Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Starr: Coalitions and Future War
Harvey Starr, Coalitions and Future War: A Dyadic Study of Cooperationand Conflict (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 1975).
War is a driver and not only a driven variable. Countries that have been allies during war are more likely to be allies in the future.
“This hypothesis propose that war coalition partners will comprise dyads that in future mutual war involvement are more likely to be allies and much less likely to be enemies. In testing this hypothesis we will also be testing the assumption that the war coalition experience is important and ‘unique’. If the war coalition experience, as will be tested below, does not produce future patterns of behavior different from other contemporary and comparable forms of experience then we should not be focusing on war coalitions but upon some other, broader, experience. The assumption, implicit so far, is that the war coalition, as a form of international cooperation, is in some way a unique experience. Thus, in testing the above hypotheses we are testing two things: that war coalitions produce a special type of international experience; and that this experience is unique by producing future patterns of war involvement which tend heavily towards continued allied behavior” (8-9).
“Our working hypothesis may now be refined. We may propose that War Coalition Participant dyads will produce ‘t+k’ that are unique—that are statistically different from the patterns produced by Belligerent dyads and Non-Participant dyads. Moreover, War Coalition Participant dyads will be more likely to be come Allies at ‘t+k’, and less likely to become Enemies at ‘t+k’ than Belligerent dyads or Non-Participant dyads” (13).
“The most compelling result we have produced so far—the strongest influence—is that of simply being a war coalition partner. That fact is related to an overwhelmingly non-belligerent set of future relationships with one’s war coalition partners. After that we find a variety of tendencies, albeit weak ones, which explain to some degree why 28.3% of the War Coalition Participant dyads that do become involved in future war become involved as Enemies (Or, why 13.5% of all War Coalition Participant dyads ‘go bad,’ and become Enemies in the future)” (50).
This quote is from this publication: Skjelsbaek, K (1971): “Shared membership in interngovernmental organizations and dyadic war, 1865-1964” pp31-61 in E H Fedder [ed] The United Nations: Problems and Prospects. St Louis: Center for International Studies
‘The probability of a pair of nations becoming involved in war may be compared to the probability of persons getting lung cancer. In absolute terms both probabilities are very low. However, if a person smokes cigarettes, and a pair of nations substantially reduces its number of shared IGO memberships, the probabilities of getting lung cancer and fighting on opposite sides in a war, respectively, are relatively much higher than they would otherwise have been” (51).
“Finally, the very striking difference in groups based on different Major Power-Minor Power composition was revealed. Simply, dyads composed of two major powers were more likely to become Enemies in the future. Of the total 624 War Coalition Participant dyads, 84 were composed of two major powers. Of these Major/Major dyads, a full 36% became Enemies at t+k…Above analyses clearly indicate that major/major dyads are more likely than other dyads to become Enemies. However, after this there is very little that can be said for major/major dyads. They differ from minor/minor dyads across almost every hypothesis, and do so by producing no relationships with most of the variables” (52).
“If we look at three of the four best discriminatory variables—major power/minor, border, lastwar—we may be understandably pessimistic in observing that they offer a gloomy picture indeed. None of these variables are truly manipulable in the policy relevant sense that they can be altered easily by the conscious actions of officials. This argues for war as being a heavily ‘systemic’ phenomena, built into the status hierarchy of the international system via the major power/minor power dimension and relationships” (59).
Wright: A Study of War
Quincy Wright, A Study of War, Abridged ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
Quincy Wright’s quantitative and philosophical treatise on various aspects of international conflict is rightfully decisive in the field. It represents a very early attempt (before data was even readily available) to take a macro-level account of the causes of different kinds of international conflict. However, to my chagrin, I boarded the plane with the abridged version of the book, which leaves out some of the most critical quantitative results which are said to be located in the appendix.
The famous Deutsch quote from the foreword: “War, to be abolished, must be understood. To be understood, it must be studied” (xii).
“In the broadest sense war is a violent contact of distinct but similar entities. In this sense a collision of stars, a fight between a lion and a tiger, a battle between two primitive tribes, and hostilities between two modern nations would all be war” (5).
Wright tends to analyze things in fours, typically with an analysis that takes a social, psychological, technical and legal frameworks. In terms of definitions, he substitutes philosophical for technological. The definitions of war from different frameworks are the following:
Sociological: “…socially recognized form of intergroup conflict involving violence”
Legal: “……usually followed Grotius’ conception of war as ‘the condition of those contending by force as such’” (5).
Philosophy: have focused on the “…degree in which military methods are employed” (6). Here he quotes Clausewitz.
Psychological: “…ignoring form, have found the substance of war in the degree of hostile attitude in the relation of states” (6).
“Whatever point of view is selected, war appears to be a species of wider genus” (7).
“Combining the four points of view, war is seen to be a state of law and a form of conflict involving a high degree of legal equality, of hostility, and of violence in the relations of organized human groups, or, more simply, the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force” (7).
“It is to be observed that this definition implies sufficient social solidarity throughout the community of nations of which both belligerents and neutrals are members to permit general recognition of the behaviors and standards appropriate to the situation of war. Although war manifests the weakness of the community of nations, it also manifests the existence of that community” (7).
There is a general and persistent attempt to trace out a conceptual framework—across time—that can help to identify and map out different components of armed international conflict. Much of this is of no interest to me.
The causes of war, by social system:
Technological: “…war is a violent encounter of powers, each of which is conceived as a physical system with expansive tendencies…War occurs whenever the tension, arising from pressures and resistances on a given frontier, passes beyond the tolerance point and invasion occurs” (108).
Legal: “War may…be conceived as the consequence of the diversity of legal systems. Each state, because it claims legal sovereignty, assumes that its law must prevail whenever it extends, even on the high seas, over foreign territory, or over aliens” (110).
Sociological: “Wars may…be considered consequences of the contacts of diverse cultures” (111).
Psychological: “The tendency for individuals to concentrate their loyalties upon a concrete group and to concentrate their aggressive dispositions upon an external group makes it possible that an incident in the relations of the two groups will acquire a symbolic significance and stimulate mass reactions which may produce war” (113).
“With much oversimplification and with decreasing accuracy as civilization develops, it may be said that wars usually result (1) technologically, because of the need of political power confronted by rivals continually to increase itself in order to survive, (2) legally, because of the tendency fo a system of law to assume that the state is completely sovereign, (3) sociologically, because of the utility of external war as a means of integrating societies in time of emergency, and (4) psychologically, because persons cannot satisfy the human disposition to dominate except through identification with a sovereign group” (114).
“Explanations of war from the deterministic and voluntaristic points of view differ in degree rather than in kind, and they tend to approach each other as the knowledge and intelligence of the entity which initiates war approach zero or infinity. Determinism is a function either of matter or of God. Man, being superior to unconscious matter and lower than the angels, can exercise uncertain choices. If a government had no knowledge at all of the external word, its reactions would be entirely determined by the natural law defining the behavior of entities of its type in contact with an environment of the type within which it exists. It would have no more freedom than would a particle of matter obeying the laws of gravitation and inertia. On the other hand, if a government had perfect knowledge of the universe in which it exists, it would be able to frame policies and adopt methods which were certain to succeed without disabling costs. Proposals which did not conform to these conditions would not be accepted. Wars arise unpredictably because governments know something but not everything. Their image of other governments, of the world situation, and even of themselves, upon which their policies, decision, and actions are based, is always in some measure distorted” (115).
“Wars arise because of the changing relations of numerous variables—technological, psychic, social and intellectual. There is no single cause of war. Peace is an equilibrium among many forces. Change in any particular force, trend, movement or policy may at one time make for war, but under other conditions a similar change may make for peace. A state may at one time promote peace by armament, at another time by disarmament; at one time by insistence on its rights, at another time by a spirit of conciliation. To estimate the probability of war at any time involves, therefore, an appraisal of the effect of current changes upon the complex of intergroup relationships throughout the world” (351).
“War tends to increase both in frequency and in severity in times of rapid technological and cultural change because adjustment, which always involves habituation, is a function of time” (352).
Quincy Wright’s quantitative and philosophical treatise on various aspects of international conflict is rightfully decisive in the field. It represents a very early attempt (before data was even readily available) to take a macro-level account of the causes of different kinds of international conflict. However, to my chagrin, I boarded the plane with the abridged version of the book, which leaves out some of the most critical quantitative results which are said to be located in the appendix.
The famous Deutsch quote from the foreword: “War, to be abolished, must be understood. To be understood, it must be studied” (xii).
“In the broadest sense war is a violent contact of distinct but similar entities. In this sense a collision of stars, a fight between a lion and a tiger, a battle between two primitive tribes, and hostilities between two modern nations would all be war” (5).
Wright tends to analyze things in fours, typically with an analysis that takes a social, psychological, technical and legal frameworks. In terms of definitions, he substitutes philosophical for technological. The definitions of war from different frameworks are the following:
Sociological: “…socially recognized form of intergroup conflict involving violence”
Legal: “……usually followed Grotius’ conception of war as ‘the condition of those contending by force as such’” (5).
Philosophy: have focused on the “…degree in which military methods are employed” (6). Here he quotes Clausewitz.
Psychological: “…ignoring form, have found the substance of war in the degree of hostile attitude in the relation of states” (6).
“Whatever point of view is selected, war appears to be a species of wider genus” (7).
“Combining the four points of view, war is seen to be a state of law and a form of conflict involving a high degree of legal equality, of hostility, and of violence in the relations of organized human groups, or, more simply, the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force” (7).
“It is to be observed that this definition implies sufficient social solidarity throughout the community of nations of which both belligerents and neutrals are members to permit general recognition of the behaviors and standards appropriate to the situation of war. Although war manifests the weakness of the community of nations, it also manifests the existence of that community” (7).
There is a general and persistent attempt to trace out a conceptual framework—across time—that can help to identify and map out different components of armed international conflict. Much of this is of no interest to me.
