Andrews, DM. 1994. Capital mobility and state autonomy: toward a structural theory of international monetary relations. International Studies Quarterly: 193-218.
Capital mobility, it is argued in this piece, has become restrictive enought to be highlighted as a structure in the international system. This paper introduces the "capital mobility hypothesis". Also, it argues against generalizing about the effects that capital mobility will have on all states.
In exploring others who have looked at this topic: "In essence, the central claim of these theorists is that when capital is highly mobile across international borders, the sustainable macroeconomic policy options available to states are systematically circumscribed. International financial integration, so the argument goes, has raised the costs associated with pursuing monetary policies that diverge from regional or international trends. While differences in national preferences, the causal beliefs of policymakers and institutional affiliations may help shape particular patterns of adaptation, proponents of what may be termed the 'capital mobility hypothesis' maintain that changes in the external constraint confronting all states constitute a structural cause of observed shifts in the patterns of states' monetary policy behavior over time" (193-4).
"The central claim associated with the capital mobility hypothesis is that financial integration has increased the costs of pursuing divergent monetary objectives, resulting in structural incentives for monetary adjustment" (203).
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
Webb: International Economic Structures, Government Interests and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies
Webb, MC. 1991. International economic structures, government interests, and international coordination of macroeconomic adjustment policies. International Organization: 309-342.
How does increased capital mobility effect domestic macroeconomic policy coordination measures? "When different countries pursue different macroeconomic policies, it is likely that external payments imbalances, exchange rate movements, or both will result. A number of different types of policy could be used to reconcile national macroeconomic objectives with international constraints imposed by the resulting payments imbalances or exchange rate movements...Three categories of policies are relevant" (314).
External Policies: manipulation of trade and capital controls; Symptom Management: intervention in markets to control them through reserve spending, etc; Internal Policies: adjustment of domestic imbalances between savings and consumption through fiscal and monetary intervention.
See Table 4 (338) for an overview of how different policy coordination measures changed from the 60s to the 80s.
"This article demonstrates that international coordination of macroeconomic adjustment policies was at least as extensive in the 1980s as it had been in the 1960s. Because of changes in the structure o the international economy, however, there were shifts in the pattern of policy coordination: in the 1980s, payments financing coordination was less extensive, capital controls coordination was more extensive, exchange rate coordination was as extensively pursued...and, most important, monetary and fiscal policies became the focus of coordination efforts. The pattern of the 1980s reflects the fact that when international capital mobility is high, the plight of a country facing serious external imbalances can be resolved only by adjustments to monetary and fiscal policies-either those of its own government or those of the governments of other leading countries" (340).
How does increased capital mobility effect domestic macroeconomic policy coordination measures? "When different countries pursue different macroeconomic policies, it is likely that external payments imbalances, exchange rate movements, or both will result. A number of different types of policy could be used to reconcile national macroeconomic objectives with international constraints imposed by the resulting payments imbalances or exchange rate movements...Three categories of policies are relevant" (314).
External Policies: manipulation of trade and capital controls; Symptom Management: intervention in markets to control them through reserve spending, etc; Internal Policies: adjustment of domestic imbalances between savings and consumption through fiscal and monetary intervention.
See Table 4 (338) for an overview of how different policy coordination measures changed from the 60s to the 80s.
"This article demonstrates that international coordination of macroeconomic adjustment policies was at least as extensive in the 1980s as it had been in the 1960s. Because of changes in the structure o the international economy, however, there were shifts in the pattern of policy coordination: in the 1980s, payments financing coordination was less extensive, capital controls coordination was more extensive, exchange rate coordination was as extensively pursued...and, most important, monetary and fiscal policies became the focus of coordination efforts. The pattern of the 1980s reflects the fact that when international capital mobility is high, the plight of a country facing serious external imbalances can be resolved only by adjustments to monetary and fiscal policies-either those of its own government or those of the governments of other leading countries" (340).
