Bennett and Stam: A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War

Bennett, DS, and AC Stam. 2000. “A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War.” International Studies Quarterly 44:451-480.

This account explores the expected utility theory of war, a rationalist approach to modeling the interaction of states that stems from the work of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman. In War and Reason, these authors explore the International Interaction Game (IIG), but only on 707 dyads and only for Europe. These authos attempt to expand upon that approach.

“Rational choice applications to war initiation begin with the assumption that states can be modeled as rational actors who make choices about war and peace by assessing the costs and benefits of alternative actions” (452).

“The IIG posits a series of interactive decision paths that lead to a set of eight different possible outcomes for any dyadic relationship at any given moment. Given adequate data, a prediction can be made of the expected outcome in equilibrium from any given interstate dyadic interaction” (452). It is assumed that this model “holds up” against space and time.

“Overall, our results support the prior findings of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman that the game-theoretic predictions of the IIG and the empirical measures developed to test them successfully predict behavior” (477).