The causes of war, by social system:
Technological: “…war is a violent encounter of powers, each of which is conceived as a physical system with expansive tendencies…War occurs whenever the tension, arising from pressures and resistances on a given frontier, passes beyond the tolerance point and invasion occurs” (108).
Legal: “War may…be conceived as the consequence of the diversity of legal systems. Each state, because it claims legal sovereignty, assumes that its law must prevail whenever it extends, even on the high seas, over foreign territory, or over aliens” (110).
Sociological: “Wars may…be considered consequences of the contacts of diverse cultures” (111).
Psychological: “The tendency for individuals to concentrate their loyalties upon a concrete group and to concentrate their aggressive dispositions upon an external group makes it possible that an incident in the relations of the two groups will acquire a symbolic significance and stimulate mass reactions which may produce war” (113).
“With much oversimplification and with decreasing accuracy as civilization develops, it may be said that wars usually result (1) technologically, because of the need of political power confronted by rivals continually to increase itself in order to survive, (2) legally, because of the tendency fo a system of law to assume that the state is completely sovereign, (3) sociologically, because of the utility of external war as a means of integrating societies in time of emergency, and (4) psychologically, because persons cannot satisfy the human disposition to dominate except through identification with a sovereign group” (114).
“Explanations of war from the deterministic and voluntaristic points of view differ in degree rather than in kind, and they tend to approach each other as the knowledge and intelligence of the entity which initiates war approach zero or infinity. Determinism is a function either of matter or of God. Man, being superior to unconscious matter and lower than the angels, can exercise uncertain choices. If a government had no knowledge at all of the external word, its reactions would be entirely determined by the natural law defining the behavior of entities of its type in contact with an environment of the type within which it exists. It would have no more freedom than would a particle of matter obeying the laws of gravitation and inertia. On the other hand, if a government had perfect knowledge of the universe in which it exists, it would be able to frame policies and adopt methods which were certain to succeed without disabling costs. Proposals which did not conform to these conditions would not be accepted. Wars arise unpredictably because governments know something but not everything. Their image of other governments, of the world situation, and even of themselves, upon which their policies, decision, and actions are based, is always in some measure distorted” (115).
“Wars arise because of the changing relations of numerous variables—technological, psychic, social and intellectual. There is no single cause of war. Peace is an equilibrium among many forces. Change in any particular force, trend, movement or policy may at one time make for war, but under other conditions a similar change may make for peace. A state may at one time promote peace by armament, at another time by disarmament; at one time by insistence on its rights, at another time by a spirit of conciliation. To estimate the probability of war at any time involves, therefore, an appraisal of the effect of current changes upon the complex of intergroup relationships throughout the world” (351).
“War tends to increase both in frequency and in severity in times of rapid technological and cultural change because adjustment, which always involves habituation, is a function of time” (352).
Lee Ray: The Measurement of System Structure
“The Measurement of System Structure,” in Measuring the Correlates of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).
“We can think of few words that are so causally and imprecisely used as system and structure; this semantic permissiveness has even gone so far as to see them used interchangeably. Thus any pattern, order, or regularity—real or imagined—in the referent world may well be graced with the label ‘system’ or ‘structure.’ We mean, of course, to sue them rather more carefully here. By system, we mean an aggregation of social entities that share a common fate (Campbell 1958), or are sufficiently interdependent to have the actions of some consistently affect the behavior and fate of the rest. In addition, our definition of system is clearly distinct from those that focus on ‘systems of action’ and thus fail to specify which social entities constitute the system (Singer 1971). By the structure of the system we mean the way in which relationships are arranged, but this definition leaves unclear the distinction between two kinds of relationships, that is, those based on comparisons between and among states or other entities and those based on links or bonds between them. For example, if we refer to the concentration of military industrial capability in the international system, we are focusing on a structural attribute based on comparisons of the attributes of states. However, if we focus on the bipolarity of the system, we are then discussing a structural attribute that arises out of the links and bonds among states. It should also be pointed out that these two kinds of structural attributed are related in the sense that variation in one may produce variation in the other. For example, a concentration of military-industrial capability in the hands of two dominant states in the system may well lead to its bipolarization” (99-100).
“We have already mentioned one distinction that we find useful, that is, the distinction between structural attributes based on comparisons among states and those based on linkages and bonds. Both kinds of structural variables order states…either vertically or horizontally” (101).
This chapter is very interesting for my work and it contains a slew of relevant citations that need to be checked and reviewed.
“We can think of few words that are so causally and imprecisely used as system and structure; this semantic permissiveness has even gone so far as to see them used interchangeably. Thus any pattern, order, or regularity—real or imagined—in the referent world may well be graced with the label ‘system’ or ‘structure.’ We mean, of course, to sue them rather more carefully here. By system, we mean an aggregation of social entities that share a common fate (Campbell 1958), or are sufficiently interdependent to have the actions of some consistently affect the behavior and fate of the rest. In addition, our definition of system is clearly distinct from those that focus on ‘systems of action’ and thus fail to specify which social entities constitute the system (Singer 1971). By the structure of the system we mean the way in which relationships are arranged, but this definition leaves unclear the distinction between two kinds of relationships, that is, those based on comparisons between and among states or other entities and those based on links or bonds between them. For example, if we refer to the concentration of military industrial capability in the international system, we are focusing on a structural attribute based on comparisons of the attributes of states. However, if we focus on the bipolarity of the system, we are then discussing a structural attribute that arises out of the links and bonds among states. It should also be pointed out that these two kinds of structural attributed are related in the sense that variation in one may produce variation in the other. For example, a concentration of military-industrial capability in the hands of two dominant states in the system may well lead to its bipolarization” (99-100).
“We have already mentioned one distinction that we find useful, that is, the distinction between structural attributes based on comparisons among states and those based on linkages and bonds. Both kinds of structural variables order states…either vertically or horizontally” (101).
This chapter is very interesting for my work and it contains a slew of relevant citations that need to be checked and reviewed.
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Dupuy: Understanding War
Trevor N Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (New York: Paragon House, 1987).
This book is entirely about combat theory and combat strategy.
This book is entirely about combat theory and combat strategy.
Howard: The Causes of Wars
Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars and Other Essays, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984).
"Whatever may be the underlying causes of international conflict, even if we accept the role of atavistic militarism or of military-industrial complexes or of socio-biological drives or of domestic tensions in fuelling it, wars begin with conscious and reasoned decisions based on the calculation, made by both parties, that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace" (22).
Wide ranging and often rambling.
"Whatever may be the underlying causes of international conflict, even if we accept the role of atavistic militarism or of military-industrial complexes or of socio-biological drives or of domestic tensions in fuelling it, wars begin with conscious and reasoned decisions based on the calculation, made by both parties, that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace" (22).
Wide ranging and often rambling.
Suganami: On the Causes of War
Hidemi Suganami, On the Causes of War (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1996).
The author breaks down approaches to analyzing the causes of war into those that address three distinct questions. The kind of question that the theorists are attempting to address directly drives the approach taken, and the conclusions gleaned.
The three questions are:
“What are the conditions that must be present for wars to occur?”
“Under what types of circumstances have wars occurred more frequently?”
“How did this particular war come about?”
The first question addresses the necessary conditions for war to occur. A necessary condition, like oxygen for fire, can hardly be found to exist for the causes of international war. The second question—regarding the correlates of war—has a much richer set of studies to draw from. The final question deals most explicitly with understanding notions of causality. This is where Suganami fleshes out his own understanding of the causes of international crises.
The other two questions are relatively more straight forward.
“Nearly everyone knows that correlation is not causation” (Haas 1974, 59) (80).
The author breaks down approaches to analyzing the causes of war into those that address three distinct questions. The kind of question that the theorists are attempting to address directly drives the approach taken, and the conclusions gleaned.
The three questions are:
“What are the conditions that must be present for wars to occur?”
“Under what types of circumstances have wars occurred more frequently?”
“How did this particular war come about?”
The first question addresses the necessary conditions for war to occur. A necessary condition, like oxygen for fire, can hardly be found to exist for the causes of international war. The second question—regarding the correlates of war—has a much richer set of studies to draw from. The final question deals most explicitly with understanding notions of causality. This is where Suganami fleshes out his own understanding of the causes of international crises.
The other two questions are relatively more straight forward.
“Nearly everyone knows that correlation is not causation” (Haas 1974, 59) (80).
Dickinson: Causes of International War
G. Lowes Dickinson, Causes of International War (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1984).
“In discussing war it is important to distinguish clearly what we mean by it…We mean the deliberate use of organized physical force by groups of men against other groups” (7).
“It is necessary…to distinguish international war from civil. In some periods of h8istory, the distinction is not easy to draw in practice. But it becomes clear as soon as sovereign states have appeared. International war is, then, war between such states; while civil war is war between groups included in one of them” (8).
The book begins by positioning international war as a strange thing. Yes, people will fight, but that is because they are mad at each other. War, on the other hand, does not require that any of the participants actually dislike one another.
One necessary condition for the occurrence of international conflict is that humans tend to be “social animals”, and that without this sense of community, the drive for war would be less likely.
“We have seen that the community-sense is a condition of the possibility of war. But it is not enough to account for war” (15).
“There is no evidence for the statement, sometimes hastily made, that whenever and wherever there have been men there has been war” (16).
“In discussing war it is important to distinguish clearly what we mean by it…We mean the deliberate use of organized physical force by groups of men against other groups” (7).
“It is necessary…to distinguish international war from civil. In some periods of h8istory, the distinction is not easy to draw in practice. But it becomes clear as soon as sovereign states have appeared. International war is, then, war between such states; while civil war is war between groups included in one of them” (8).
The book begins by positioning international war as a strange thing. Yes, people will fight, but that is because they are mad at each other. War, on the other hand, does not require that any of the participants actually dislike one another.
One necessary condition for the occurrence of international conflict is that humans tend to be “social animals”, and that without this sense of community, the drive for war would be less likely.