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
Grabel: Averting Crisis?
Grabel, I. 2003. Averting crisis? Assessing measures to manage financial integration in emerging economies. Cambridge Journal of Economics 27, no. 3: 317-336.
Grabel highlights five distinct types of risk that are brought about when a country adopts neoliberal policy reforms. These are outlined in Table 1 (319) and are the following types of risk: currency, flight, fragility, contagion and sovereignty. Alternative policies are then outlined in Table 2 (322).
Grabel highlights five distinct types of risk that are brought about when a country adopts neoliberal policy reforms. These are outlined in Table 1 (319) and are the following types of risk: currency, flight, fragility, contagion and sovereignty. Alternative policies are then outlined in Table 2 (322).
Monday, March 23, 2009
Alves, Ferrari and Paula: The Post Keynesian Critique of Conventional Currency Crisis Models
Alves, AJ, F Ferrari, and LF de Paula. 2000. The Post Keynesian critique of conventional currency crisis models and Davidson's proposal to reform the international monetary system. JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 22, no. 2: 207-226.
Efficient market theory provides an account of financial crises that focuses on poorly performing economic fundamentals, whether or not speculators are herding or following their own rational behavior. This post-Keynsian approach is quite different in that it focuses on the impossibility of ever fully knowing what the fundamentals are, and thus not being able to ever fully adjudicate as to exactly how the causes of the financial crisis were fundamental related. Thus, speculation is a constant and foundational part of market activity as it is currently organized.
Efficient market theory provides an account of financial crises that focuses on poorly performing economic fundamentals, whether or not speculators are herding or following their own rational behavior. This post-Keynsian approach is quite different in that it focuses on the impossibility of ever fully knowing what the fundamentals are, and thus not being able to ever fully adjudicate as to exactly how the causes of the financial crisis were fundamental related. Thus, speculation is a constant and foundational part of market activity as it is currently organized.
Abdelal: Writing the Rules of Global Finance
ABDELAL, R. 2006. Writing the Rules of Global Finance: France, Europe, and Capital Liberalization. Review of International Political Economy 13, no. 1: 1-27.
Capital controls and their promotion: Why was it true that capital controls formed the cornerstone of the monetary system after WWII but were sacrilegious in the late 90s? This paper attempts to tell that story. There is a difference between how US and European leaders presented the promotion of global capital. The Europeans wanted a more globally managed diffusion of finance while the US was much more keenly interested in an ad hoc approach. The standard story focuses on the role of the US in promoting international finance; this story focuses much more on the European players.
Capital controls and their promotion: Why was it true that capital controls formed the cornerstone of the monetary system after WWII but were sacrilegious in the late 90s? This paper attempts to tell that story. There is a difference between how US and European leaders presented the promotion of global capital. The Europeans wanted a more globally managed diffusion of finance while the US was much more keenly interested in an ad hoc approach. The standard story focuses on the role of the US in promoting international finance; this story focuses much more on the European players.
Wibbels and Arce: Globalization, Taxation, and Burden-Shifting in Latin America
Wibbels, E, and M Arce. 2003. Globalization, Taxation, and Burden-Shifting in Latin America. International Organization 57, no. 01: 111-136.
This paper explores the relationship of taxation policy in Latin America and the possible effects of globalization. "The question becomes: If capital flows and deregulation cause burden-shifting, are governments that reform tax systems rewarded with greater flows? We hypothesize that capital flows do respond to tax policy, but that markets evaluate tax systems as a whole, not just capital's burden of taxation"
The rosy assessment of tax policies that come out of Europe cannot be generalized to the rest of the world. Short-term capital needs require clear signals of country intention to be generated. This having been said, it is not entirely a dire situation for all developing countries, and there is still national room for movement and adjustment.
