Wendt, Alexander. 1987. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” International Organization 41:335-370.
Neorealism and World System Theory (WST) both claim to provide structural accounts of IR. Both have a different understanding of system structure. “Neorealists define international system structures in terms of the observable attributes of their member states…, and as a result, they understand the explanatory role of those structures in individualist terms as constraining the choices of preexisting state actors” (335). “World-system theorists, on the other hand, define international system structures in terms of the fundamental organizing principles of the capitalist world economy which underlie and constitute states, and thus they understand the explanatory role of structures in structuralist terms as generating state actors themselves” (335).
These theories could be critiqued from a number of perspectives, but Wendt chooses to explore the ontological critique: “…neorealism embodies an individualist ontology, while world-system theory embodies a holistic one” (336). “A useful way to capture the nature and implications of this difference is to evaluate the two theories in terms of their underlying assumptions about the relationship of system structures to human agents (336).
“All social scientific theories embody an at least implicit solution to the ‘agent-structure problem,’ which situates agents and social structures in relation to one another” (337).
The Agent-Structure Problem:
“The agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life which underlie most social scientific inquiry: 1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (337-8).
Agent and structure are interdependent, co-constitutive, etc.
There are two issues involved in this debate, one is ontological and the other epistemological. The ontological issues, “…concerns the nature of both agents and structures and, because they are in some way mutually implicating, of their interrelationship” (339). There are three possible responses to the “ontological problem”: individualism, structuralism, and structurationism (339). Neorealists and WST theorists embrace the first two solutions. “The structurationist approach, on the other hand, tries to avoid what I shall argue are the negative consequences of individualism and structuralism by giving agents and structures equal ontological status” (339).
The answer to the ontological issue drives the scientists’ answer to the epistemological problem. “This problem actually raises two epistemological issues. The first is the choice of the form of explanation corresponding respectively to agents and structures…On the other hand, approaches that conceive of human beings as nothing more than complex organisms processing stimuli—such as behaviorism—generate agent-explanations that are more mechanistically causal in form” (339-40).
Reductionism and Reification in International Relations Theory:
Wendt compares neorealism and WST in their conception of structuralism, as well as showing that their approaches are similar and that, “…precludes an explanation of the essential properties of their respective primitive units” (340).
Thorough critique of the nature of neorealist conceptions of international structure affecting its atomized, individualist state without the deployment of a theory of the state.
WST: “Without a recognition of the ontological dependence of system structures on state and class agents, Wallerstein is forced into an explanation of that transition in terms of exogenous shocks and the teleological imperatives of an immanent capitalist mode of production” (348).
“World-system theorists, then, like neorealistis, treat their primitive units, in this case the structure of world system, as given and unprobmeatic. This treatment leads them to separate the operation of system structures from the activities of state and class agents—in other words, to reify system structures in a way which leads to static and even functional explanations of state action” (348).
“I have…attempted to show that…neorealism and world-system theory share a common, underlying approach to the agent-structure problem: they both attempt to make either agents or structures into primitive units, which leaves each equally unable to explain the properties of those units, and therefore to justify its theoretically and explanatory claims about state action” (349).
The implication of all of this is the following: theories need to start somewhere, they need to begin with either agents or structures, but they also need to have a theory for why they begin where they begin. Theories can have “primitive units”, but they should also explain that they are not ontologically prior or from God.
Alternative Approach to the Agent-Structure Problem:
“Structuration theory is a relational solution to the agent-structure problem that conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually constituted or codetermined entities” (350).
Digresses to the debate between rationalists and empiricists.
Implications: “First, scientific realism attempts to make sense of what practicing natural and social scientists in fact do, rather than prescribing on the legitimacy of certain research practices versus others…in contrast to empiricism, scientific realism can make scientific sense of unobservable generative structures, of structures that are irreducible to and generate their elements…Finally, although there are important problems in translating the protocols and discourse of natural scientific practice directly to the social sciences…the basic realist idea that scientific explanation consists in the identification of underlying causal mechanisms rather than in generalizations about observable regularities does apply to the social sciences, and its adoption there would have important implications for the explanation of social action” (354-5).
“Structuraiton theory attempts to preserve the generative and relational aspects of structuralism while taking explicit conceptual and methodological steps to prevent the analytical separation of generative structures fro the self-understandings and practices of human agents to prevent structural reification” (355). It is analytical, and not substantive, about the, “analysis rather than the substance of the social world” (355).
Core of the program: accept unobservable social structures as generative; stress human intentionality and motivation; there is a unification of agents and structures in a “dialectical synthesis”; social and space/time structures are different (356).
Agents and structures can not be seen or determined independently.
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Krasner: Structural Causes and Regime Consequences
Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables.” International Organization 36:185-205.
“International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (185). “As a starting point, regimes have been conceptualized as intervening variables standing between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the other” (185). Krasner raises two questions based on these assumptions: “…what is the relationship between basic causal factors such as power, interest, and values and regimes?...what is the relationship between regimes and related outcomes and behavior?” (185).
Keohane and Nye: “…’sets of governing arrangements’,” “…’networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects’” (186).
Haas: “a regime encompasses a mutually coherent set of procedures, rules, and norms” (186).
Bull: “…’general imperative principles which require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways’” (186).
Keohane: agreements are not regimes.
Jervis: “…’implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest’” (187).
Waltz and Kaplan: “Waltz’s conception of the balance of power, in which states are driven by systemic pressures to repetitive balancing behavior, is not a regime; Kaplan’s conception, in which equilibrium requires commitment to rules that constrain immediate, short-term power maximization…, is a regime” (187).
Hirsch: regime as friendship
“A fundamental distinction must be made between principles and norms on the one hand, and rules and procedures on the other” (187). “Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes” (187). “Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself” (188). “If the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened” (189). “in sum, change within a regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, but not of norms or principles; change of a regime involves alteration of norms and principles; and weakening of a regime involves incoherence among the components of the regime or inconsistency between the regime and related behavior” (189).
Do regimes matter?: “It would take some courage, perhaps more courage than this editor possesses, to answer this question in the negative” (189).
Three points of view as to how regimes matter: “The conventional structural views the regime concept as useless, it not misleading. Modified structural suggests that regimes may matter, but only under fairly restrictive conditions. And Grotian sees regimes as much more pervasive, as inherent attributes of any complex, persistent pattern of human behavior” (190).
Susan Strange represents the conventional structural view.
Keohane and Stein represent the modified structural view.
Hopkins, Puchala and Young represent the Grotian view.
“Regimes are much more easily encompassed by a Grotian worldview. But, as the arguments made by Jervis, Keohane, Stein, Lipson, and Cohen indicate, the concept is not precluded by a realist perspective. The issue si not so much whether one accepts the possibility of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures affecting outcomes and behavior, as what one’s basic assumption is about the normal state of international affairs…Adherents of a structural realist orientation see regimes as a phenomenon whose presence cannot be assumed and whose existence requires careful explanation…From a realist perspective, regimes are phenomena that need to be explained; from a Grotian perspective, they are data to be described” (194).
What created regimes?
-egoistic self-interest: in this volume, Stein and Keohane represent this perspective: one uses game theory, the other microeconomics.
-political power: Two different perspectives: 1.) cosmopolitian/instrumental power: “power is used to secure optimal outcomes for the system as a whole” (197); 2.) particularistic/consummatory: “power is used to enhance the values of specific actors within the system” (197).
-norms and principles: “…norms and principles that influence the regime in a particular issue-area but are not directly related to that issue-area can also be regarded as explanations for the creation, persistence, and dissipation of regimes” (200).
-usage and custom: “Usage refers to regular patterns of behavior based on actual practice; custom, to long-standing practice” (202).
-knowledge: pervasive knowledge can establish regimes (quarantine, for example).
“International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (185). “As a starting point, regimes have been conceptualized as intervening variables standing between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the other” (185). Krasner raises two questions based on these assumptions: “…what is the relationship between basic causal factors such as power, interest, and values and regimes?...what is the relationship between regimes and related outcomes and behavior?” (185).
Keohane and Nye: “…’sets of governing arrangements’,” “…’networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects’” (186).
Haas: “a regime encompasses a mutually coherent set of procedures, rules, and norms” (186).
Bull: “…’general imperative principles which require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways’” (186).
Keohane: agreements are not regimes.
Jervis: “…’implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest’” (187).
Waltz and Kaplan: “Waltz’s conception of the balance of power, in which states are driven by systemic pressures to repetitive balancing behavior, is not a regime; Kaplan’s conception, in which equilibrium requires commitment to rules that constrain immediate, short-term power maximization…, is a regime” (187).
Hirsch: regime as friendship
“A fundamental distinction must be made between principles and norms on the one hand, and rules and procedures on the other” (187). “Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes” (187). “Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself” (188). “If the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened” (189). “in sum, change within a regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, but not of norms or principles; change of a regime involves alteration of norms and principles; and weakening of a regime involves incoherence among the components of the regime or inconsistency between the regime and related behavior” (189).
Do regimes matter?: “It would take some courage, perhaps more courage than this editor possesses, to answer this question in the negative” (189).
Three points of view as to how regimes matter: “The conventional structural views the regime concept as useless, it not misleading. Modified structural suggests that regimes may matter, but only under fairly restrictive conditions. And Grotian sees regimes as much more pervasive, as inherent attributes of any complex, persistent pattern of human behavior” (190).
Susan Strange represents the conventional structural view.
Keohane and Stein represent the modified structural view.
Hopkins, Puchala and Young represent the Grotian view.
“Regimes are much more easily encompassed by a Grotian worldview. But, as the arguments made by Jervis, Keohane, Stein, Lipson, and Cohen indicate, the concept is not precluded by a realist perspective. The issue si not so much whether one accepts the possibility of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures affecting outcomes and behavior, as what one’s basic assumption is about the normal state of international affairs…Adherents of a structural realist orientation see regimes as a phenomenon whose presence cannot be assumed and whose existence requires careful explanation…From a realist perspective, regimes are phenomena that need to be explained; from a Grotian perspective, they are data to be described” (194).
What created regimes?
-egoistic self-interest: in this volume, Stein and Keohane represent this perspective: one uses game theory, the other microeconomics.