“We have seen that the community-sense is a condition of the possibility of war. But it is not enough to account for war” (15).
“There is no evidence for the statement, sometimes hastily made, that whenever and wherever there have been men there has been war” (16).
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
Cashman: What Causes War?
Cashman, Greg. 1993. What Causes War?: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict. New York: Lexington Books.
This book is a wide ranging overview of the different causes of war organized by levels of analysis.”Clues to the cause of war may be found in a variety of different locations. The causes of war may be said to exist at several levels of analysis. While there are different views of the number and identity of levels of analysis, we will examine theories of war at five levels: the individual, the small group, the state, the interaction between two states, and the international system” (13).
At the level of states—where internal conflict can foment external conflict—Blainey argued that about 50% of wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries were “immediately preceded by civil conflict in one of the belligerent nations” (147). This is referred to as the “kick them while they’re down” theory of war. The “scapegoat” theory of war, or the diversionary conflict theory, has been supported by Rosencrance. Lebow also supports this argument by presenting the case for “brinksmanship crises”. Maoz argues that revolutionary transformations create a context where states are likely to either be the perpetrator of international violence or the recipient. Rummel explored this empirically and found that internal and external conflict are not related. Wilkenfeld argued that this lack of a finding was the result of Rummel grouping all regime types into the same analysis and not breaking them out at all.
There is obviously much more than this brief abstract, though this piece was the one that I was most interested in at the moment.
UPDATE:
ToC:
The individual Level of Analysis: Human Aggression
The Individual Level of Analysis: Psychological Explanations for War
Governmental Decision Making
The State and International Conflict
International interaction: Stimulus-Response Theory and Arms Races
International Interaction: Game Theory and Deterrence
The International System: Anarchy and Power
The International System: Cyclical Theories and Historical Structural Theories of War
UPDATE II:
The book begins by claiming that there is both good news and bad news about "war". First, big wars are less frequent than they used to be. Second, they are more deadly. Third, intra-state wars are more prevalent. Fourth, inter-state wars are incredibly rare, especially when all possible dyads are taken into consideration.
The introduction then goes on to explore different explanations for the causes of war from the perspective of different levels of analysis. These levels are the following: the individual level, the substate level, the nation-state level, the dyadic level, the international system level and then analyses that take place across levels, or multilevel analysis.
The book then thoroughly explores major wars of the 20th and 21st centuries from the perspectives of these levels of analysis.
This book is a wide ranging overview of the different causes of war organized by levels of analysis.”Clues to the cause of war may be found in a variety of different locations. The causes of war may be said to exist at several levels of analysis. While there are different views of the number and identity of levels of analysis, we will examine theories of war at five levels: the individual, the small group, the state, the interaction between two states, and the international system” (13).
At the level of states—where internal conflict can foment external conflict—Blainey argued that about 50% of wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries were “immediately preceded by civil conflict in one of the belligerent nations” (147). This is referred to as the “kick them while they’re down” theory of war. The “scapegoat” theory of war, or the diversionary conflict theory, has been supported by Rosencrance. Lebow also supports this argument by presenting the case for “brinksmanship crises”. Maoz argues that revolutionary transformations create a context where states are likely to either be the perpetrator of international violence or the recipient. Rummel explored this empirically and found that internal and external conflict are not related. Wilkenfeld argued that this lack of a finding was the result of Rummel grouping all regime types into the same analysis and not breaking them out at all.
There is obviously much more than this brief abstract, though this piece was the one that I was most interested in at the moment.
UPDATE:
ToC:
The individual Level of Analysis: Human Aggression
The Individual Level of Analysis: Psychological Explanations for War
Governmental Decision Making
The State and International Conflict
International interaction: Stimulus-Response Theory and Arms Races
International Interaction: Game Theory and Deterrence
The International System: Anarchy and Power
The International System: Cyclical Theories and Historical Structural Theories of War
UPDATE II:
The book begins by claiming that there is both good news and bad news about "war". First, big wars are less frequent than they used to be. Second, they are more deadly. Third, intra-state wars are more prevalent. Fourth, inter-state wars are incredibly rare, especially when all possible dyads are taken into consideration.
The introduction then goes on to explore different explanations for the causes of war from the perspective of different levels of analysis. These levels are the following: the individual level, the substate level, the nation-state level, the dyadic level, the international system level and then analyses that take place across levels, or multilevel analysis.
The book then thoroughly explores major wars of the 20th and 21st centuries from the perspectives of these levels of analysis.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Miller: States, Nations and the Great Powers
Miller, Benjamin. 2007. States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace. Cambridge studies in international relations 104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
“”I argue that if we approach the question of war and peace from the regional perspective, we may gain new insights which are otherwise obscured. The new theory developed here thus offers an explanation of the variations between war and peace within and among regions. It explains why some regions are particularly war-prone , while others are so peaceful that war among the regional states has become practically unthinkable” (1).
“What I call the ‘state-to-nation-balance’ is the key underlying cause that affects the disposition of a region toward war…The state-to-nation balance refers to the degree of congruence between the division of the region into territorial states and the national aspirations and political identifications of the region’s peoples. This balance also refers to the prevalence of strong versus weak states in the region. There is a nation-to-state imbalance when there is a lack of congruence between states and national identifications and at least some of the regional states are weak states” (2).
“…I argue that the old and apparently irreconcilable divide between systemic and regional/domestic explanations of state behavior may be bridged, and this books offers a theoretical synthesis that shows how a fruitful and compelling theoretical coexistence may be created within different schools of IR scholarship, and between IR scholarship and comparative politics” (3).
Both regional and global drivers explain the occurrence of international conflict. “Regional/domestic factors are responsible for hot outcomes; global factors are responsible for cold outcomes” (13).
Argues that there are “outside-in” and “inside-out” explanations for the cause of international conflict. The main drawback of these accounts is that they don’t take each other into consideration.
The author argues that most previous theory has treated the causes of war and peace as being separate. Instead, we should be looking at why certain regions are more or less war-prone than others, which takes into consideration both drivers of peace and war.
“”I argue that if we approach the question of war and peace from the regional perspective, we may gain new insights which are otherwise obscured. The new theory developed here thus offers an explanation of the variations between war and peace within and among regions. It explains why some regions are particularly war-prone , while others are so peaceful that war among the regional states has become practically unthinkable” (1).
“What I call the ‘state-to-nation-balance’ is the key underlying cause that affects the disposition of a region toward war…The state-to-nation balance refers to the degree of congruence between the division of the region into territorial states and the national aspirations and political identifications of the region’s peoples. This balance also refers to the prevalence of strong versus weak states in the region. There is a nation-to-state imbalance when there is a lack of congruence between states and national identifications and at least some of the regional states are weak states” (2).
“…I argue that the old and apparently irreconcilable divide between systemic and regional/domestic explanations of state behavior may be bridged, and this books offers a theoretical synthesis that shows how a fruitful and compelling theoretical coexistence may be created within different schools of IR scholarship, and between IR scholarship and comparative politics” (3).
Both regional and global drivers explain the occurrence of international conflict. “Regional/domestic factors are responsible for hot outcomes; global factors are responsible for cold outcomes” (13).
Argues that there are “outside-in” and “inside-out” explanations for the cause of international conflict. The main drawback of these accounts is that they don’t take each other into consideration.
The author argues that most previous theory has treated the causes of war and peace as being separate. Instead, we should be looking at why certain regions are more or less war-prone than others, which takes into consideration both drivers of peace and war.
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Axelrod: The Complexity of Cooperation
Robert M Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration, Princeton studies in complexity (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1997).
This book builds upon Axelrod's earlier work on cooperation--specifically using the Prisoner's Dilemma--by adding complexity to the mix. "Adding complexity to that framework allows the exploration of many interesting and important features of competition and collaboration that are beyond the reach of the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm" (3).
"Complexity theory involves the study of many actors and their interactions. The actors may be atoms, fish, people, organizations or nations...a primary tool of complexity theory is computer simulation" (3).
"Agent-based modeling is a third way of doing science. Like deduction, it starts with a set of explicitly assumptions. But unlike deduction, it does not prove theorems. Instead, an agent-based model generates simulated data that can be analyzed inductively. Unlike typical induction, however, the simulated data come from a rigorously specified set of rules rather than direct measurement of the real world. Whereas the purpose of induction is to find patterns in data and that of deduction to find consequences of assumptions, the purpose of agent-based modeling is to aid intuition" (3-4).
This book builds upon Axelrod's earlier work on cooperation--specifically using the Prisoner's Dilemma--by adding complexity to the mix. "Adding complexity to that framework allows the exploration of many interesting and important features of competition and collaboration that are beyond the reach of the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm" (3).
"Complexity theory involves the study of many actors and their interactions. The actors may be atoms, fish, people, organizations or nations...a primary tool of complexity theory is computer simulation" (3).
"Agent-based modeling is a third way of doing science. Like deduction, it starts with a set of explicitly assumptions. But unlike deduction, it does not prove theorems. Instead, an agent-based model generates simulated data that can be analyzed inductively. Unlike typical induction, however, the simulated data come from a rigorously specified set of rules rather than direct measurement of the real world. Whereas the purpose of induction is to find patterns in data and that of deduction to find consequences of assumptions, the purpose of agent-based modeling is to aid intuition" (3-4).
Monday, March 1, 2010
Boulding: General Systems Theory: The Skeleton of Science
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1956. “General Systems Theory-The Skeleton of Science.” Management Science 2(3) (April): 197-208.
