.
The authors then expand upon the notion of empire and imperial rule. They claim that it focuses on policies of divide and rule. They use Moytl’s construction of empire as a hub and spokes with no rim between the core and periphery. This form of empire works well, until, that is, the periphery begins to communicate with one another and thus opens up the opportunity for increased resistance. They explain that empires can operate through channels of informal rule.
They then approach the American Empire question: “It follows that questions such as “is America an empire?” or “is the international system an imperial one?” obscure more than they reveal. The problem of contemporary empire (American or otherwise) hinges, rather, on the degree to which specific relations—–among polities, between polities and nonstate actors, and in specific policy arenas—–look more or less like those associated with ideal-typical empires” (266). And, “Whenever relations between or among two or more political organizations involve indirect rule and heterogeneous contracting, their interactions will develop at least some of the dynamics associated with imperial control” (266). And, “…influence, exercised routinely and consistently, becomes indistinguishable from indirect rule. In informal empires the lines between influence and rule necessarily blur. When actors believe that certain options are “off the table” because of an asymmetric (if tacit) contract, or consistently comply with the wishes of another
because they recognize steep costs from noncompliance, then the relationship between the two becomes effectively one between ruler and ruled” (266).
Also, there is a focus on institutional power. Units must be understood as something broader than states, as this is a limited metric. Intuitions have a clearly structural dimension. Predominant powers can choose to organize the world in different ways.
“Empires, we argue, are characterized by rule through intermediaries and the existence of distinctive contractual relations between cores and their peripheries. These features endow them with a distinctive network-structure from those associated with unipolar and hegemonic orders. The existence of imperial relations alters the dynamics of international politics: processes of divide and rule supplant the balance-of-power mechanism; the major axis of relations shift from interstate to those among imperial authorities, local intermediaries, and other peripheral actors; and preeminent powers face special problems of legitimating their bargains across heterogeneous audiences” (253)
This article take the debate about empires and makes the case that America is not an empire because it does not exhibit many of the characteristics of previous empires, specifically those of direct, territorial rule. This argument is fleshed out by providing examples of different forms of organization in international society. “We argue that ideal-typical empires, contra Ferguson, differ from hegemonic and uni-polar orders because they combine two features: rule through intermediaries and heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities”(253). However, while it is not a formal empire, it does exhibit many characteristics of an informal empire.
The authors identify three types of approaches to understanding an international system with a dominant player. There is the uni-polar system, where one country represents the strongest player in the international system. Many who theorize about this feature of international organization do so with assumptions of anarchy and rational agency. Some believe that this represents a stable form of international societal organization. Another form of international organization is that of hegemony, which can be understood and theorized in many ways. Many see this form of organization requiring the hegemonic leader to control economic, military and technological aspects of global interaction. The third form of international control is empire.
The authors then expand upon the notion of empire and imperial rule. They claim that it focuses on policies of divide and rule. They use Moytl’s construction of empire as a hub and spokes with no rim between the core and periphery. This form of empire works well, until, that is, the periphery begins to communicate with one another and thus opens up the opportunity for increased resistance. They explain that empires can operate through channels of informal rule.
They then approach the American Empire question: “It follows that questions such as “is America an empire?” or “is the international system an imperial one?” obscure more than they reveal. The problem of contemporary empire (American or otherwise) hinges, rather, on the degree to which specific relations—–among polities, between polities and nonstate actors, and in specific policy arenas—–look more or less like those associated with ideal-typical empires” (266). And, “Whenever relations between or among two or more political organizations involve indirect rule and heterogeneous contracting, their interactions will develop at least some of the dynamics associated with imperial control” (266). And, “…influence, exercised routinely and consistently, becomes indistinguishable from indirect rule. In informal empires the lines between influence and rule necessarily blur. When actors believe that certain options are “off the table” because of an asymmetric (if tacit) contract, or consistently comply with the wishes of another
because they recognize steep costs from noncompliance, then the relationship between the two becomes effectively one between ruler and ruled” (266).
Also, there is a focus on institutional power. Units must be understood as something broader than states, as this is a limited metric. Intuitions have a clearly structural dimension. Predominant powers can choose to organize the world in different ways.
Clark: Coupling, Emergence, and Explanation
Clark, Andy. (2007). "Coupling, Emergence, and Explanation". In M. K. D. Schouten & H. Looren de Jong (Eds.), The matter of the mind : philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction (pp. x, 330 p.). Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
This compilation of articles is aimed at the science of cognition. In this selection, Clark presents emergence as a new tool for understanding issues surrounding cognition. “I shall argue that emergent phenomena do require new modes of explanation and understanding. But these modes do not displace more familiar project such as homuncular decomposition and representational/computational description. Instead, we must use a variety of tools to understand the multiple aspects of real-time, embodied, embedded cognition” (228).