"In sum, globalization seems to bring a mixed bag for policymakers; it brings a broad set of constraints onto the outlines of policy but provides room for policy choices therein. The most direct evidence of this flexibility is the fact that longer-term markets seem to be less interested in the relative share of taxes paid by capital than in how market friendly tax systems are as a whole. While net capital flows have not rewarded shifts to increase the burden of taxation on labor, these flows have rewarded market-oriented reforms of tax systems. Thus, national policy-makers can attract capital by streamlining tax codes, eliminating distortionary taxes on trade, or increasing the efficiency of existing taxes, rather than contributing to ongoing trends in inequality by eliminating progressive components of tax codes" (131-2).
This paper explores the relationship of taxation policy in Latin America and the possible effects of globalization. "The question becomes: If capital flows and deregulation cause burden-shifting, are governments that reform tax systems rewarded with greater flows? We hypothesize that capital flows do respond to tax policy, but that markets evaluate tax systems as a whole, not just capital's burden of taxation"
The rosy assessment of tax policies that come out of Europe cannot be generalized to the rest of the world. Short-term capital needs require clear signals of country intention to be generated. This having been said, it is not entirely a dire situation for all developing countries, and there is still national room for movement and adjustment.
"In sum, globalization seems to bring a mixed bag for policymakers; it brings a broad set of constraints onto the outlines of policy but provides room for policy choices therein. The most direct evidence of this flexibility is the fact that longer-term markets seem to be less interested in the relative share of taxes paid by capital than in how market friendly tax systems are as a whole. While net capital flows have not rewarded shifts to increase the burden of taxation on labor, these flows have rewarded market-oriented reforms of tax systems. Thus, national policy-makers can attract capital by streamlining tax codes, eliminating distortionary taxes on trade, or increasing the efficiency of existing taxes, rather than contributing to ongoing trends in inequality by eliminating progressive components of tax codes" (131-2).
Rudra and Haggard: Globalization, Democracy and Effective Welfare Spending in the Developing World
Rudra, N, and S Haggard. 2005. Globalization, democracy, and effective welfare spending in the developing world. Comparative Political Studies 38, no. 9: 1015.
"The results show that social spending in 'hard' authoritarian regimes is more sensitive to the pressures of globalization than in democratic or intermediate regimes" (1015; from abstract).
"Our findings cast substantial doubt on the hypothesis that globalization necessarily has an adverse effect on welfare spending in developing countries. We find that political institutions and the rules governing political competition matter. In the face of increasing trade openness, in particular, authoritarian regimes are less generous than democracies with respect to social spending and do worse with respect to several key social performance indicators. Also of significance, we find that under conditions of globalization, 'intermediate' authoritarian regimes show different social spending patterns than 'hard' authoritarian regimes and in some cases, behave more similar to democracies" (1017).
Rudra, N. 2008. Welfare states in developing countries: unique or universal? The Journal of Politics 69, no. 02: 378-396.
Rudra further promotes a distinction between three types of welfare states in LDCs: productive welfare (promote market development), protective welfare (protect select interest groups) and combinations of the above.
"The results show that social spending in 'hard' authoritarian regimes is more sensitive to the pressures of globalization than in democratic or intermediate regimes" (1015; from abstract).
"Our findings cast substantial doubt on the hypothesis that globalization necessarily has an adverse effect on welfare spending in developing countries. We find that political institutions and the rules governing political competition matter. In the face of increasing trade openness, in particular, authoritarian regimes are less generous than democracies with respect to social spending and do worse with respect to several key social performance indicators. Also of significance, we find that under conditions of globalization, 'intermediate' authoritarian regimes show different social spending patterns than 'hard' authoritarian regimes and in some cases, behave more similar to democracies" (1017).
Rudra, N. 2008. Welfare states in developing countries: unique or universal? The Journal of Politics 69, no. 02: 378-396.
Rudra further promotes a distinction between three types of welfare states in LDCs: productive welfare (promote market development), protective welfare (protect select interest groups) and combinations of the above.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