“General Systems Theory is a name which has come into use to describe a level of theoretical model-building which lies somewhere between the highly generalized constructions of pure mathematics and the specific theories of the specialized disciplines” 197
“The objectives of General Systems Theory…can be set out with varying degrees of ambition and confidence. At a low level of ambition but with a high degree of confidence it aims to point out similarities in the theoretical constructions of different disciplines, where these exist, and to develop theoretical models having applicability to at least two different fields of study. A t a higher level of ambition, but with perhaps a lower degree of confidence it hopes to develop something like a ‘spectrum’ of theories—a system of systems which may perform the function of a ‘gestalt’ in theoretical construction. Such ‘gestalts’ in special fields have been of great value in directing research towards the gaps which they reveal” 198
Two possible approaches to GST: Find common phenomenon to different schools of theory: an individual interacting with an environment, growth, information/communication, etc. Or, you could create a framework for mapping out the interaction of different theories across degrees of complexity.
“General Systems Theory is a name which has come into use to describe a level of theoretical model-building which lies somewhere between the highly generalized constructions of pure mathematics and the specific theories of the specialized disciplines” 197
“The objectives of General Systems Theory…can be set out with varying degrees of ambition and confidence. At a low level of ambition but with a high degree of confidence it aims to point out similarities in the theoretical constructions of different disciplines, where these exist, and to develop theoretical models having applicability to at least two different fields of study. A t a higher level of ambition, but with perhaps a lower degree of confidence it hopes to develop something like a ‘spectrum’ of theories—a system of systems which may perform the function of a ‘gestalt’ in theoretical construction. Such ‘gestalts’ in special fields have been of great value in directing research towards the gaps which they reveal” 198
Two possible approaches to GST: Find common phenomenon to different schools of theory: an individual interacting with an environment, growth, information/communication, etc. Or, you could create a framework for mapping out the interaction of different theories across degrees of complexity.
Simon: The Architecture of Complexity
Simon, Herbert A. 1962. “The Architecture of Complexity.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106(6) (December 12): 467-482.
“Roughly, by a complex system I mean one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way. In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole” (468).
“Thus, the central theme that runs through my remarks is that complexity frequently takes the form of hierarchy, and that hierarchic systems have some common properties that are independent of their specific content. Hierarchy, I shall argue, is one of the central structural schemes that the architect of complexity uses” (468).
“By a hierarchic system, or hierarchy, I mean a system that is composed of interrelated sub-systems, each of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem” (468).
“There is one important difference between the physical and biological hierarchies, on the one hand, and social hierarchies, on the other. Most physical and biological hierarchies are described in spatial terms…On the other hand, we propose to identify social hierarchies not by observing who lives close to whom but by observing who interacts with whom. These two points of view can be reconciled by defining hierarchy in terms of intensity of interaction” (469).
“We have shown thus far that complex systems will evolve from simple systems much more rapidly if there are stable intermediate forms than if there are not. The resulting complex forms in the former case will be hierarchic. We have only to turn the argument around to explain the observed predominance of hierarchies among the complex systems nature presents to us” (473).
“In hierarchic systems, we can distinguish between the interactions among subsystems, on the one hand, and the interactions within subsystems…The interactions at the different levels may be, and often will be, of different orders of magnitudes” (473-4).
“At least some kinds of hierarchic systems can be approximated successfully as nearly decomposable systems. The main theoretical findings from the approach can be summed up in two propositions: (a) in a nearly decomposable system, the short-run behavior of each of the component subsystems is approximately independent of the short-run behavior of the other components; (b) in the long run, the behavior of any one of the components depends in only an aggregate way on the behavior of the other components” (474).
“How complex or simple a structure is depends critically upon the way in which we describe it. Most of the complex structures round in the world are enormously redundant, and we can use this redundancy to simplify their description. But to use it, to achieve the simplification, we must find the right representation” (481).
“My thesis has been that one path to the construction of a non-trivial theory of complex systems is by way of a theory of hierarchy. Empirically, a large proportion of the complex systems we observe in nature exhibit hierarchic structure. On theoretical grounds we could expect complex systems to be hierarchies in a world in which complexity had to evolve from simplicity. In their dynamics, hierarchies have property, near-decomposability, that greatly simplifies their behavior. Near-decomposability also simplifies the description of a complex system, and makes it easier to understand how the information needed for the development or reproduction of the system can be stored in reasonable compass” (481-2).
“Roughly, by a complex system I mean one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way. In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole” (468).
“Thus, the central theme that runs through my remarks is that complexity frequently takes the form of hierarchy, and that hierarchic systems have some common properties that are independent of their specific content. Hierarchy, I shall argue, is one of the central structural schemes that the architect of complexity uses” (468).
“By a hierarchic system, or hierarchy, I mean a system that is composed of interrelated sub-systems, each of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem” (468).
“There is one important difference between the physical and biological hierarchies, on the one hand, and social hierarchies, on the other. Most physical and biological hierarchies are described in spatial terms…On the other hand, we propose to identify social hierarchies not by observing who lives close to whom but by observing who interacts with whom. These two points of view can be reconciled by defining hierarchy in terms of intensity of interaction” (469).
“We have shown thus far that complex systems will evolve from simple systems much more rapidly if there are stable intermediate forms than if there are not. The resulting complex forms in the former case will be hierarchic. We have only to turn the argument around to explain the observed predominance of hierarchies among the complex systems nature presents to us” (473).
“In hierarchic systems, we can distinguish between the interactions among subsystems, on the one hand, and the interactions within subsystems…The interactions at the different levels may be, and often will be, of different orders of magnitudes” (473-4).
“At least some kinds of hierarchic systems can be approximated successfully as nearly decomposable systems. The main theoretical findings from the approach can be summed up in two propositions: (a) in a nearly decomposable system, the short-run behavior of each of the component subsystems is approximately independent of the short-run behavior of the other components; (b) in the long run, the behavior of any one of the components depends in only an aggregate way on the behavior of the other components” (474).
“How complex or simple a structure is depends critically upon the way in which we describe it. Most of the complex structures round in the world are enormously redundant, and we can use this redundancy to simplify their description. But to use it, to achieve the simplification, we must find the right representation” (481).
“My thesis has been that one path to the construction of a non-trivial theory of complex systems is by way of a theory of hierarchy. Empirically, a large proportion of the complex systems we observe in nature exhibit hierarchic structure. On theoretical grounds we could expect complex systems to be hierarchies in a world in which complexity had to evolve from simplicity. In their dynamics, hierarchies have property, near-decomposability, that greatly simplifies their behavior. Near-decomposability also simplifies the description of a complex system, and makes it easier to understand how the information needed for the development or reproduction of the system can be stored in reasonable compass” (481-2).
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Clemens: Complexity Theory as a Tool for Understanding and Coping with Ethnic Conflict and Development Issues in Post-Soviet Eurasia
Clemens, WC. 2002. “Complexity Theory as a Tool for Understanding and Coping with Ethnic Conflict and Development Issues in Post-Soviet Eurasia.” International Journal of Peace Studies 7(2): 1-16.
“This paper contends that movement toward or away from resolution of ethnic problems in newly independent states can be more fully explained [than does Snyder, 2000 and the focus on democratization] by concepts derived from complexity theory. These concepts do not contradict explanations rooted in democratization but enrich them and offer linkages to other fields of knowledge. They start with a wider lens than democratization but include it. The concept of societal fitness, a major concern of complexity theory, subsumes political, economic, and cultural strengths. The precise role played by each strength in shaping societal fitness becomes an important but secondary question” (2).
“Generated by scholars from various disciplines, complexity theory integrates concepts from many fields to produce a new slant on evolution. Its exponents seek a general theory able to explain many different types of phenomena” (2).
“The analysis here suggests that complexity theory can enhance our ability to describe and explain the past and present. But the theory has much less utility for projecting alternative futures or prescribing policy. Still, complexity theory can enlarge our vision and complement other approaches to social science” (2).
“Complexity theory is anchored in nine basic concepts: fitness, coevolution, emergence, agent-based systems, self-organization, self-organized criticality, punctuated equilibrium and fitness landscapes” (3).
Fitness: how well does a system deal with complexity? All systems are on a range from highly unstable to highly stable, where fitness is located in the middle.
Coevolution: Everything evolves together, and the more connections that there are, the more difficult it is to understand what is happening.
Emergence: Macro complexity arising from micro complexity.
Agent-Based Systems: Systems where emergence comes from the behavior of individual units.
Self-Organization: The system organizes to create fitness.
Self-Organized Criticality: Claimed to not be essential to complexity theory, but posits a system that exists directly between order and chaos, where it can slip into chaos quicly.
Punctuated Equilibrium: Tipping points, where extinctions happen, mutations etc.
Fitness Landscapes: Fitness of different groups as they coevolve. Thus, the fitness of one group can be negatively or positively impacted by actions taken by another group.
The paper argues that certain countries demonstrate high levels of fitness, as can be seen in HDI scores. Other countries had lower levels of fitness. These countries had different histories from the countries experiencing high levels of fitness, and dealt with minority groups less well. Self-organization takes in democratic politics, market economies and the media. Coevolution explains that countries close to the West evolve with them. Emergence is seen in agreements and regional groups. Agent-Based systems in the fit groups, agents are free. Self-organized Criticality: some countries might not be as stable as they appear! Punctuated equilibrium: don’t expect steady progress. Fitness Landscapes: it might be possible to say something here, maybe not.
“The fundamental insight of complexity theory is its prediction that fitness will be found along the middle range of a spectrum ranging from rigid order to the other extreme—chaos. This insight helps explain why Central Asia is frozen in time, why the Caucasus explodes and why Russia resorts to an iron fist to overcome chaos” (10).
“This paper contends that movement toward or away from resolution of ethnic problems in newly independent states can be more fully explained [than does Snyder, 2000 and the focus on democratization] by concepts derived from complexity theory. These concepts do not contradict explanations rooted in democratization but enrich them and offer linkages to other fields of knowledge. They start with a wider lens than democratization but include it. The concept of societal fitness, a major concern of complexity theory, subsumes political, economic, and cultural strengths. The precise role played by each strength in shaping societal fitness becomes an important but secondary question” (2).
“Generated by scholars from various disciplines, complexity theory integrates concepts from many fields to produce a new slant on evolution. Its exponents seek a general theory able to explain many different types of phenomena” (2).