-political power: Two different perspectives: 1.) cosmopolitian/instrumental power: “power is used to secure optimal outcomes for the system as a whole” (197); 2.) particularistic/consummatory: “power is used to enhance the values of specific actors within the system” (197).
-norms and principles: “…norms and principles that influence the regime in a particular issue-area but are not directly related to that issue-area can also be regarded as explanations for the creation, persistence, and dissipation of regimes” (200).
-usage and custom: “Usage refers to regular patterns of behavior based on actual practice; custom, to long-standing practice” (202).
-knowledge: pervasive knowledge can establish regimes (quarantine, for example).
Reus-Smit: Constructivism
Reus-Smit, C. 2005. “Constructivism.” Theories of international relations.
Throughout the 80’s, there were two debates: between neorealists and neoliberals and between critical theorists and rationalists. Constructivism became a third node in these debates. “Constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action, and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures” (209).
The chapter then traces the rise of realism by positioning Waltz as a decisive voice giving rise to the distinction between neo and structural realism. Then, moving through dissenting voices like Keohane writing in After Hegemony, where he crucially agrees with realists on the following: importance of anarchy, state centered action and state self interest.
“The debate between neo-realists and neoliberals is often characterized as a debate between those who think states are preoccupied with relative gains versus those who think states are more interested in absolute gains” (212).
Rationalist theories: “First, political actors…are assumed to be atomistic, self-interested and rational” (213). “And they are rational, capable of establishing the most effective and efficient way to realize their interests within the environmental constraints they encounter” (213). “Second, and following from the above, actors interests are assumed to be exogenous to social interaction. Individuals and states are thought to enter social relations with their interests already formed” (213). “Third…society is understood as a strategic realm, a realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their pre-defined interests” (213).
Reus-smit calls the debate between realists and liberals a “rationalist family feud” (214).
The rise of Constructivism:
Price and Reus-smit argue that Constructivism should be identified with the growth of critical theory. “The rise of constructivisim was prompted by four factors. First, motivated by an attempt to reassert the preeminence of their own conceptions of theory and world politics, leading rationalists challenged critical theorists to move beyond theoretical critique to the substantivec analysis of international relations. While prominent critical theorists condemned the motives behind this challenge, constructivists saw it as an opportunity to demonstrate the heuristic power of non-rationalist perspectives. Second, the end of the Cold War undermined the explanatory pretensions of neo-relaist and neoliberals, neither or which had predicted, nor could adequately comprehend, the systemic transformations reshaping the gtlobal order…Third, by the beginning of the 1990s a new generation of young scholars had emerged who embraced many of the propositions of critical international theory, but who saw potential for innovation in conceptual elaboration and empirically-informed theoretical development…Finally, the advance of the new constructivist perspective was aided by the enthusiasm that mainstream scholars, frustrated by the analytical failings of the dominant realist theories, showed in embracing the new perspective, moving it from the margins to the mainstream of theoretical debate” (216).
Constructivists divided between modernists and post-modernists.
Ideational structures just as important as material structures.
Identities inform interests and actions.
Agents and structures are mutually constituted.
Contrast between constructivism and rationalism: atomistic actor v. social actor; endogenous v. exogenous interests; society as strategic realm or constitutive realm.
Three kinds of Constructivism have emerged: systemic, unit-level and holistic. The first ignores domestic politics and theorises about the interaction of states. Wendt is a systemic constructivist. Unit-level construcitivsm focuses on the units. Katzenstein is a good example of this. “Setting out to explain why two states, with common experiences of military defeat, foreign occupation, economic development, transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and nascent great power status, have adopted very different internal and external national security policies, Katzenstein stresses the importance of institutionalised regulatory and constitutive national social and legal norms” (220). Holist constructivists try to bridge the divide between unit-level constructivism and systemic constructivism. This has brought about two foci: grand shifts in the international system and another focusing on recent changes. The first can be seen through Ruggie’s work exploring the transition from feudal to modern sovereignty. The later can be seen in Kratochwil’s writing on the end of the Cold War (220).
“The rise of constructivism heralds a return to a more sociological, historical and practice-oriented form of international relations scholarship” (227).
Throughout the 80’s, there were two debates: between neorealists and neoliberals and between critical theorists and rationalists. Constructivism became a third node in these debates. “Constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action, and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures” (209).
The chapter then traces the rise of realism by positioning Waltz as a decisive voice giving rise to the distinction between neo and structural realism. Then, moving through dissenting voices like Keohane writing in After Hegemony, where he crucially agrees with realists on the following: importance of anarchy, state centered action and state self interest.
“The debate between neo-realists and neoliberals is often characterized as a debate between those who think states are preoccupied with relative gains versus those who think states are more interested in absolute gains” (212).
Rationalist theories: “First, political actors…are assumed to be atomistic, self-interested and rational” (213). “And they are rational, capable of establishing the most effective and efficient way to realize their interests within the environmental constraints they encounter” (213). “Second, and following from the above, actors interests are assumed to be exogenous to social interaction. Individuals and states are thought to enter social relations with their interests already formed” (213). “Third…society is understood as a strategic realm, a realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their pre-defined interests” (213).
Reus-smit calls the debate between realists and liberals a “rationalist family feud” (214).
The rise of Constructivism:
Price and Reus-smit argue that Constructivism should be identified with the growth of critical theory. “The rise of constructivisim was prompted by four factors. First, motivated by an attempt to reassert the preeminence of their own conceptions of theory and world politics, leading rationalists challenged critical theorists to move beyond theoretical critique to the substantivec analysis of international relations. While prominent critical theorists condemned the motives behind this challenge, constructivists saw it as an opportunity to demonstrate the heuristic power of non-rationalist perspectives. Second, the end of the Cold War undermined the explanatory pretensions of neo-relaist and neoliberals, neither or which had predicted, nor could adequately comprehend, the systemic transformations reshaping the gtlobal order…Third, by the beginning of the 1990s a new generation of young scholars had emerged who embraced many of the propositions of critical international theory, but who saw potential for innovation in conceptual elaboration and empirically-informed theoretical development…Finally, the advance of the new constructivist perspective was aided by the enthusiasm that mainstream scholars, frustrated by the analytical failings of the dominant realist theories, showed in embracing the new perspective, moving it from the margins to the mainstream of theoretical debate” (216).
Constructivists divided between modernists and post-modernists.
Ideational structures just as important as material structures.
Identities inform interests and actions.
Agents and structures are mutually constituted.
Contrast between constructivism and rationalism: atomistic actor v. social actor; endogenous v. exogenous interests; society as strategic realm or constitutive realm.
Three kinds of Constructivism have emerged: systemic, unit-level and holistic. The first ignores domestic politics and theorises about the interaction of states. Wendt is a systemic constructivist. Unit-level construcitivsm focuses on the units. Katzenstein is a good example of this. “Setting out to explain why two states, with common experiences of military defeat, foreign occupation, economic development, transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and nascent great power status, have adopted very different internal and external national security policies, Katzenstein stresses the importance of institutionalised regulatory and constitutive national social and legal norms” (220). Holist constructivists try to bridge the divide between unit-level constructivism and systemic constructivism. This has brought about two foci: grand shifts in the international system and another focusing on recent changes. The first can be seen through Ruggie’s work exploring the transition from feudal to modern sovereignty. The later can be seen in Kratochwil’s writing on the end of the Cold War (220).
“The rise of constructivism heralds a return to a more sociological, historical and practice-oriented form of international relations scholarship” (227).
Devetak: Critical Theory
Devetak, R. 1997. “Critical Theory.” Theories of International Relations, Basingstoke 145-178.
“Critical international theory, building especially on the lineage of emancipatory politics extending from Kant via Marx to Habermas, sought to inquire into the possibilities of transforming international relations in order to remove unnecessary constraints on achieving universal freedom and equality” (155). What holds disparate scholars together under the banner of Critical Theory, “…is the idea that the study of international relations should be oriented by an emancipatory politics” (155).
CT came from Kant, Hegel and Marx, it is typically argued. This is not universal, as some argue it goes back to the Greeks, and others that it incorporates Nietzsche and Weber. It is most clearly associated with the Frankfurt school, the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Fromm, Lowenthal, Habermas, etc.
The point is not to look out at the world and say what is, to interpret it, but to change it.
In Cox’s 1981 article, he makes a distinction between problem-solving theories and critical theories. “Problem-solving theories are marked by two main characteristics. First by a positivist methodology; second, by a tendency to legitimize prevailing social and political structures” (160). “Problem-solving theory, as Cox defines it, ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organizes, as the given framework for action” (161).
Critical theory, on the other hand, problematizes prevailing power and knowledge relationships. It does not believe that the re is a world out there that we need to approach, but embraces different starting points that provide for different kinds of inquiry. It embraces “theoretical reflectivity, or, “…a willingness to be open about our philosophical and political starting point and facing the challenge of clarifying ‘how our commitments and values are consistent with our (meta-)theoretical starting points’” (161).
“Critical theory is essentially a critique of the dogmatism it finds in traditional modes of theorizing” (161).
How does one determine ethical positions without an objective market?
“Critical theory’s emancipatory interest is concerned with ‘securing freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness’” (163).
Booth and emancipation: “…’freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do’” (163).
“To conclude this part of the chapter, critical international theory makes a strong case for paying closer attention to the relations between knowledge and interests” (164).
“Informing critical international theory is the spirit, if not the letter, of Marx’s critique of capitalism” (164).
“This section elaborates three dimensions on which critical international theory rethinks political community. The first dimension is the normative and pertains to the philosophical critique of the state as an exclusionary form of political organization. The second is the sociological dimension and relates to the need to develop an account of the origins and evolution of the modern state and states-system. Third is the praxeological dimension concerning practical possibilities for reconstructing international relations along more emancipatory and cosmopolitan lines” (165).
“Critical international theory, building especially on the lineage of emancipatory politics extending from Kant via Marx to Habermas, sought to inquire into the possibilities of transforming international relations in order to remove unnecessary constraints on achieving universal freedom and equality” (155). What holds disparate scholars together under the banner of Critical Theory, “…is the idea that the study of international relations should be oriented by an emancipatory politics” (155).