The homuncular explanation is the first to be explored. Clark claims that it is a fully reductionist account of cognitive functioning. Some have posited that the concept of emergence is also reductionist. “...to contrast emergent explanation with reductionist explanation would be to invite a common misunderstanding of the notion of emergence, that is to suggest that emergentist accounts do not explain how higher level properties arise as a result of more basic structures and interactions…emergentist hypotheses are by no means silent on such matters. Rather, the contrast lies in the ways in which the lower-level properties and features combine to yield the target phenomena. This kind of emergentist explanation is really a special case of reductionist explanation, at least as intuitively construed, since the explanations aim to render the presence of the higher-level properties unmysterious by reference to a multitude of lower-level organization” (229).
The next target is interactive explanation. “…interactive explanation takes very seriously the role of the environment in promoting successful problem-solving activity. It seeks to display the ways in which crucial problem-solving moves may actively exploit the opportunities which the real world presents to embodied, mobile agents” (230).
“Emergent explanation is at once the most radical and most elusive member of our trinity” (232). Some people understand emergent behavior to be properties that are unexpected outcomes from the perspective of the observer. However, this produces a set of emergent properties that are objective-relative. Others have attempt to see emergence as being a property associated with successful evolution of a subject with their enviornemnt, “…and in which the patterns of results which this interaction yields require description in a vocabulary which differs from the one we use to characterize the powers and properties of the inner components themselves” (232).
Clark then provides examples from the field of artificial intelligence, one dealing with termites, the other robots. Throughout these examples, the theme of a distinction between controlled and uncontrolled variables rings out. However, according to Clark, these are not the instances of emergence that are most interesting: the most interesting cases are, “…cases in which the uncontrolled variable tracks some process…involving ‘continuous reciprocal causation’” (234).
Continuous reciprocal causation is, “causation that involves multiple simultaneous interactions and complex dynamic feedback loops, such that (a) the causal contribution of each component in the system of interest is determined by, and helps to determine, the causal contributions of…other components, and (b) those contributions may, as a result, change quite radically as the process evolves” (234).
Clark then claims that it is not the continuity of a system that allows it to be prone for emergent behavior, but rather the complexity of the system.
This compilation of articles is aimed at the science of cognition. In this selection, Clark presents emergence as a new tool for understanding issues surrounding cognition. “I shall argue that emergent phenomena do require new modes of explanation and understanding. But these modes do not displace more familiar project such as homuncular decomposition and representational/computational description. Instead, we must use a variety of tools to understand the multiple aspects of real-time, embodied, embedded cognition” (228).
The homuncular explanation is the first to be explored. Clark claims that it is a fully reductionist account of cognitive functioning. Some have posited that the concept of emergence is also reductionist. “...to contrast emergent explanation with reductionist explanation would be to invite a common misunderstanding of the notion of emergence, that is to suggest that emergentist accounts do not explain how higher level properties arise as a result of more basic structures and interactions…emergentist hypotheses are by no means silent on such matters. Rather, the contrast lies in the ways in which the lower-level properties and features combine to yield the target phenomena. This kind of emergentist explanation is really a special case of reductionist explanation, at least as intuitively construed, since the explanations aim to render the presence of the higher-level properties unmysterious by reference to a multitude of lower-level organization” (229).
The next target is interactive explanation. “…interactive explanation takes very seriously the role of the environment in promoting successful problem-solving activity. It seeks to display the ways in which crucial problem-solving moves may actively exploit the opportunities which the real world presents to embodied, mobile agents” (230).
“Emergent explanation is at once the most radical and most elusive member of our trinity” (232). Some people understand emergent behavior to be properties that are unexpected outcomes from the perspective of the observer. However, this produces a set of emergent properties that are objective-relative. Others have attempt to see emergence as being a property associated with successful evolution of a subject with their enviornemnt, “…and in which the patterns of results which this interaction yields require description in a vocabulary which differs from the one we use to characterize the powers and properties of the inner components themselves” (232).
Clark then provides examples from the field of artificial intelligence, one dealing with termites, the other robots. Throughout these examples, the theme of a distinction between controlled and uncontrolled variables rings out. However, according to Clark, these are not the instances of emergence that are most interesting: the most interesting cases are, “…cases in which the uncontrolled variable tracks some process…involving ‘continuous reciprocal causation’” (234).
Continuous reciprocal causation is, “causation that involves multiple simultaneous interactions and complex dynamic feedback loops, such that (a) the causal contribution of each component in the system of interest is determined by, and helps to determine, the causal contributions of…other components, and (b) those contributions may, as a result, change quite radically as the process evolves” (234).
Clark then claims that it is not the continuity of a system that allows it to be prone for emergent behavior, but rather the complexity of the system.
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