“The analysis here suggests that complexity theory can enhance our ability to describe and explain the past and present. But the theory has much less utility for projecting alternative futures or prescribing policy. Still, complexity theory can enlarge our vision and complement other approaches to social science” (2).
“Complexity theory is anchored in nine basic concepts: fitness, coevolution, emergence, agent-based systems, self-organization, self-organized criticality, punctuated equilibrium and fitness landscapes” (3).
Fitness: how well does a system deal with complexity? All systems are on a range from highly unstable to highly stable, where fitness is located in the middle.
Coevolution: Everything evolves together, and the more connections that there are, the more difficult it is to understand what is happening.
Emergence: Macro complexity arising from micro complexity.
Agent-Based Systems: Systems where emergence comes from the behavior of individual units.
Self-Organization: The system organizes to create fitness.
Self-Organized Criticality: Claimed to not be essential to complexity theory, but posits a system that exists directly between order and chaos, where it can slip into chaos quicly.
Punctuated Equilibrium: Tipping points, where extinctions happen, mutations etc.
Fitness Landscapes: Fitness of different groups as they coevolve. Thus, the fitness of one group can be negatively or positively impacted by actions taken by another group.
The paper argues that certain countries demonstrate high levels of fitness, as can be seen in HDI scores. Other countries had lower levels of fitness. These countries had different histories from the countries experiencing high levels of fitness, and dealt with minority groups less well. Self-organization takes in democratic politics, market economies and the media. Coevolution explains that countries close to the West evolve with them. Emergence is seen in agreements and regional groups. Agent-Based systems in the fit groups, agents are free. Self-organized Criticality: some countries might not be as stable as they appear! Punctuated equilibrium: don’t expect steady progress. Fitness Landscapes: it might be possible to say something here, maybe not.
“The fundamental insight of complexity theory is its prediction that fitness will be found along the middle range of a spectrum ranging from rigid order to the other extreme—chaos. This insight helps explain why Central Asia is frozen in time, why the Caucasus explodes and why Russia resorts to an iron fist to overcome chaos” (10).
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Easton: An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems
Easton, David. 1957. “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems.” World Politics 9(3) (April): 383-400.
List of attributes of a political system:
1. Properties of identification
a. Units of a political system
b. Boundaries: “Without pausing to argue the matter, I would suggest that it is useful to conceive of a political system as having a boundary in the same sense as a physical system. The boundary of a political system is defined by all those actions more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for a society; every social action that does not partake of this characteristic will be excluded from the system and thereby will automatically be viewed as an external variable in the environment” (385).
2. Inputs and outputs. “Presumably, if we select political systems for special study, we do so because we believe that they have characteristically important consequences for society, namely, authoritative decisions. These consequences I shall call the outputs” (385).
3. Differentiation within a system
4. Integration of a system
List of attributes of a political system:
1. Properties of identification
a. Units of a political system
b. Boundaries: “Without pausing to argue the matter, I would suggest that it is useful to conceive of a political system as having a boundary in the same sense as a physical system. The boundary of a political system is defined by all those actions more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for a society; every social action that does not partake of this characteristic will be excluded from the system and thereby will automatically be viewed as an external variable in the environment” (385).
2. Inputs and outputs. “Presumably, if we select political systems for special study, we do so because we believe that they have characteristically important consequences for society, namely, authoritative decisions. These consequences I shall call the outputs” (385).
3. Differentiation within a system
4. Integration of a system
Thursday, February 18, 2010
Weltman: Systems Theory in International Relations
Weltman, John J. 1973. Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.
“The best-known application of this approach to international relations is embodies in Morton A. Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics. Building on Kaplan’s framework and modifying it to suit their own purposes, other authors have employed systems theory in many studies. …We propose to analyze in this work the utility of this body of thought as a vehicle by which knowledge relating to the field of international relations may be advanced” (1). Utility will be defined as the explanatory power of the theory.
Kaplan’s definition of systems approach to IR: “A system of action is a set of variables so related, in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of the variables to each other and the external relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables” (3).
“Through the use of this concept it is possible to describe the state of the system, and to delineate the requirements for its continue dexistance. Processes contributing to these requirements are functional. The system is by definition in equilibrium. The regularities observable in its operation provide the limits of the equilibrium. A disequilibrium indicates the dissolution of the system; with the ordered pattern of interaction previously defining it no longer operative, the system can no longer be distinguished from its environment” (3).
Discussion of feedback, a term drawn from cybernetics (4).
“Marion J. Levy’s definition of Structure, as cited in Weltman: “The term structure as used here means a pattern, i.e., an observable uniformity ,of action or operation” (4) The definition of function: “The term function…is defined here as a condition, or state of affairs, resultant from the operation…of a structure through time” (4).
Martindale quote on holism and elementarism in Weltman: “Holism is the view tha the basic social reality consists of interrelated wholes which are superior to the individual and his acts…One cannot of course have a whole without parts, but the whole is prior to the parts in the sense that its operations are irreducible to these parts and their properties. Elementarism is the view that the basic social reality is constituted by individuals and their acts. Social events consist solely in their interaction. Any notion that interaction possesses new or emergent properties such that some sort of whole with irreducible properties of its own arises is a pure product of reification” (5).
There is a discussion of “sociological functionalism” with many references to “self sufficiency” “system maintaining” “system determined” (6-7).
In summarizing Merton: “Function is defined as an equilibrium-conducing operation” (7).
“But precisely what is the nature of this system called political? Easton answers this question by referring to what can only be called the function of the political within the larger context of the social system or society. The political system stems from and fulfills a need of the social system. Without fulfillment of this function of ‘authoritative allocation of values,’ a society cannot exist” (9).
The discussion moves from sociological functional theories to general systems theory, its structure, and ability to produce hypotheses of use. General Systems Theory is an attempt to create the language of a methodological approach that can be used across scientific fields.
“The view of reality lying behind the more ambitious formulations of the utility of general systems theory can be neither proved nor disproved; it can only be stated. It is basically a metaphysical scheme which seeks to find in reality an ultimate orderliness above and beyond the ken of normal scientific methods of verification. Systems theory in the study of international relations is a mode of analysis growing out of, and conditioned by, two pervasive currents of thought—functional sociology and general systems theory. These modes of thought do exhibit certain points of common concern. They are both essentially holistic; each would find more in the whole than the sum of its parts. They approach this point of common concern, whoever, by different, and one might say complementary, routes. The functional sociologists are more concerned with activity than with the entity within which this activity occurs, to which it is related, and in terms of which it is assessed. The whole often appears as a residual, whose definition is important less for operational utility than for logical completeness. What is secondary for functional sociology is primary in general systems theory. The nature of the entity within which activity occurs is paramount, often to the exclusion of direct concern with the concrete activity itself” (14).
“Given the non-operational or tautological nature of the bulk of the ‘essential rules’ of his systems, it follows that Kaplan’s conclusions concerning systemic stability and transformation are not compelling. Too often these statements refer merely to end results of processes…We are left with little to enable us to predict in concrete circumstances which one among several possible transformations will occur…Conclusions as to stability or transformation—if they are not make indeterminate as above—turn on hypotheses as to international relations which are not made an explicit part of the systems analysis. It is possible to trace through Kaplan’s work a series of assumptions of this sort, which, rather than systemic analysis, provide the basis from which his conclusions follow. Thus Kaplan assumes rather than demonstrates a tendency toward instability as the state structure approaches bipolarity” (34).
The next book explored is Haas and Beyond the Nation-State. The same criterion are used to judge the use of the theory.
“It should of course be obvious that this analysis too could easily be formulated without the intrusion of the concepts of systems theory…That third parties find their positions enhanced by the occurrence of conflict between others is a commonplace of the folk wisdom of political thought…Haas has attempted to rework the systems approach so as to eliminate the occurrence of causal statements purporting to explain phenomena by reference to an attribute of the system. This he has attempted to do by introducing his ‘concrete, actor-oriented’ system. Unfortunately, by doing away with the type of explanation mentioned, he has left us with little but an undifferentiated mass of data. It is only by introducing criteria of importance and behavioral assumptions which are systemic and autonomous that this data can be made to yield explanations and interpretations. At best the conceptualizations of systems theory become simply redundant in this process. At worst the approach can serve to absolutize arbitrary interpretations by concealing their origins, and to lend seeming objectivity to mere value preferences. Furthermore, Haas is unable to demonstrate the necessity of the systems approach in arriving at his substantive conclusions or in making predictions” (47-8).
Next is Rosecrance and his Action and Reaction in World Politics. “Rosecrance’s analysis falls into three parts. First there is a series of historical essays describing nine periods of international politics…Next, these nine periods are translated into nine international systems. On the basis of this systemic analysis Rosecrance then explains the mutations of international politics in terms of the interactions of four factors whose influence in the present day he assesses” (49).
“The conclusions Rosecrance derives, supposedly through the vehicle of systemic analysis, are simply the themes of his historical analysis in slightly different form…Thus, the distinction between stable and unstable historical periods is correlated in most instances simply with the presence or absence of international war; and historical analyses in terms of a regulative mechanism often strike the reader as serving no useful purpose furthering explanation of the materials at hand” (60).
Chapter 6 is highly germane for my work. It is on balance of power in the international system and the stability.
“It may be that systems theory should not be regarded as an explanatory scheme, but only as a suggestive device. It does not serve to verify hypotheses, but merely to provide them. It should be understood, then, primarily as a sort of bank of ideas and novel interpretations” (79). However, we have plenty of hypotheses, and what we need is a way to solve them. “The systems approach, then, seems to ahev little utility either as an explanatory scheme or a suggestive device” (79).
“The best-known application of this approach to international relations is embodies in Morton A. Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics. Building on Kaplan’s framework and modifying it to suit their own purposes, other authors have employed systems theory in many studies. …We propose to analyze in this work the utility of this body of thought as a vehicle by which knowledge relating to the field of international relations may be advanced” (1). Utility will be defined as the explanatory power of the theory.