CT came from Kant, Hegel and Marx, it is typically argued. This is not universal, as some argue it goes back to the Greeks, and others that it incorporates Nietzsche and Weber. It is most clearly associated with the Frankfurt school, the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Fromm, Lowenthal, Habermas, etc.
The point is not to look out at the world and say what is, to interpret it, but to change it.
In Cox’s 1981 article, he makes a distinction between problem-solving theories and critical theories. “Problem-solving theories are marked by two main characteristics. First by a positivist methodology; second, by a tendency to legitimize prevailing social and political structures” (160). “Problem-solving theory, as Cox defines it, ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organizes, as the given framework for action” (161).
Critical theory, on the other hand, problematizes prevailing power and knowledge relationships. It does not believe that the re is a world out there that we need to approach, but embraces different starting points that provide for different kinds of inquiry. It embraces “theoretical reflectivity, or, “…a willingness to be open about our philosophical and political starting point and facing the challenge of clarifying ‘how our commitments and values are consistent with our (meta-)theoretical starting points’” (161).
“Critical theory is essentially a critique of the dogmatism it finds in traditional modes of theorizing” (161).
How does one determine ethical positions without an objective market?
“Critical theory’s emancipatory interest is concerned with ‘securing freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness’” (163).
Booth and emancipation: “…’freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do’” (163).
“To conclude this part of the chapter, critical international theory makes a strong case for paying closer attention to the relations between knowledge and interests” (164).
“Informing critical international theory is the spirit, if not the letter, of Marx’s critique of capitalism” (164).
“This section elaborates three dimensions on which critical international theory rethinks political community. The first dimension is the normative and pertains to the philosophical critique of the state as an exclusionary form of political organization. The second is the sociological dimension and relates to the need to develop an account of the origins and evolution of the modern state and states-system. Third is the praxeological dimension concerning practical possibilities for reconstructing international relations along more emancipatory and cosmopolitan lines” (165).
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
Devetak: Postmodernism
Devetak, R. 1996. “Postmodernism.” Theories of International Relations.
This chapter attempts to present a positive account of post-modernism in IR. It begins by claiming that many see it as a bete noir, but this is because it is just poorly understood. It is also poorly defined from within: many proponents disagree about exactly what postmodernism means.
Power and Knowledge:
The treatment of knowledge is not devoid of political movements, according to post-moderns. This point is most clearly made by Foucault. For Foucault, power and knowledge implied one another, and thus they could never be separated. The scientists’ goal should be to explore the interaction of these two variables, as he did in a variety of books. For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault traced the exertion of power from a pre-modern state to a modern state, from the sovereign’s direct imposition onto the body of the criminal, to the clean, clinical approach to modern incarceration. Examples are drawn from the study of sovereignty and its overdetermined characteristics.
Genealogy:
This is a methodological approach of tracing histories of domination from the “perspective of nowhere”. The point is to decenter the traditional historical tellings of events away from narratives of truth and right and towards a narrative that embraces context and contingency. The work of Nietzsche and Campbell are highlighted.
Textual Strategies:
“The ‘reality’ of power politics (like any social reality) is always already constituted through textuality and inscribed modes of representation” (186). This focus on text-based interpretations of politics presents two questions: “…what is meant by textual interplay?...and…how, by using what methods and strategies, does postmodernism seek to disclose this textual interplay?” (186). The focus on textuality stems from On Grammatology. The world is like a text in the sense that it must be interpreted by subjects for it to be real.
Deconstruction:
This is a method that is meant to disrupt previously “settled” understandings of things (histories, meanings, identities, etc.).
Double Reading:
“Derrida seeks to expose this relationship between stability-effects and destabilizations by passing through two readings in any analysis. As expressed by Derrida, double reading is essentially a duplicitous strategy which is ‘simultaneously faithful and violent’. The first reading is a commentary or repetition of the dominant interpretation…the second, counter-memorializing reading unsettles it by applying pressure to those points of instability within a text, discourse or institution” (187-8).
Violence, boundaries, identity, statecraft, are seen as tools in the making of a sovereign state system. What might ethics say about this situation? Post-modern scholars are interested in and find questions like the above stated to be fruitful areas of inquiry. The discussion of ethics moves to Levinas.
This chapter attempts to present a positive account of post-modernism in IR. It begins by claiming that many see it as a bete noir, but this is because it is just poorly understood. It is also poorly defined from within: many proponents disagree about exactly what postmodernism means.
Power and Knowledge:
The treatment of knowledge is not devoid of political movements, according to post-moderns. This point is most clearly made by Foucault. For Foucault, power and knowledge implied one another, and thus they could never be separated. The scientists’ goal should be to explore the interaction of these two variables, as he did in a variety of books. For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault traced the exertion of power from a pre-modern state to a modern state, from the sovereign’s direct imposition onto the body of the criminal, to the clean, clinical approach to modern incarceration. Examples are drawn from the study of sovereignty and its overdetermined characteristics.
Genealogy:
This is a methodological approach of tracing histories of domination from the “perspective of nowhere”. The point is to decenter the traditional historical tellings of events away from narratives of truth and right and towards a narrative that embraces context and contingency. The work of Nietzsche and Campbell are highlighted.
Textual Strategies:
“The ‘reality’ of power politics (like any social reality) is always already constituted through textuality and inscribed modes of representation” (186). This focus on text-based interpretations of politics presents two questions: “…what is meant by textual interplay?...and…how, by using what methods and strategies, does postmodernism seek to disclose this textual interplay?” (186). The focus on textuality stems from On Grammatology. The world is like a text in the sense that it must be interpreted by subjects for it to be real.
Deconstruction:
This is a method that is meant to disrupt previously “settled” understandings of things (histories, meanings, identities, etc.).
Double Reading:
“Derrida seeks to expose this relationship between stability-effects and destabilizations by passing through two readings in any analysis. As expressed by Derrida, double reading is essentially a duplicitous strategy which is ‘simultaneously faithful and violent’. The first reading is a commentary or repetition of the dominant interpretation…the second, counter-memorializing reading unsettles it by applying pressure to those points of instability within a text, discourse or institution” (187-8).
Violence, boundaries, identity, statecraft, are seen as tools in the making of a sovereign state system. What might ethics say about this situation? Post-modern scholars are interested in and find questions like the above stated to be fruitful areas of inquiry. The discussion of ethics moves to Levinas.
Grieco: Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics
Grieco, JM. 1997. “Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics.” New Thinking in International Relations Theory 163-201.
The claim is that, ever since the publication of Morgenthau’s seminal book in 1948, realism has been the most important school of thought in international relations. “This is because realist theory addresses the key questions in international relations: What are the causes of conflict and war among nations, and what are the conditions for cooperation dn peace among them?” (163). “Precisely because it engages these fundamental international problems, other scholars, seeking to develop alternative analytical approaches to international affairs...have often defined their theoretical perspectives and research programs in large measure through their opposition to one or more elements of realist theory” (163). “In this chapter I present a critical appreciation of realist international theory” (163). “The view put forward in that section is that realism does in fact provide substantial leverage on many aspects of world politics…in the third and final main section of the chapter I identify two serious conceptual ambiguities and tensions in realist theory and offer a discussion of possible lines of analysis that might address these problems and thus allow realist theory to provide a more effective understanding of politics among nations” (164).
Realist Assumptions:
State is the central focus of enquiry. People fight for what they want, against what they do not want in groups. This insight is provided by R. Gilpin. “For realists, the fundamental unit of political organization for the past several centuries ahs been, and at present it is, the nation-state” (164). While there are other international actors, the state is the one that conditions the ability of all others to act.
Anarchy:
“Realism’s second core assumption is that states coexist in a context of international anarchy, that is, the absence of a reliable central authority to which they can appeal for protection or the redress of grievances” (164). States must be self-help agents. They operate in a world where they can never be sure of the intentions of the other agents. This is a world of constant potential conflict and war.
States are rational, autonomous and unitary:
States’ rationality is goal oriented, these goals are consistent and these goals are achieved through the construction of strategies.
Secondly, states are able to pursue the national interest without undue distracting influence from powerful groups domestically.
Finally, states are able to act unitarily and coherently in relation to other countries.
Propositions:
States are Defensive Actors:
Security is the states’ central goal.
States are Defensive Positionalists:
Relative power gains encourage states to be positionally focused. States are interested in maximizing their relative power capabilities and minimizing the gains of others.
State Interest in Independence and Autonomy:
States seek to be free to pursue their defensive positionalism. States seek to be independent and autonomous.
These assumptions and propositions are then explored vis-à-vis historical examples.
Realists have three main clusters of explanations that derive from the above assumptions:
Balancing: “…if the security of independence of some states are threatened by the growth in power of one state or a group of states, the threatened states, according to realist theory, will respond to that challenge by seeking to take actions that mitigate or offset the growth in power of the rising side” (169-70). In contrast, states may bandwagon, but not in the above example.
System Polarity and Stability:
Stability is a product of the amount of poles in the international system. Waltz says that a multipolar system is prone to conflict.
Hypothesized Constraints on Cooperation:
It is not outside of the border of this theory for states to form alliances to fight common enemies. However, there are constraints, like cheating. Also, because the world is self-help, alliances are also difficult to form. Finally, there is a difficulty in cooperating because of the logic of relative gains.
How, then, could cooperation take place? Through a hegemon. For example, Gilpin and Krasner assert that a liberal international order will arise only if there is a state that is strong enough and willing enough to take on that responsibility.
Criticisms:
Change: Realism can not account for international change.
Does not look at the domestic.
(These are both followed by lengthy explanations of possible Realist responses to these criticisms)
Two other issues that may be more problematic, from Grieco’s perspective: The EU.
Secondly: “Does anarchy lead ‘normal’ states to be security or power maximizers, and is there an observable difference between the two goals?” (186).
