Axelrod and Keohane: Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy

Axelrod, R. & Keohane, R., 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. World Politics, 38(1), 226-254.

“Achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics” (226).

Cooperation is not the same as harmony. Harmony means that interests align. For Axelrod and Keohane, anarchy means the absence of a common government in international relations. “To say that world politics is anarchic does not imply that it entirely lacks organization” (226).

It is often noted that security relationships seems to conform more closely to the standard predictions of what will happen in anarchy than do political or economic relations. Specifically, Lipson noted that the later relationships are clearly more internationally institutionalized.

The Effects of Structure on Cooperation: Three factors can lead to cooperation in the international system. These are mutuality of interests (issue linkage), the shadow of the future, and the number of players (in a game theory situation).

Points to Jervis’ work on cooperation and game theory, which shows that cooperation is differently possible with different kinds of interactions among actors.

Stag hunt is less conflictual than prisoner’s dilemma. The difference in the two is the relative actor perception of interests. These game theory presentations are done using a metric of payoff structure, which is a way of determining or describing the results of the cost/benefit analysis. The payoff structure can be used to analyze both political/economic and military/security situations and international relations.

Oye talks about blackmailing and backscratching as being techniques to increase cooperation.

Axelrod and Keohane conclude this piece by focusing on the importance of actor perception. Also, the importance of institutions and reciprocity: institutions do not substitute for reciprocity, but they institutionalize it.