Kaplan’s definition of systems approach to IR: “A system of action is a set of variables so related, in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of the variables to each other and the external relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables” (3).
“Through the use of this concept it is possible to describe the state of the system, and to delineate the requirements for its continue dexistance. Processes contributing to these requirements are functional. The system is by definition in equilibrium. The regularities observable in its operation provide the limits of the equilibrium. A disequilibrium indicates the dissolution of the system; with the ordered pattern of interaction previously defining it no longer operative, the system can no longer be distinguished from its environment” (3).
Discussion of feedback, a term drawn from cybernetics (4).
“Marion J. Levy’s definition of Structure, as cited in Weltman: “The term structure as used here means a pattern, i.e., an observable uniformity ,of action or operation” (4) The definition of function: “The term function…is defined here as a condition, or state of affairs, resultant from the operation…of a structure through time” (4).
Martindale quote on holism and elementarism in Weltman: “Holism is the view tha the basic social reality consists of interrelated wholes which are superior to the individual and his acts…One cannot of course have a whole without parts, but the whole is prior to the parts in the sense that its operations are irreducible to these parts and their properties. Elementarism is the view that the basic social reality is constituted by individuals and their acts. Social events consist solely in their interaction. Any notion that interaction possesses new or emergent properties such that some sort of whole with irreducible properties of its own arises is a pure product of reification” (5).
There is a discussion of “sociological functionalism” with many references to “self sufficiency” “system maintaining” “system determined” (6-7).
In summarizing Merton: “Function is defined as an equilibrium-conducing operation” (7).
“But precisely what is the nature of this system called political? Easton answers this question by referring to what can only be called the function of the political within the larger context of the social system or society. The political system stems from and fulfills a need of the social system. Without fulfillment of this function of ‘authoritative allocation of values,’ a society cannot exist” (9).
The discussion moves from sociological functional theories to general systems theory, its structure, and ability to produce hypotheses of use. General Systems Theory is an attempt to create the language of a methodological approach that can be used across scientific fields.
“The view of reality lying behind the more ambitious formulations of the utility of general systems theory can be neither proved nor disproved; it can only be stated. It is basically a metaphysical scheme which seeks to find in reality an ultimate orderliness above and beyond the ken of normal scientific methods of verification. Systems theory in the study of international relations is a mode of analysis growing out of, and conditioned by, two pervasive currents of thought—functional sociology and general systems theory. These modes of thought do exhibit certain points of common concern. They are both essentially holistic; each would find more in the whole than the sum of its parts. They approach this point of common concern, whoever, by different, and one might say complementary, routes. The functional sociologists are more concerned with activity than with the entity within which this activity occurs, to which it is related, and in terms of which it is assessed. The whole often appears as a residual, whose definition is important less for operational utility than for logical completeness. What is secondary for functional sociology is primary in general systems theory. The nature of the entity within which activity occurs is paramount, often to the exclusion of direct concern with the concrete activity itself” (14).
“Given the non-operational or tautological nature of the bulk of the ‘essential rules’ of his systems, it follows that Kaplan’s conclusions concerning systemic stability and transformation are not compelling. Too often these statements refer merely to end results of processes…We are left with little to enable us to predict in concrete circumstances which one among several possible transformations will occur…Conclusions as to stability or transformation—if they are not make indeterminate as above—turn on hypotheses as to international relations which are not made an explicit part of the systems analysis. It is possible to trace through Kaplan’s work a series of assumptions of this sort, which, rather than systemic analysis, provide the basis from which his conclusions follow. Thus Kaplan assumes rather than demonstrates a tendency toward instability as the state structure approaches bipolarity” (34).
The next book explored is Haas and Beyond the Nation-State. The same criterion are used to judge the use of the theory.
“It should of course be obvious that this analysis too could easily be formulated without the intrusion of the concepts of systems theory…That third parties find their positions enhanced by the occurrence of conflict between others is a commonplace of the folk wisdom of political thought…Haas has attempted to rework the systems approach so as to eliminate the occurrence of causal statements purporting to explain phenomena by reference to an attribute of the system. This he has attempted to do by introducing his ‘concrete, actor-oriented’ system. Unfortunately, by doing away with the type of explanation mentioned, he has left us with little but an undifferentiated mass of data. It is only by introducing criteria of importance and behavioral assumptions which are systemic and autonomous that this data can be made to yield explanations and interpretations. At best the conceptualizations of systems theory become simply redundant in this process. At worst the approach can serve to absolutize arbitrary interpretations by concealing their origins, and to lend seeming objectivity to mere value preferences. Furthermore, Haas is unable to demonstrate the necessity of the systems approach in arriving at his substantive conclusions or in making predictions” (47-8).
Next is Rosecrance and his Action and Reaction in World Politics. “Rosecrance’s analysis falls into three parts. First there is a series of historical essays describing nine periods of international politics…Next, these nine periods are translated into nine international systems. On the basis of this systemic analysis Rosecrance then explains the mutations of international politics in terms of the interactions of four factors whose influence in the present day he assesses” (49).
“The conclusions Rosecrance derives, supposedly through the vehicle of systemic analysis, are simply the themes of his historical analysis in slightly different form…Thus, the distinction between stable and unstable historical periods is correlated in most instances simply with the presence or absence of international war; and historical analyses in terms of a regulative mechanism often strike the reader as serving no useful purpose furthering explanation of the materials at hand” (60).
Chapter 6 is highly germane for my work. It is on balance of power in the international system and the stability.
“It may be that systems theory should not be regarded as an explanatory scheme, but only as a suggestive device. It does not serve to verify hypotheses, but merely to provide them. It should be understood, then, primarily as a sort of bank of ideas and novel interpretations” (79). However, we have plenty of hypotheses, and what we need is a way to solve them. “The systems approach, then, seems to ahev little utility either as an explanatory scheme or a suggestive device” (79).
Monday, January 25, 2010
Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict
Anon. 1999. Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict. London: Zed Books.
Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict
Lots of good things, especially chapter 5.
Chapter 1:
The standard account of conflict in Africa can be broken down into arguments about either blood or babies. By that, the author indicates conflict over either resources or ethnic tensions;. The author believes that these explanations are not as adequately descriptive as they could be. These explanations are not nuance3d, and much more is brought to bear on the cause of African conflict.
There is a very good overview of the history of the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis. The origins of this conflict is largely related to political situations (Belgium initially preferred the Tutsis, as they were more “European” looking, then preferred the Hutus. The Hutus then gained power, and, when there was the potential for power sharing situations, they quickly took out their frustrations on the Tutsis, eventually leading to genocide when the Hutu president’s plane was shot down.)
Models of agricultural production are also not adequately nuanced and do not take into perspective other options for production, such as organic production that does not overly rely on pesticides, etc. The future needs of global agricultural production are typically prescribed technocratic, top-down solutions, which are not sustainable.
Chapter 2:
There is a typology for African conflict:
1. Banditry
2. National conflict over Political Power
3. Regional conflict over domestic political power
4. Local conflict over renewable resources
The causes of increased violence in Africa are mai8nly Western. Tradi8tional differences between ethnic groups involved violent conflict, but not on the scale that mo9der weaponry affords. . Other causes include the lack of specialization within African countries relating to agricultural or economic production; the economies need to be3 more diversified. Explanations for the cause of conflict typically involve crass claims about e3thnic groups, and do not fully deal with the importance of resources.
Chapter 5:
“A basic assumption of this chapter is that under certain conditions environmental degradation may cause violent conflict or war” (76).
“It is important to note the twin biases in the debate on environmental conflicts among scholars and experts. The first I call ‘the discovery of a new issue’ bias: whenever a new issue emerges, there is a tendency to ignore history. This leads to rather alarming statements about future events such as ‘water wars…The second bias is ‘environmental determinism’, which tends to overestimate the significance of geographical structures, demographic data and resource dependence at the expense of cultural, socioeconomic and political capacities or shortcomings, respectively, in order to deal with environmental degradation as well as discrimination…This chapter does not set out to provide an exhaustive survey of the growing literature dealing with environmental security in one form or another…It concentrates instead on: (1) an early contribution that conceptualized well the interrelationship between environmental transformation, underdevelopment and socio-political conflict…; (2) recent studies which focus on resource scarcity and environmental degradation as a major security issue or as a trigger of various types of serious conflicts” (77).
Then reviews different paths to conflict through environmental scarcity. Of particular use would be the review of three authors and their takes on the link (88). Wallensteen (92), Homer-Dixon (91, 94) and Baechler et al (96) are explored.
Overall, a very useful chapter.
Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict
Lots of good things, especially chapter 5.
Chapter 1:
The standard account of conflict in Africa can be broken down into arguments about either blood or babies. By that, the author indicates conflict over either resources or ethnic tensions;. The author believes that these explanations are not as adequately descriptive as they could be. These explanations are not nuance3d, and much more is brought to bear on the cause of African conflict.
There is a very good overview of the history of the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis. The origins of this conflict is largely related to political situations (Belgium initially preferred the Tutsis, as they were more “European” looking, then preferred the Hutus. The Hutus then gained power, and, when there was the potential for power sharing situations, they quickly took out their frustrations on the Tutsis, eventually leading to genocide when the Hutu president’s plane was shot down.)
Models of agricultural production are also not adequately nuanced and do not take into perspective other options for production, such as organic production that does not overly rely on pesticides, etc. The future needs of global agricultural production are typically prescribed technocratic, top-down solutions, which are not sustainable.
Chapter 2:
There is a typology for African conflict:
1. Banditry
2. National conflict over Political Power
3. Regional conflict over domestic political power
4. Local conflict over renewable resources
The causes of increased violence in Africa are mai8nly Western. Tradi8tional differences between ethnic groups involved violent conflict, but not on the scale that mo9der weaponry affords. . Other causes include the lack of specialization within African countries relating to agricultural or economic production; the economies need to be3 more diversified. Explanations for the cause of conflict typically involve crass claims about e3thnic groups, and do not fully deal with the importance of resources.