The claim is that, ever since the publication of Morgenthau’s seminal book in 1948, realism has been the most important school of thought in international relations. “This is because realist theory addresses the key questions in international relations: What are the causes of conflict and war among nations, and what are the conditions for cooperation dn peace among them?” (163). “Precisely because it engages these fundamental international problems, other scholars, seeking to develop alternative analytical approaches to international affairs...have often defined their theoretical perspectives and research programs in large measure through their opposition to one or more elements of realist theory” (163). “In this chapter I present a critical appreciation of realist international theory” (163). “The view put forward in that section is that realism does in fact provide substantial leverage on many aspects of world politics…in the third and final main section of the chapter I identify two serious conceptual ambiguities and tensions in realist theory and offer a discussion of possible lines of analysis that might address these problems and thus allow realist theory to provide a more effective understanding of politics among nations” (164).
Realist Assumptions:
State is the central focus of enquiry. People fight for what they want, against what they do not want in groups. This insight is provided by R. Gilpin. “For realists, the fundamental unit of political organization for the past several centuries ahs been, and at present it is, the nation-state” (164). While there are other international actors, the state is the one that conditions the ability of all others to act.
Anarchy:
“Realism’s second core assumption is that states coexist in a context of international anarchy, that is, the absence of a reliable central authority to which they can appeal for protection or the redress of grievances” (164). States must be self-help agents. They operate in a world where they can never be sure of the intentions of the other agents. This is a world of constant potential conflict and war.
States are rational, autonomous and unitary:
States’ rationality is goal oriented, these goals are consistent and these goals are achieved through the construction of strategies.
Secondly, states are able to pursue the national interest without undue distracting influence from powerful groups domestically.
Finally, states are able to act unitarily and coherently in relation to other countries.
Propositions:
States are Defensive Actors:
Security is the states’ central goal.
States are Defensive Positionalists:
Relative power gains encourage states to be positionally focused. States are interested in maximizing their relative power capabilities and minimizing the gains of others.
State Interest in Independence and Autonomy:
States seek to be free to pursue their defensive positionalism. States seek to be independent and autonomous.
These assumptions and propositions are then explored vis-à-vis historical examples.
Realists have three main clusters of explanations that derive from the above assumptions:
Balancing: “…if the security of independence of some states are threatened by the growth in power of one state or a group of states, the threatened states, according to realist theory, will respond to that challenge by seeking to take actions that mitigate or offset the growth in power of the rising side” (169-70). In contrast, states may bandwagon, but not in the above example.
System Polarity and Stability:
Stability is a product of the amount of poles in the international system. Waltz says that a multipolar system is prone to conflict.
Hypothesized Constraints on Cooperation:
It is not outside of the border of this theory for states to form alliances to fight common enemies. However, there are constraints, like cheating. Also, because the world is self-help, alliances are also difficult to form. Finally, there is a difficulty in cooperating because of the logic of relative gains.
How, then, could cooperation take place? Through a hegemon. For example, Gilpin and Krasner assert that a liberal international order will arise only if there is a state that is strong enough and willing enough to take on that responsibility.
Criticisms:
Change: Realism can not account for international change.
Does not look at the domestic.
(These are both followed by lengthy explanations of possible Realist responses to these criticisms)
Two other issues that may be more problematic, from Grieco’s perspective: The EU.
Secondly: “Does anarchy lead ‘normal’ states to be security or power maximizers, and is there an observable difference between the two goals?” (186).
Morgenthau: Politics among Nations
Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. “Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.” New York.
Six Principles of Political Realism:
1.
“Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure” (4).
“For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts” (4).
Must approach politics through the lenses of rationality and assume that leaders are operating with a certain amount of rational calculus.
2.
“The main signpost that helps poli8tical realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” (5). This is the connection between the rationality of the actors and what they are striving for. “The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible” (5).
Political realism’s rationality is both descriptive and normative. It is rational for states to maximize the cost-benefit analysis that they undertake. It is also something that should happen if they are to survive. This has nothing to do with intentions, as the example of Neville Chamberlain illustrates.
3.
“Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all” (10). “…the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (11). “The same observations apply to the concept of power…Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man” (11).
4.
“Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action” (12). “There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” (12). “Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics” (12).
5.
“Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted…to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purpose of the universe” (13). “…it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them” (13).
6.
“The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound…Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth…” (13).
Realism views things in their nature, not as we would like them to be. They focus “political man” as a power maximizer as other disciplines have their own distinct foci.
Six Principles of Political Realism:
1.
“Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure” (4).
“For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts” (4).
Must approach politics through the lenses of rationality and assume that leaders are operating with a certain amount of rational calculus.
2.
“The main signpost that helps poli8tical realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” (5). This is the connection between the rationality of the actors and what they are striving for. “The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible” (5).
Political realism’s rationality is both descriptive and normative. It is rational for states to maximize the cost-benefit analysis that they undertake. It is also something that should happen if they are to survive. This has nothing to do with intentions, as the example of Neville Chamberlain illustrates.
3.
“Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all” (10). “…the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (11). “The same observations apply to the concept of power…Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man” (11).
4.
“Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action” (12). “There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” (12). “Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics” (12).
5.
“Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted…to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purpose of the universe” (13). “…it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them” (13).
6.
“The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound…Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth…” (13).
Realism views things in their nature, not as we would like them to be. They focus “political man” as a power maximizer as other disciplines have their own distinct foci.
Monday, July 28, 2008
Bennett and Stam: A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War
Bennett, DS, and AC Stam. 2000. “A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War.” International Studies Quarterly 44:451-480.
This account explores the expected utility theory of war, a rationalist approach to modeling the interaction of states that stems from the work of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman. In War and Reason, these authors explore the International Interaction Game (IIG), but only on 707 dyads and only for Europe. These authos attempt to expand upon that approach.
“Rational choice applications to war initiation begin with the assumption that states can be modeled as rational actors who make choices about war and peace by assessing the costs and benefits of alternative actions” (452).
“The IIG posits a series of interactive decision paths that lead to a set of eight different possible outcomes for any dyadic relationship at any given moment. Given adequate data, a prediction can be made of the expected outcome in equilibrium from any given interstate dyadic interaction” (452). It is assumed that this model “holds up” against space and time.
“Overall, our results support the prior findings of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman that the game-theoretic predictions of the IIG and the empirical measures developed to test them successfully predict behavior” (477).
This account explores the expected utility theory of war, a rationalist approach to modeling the interaction of states that stems from the work of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman. In War and Reason, these authors explore the International Interaction Game (IIG), but only on 707 dyads and only for Europe. These authos attempt to expand upon that approach.
“Rational choice applications to war initiation begin with the assumption that states can be modeled as rational actors who make choices about war and peace by assessing the costs and benefits of alternative actions” (452).
“The IIG posits a series of interactive decision paths that lead to a set of eight different possible outcomes for any dyadic relationship at any given moment. Given adequate data, a prediction can be made of the expected outcome in equilibrium from any given interstate dyadic interaction” (452). It is assumed that this model “holds up” against space and time.
“Overall, our results support the prior findings of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman that the game-theoretic predictions of the IIG and the empirical measures developed to test them successfully predict behavior” (477).
Barbieri and Schneider: Globalization and Peace
Barbieri, K, and G Schneider. 1999. “Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 36:387.
This piece explores the connection between globalization, a synonym for economic interdependence, is or is not a driver of peace. The authors claim that this is a disputed topic, and they present a model that shows that increased interdependence in trade can actually promote less peace. “…critics of the ‘trade promotes peace’ hypothesis argue that economic interdependence may have either a negligible or amplifying effect on international conflict” (387).
Four views of the trade/peace debate are presented. These are the same as Barbieri’s earlier piece.
Table I is a very useful overview of a wide variety of works on the trade/conflict debate (391). These are separated into Expected Utility Models, Cooperative Game Models and Non-Cooperative Game Models.
Table II summarizes the empirical studies of the relationship between trade and conflict.
There is not a consensus as to the relationship between trade and conflict. “What are the origins of the contradictory explanations and evidence regarding the impact of trade on interstate relations?...To date, no compelling theoretical rationale has been offered for why empirical findings differ, other than the fact that scholars pursue very different inquiries, with different samples, data, measures or modeling techniques” (399).
This piece explores the connection between globalization, a synonym for economic interdependence, is or is not a driver of peace. The authors claim that this is a disputed topic, and they present a model that shows that increased interdependence in trade can actually promote less peace. “…critics of the ‘trade promotes peace’ hypothesis argue that economic interdependence may have either a negligible or amplifying effect on international conflict” (387).
Four views of the trade/peace debate are presented. These are the same as Barbieri’s earlier piece.
Table I is a very useful overview of a wide variety of works on the trade/conflict debate (391). These are separated into Expected Utility Models, Cooperative Game Models and Non-Cooperative Game Models.
Table II summarizes the empirical studies of the relationship between trade and conflict.
There is not a consensus as to the relationship between trade and conflict. “What are the origins of the contradictory explanations and evidence regarding the impact of trade on interstate relations?...To date, no compelling theoretical rationale has been offered for why empirical findings differ, other than the fact that scholars pursue very different inquiries, with different samples, data, measures or modeling techniques” (399).
Oneal and Russett: Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications
Oneal, JR, and B Russett. 1999. “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 36:423.
This article deals with attacks coming from scholars who claim that trade interdependence does not have pacifying effects. These two claims, specifically from Beck et al. (1998) and Barbieri (1998), address potential effects that were not taken into consideration by the earlier work of Russett and Oneal (and Moaz). The authors find that, by extending the analysis to all dyads, there is not a “relationship between interdependence and peace, but the pacific benefits of trade become evident among the politically relevant dyads (those including a major power, or two contiguous states), among whom the great majority of disputes occur…With these sequential modifications we find increasingly strong support for the liberals’ belief that economic interdependence and democracy have important pacific benefits” (423). “We find no evidence that asymmetric trade increases conflict” (423).
“Beck et al. argue that simple logistic regression analysis is inappropriate for cross-sectional and time-series data because observations are not temporally independent. They suggest a method to correct for this problem and show that, with their technique, the beneficial influence of economic interdependence…becomes statistically insignificant” (423-4). “In this article, we address the concerns of our colleagues by adopting their suggestions for testing liberal theory, although we do not regard all of their proposed procedures as appropriate. Nevertheless, when we adopt their methods, we find that interdependence did significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict during the years 1950-92” (424).