Chapter 5:
“A basic assumption of this chapter is that under certain conditions environmental degradation may cause violent conflict or war” (76).
“It is important to note the twin biases in the debate on environmental conflicts among scholars and experts. The first I call ‘the discovery of a new issue’ bias: whenever a new issue emerges, there is a tendency to ignore history. This leads to rather alarming statements about future events such as ‘water wars…The second bias is ‘environmental determinism’, which tends to overestimate the significance of geographical structures, demographic data and resource dependence at the expense of cultural, socioeconomic and political capacities or shortcomings, respectively, in order to deal with environmental degradation as well as discrimination…This chapter does not set out to provide an exhaustive survey of the growing literature dealing with environmental security in one form or another…It concentrates instead on: (1) an early contribution that conceptualized well the interrelationship between environmental transformation, underdevelopment and socio-political conflict…; (2) recent studies which focus on resource scarcity and environmental degradation as a major security issue or as a trigger of various types of serious conflicts” (77).
Then reviews different paths to conflict through environmental scarcity. Of particular use would be the review of three authors and their takes on the link (88). Wallensteen (92), Homer-Dixon (91, 94) and Baechler et al (96) are explored.
Overall, a very useful chapter.
Climate Change and Energy Insecurity
Anon. 2009. Climate Change and Energy Insecurity: The Challenge for Peace, Security and Development. London: Earthscan.
Edited volume of short chapters dealing with many aspects of climate change, clearly not just with energy insecurity.
Some chapters that may have limited use:
Oil: How Can Europe Kick the Habit of Dependence?
Derek Osborn
“Two critical factors will shape the future of oil production and consumption over the next decades. The first is accelerating climate change. The second is the increasing difficulty in finding secure sources of oil in the world. The interaction of these two factors is currently leading the world into a more and more unstable position” (18).
Localized Energy Conflicts in the Oil Sector
Nniimmo Bassey
Oil corrupts already corrupted states. Energy conflicts are not local, but are global (50). What about national peak oils, not just global peak oil (51).
Climate of Fear: Environment, Migration and Security
Devyani Gupta
This is a problem.
Edited volume of short chapters dealing with many aspects of climate change, clearly not just with energy insecurity.
Some chapters that may have limited use:
Oil: How Can Europe Kick the Habit of Dependence?
Derek Osborn
“Two critical factors will shape the future of oil production and consumption over the next decades. The first is accelerating climate change. The second is the increasing difficulty in finding secure sources of oil in the world. The interaction of these two factors is currently leading the world into a more and more unstable position” (18).
Localized Energy Conflicts in the Oil Sector
Nniimmo Bassey
Oil corrupts already corrupted states. Energy conflicts are not local, but are global (50). What about national peak oils, not just global peak oil (51).
Climate of Fear: Environment, Migration and Security
Devyani Gupta
This is a problem.
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Stott: Climate Change, Poverty and War
Stott, R. 2007. “Climate change, poverty and war.” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 100(9) (9): 399-402. doi:10.1258/jrsm.100.9.399.
This article looks at the Global Commons Institute policy prescription for mitigating the impacts of climate change, referred to as Contraction and Convergence. There is little about the link between climate change and conflict, though there are three citations that indicate that climate change will exacerbate the drivers of conflict.
This article looks at the Global Commons Institute policy prescription for mitigating the impacts of climate change, referred to as Contraction and Convergence. There is little about the link between climate change and conflict, though there are three citations that indicate that climate change will exacerbate the drivers of conflict.
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
OECD: Infrastructure to 2030
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2006. Infrastructure to 2030. Paris: OECD.
”Tomorrow’s infrastructure will demand a much lower spend than today’s fixed line and cellular mobile and will be much quicker to roll out” (53).
“Often overestimated in the past, telecommunications will nevertheless increasingly be viewed as a potential substitute for travel. This could reduce dependencies on vehicles and their fuels and ameliorate the effects of pollution” (54).
“This section briefly reviews the telecommunication infrastructure developments of the past 25 years by examining gfour areas of trends in infrastructure investment:
-past demand and the main drivers
-current state of the infrastructure
-whether past developments in demand will continue
-which trends seem clearly unsustainable” (61).
The publication presents a table over viewing the main drivers of telecommunication demand. Under the “main drivers” of broadband (long-distance, not local loop) demand are “cost and technical (ease of upgrading capacity) for growing international data traffic, especially Internet users after 1996/7 as World Wide Web interface made the Internet popular” (62). It is clear that the roll-out of broadband is very heavily driven by consumer demand.
“The major point here is that there is an underlying force behind the successful developments of recent times. Liberalization has been a significant driver of infrastructure development over the past 25 years since it has allowed the door to open to a new era of multiple infrastructures. Demand-side forces, especially the power of consumers acting on the political balance in government, have produced a revolution in the three key infrastructure drivers of telecommunications:
-…deregulation…
-competition of all kinds…
-new technology…” (64).
What about the future of telecom demand? “With the growing importance of the knowledge-based economy, the demand for telecommunications and its infrastructure will continue to expand well beyond 2030” (68).
“Key factors driving future demand and infrastructure investment” (70).
“-geopolitics;
-security;
-macroeconomy;
-finance;
-demography;
-environment;
-technology;
-governance;
-telecommunications pricing;
-microeconomics—primary consumer basics inflation” (70).
“Projected trends in demand for telecoms and investment to 2030” (78).
“Accessibility = control of access + cost of access + ease of access + ubiquity + speed of rollout” (79).
“In general we can say that the main trend in demand for telecommunications that will drive infrastructure is a massive expansion of demand globally from developin countries, firstly as incomes increase to around the USD 3 000 level. Secondly we can expect take-up for those below this income level, as prices fall” (82).
“In later years, beyond 2015, an increasing component of traffic is expected to be machine-to-machine communications and transactions over the Internet, especially in industrial applications such as supply chain, process control and also in financial transactions for person to machine. An ‘Internet of things’ will grow up. Machine-to-machine communications for industrial and consumer functions and person-to-machine, for instance to make purchases, will be increasingly an everyday event. The impact on infrastructure will be to increase not only the traffic, but the address space required for all the new respondents” (84).
“The telecommunications industry has been notoriously poor at forecasting the take-up of new technologies and services, largely because market forecasts have often been supply driven and technocentric and do not focus on understanding consumers; behavior and their needs—and what they will pay for…A better approach to forecasting is to identify and understand the underlying trends and their drivers, and to take a demand-driven approach. Firstly a more global view of the market is not essential. This perspective provides an understanding that the overall telecommunications market has the potential to grow to three or four times its current size in terms of the number of consumers, by expansion outside the OECD group. This pricing is important and this will be the key stimulant for consumer take-up. A second key finding is that ‘content is not king’; instead it is connectivity that consumers will pay for as their primary m0otivation as this new market opens…Third, wireless technologies are developing rapidly and allowing infrastructure to be rolled out more cost effectively than ever before, offering the promise of connectivity anytime, anywhere, and at even lower prices…” (85).
The issue of infrastructure investment is then explored. It is highlighted that telecom investment, as a percentage of total infrastructure investment, has found its share steadily growing (86).
Private v public investment: “Private sector-led growth in infrastructure investment has revolutionzed access to telecommunications services around the world over the past ten years. For the OECD community we see that deregulation has allowed new pricing regimes, not controlled by the incumbents, and specifically the VoIP market to take off, despite attempts to ban or restrict it in some countries” (88).
“The key growth regions for telecommunications infrastructure, as outlined above, are in developing countries” (88).
There is a discussion of the future mix of technology, and how this relates to current infrastructure constraints (the local loop, for example).
“In consequence it is possible to see the progressive arrival of a new model of infrastructure, heavily influenced by the requirements of the low-cost demands, from developing countries seeking more ‘bits per buck’ for their billions of people in the under USD 3 000 per year income bracket” (101).
“The result may be parallel operation of two infrastructure models globally for at least a decade: a previous OECD model of mixed long distance carrier standards for trunk networking with a legacy of wireline in broadband DSL and CATV cable in the local loop, and at the same time, the simpler two level radio access/fibre long distance model slowly spreading across the world” (103). The mix of this parallel development is explored for different key regions on 110-1.
Cross-infrastructure impacts on transport are explored on 122-5. On health and medicine on 128-9. On the elderly on 130-1. On education on 131-3. On crime on 133-4.
The chapter ends with policy recommendations.
”Tomorrow’s infrastructure will demand a much lower spend than today’s fixed line and cellular mobile and will be much quicker to roll out” (53).
“Often overestimated in the past, telecommunications will nevertheless increasingly be viewed as a potential substitute for travel. This could reduce dependencies on vehicles and their fuels and ameliorate the effects of pollution” (54).
“This section briefly reviews the telecommunication infrastructure developments of the past 25 years by examining gfour areas of trends in infrastructure investment:
-past demand and the main drivers
-current state of the infrastructure
-whether past developments in demand will continue
-which trends seem clearly unsustainable” (61).
The publication presents a table over viewing the main drivers of telecommunication demand. Under the “main drivers” of broadband (long-distance, not local loop) demand are “cost and technical (ease of upgrading capacity) for growing international data traffic, especially Internet users after 1996/7 as World Wide Web interface made the Internet popular” (62). It is clear that the roll-out of broadband is very heavily driven by consumer demand.
“The major point here is that there is an underlying force behind the successful developments of recent times. Liberalization has been a significant driver of infrastructure development over the past 25 years since it has allowed the door to open to a new era of multiple infrastructures. Demand-side forces, especially the power of consumers acting on the political balance in government, have produced a revolution in the three key infrastructure drivers of telecommunications:
-…deregulation…
-competition of all kinds…
-new technology…” (64).
What about the future of telecom demand? “With the growing importance of the knowledge-based economy, the demand for telecommunications and its infrastructure will continue to expand well beyond 2030” (68).
“Key factors driving future demand and infrastructure investment” (70).
“-geopolitics;
-security;
-macroeconomy;
-finance;
-demography;
-environment;
-technology;
-governance;
-telecommunications pricing;
-microeconomics—primary consumer basics inflation” (70).
“Projected trends in demand for telecoms and investment to 2030” (78).
“Accessibility = control of access + cost of access + ease of access + ubiquity + speed of rollout” (79).
“In general we can say that the main trend in demand for telecommunications that will drive infrastructure is a massive expansion of demand globally from developin countries, firstly as incomes increase to around the USD 3 000 level. Secondly we can expect take-up for those below this income level, as prices fall” (82).
“In later years, beyond 2015, an increasing component of traffic is expected to be machine-to-machine communications and transactions over the Internet, especially in industrial applications such as supply chain, process control and also in financial transactions for person to machine. An ‘Internet of things’ will grow up. Machine-to-machine communications for industrial and consumer functions and person-to-machine, for instance to make purchases, will be increasingly an everyday event. The impact on infrastructure will be to increase not only the traffic, but the address space required for all the new respondents” (84).
“The telecommunications industry has been notoriously poor at forecasting the take-up of new technologies and services, largely because market forecasts have often been supply driven and technocentric and do not focus on understanding consumers; behavior and their needs—and what they will pay for…A better approach to forecasting is to identify and understand the underlying trends and their drivers, and to take a demand-driven approach. Firstly a more global view of the market is not essential. This perspective provides an understanding that the overall telecommunications market has the potential to grow to three or four times its current size in terms of the number of consumers, by expansion outside the OECD group. This pricing is important and this will be the key stimulant for consumer take-up. A second key finding is that ‘content is not king’; instead it is connectivity that consumers will pay for as their primary m0otivation as this new market opens…Third, wireless technologies are developing rapidly and allowing infrastructure to be rolled out more cost effectively than ever before, offering the promise of connectivity anytime, anywhere, and at even lower prices…” (85).
The issue of infrastructure investment is then explored. It is highlighted that telecom investment, as a percentage of total infrastructure investment, has found its share steadily growing (86).
Private v public investment: “Private sector-led growth in infrastructure investment has revolutionzed access to telecommunications services around the world over the past ten years. For the OECD community we see that deregulation has allowed new pricing regimes, not controlled by the incumbents, and specifically the VoIP market to take off, despite attempts to ban or restrict it in some countries” (88).
“The key growth regions for telecommunications infrastructure, as outlined above, are in developing countries” (88).
There is a discussion of the future mix of technology, and how this relates to current infrastructure constraints (the local loop, for example).
“In consequence it is possible to see the progressive arrival of a new model of infrastructure, heavily influenced by the requirements of the low-cost demands, from developing countries seeking more ‘bits per buck’ for their billions of people in the under USD 3 000 per year income bracket” (101).
“The result may be parallel operation of two infrastructure models globally for at least a decade: a previous OECD model of mixed long distance carrier standards for trunk networking with a legacy of wireline in broadband DSL and CATV cable in the local loop, and at the same time, the simpler two level radio access/fibre long distance model slowly spreading across the world” (103). The mix of this parallel development is explored for different key regions on 110-1.
Cross-infrastructure impacts on transport are explored on 122-5. On health and medicine on 128-9. On the elderly on 130-1. On education on 131-3. On crime on 133-4.
The chapter ends with policy recommendations.
Monday, January 11, 2010
Stordahl: Long-Term Broadband Technology Forecasting
Stordahl, K. 2004. “Long-term broadband technology forecasting.” Teletronikk 4(4.2004): 13-31.
“This paper gives an overview of the relevant broadband technologies, describes their market positions and possibilities. Diffusion models are used to make long-term broadband forecasts for the Western European residential market. The forecasts are separated for the main broadband technologies…based on market share predictions for each technology. The long-term forecasts are evaluated and compared with other broadband forecasts for the Western Europe market” (13).
There is increasing difficulty to make specific, long-term forecasts of ICT related technologies because
the market has become deregulated.
In order to understand “broadband rollout”, we must have two components: we must first know the overall broadband coverage, and secondly the “take rate”, which is the, “proportion between demand and coverage in an area” (17).
“The long-term broadband forecasts are based on results from techno-economic calculations. The techno-economic calculations evaluate the ‘economic value’, i.e. expressed by net present value or pay back [sic] period of rollout of different broadband technologies. The assessments have been carried out for rollout on a national level and on specific areas like urban, suburban, rural and especially the rest market to examine the potential of the different broadband technologies. The main results from the techno-economic calculations show that it is difficult for new broadband technologies to capture significant market share in areas where cable modem and/or DSL are already deployed” (18).
“Important drivers in the broadband market are of course the applications. The evolution of applications generates continuously higher broadband penetration” (21). Other important drivers are the online content and the government supported programs promoting the technology.
“The broadband forecasts for the different technologies are modeled by beginning with the broadband penetration forecasts developed for the total broadband demand in the Western European residential market. Based on experience from the last few years, diffusion type models have proved to have the best abilities for long-term forecast modeling” (22).
There is a broadband forecast from 2000-2010 for Western Europe, with the inflection point at around 2005-6.
The author then compares broadband forecasts for 7 models.
“This paper gives an overview of the relevant broadband technologies, describes their market positions and possibilities. Diffusion models are used to make long-term broadband forecasts for the Western European residential market. The forecasts are separated for the main broadband technologies…based on market share predictions for each technology. The long-term forecasts are evaluated and compared with other broadband forecasts for the Western Europe market” (13).
There is increasing difficulty to make specific, long-term forecasts of ICT related technologies because
the market has become deregulated.
In order to understand “broadband rollout”, we must have two components: we must first know the overall broadband coverage, and secondly the “take rate”, which is the, “proportion between demand and coverage in an area” (17).
“The long-term broadband forecasts are based on results from techno-economic calculations. The techno-economic calculations evaluate the ‘economic value’, i.e. expressed by net present value or pay back [sic] period of rollout of different broadband technologies. The assessments have been carried out for rollout on a national level and on specific areas like urban, suburban, rural and especially the rest market to examine the potential of the different broadband technologies. The main results from the techno-economic calculations show that it is difficult for new broadband technologies to capture significant market share in areas where cable modem and/or DSL are already deployed” (18).
“Important drivers in the broadband market are of course the applications. The evolution of applications generates continuously higher broadband penetration” (21). Other important drivers are the online content and the government supported programs promoting the technology.
“The broadband forecasts for the different technologies are modeled by beginning with the broadband penetration forecasts developed for the total broadband demand in the Western European residential market. Based on experience from the last few years, diffusion type models have proved to have the best abilities for long-term forecast modeling” (22).
There is a broadband forecast from 2000-2010 for Western Europe, with the inflection point at around 2005-6.
The author then compares broadband forecasts for 7 models.
Fildes and Kumar: Telecommunications Demand Forecasting - A Review
Fildes, Robert, and V. Kumar. “Telecommunications demand forecasting--a review.” International Journal of Forecasting 18(4) (October): 489-522. doi:10.1016/S0169-2070(02)00064-X.
“This paper describes various models that have been used to understand market dynamics. Markets discussed include both established and new: mobile, the internet, and PSTN… Cross-sectional choice models of the mode of accessing the service are discussed along with models for usage in established markets. These models typically include price…differ4entials and use standard econometric methods, focusing on price elasticity estimation. Forecasting accuracy has been neglected. New product models may include additional ‘drivers’ such as aspects of service quality and the attributes of the products themselves. Both choice models of adoption of new products and Bass-type diffusion models have been used in forecasting. Because of the complexity of the ‘drivers’ of the adoption process, the successful modeling of these markets has been limited, not least by inadequate data. Simulation models have been proposed to structure the problems more completely and overcome these inadequacies. Both these classes of model have not been effectively validated, researchers having been content to just propose a new approach without thoroughly testing it against alternatives” (Robert Fildes and V. Kumar, 1).
“The core concept at the heart of most models of telecommunications demand is simple—that expected usage determines access demand and these two in turn determine equipment requirements” (R Fildes and V Kumar 2002).
“In standard models of demand in the PSTN, modeling is though a two stage procedure where usage (quantity in minutes demanded or number of calls) is modeled as a function of price, income and other relevant variables conditional on access while access is modeled through a model of the individual choices made between alternatives. here the dependent variable is categorical and the logit framework, which we discuss later in this section, offers a suitable representation” (R Fildes and V Kumar 2002, 5).
“This paper describes various models that have been used to understand market dynamics. Markets discussed include both established and new: mobile, the internet, and PSTN… Cross-sectional choice models of the mode of accessing the service are discussed along with models for usage in established markets. These models typically include price…differ4entials and use standard econometric methods, focusing on price elasticity estimation. Forecasting accuracy has been neglected. New product models may include additional ‘drivers’ such as aspects of service quality and the attributes of the products themselves. Both choice models of adoption of new products and Bass-type diffusion models have been used in forecasting. Because of the complexity of the ‘drivers’ of the adoption process, the successful modeling of these markets has been limited, not least by inadequate data. Simulation models have been proposed to structure the problems more completely and overcome these inadequacies. Both these classes of model have not been effectively validated, researchers having been content to just propose a new approach without thoroughly testing it against alternatives” (Robert Fildes and V. Kumar, 1).
“The core concept at the heart of most models of telecommunications demand is simple—that expected usage determines access demand and these two in turn determine equipment requirements” (R Fildes and V Kumar 2002).
“In standard models of demand in the PSTN, modeling is though a two stage procedure where usage (quantity in minutes demanded or number of calls) is modeled as a function of price, income and other relevant variables conditional on access while access is modeled through a model of the individual choices made between alternatives. here the dependent variable is categorical and the logit framework, which we discuss later in this section, offers a suitable representation” (R Fildes and V Kumar 2002, 5).
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