“Beck et al. (1998) propose that researchers using logistic regression remedy temporal dependence in their time-series by creating a variable marks the number of years that have elapsed from the most recent occurrence of a dispute and by generating a spline function of the years of peace” (427).
They use COW data.
“We found that interdependence significantly reduced the likelihood of conflict…among contiguous and major-power pairs” (439).
This article deals with attacks coming from scholars who claim that trade interdependence does not have pacifying effects. These two claims, specifically from Beck et al. (1998) and Barbieri (1998), address potential effects that were not taken into consideration by the earlier work of Russett and Oneal (and Moaz). The authors find that, by extending the analysis to all dyads, there is not a “relationship between interdependence and peace, but the pacific benefits of trade become evident among the politically relevant dyads (those including a major power, or two contiguous states), among whom the great majority of disputes occur…With these sequential modifications we find increasingly strong support for the liberals’ belief that economic interdependence and democracy have important pacific benefits” (423). “We find no evidence that asymmetric trade increases conflict” (423).
“Beck et al. argue that simple logistic regression analysis is inappropriate for cross-sectional and time-series data because observations are not temporally independent. They suggest a method to correct for this problem and show that, with their technique, the beneficial influence of economic interdependence…becomes statistically insignificant” (423-4). “In this article, we address the concerns of our colleagues by adopting their suggestions for testing liberal theory, although we do not regard all of their proposed procedures as appropriate. Nevertheless, when we adopt their methods, we find that interdependence did significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict during the years 1950-92” (424).
“Beck et al. (1998) propose that researchers using logistic regression remedy temporal dependence in their time-series by creating a variable marks the number of years that have elapsed from the most recent occurrence of a dispute and by generating a spline function of the years of peace” (427).
They use COW data.
“We found that interdependence significantly reduced the likelihood of conflict…among contiguous and major-power pairs” (439).
Oneal and Russett: The Classical Liberals were Right
Oneal, JR, and BM Russett. 1997. “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985.” International Studies Quarterly 41:267-294.
(23).
“The liberals believed that economic interdependence, as well as democracy, would reduce the incidence of interstate conflict. In this article, we test both their economic and their political prescriptions for peace, suing pooled-regression analysis of politically relevant dyads for the Cold War era. We find that the pacific benefits of trade, both total and dyadic, have not been sufficiently appreciated” (267).
This article represents an expansion on earlier work by Maoz, Russett and Oneal. This approach is more theoretically grounded in the relationship between regimes and trade affect conflict. It also uses expanded data sets. Finally, it explores the transition from one type of regime to another.
There is a review of the literature beginning with classical liberalism and building towards democratic peace theory. There is a nice overview of democratic peace theory and it would be useful to revisit this article to explore that. The literature review then builds to an account of trade interconnectedness as being a mitigating factor for conflict and how this is not entirely taken into consideration by democratic peace theories, though it should, because it stems naturally from the classic liberalism literature. There have been analyses of the effect of trade interdependence on peace, but the findings have been largely unclear, and there is still a substantial divide between liberal and realist thought on the matter. The direction of causality is also important to take into consideration: before the 19th century, it was not uncommon for nations at war to continue trading. That has since changed, and, if one is not careful to examine the data thoroughly, the decline of trade as a result of conflict could be misinterpreted as being causally connected in different ways.
They use dyads involving at least one great power from the Correlates of War database. They examine the years 1950-85. Use MID data from COW: “A militarized dispute is an international interaction involving threats, displays, or actual uses of military force; it must be explicit, overt, not accidental, and government sanctioned” (273). They have a relatively standard set of independent variables (economic interdependence, democracy, political change, alliances, economic growth, contiguity, etc.).
(23).
“The liberals believed that economic interdependence, as well as democracy, would reduce the incidence of interstate conflict. In this article, we test both their economic and their political prescriptions for peace, suing pooled-regression analysis of politically relevant dyads for the Cold War era. We find that the pacific benefits of trade, both total and dyadic, have not been sufficiently appreciated” (267).
This article represents an expansion on earlier work by Maoz, Russett and Oneal. This approach is more theoretically grounded in the relationship between regimes and trade affect conflict. It also uses expanded data sets. Finally, it explores the transition from one type of regime to another.
There is a review of the literature beginning with classical liberalism and building towards democratic peace theory. There is a nice overview of democratic peace theory and it would be useful to revisit this article to explore that. The literature review then builds to an account of trade interconnectedness as being a mitigating factor for conflict and how this is not entirely taken into consideration by democratic peace theories, though it should, because it stems naturally from the classic liberalism literature. There have been analyses of the effect of trade interdependence on peace, but the findings have been largely unclear, and there is still a substantial divide between liberal and realist thought on the matter. The direction of causality is also important to take into consideration: before the 19th century, it was not uncommon for nations at war to continue trading. That has since changed, and, if one is not careful to examine the data thoroughly, the decline of trade as a result of conflict could be misinterpreted as being causally connected in different ways.
They use dyads involving at least one great power from the Correlates of War database. They examine the years 1950-85. Use MID data from COW: “A militarized dispute is an international interaction involving threats, displays, or actual uses of military force; it must be explicit, overt, not accidental, and government sanctioned” (273). They have a relatively standard set of independent variables (economic interdependence, democracy, political change, alliances, economic growth, contiguity, etc.).
Oneal, Oneal, Maoz and Russett: The Liberal Peace
Oneal, JR, FH Oneal, Z Maoz, and B Russett. 1996. “The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85.” Journal of Peace Research 33:11.
Classic liberals believed that interdependence rooted in trade as well as similar political systems based on majority rule would lead to increased levels of international peace. This article uses economic interdependence variables to augment the democratic peace studies of Maoz and Russett (1993). “Our logistic regression analyses of politically relevant dyads…indicate that the benefits of the liberals’ economic program have not been sufficiently appreciated. Trade is a powerful influence for peace, especially among the war-prone, contiguous pairs of states…international conflict is less likely when external economic relations are important, executives are constrained, and societies are governed by non-violent norms of conflict resolution” (11).
There is initially a very thorough review of literature relating to trade, liberalism, peace and international interdependence.
The research operationalization follows closely that of Maoz and Russett (1993) and is an attempt to quantify the variables identified by Kant. They look at “major powers” as defined by the Correlates of War project. Use MID data for dependent variable and a variety of independent variables. “Our logistic regression analyses of politically relevant dyads…indicate that the pacific benefits of interdependence have not been sufficiently appreciated. This is especially apparent in the analyses of contiguous pairs of states, where the potential for conflict is greatest. Countries that share a border have more issues, particularly territorial, over which to fight; and their proximity makes armed conflict feasible. Economic interdependence significantly counteracts these influences” (23).
Classic liberals believed that interdependence rooted in trade as well as similar political systems based on majority rule would lead to increased levels of international peace. This article uses economic interdependence variables to augment the democratic peace studies of Maoz and Russett (1993). “Our logistic regression analyses of politically relevant dyads…indicate that the benefits of the liberals’ economic program have not been sufficiently appreciated. Trade is a powerful influence for peace, especially among the war-prone, contiguous pairs of states…international conflict is less likely when external economic relations are important, executives are constrained, and societies are governed by non-violent norms of conflict resolution” (11).
There is initially a very thorough review of literature relating to trade, liberalism, peace and international interdependence.
The research operationalization follows closely that of Maoz and Russett (1993) and is an attempt to quantify the variables identified by Kant. They look at “major powers” as defined by the Correlates of War project. Use MID data for dependent variable and a variety of independent variables. “Our logistic regression analyses of politically relevant dyads…indicate that the pacific benefits of interdependence have not been sufficiently appreciated. This is especially apparent in the analyses of contiguous pairs of states, where the potential for conflict is greatest. Countries that share a border have more issues, particularly territorial, over which to fight; and their proximity makes armed conflict feasible. Economic interdependence significantly counteracts these influences” (23).
Gartzke et al.: Investing in Peace
Gartzke, E, Q Li, and C Boehmer. 2003. “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.” International Organization 55:391-438.
“Research appears to substantiate the liberal conviction that trade fosters global peace” (391). These studies are limited. There is an overemphasis on trade, while other transfers are quantitatively larger. “Second, the manner in which economics is said to inhibit conflict behavior is implausible in light of new analytical insights about the causes of war” (391).
“Our quantities results who that capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade, democracy, interest, and other variables (391).
“We begin with a theory of disputes. A valid explanation for the effect of economics on peace must be placed in the context of an account of why most states occasionally resort to military violence” (392).
The authors explore different kinds of interdependence, monetary, trade, democratic, capital, and thoroughly explore the literature.
They use MID data.
Dismisses Barbieri’s findings as being flawed because of the author’s metric for determining economic interdependence: trade share.
“We have reviewed arguments for the effect of economic interdependence on peace. We show that existing accounts do not adequately explain why liberal economies are less likely to fight, but that a signaling argument is consistent with the observation of a liberal peace. We also expand interdependence to include financial and monetary integration, offering a set of variables that measure these processes” (418). They key finding is that increased interdependence reduces the vagueness of information transfers in bargaining between states.
“Research appears to substantiate the liberal conviction that trade fosters global peace” (391). These studies are limited. There is an overemphasis on trade, while other transfers are quantitatively larger. “Second, the manner in which economics is said to inhibit conflict behavior is implausible in light of new analytical insights about the causes of war” (391).
“Our quantities results who that capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade, democracy, interest, and other variables (391).
“We begin with a theory of disputes. A valid explanation for the effect of economics on peace must be placed in the context of an account of why most states occasionally resort to military violence” (392).
The authors explore different kinds of interdependence, monetary, trade, democratic, capital, and thoroughly explore the literature.
They use MID data.
Dismisses Barbieri’s findings as being flawed because of the author’s metric for determining economic interdependence: trade share.
“We have reviewed arguments for the effect of economic interdependence on peace. We show that existing accounts do not adequately explain why liberal economies are less likely to fight, but that a signaling argument is consistent with the observation of a liberal peace. We also expand interdependence to include financial and monetary integration, offering a set of variables that measure these processes” (418). They key finding is that increased interdependence reduces the vagueness of information transfers in bargaining between states.
Barbieri: Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?
Barbieri, K. 1996. “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?.” Journal of Peace Research 33:29.
“Four propositions about the trade-conflict relationship are easily identified among a broad group of theorists” (30). These are the liberal argument linking trade to peace, the neo-Marxist argument that symmetry in trade promotes peace, the (realist) idea that trade promotes conflict and the final belief that the two variables are not related.
These four positions are explored.
Of interest: “Interdependence generally implies relations of mutual need and, by extension, mutual vulnerability between actors, while dependence denotes asymmetrical relations. A further distinction is made by Keohane and Nye (1977, pp. 8-9), between interdependence and interconnectedness. Interconnectedness merely represents weak linkages among states incapable of having a significant influence eon interstate relations; while interdependence entails a vulnerability and sensitivity not found in less extensive linkages” (33).
Barbieri then puts forth 4 hypotheses that deal with the degree of economic salience in a trading relationship as well as the symmetry.
Uses Mitiliarized Interstate Dispute Dataset.
Thorough review of the literature on the operationalization of interdependence, and the difficulties in identifying interdependence.
The article finds that there is an interesting, curvilinear relationship between interdependence and MID conflict: if there is asymmetrical conflict, the chance of conflict is high. If there is a very high degree of symmetrical interdependence, there is also a very high degree of conflict.
“Four propositions about the trade-conflict relationship are easily identified among a broad group of theorists” (30). These are the liberal argument linking trade to peace, the neo-Marxist argument that symmetry in trade promotes peace, the (realist) idea that trade promotes conflict and the final belief that the two variables are not related.
These four positions are explored.
Of interest: “Interdependence generally implies relations of mutual need and, by extension, mutual vulnerability between actors, while dependence denotes asymmetrical relations. A further distinction is made by Keohane and Nye (1977, pp. 8-9), between interdependence and interconnectedness. Interconnectedness merely represents weak linkages among states incapable of having a significant influence eon interstate relations; while interdependence entails a vulnerability and sensitivity not found in less extensive linkages” (33).
Barbieri then puts forth 4 hypotheses that deal with the degree of economic salience in a trading relationship as well as the symmetry.
Uses Mitiliarized Interstate Dispute Dataset.
Thorough review of the literature on the operationalization of interdependence, and the difficulties in identifying interdependence.
The article finds that there is an interesting, curvilinear relationship between interdependence and MID conflict: if there is asymmetrical conflict, the chance of conflict is high. If there is a very high degree of symmetrical interdependence, there is also a very high degree of conflict.
Copeland: Economic Interdependence and War
Copeland, DC. 1996. “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations.” International Security 20:5-41.
“The prolonged debate between realists and liberals on the causes of war has been largely a debate about the relative salience of different causal variables. Realists stress such factors as relative power, while liberals focus on the absence or presence of collective security regimes and the pervasiveness of democratic communities” (5).
“Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression…Realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war” (5-6). Different periods in time can be used as supports for either theory, and the results appear to be problematically correlated.
Copeland presents a theory of trade relations that tries to overcome these problems. “The theory starts b y clarifying the notion of economic interdependence, fusing the liberal insight that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to avoid war with the realist view that the potential costs of being cut off can push states to war to secure vital goods. The total of the benefits and potential costs of trade versus autarchy reveals the true level of dependence a state faces, for if trade is completely severed, the state not only loses the gains from trade but also suffers the costs of adjusting its economy to the new situation” (6). “Trade expectations theory introduces a new causal variable, the expectatt4ions of future trade, examining its impact on the overall expected value of the trading option if a state decides to forgo war” (6). “Levels of interdependence and expectations of future trade, considered simultaneously, lead to new predictions” (7). “Interdependence can foster peace, as liberals argue, but this will only be so when states expect that trade levels will be high into the foreseeable future” (7).
The liberal argument that free trade incentivises nations towards making peaceful decisions was first made popular in the 1850s by Richard Cobden. “Realists turn the liberal argument on its head, arguing that economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace, but in fact heightens the likelihood of war” (10). This realist logic is most clearly made by Waltz and Mearsheimer, though it has its roots in mercantilist thinking of the 1800s. “Mercantilists saw states as locked in a competition for relative power and for the wealth that underpins that power” (11).
“While the liberal and the realist arguments display critical differences, they possess one important similarity: the causal logic of both perspectives is founded on an individual state’s decision-making process. That is, while the two camps freely use the term ‘interdependence,’ both derive predictions from how particular decision-making units—states—deal with their own specific dependence” (12).
“The main difference between liberals and realists has to do with their emphasis on the benefits versus the costs of interdependence” (12).
“…these theories [realism and liberalis] lack an understanding of how rational decision-makers incorporate the future trading environment into their choice between peace and war” (16).
“For the purposes of forging strong theories, however, trading patterns cannot be simply assumed a priori to match the stipulations of either liberalism or of realism. Trade levels fluctuate significantly over time, both for the system as a whole and particularly between specific trading partners, as the last two centuries demonstrate” (16-7).
“From consideration of the expectations-of-future-trade variable along with a state’s level of dependence, one can derive a consistent deductive theory of state decision-making showing the conditions under which high interdependence will lead to peace or to war” (17).
On page 24 there is a very nice overview of the difference between liberal, realist and trade expectations theory.
The theory is then applied to Germany and WWI and Germany and WWII.
“The prolonged debate between realists and liberals on the causes of war has been largely a debate about the relative salience of different causal variables. Realists stress such factors as relative power, while liberals focus on the absence or presence of collective security regimes and the pervasiveness of democratic communities” (5).
“Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression…Realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war” (5-6). Different periods in time can be used as supports for either theory, and the results appear to be problematically correlated.
Copeland presents a theory of trade relations that tries to overcome these problems. “The theory starts b y clarifying the notion of economic interdependence, fusing the liberal insight that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to avoid war with the realist view that the potential costs of being cut off can push states to war to secure vital goods. The total of the benefits and potential costs of trade versus autarchy reveals the true level of dependence a state faces, for if trade is completely severed, the state not only loses the gains from trade but also suffers the costs of adjusting its economy to the new situation” (6). “Trade expectations theory introduces a new causal variable, the expectatt4ions of future trade, examining its impact on the overall expected value of the trading option if a state decides to forgo war” (6). “Levels of interdependence and expectations of future trade, considered simultaneously, lead to new predictions” (7). “Interdependence can foster peace, as liberals argue, but this will only be so when states expect that trade levels will be high into the foreseeable future” (7).
The liberal argument that free trade incentivises nations towards making peaceful decisions was first made popular in the 1850s by Richard Cobden. “Realists turn the liberal argument on its head, arguing that economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace, but in fact heightens the likelihood of war” (10). This realist logic is most clearly made by Waltz and Mearsheimer, though it has its roots in mercantilist thinking of the 1800s. “Mercantilists saw states as locked in a competition for relative power and for the wealth that underpins that power” (11).
“While the liberal and the realist arguments display critical differences, they possess one important similarity: the causal logic of both perspectives is founded on an individual state’s decision-making process. That is, while the two camps freely use the term ‘interdependence,’ both derive predictions from how particular decision-making units—states—deal with their own specific dependence” (12).
“The main difference between liberals and realists has to do with their emphasis on the benefits versus the costs of interdependence” (12).
“…these theories [realism and liberalis] lack an understanding of how rational decision-makers incorporate the future trading environment into their choice between peace and war” (16).
“For the purposes of forging strong theories, however, trading patterns cannot be simply assumed a priori to match the stipulations of either liberalism or of realism. Trade levels fluctuate significantly over time, both for the system as a whole and particularly between specific trading partners, as the last two centuries demonstrate” (16-7).
“From consideration of the expectations-of-future-trade variable along with a state’s level of dependence, one can derive a consistent deductive theory of state decision-making showing the conditions under which high interdependence will lead to peace or to war” (17).
On page 24 there is a very nice overview of the difference between liberal, realist and trade expectations theory.
The theory is then applied to Germany and WWI and Germany and WWII.
Jervis: Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma
Jervis, R. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30:167-214.
“The lack of international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest” (167). This is generally referred to as the security dilemma, where states want to improve their security position, but find that their defensive fortification actually represents a threat to other countries. This is possible because of the lack of a global archy.
A similar situation can be observed in Rousseau’s Stag Hunt. The article uses a game theory approach to understanding the preference ordering of states in the security dilemma. States first want to cooperate, secondly want to defect, thirdly want everyone to defect and fourthly want to be stuck hunting the stag when someone else chases the rabbit.
“Given this gloomy picture, the obvious question is, why are we not all dead? Or, to put it less starkly, what kinds of variables ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma?” (170). You can improve the gains that result from mutual cooperation. You can increase the cost of defecting. You can also improve the reliability and robustness of information flow to make sure that both sides are more reasonably assured that the other will cooperate.
Jervis also highlights a subjective nature security: states may subjectively approach issues such as the amount of defense they need, or the amount of countries they feel threatened by. Additionally, states may be unsure as to the degree that other states will or will not cooperate, i.e., they may have a subjective understanding of the nature of the threat posed by others.
Jervis additionally points out that different kinds of war can emerge from situations where either “offense” or “defense” predominates, i.e., whether or not it is more likely to be successful being defensive or offensive. These variables, along with others, create the “Four Worlds” of Jervis that divide on two axes of uncertainty: whether offense or defense has the advantage, and whether or not the two positions are distinguishable from one another.
“The lack of international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest” (167). This is generally referred to as the security dilemma, where states want to improve their security position, but find that their defensive fortification actually represents a threat to other countries. This is possible because of the lack of a global archy.
A similar situation can be observed in Rousseau’s Stag Hunt. The article uses a game theory approach to understanding the preference ordering of states in the security dilemma. States first want to cooperate, secondly want to defect, thirdly want everyone to defect and fourthly want to be stuck hunting the stag when someone else chases the rabbit.
“Given this gloomy picture, the obvious question is, why are we not all dead? Or, to put it less starkly, what kinds of variables ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma?” (170). You can improve the gains that result from mutual cooperation. You can increase the cost of defecting. You can also improve the reliability and robustness of information flow to make sure that both sides are more reasonably assured that the other will cooperate.
Jervis also highlights a subjective nature security: states may subjectively approach issues such as the amount of defense they need, or the amount of countries they feel threatened by. Additionally, states may be unsure as to the degree that other states will or will not cooperate, i.e., they may have a subjective understanding of the nature of the threat posed by others.
Jervis additionally points out that different kinds of war can emerge from situations where either “offense” or “defense” predominates, i.e., whether or not it is more likely to be successful being defensive or offensive. These variables, along with others, create the “Four Worlds” of Jervis that divide on two axes of uncertainty: whether offense or defense has the advantage, and whether or not the two positions are distinguishable from one another.
Monday, July 21, 2008
Triplett: The Solow Productivity Paradox
Triplett, JE. 1999. “The Solow Productivity Paradox: What Do Computers Do to Productivity?.” Canadian Journal of Economics 32:309-334.
(1) “You don't see computers 'everywhere,' in a meaningful economic sense. Computers and information processing equipment are a relatively small share of GDP and of the capital stock.
(2) You only thinkyou see computers everywhere. Government hedonic price indexes for computers fall 'too fast,' according to this position, and therefore measured real computer output growth is also 'too fast.'
(3) You may not see computers everywhere, but in the industrial sectors where you most see them, output is poorly measured. Examples are finance and insurance, which are heavy users of information technology and where even the concept of output is poorly specified.
(4) Whether or not you see computers everywhere, some of 'what they do is not counted in economic statistics. Examples are consumption on the job, convenience, better user-interface, and so forth.
(5) You don 't see computers in the productivity statistics yet, but wait a bit and you will. This is the analogy with the diffusion of electricity; the idea that the productivity implications of a new technology are only visible witlh a long lag.
(6) You see computers everywhere but in the productivity statistics because computers are not as productive as you think. Here, there are many anecdotes, such as failed computer system design projects, but there are also assertions from computer science that computer and software design has taken a wrong turn.
(7) There is no paradox. some economists are counting innovations and new products on an arithmetic scale when they should count on a logarithmic scale”
(309)
The author explores the preceding claims relating to the Solow Paradox.
(1) “You don't see computers 'everywhere,' in a meaningful economic sense. Computers and information processing equipment are a relatively small share of GDP and of the capital stock.
(2) You only thinkyou see computers everywhere. Government hedonic price indexes for computers fall 'too fast,' according to this position, and therefore measured real computer output growth is also 'too fast.'
(3) You may not see computers everywhere, but in the industrial sectors where you most see them, output is poorly measured. Examples are finance and insurance, which are heavy users of information technology and where even the concept of output is poorly specified.
(4) Whether or not you see computers everywhere, some of 'what they do is not counted in economic statistics. Examples are consumption on the job, convenience, better user-interface, and so forth.
(5) You don 't see computers in the productivity statistics yet, but wait a bit and you will. This is the analogy with the diffusion of electricity; the idea that the productivity implications of a new technology are only visible witlh a long lag.
(6) You see computers everywhere but in the productivity statistics because computers are not as productive as you think. Here, there are many anecdotes, such as failed computer system design projects, but there are also assertions from computer science that computer and software design has taken a wrong turn.
(7) There is no paradox. some economists are counting innovations and new products on an arithmetic scale when they should count on a logarithmic scale”
(309)
The author explores the preceding claims relating to the Solow Paradox.
Sunday, July 20, 2008
Arthur: Myths and Realities of the High-Tech Economy
Arthur, WB. 2000. “Myths and Realities of the High-Tech Economy.” Talk given at Credit Suisse First Boston Though Leader Forum, Santa Fe Institute.
Author presents 4 myths of the “high tech economy”.
The author first points out a general trend: a digital economy of networks has emerged that is distinct from the earlier economy of input-output production. This new economy is overlaid upon the old economy. Additionally, the author believes that, “of networks, there will be few” because increasing returns to scale will be impossible to overcome with differentiation (1).
Myth 1: All Networks are Subject to Network effects:
“Network effects”, a synonym for Metcalfe’s Law, states that the “value” of networks increases quadratically. Therefore, any network that people are involved within will be beneficial for those people. While this relationship may be true of some technologies (the author points to a telephone), the nature of digital networks provides different kinds of increasing returns with increased membership in a network. Combinatorial networks, like eBay, show some sort of increasing returns to scale, while “hub and spoke” networks do not: users are just connected to the same server and not to one another.
Myth 2: The Coming of the Internet implies a New Economy:
Myth 3: Either that technology must evolve in a specific place, or that technology can come from anywhere: the answer is somewhere in the middle.
Myth 4: Current political structures will last forever
Author presents 4 myths of the “high tech economy”.
The author first points out a general trend: a digital economy of networks has emerged that is distinct from the earlier economy of input-output production. This new economy is overlaid upon the old economy. Additionally, the author believes that, “of networks, there will be few” because increasing returns to scale will be impossible to overcome with differentiation (1).
Myth 1: All Networks are Subject to Network effects:
“Network effects”, a synonym for Metcalfe’s Law, states that the “value” of networks increases quadratically. Therefore, any network that people are involved within will be beneficial for those people. While this relationship may be true of some technologies (the author points to a telephone), the nature of digital networks provides different kinds of increasing returns with increased membership in a network. Combinatorial networks, like eBay, show some sort of increasing returns to scale, while “hub and spoke” networks do not: users are just connected to the same server and not to one another.
Myth 2: The Coming of the Internet implies a New Economy:
Myth 3: Either that technology must evolve in a specific place, or that technology can come from anywhere: the answer is somewhere in the middle.
Myth 4: Current political structures will last forever
Greening et. al.: Energy Efficiency and Consumption
A. Greening, L, DL Greene, and C Difiglio. 2000. “Energy efficiency and consumption: the rebound effect: a survey.” Energy Policy 28:389-401.
Rebound effects evolve from a neoclassical economic assumption. They deal with an increase in energy efficiency causing the price for a comparable good to drop, and thus to increase demand for that good, offsetting the efficiency improvement. The assumption here is that, if increased efficiency is to equal decreased overall energy consumption, it must be accompanied by an increase in energy costs.
Direct effects are seen at the micro-level when there is an improvement in energy efficiency. This reduces the price of a good, and this changes consumer patterns. Another effect happening at a different level of the economy results from changes in these consumer patterns and changes in demand profiles. Another effect, the transformational effect can, “…change consumer preferences, alter social institutions and rearrange the organization of production” (391).
The rest of the article comprises a review of quantitative studies on rebound effects. It would be well worth exploring.
Rebound effects evolve from a neoclassical economic assumption. They deal with an increase in energy efficiency causing the price for a comparable good to drop, and thus to increase demand for that good, offsetting the efficiency improvement. The assumption here is that, if increased efficiency is to equal decreased overall energy consumption, it must be accompanied by an increase in energy costs.
Direct effects are seen at the micro-level when there is an improvement in energy efficiency. This reduces the price of a good, and this changes consumer patterns. Another effect happening at a different level of the economy results from changes in these consumer patterns and changes in demand profiles. Another effect, the transformational effect can, “…change consumer preferences, alter social institutions and rearrange the organization of production” (391).
The rest of the article comprises a review of quantitative studies on rebound effects. It would be well worth exploring.
Plepys: The Grey Side of ICT
Plepys, A. 2002. “The grey side of ICT.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 22:509-523.
Begins with the argument that ICT is a GPT and that it is transforming economies.
“It is expected that ICTs are capable of delinking the economic growth from environmental degradation primarily due to their potential to increase productivity and create value-added in the form of manipulating ideas and information rather than energy and materials” (510). It is difficult to actually determine the environmental effects of ICT. “Evidence from the energy sector shows that a more efficient use of natural resources does not always reduce their absolute consumption” (510). “A more energy-efficient equipment reduces manufacturing costs and, consequently, the final price of a unit of product or service, which in turn increases demand. The phenomenon, called rebound effect, is well known to energy economists” (510).
“At present, we still know too little about the relation of ICT to the environment. However, the technology has a number of potential risks and uncertainties that we need to understand when placing high expectations on ICT. Drawing a parallel between the rebound effects in the energy sector and ICT helps discussing the environmental implications of the growing ICT use” (510).
“…the term rebound effect refers to an effective increase in the consumption of an energy service after its price decreases due to higher efficiency of the production of the service” (510). “If technological progress makes certain equipment more energy efficient, less energy is needed to produce the same amount of products or services, thus the cost per unit of production falls, which leads to increased demand for the product or the service” (510).
See Greening et. al. (2000) for a four tiered taxonomy of rebound effects that may be thoroughly complex to account for the GPT nature of ICT.
Firstly, there are direct or pure price effects. “These effects occur as a consequence of increased energy efficiency, which reduces the price of energy utilities by decreasing the amount of fuel needed to produce a commodity and, consequently, decreases its final price” (511).
These effects can be broken down into either “substation” or “income effects”. “A consume rwill not increase the use of the ‘bargain’ commodity indefinitely, but until the limits of satiation or budgetary tradeoffs with other expenditures” (511).
There are also “second-order” consumption effects relating to increased consumption power based on savings from purchase of goods that have been reduced in price because of increased efficiency (511).
The third type of effect that is highlighted by Greening et. al. (2000) is that taking place on the whole economy, or, “economy-wide” effects. “The argument of the economy-wide effects builds on the interrelationship of prices and outputs of goods and resources in different markets, which form a unique equilibrium state” (511).
“Transformational effects” are the final effect in this taxonomy. This relates to the, “changes of consumer preferences, altered social institutions, and organization of production” (512).
This taxonomy is applied to ICT.
The price effect is seen in the need to constantly innovate as expectations are that consumers will receive more computing power for the same price as time moves forward. “The phenomenon of receiving more performance for the same price ahs an analogy with the direct rebound effects in the energy sector” (513).
“The official statistics in the United States, indeed, indicated a decoupling between the GDP-measured economic growth and energy consumption. For example, some reports predict that the U.S. ICT sector will grow by 4.0% annually (other sectors only by 2.2%), while its energy intensity will be reduced by 0.92% (EIA, 1999). In the United States, during 1996–1999 the energy intensity per GDP unit declined by 3.4% compared to the decline of 2.6% during the oil crisis. More surprising, the decline of the late 1990s occurred without any significant price signals or policy initiatives (Laitner, 2000; USDC, 2000)” (514). Some credit this delinking with structural changes brought about by ICT innovation and continued adoption.
Further effects of the taxonomy created by ICT adoption are difficult to surmise as they involve complex consumer behavior.
Direct environmental effects:
“One part of environmental impacts derives directly from the life cycle of ICT products. The other part originates from the use of ICT products and services, enhancing or substituting traditional processes or creating new ones. Therefore, when discussing the environmental impacts of ICT, it is useful to frame them into both the live cycle and the system’s perspectives” (515).
One way of exploring the life cycle, is to equate the production with an ecological backpack. This uses the MIPS method of Wuppertal Institute of Germany. Many computers may require material intensity of 16-19 metric tons (516).
There is a general discussion of different technologies and their relative energy consumption needs. For example, it is much more environmentally friendly to produce and lay fiber optic cables in place of copper, but that means that they are laid everywhere (the author cites National Geographic which has them being laid faster than the speed of sound). There is also the problem of faster networks necessitating faster computing, and planned obsolescence (this last term not directly in text, but tacitly so).
Additionally, waste produced by discarded computers annually requires either huge investments in recycling centers or landfills.
ICT has the potential to help create sustainable development, but this is by no means guaranteed. There has to be a change in consumer behavior for this to happen. ICT can simply be a means to improve channels of consumerism.
Some ways in that ICT has failed to promote sustainable development: paperless offices are non-existent: paper consumption continues to rise. Digital Media: users who own computers are not necessarily more efficient in receiving their news. Online consumption: can lower price, increase demand, increase consumption.
“Clearly, the ICT has a potential to decouple economic growth from economic growth from environmental degradation. However, without considering potential rebound effects of increased ICT consumption, the environmental implications can quickly become detrimental. The environmental impacts of ICT largely depend on how the ICT applications perform when human behavior becomes a very important factor” (521).
Begins with the argument that ICT is a GPT and that it is transforming economies.
“It is expected that ICTs are capable of delinking the economic growth from environmental degradation primarily due to their potential to increase productivity and create value-added in the form of manipulating ideas and information rather than energy and materials” (510). It is difficult to actually determine the environmental effects of ICT. “Evidence from the energy sector shows that a more efficient use of natural resources does not always reduce their absolute consumption” (510). “A more energy-efficient equipment reduces manufacturing costs and, consequently, the final price of a unit of product or service, which in turn increases demand. The phenomenon, called rebound effect, is well known to energy economists” (510).
“At present, we still know too little about the relation of ICT to the environment. However, the technology has a number of potential risks and uncertainties that we need to understand when placing high expectations on ICT. Drawing a parallel between the rebound effects in the energy sector and ICT helps discussing the environmental implications of the growing ICT use” (510).
“…the term rebound effect refers to an effective increase in the consumption of an energy service after its price decreases due to higher efficiency of the production of the service” (510). “If technological progress makes certain equipment more energy efficient, less energy is needed to produce the same amount of products or services, thus the cost per unit of production falls, which leads to increased demand for the product or the service” (510).
See Greening et. al. (2000) for a four tiered taxonomy of rebound effects that may be thoroughly complex to account for the GPT nature of ICT.
Firstly, there are direct or pure price effects. “These effects occur as a consequence of increased energy efficiency, which reduces the price of energy utilities by decreasing the amount of fuel needed to produce a commodity and, consequently, decreases its final price” (511).
These effects can be broken down into either “substation” or “income effects”. “A consume rwill not increase the use of the ‘bargain’ commodity indefinitely, but until the limits of satiation or budgetary tradeoffs with other expenditures” (511).
There are also “second-order” consumption effects relating to increased consumption power based on savings from purchase of goods that have been reduced in price because of increased efficiency (511).
The third type of effect that is highlighted by Greening et. al. (2000) is that taking place on the whole economy, or, “economy-wide” effects. “The argument of the economy-wide effects builds on the interrelationship of prices and outputs of goods and resources in different markets, which form a unique equilibrium state” (511).
“Transformational effects” are the final effect in this taxonomy. This relates to the, “changes of consumer preferences, altered social institutions, and organization of production” (512).
This taxonomy is applied to ICT.
The price effect is seen in the need to constantly innovate as expectations are that consumers will receive more computing power for the same price as time moves forward. “The phenomenon of receiving more performance for the same price ahs an analogy with the direct rebound effects in the energy sector” (513).
“The official statistics in the United States, indeed, indicated a decoupling between the GDP-measured economic growth and energy consumption. For example, some reports predict that the U.S. ICT sector will grow by 4.0% annually (other sectors only by 2.2%), while its energy intensity will be reduced by 0.92% (EIA, 1999). In the United States, during 1996–1999 the energy intensity per GDP unit declined by 3.4% compared to the decline of 2.6% during the oil crisis. More surprising, the decline of the late 1990s occurred without any significant price signals or policy initiatives (Laitner, 2000; USDC, 2000)” (514). Some credit this delinking with structural changes brought about by ICT innovation and continued adoption.
Further effects of the taxonomy created by ICT adoption are difficult to surmise as they involve complex consumer behavior.
Direct environmental effects:
“One part of environmental impacts derives directly from the life cycle of ICT products. The other part originates from the use of ICT products and services, enhancing or substituting traditional processes or creating new ones. Therefore, when discussing the environmental impacts of ICT, it is useful to frame them into both the live cycle and the system’s perspectives” (515).
One way of exploring the life cycle, is to equate the production with an ecological backpack. This uses the MIPS method of Wuppertal Institute of Germany. Many computers may require material intensity of 16-19 metric tons (516).
There is a general discussion of different technologies and their relative energy consumption needs. For example, it is much more environmentally friendly to produce and lay fiber optic cables in place of copper, but that means that they are laid everywhere (the author cites National Geographic which has them being laid faster than the speed of sound). There is also the problem of faster networks necessitating faster computing, and planned obsolescence (this last term not directly in text, but tacitly so).
Additionally, waste produced by discarded computers annually requires either huge investments in recycling centers or landfills.
ICT has the potential to help create sustainable development, but this is by no means guaranteed. There has to be a change in consumer behavior for this to happen. ICT can simply be a means to improve channels of consumerism.
Some ways in that ICT has failed to promote sustainable development: paperless offices are non-existent: paper consumption continues to rise. Digital Media: users who own computers are not necessarily more efficient in receiving their news. Online consumption: can lower price, increase demand, increase consumption.
“Clearly, the ICT has a potential to decouple economic growth from economic growth from environmental degradation. However, without considering potential rebound effects of increased ICT consumption, the environmental implications can quickly become detrimental. The environmental impacts of ICT largely depend on how the ICT applications perform when human behavior becomes a very important factor” (521).
Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
Mearsheimer, JJ. 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. WW Norton & Company.
Ch. 1: Introduction:
This book begins as a response to those (utopianists? Idealists?) who believe that the fall of the USSR marked the end of history. This can not be the case because the nature of the international system make it such that states continually have to search for their own survival through offensive realism. This account is a break from classical realism and defensive structural realism. Mearsheimer positions himself as an offensive realist.
“The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system” (2). “Simply put, great powers are primed for offence” (3). “Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (3).
“This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, in genuinely tragic” (3).
He applies this approach to US/China relations: “Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail” (4).
“…I argue that multipolar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar systems that contain especially powerful states—potential hegemons—are the most dangerous systems of all” (5).
“Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability” (5).
“In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists” (12).
The book is organized around six questions:
1—why do great powers want power?
2—how much power?
3—what is power?
4—how do they go after power?
5—what are the causes of war?
6—when do threatened powers balance and when do they band-wagon/buck-pass? (12-3)
Contrasts liberalism with realism:
Liberalism: States the actor, internal characteristic of states vary considerably, calculations of power not important (15-6).
Realism: states the actor, behavior of great powers influenced by external environment, and power calculations crucial.
Two kinds of realism: “human nature realism” (aka classical realism) through Morgenthau and defensive realism, through Waltz.
For Morgenthau, human nature instills a “limitless lust for power” and thus creates the international system in a certain kind of way (19).
For Waltz, states do not want power, but survival. “For Waltz, balancing checkmates offence” (20).
“Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want” (21).
“The key difference between the two perspectives [human nature realism and offensive realism] is that offensive realists reject Morgenthau’s claim that states are naturally endowed with Type A personalities. ON the contrary, they believe that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security” (21).
There is then a bizarre explanation of why Americans don’t like realism because it’s too negative and they’re all optimists.
Ch. 2: Anarchy and the Struggle for Power:
Great powers want to be the hegemon.
Five assumptions underly his view of the world:
1—anarchy is an ordering principle
2—great powers have some military capability
3—states can never be certain about other states’ intentions
4—states primarily want to survive
5—states are rational actors
“Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power” (35).
“A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system” (40).
“My argument, which I develop at length in subsequent chapters, is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony” (41).
“The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon” (41).
Ch. 1: Introduction:
This book begins as a response to those (utopianists? Idealists?) who believe that the fall of the USSR marked the end of history. This can not be the case because the nature of the international system make it such that states continually have to search for their own survival through offensive realism. This account is a break from classical realism and defensive structural realism. Mearsheimer positions himself as an offensive realist.
“The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system” (2). “Simply put, great powers are primed for offence” (3). “Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (3).
“This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, in genuinely tragic” (3).
He applies this approach to US/China relations: “Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail” (4).
“…I argue that multipolar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar systems that contain especially powerful states—potential hegemons—are the most dangerous systems of all” (5).
“Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability” (5).
“In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists” (12).
The book is organized around six questions:
1—why do great powers want power?
2—how much power?
3—what is power?
4—how do they go after power?
5—what are the causes of war?
6—when do threatened powers balance and when do they band-wagon/buck-pass? (12-3)
Contrasts liberalism with realism:
Liberalism: States the actor, internal characteristic of states vary considerably, calculations of power not important (15-6).
Realism: states the actor, behavior of great powers influenced by external environment, and power calculations crucial.
Two kinds of realism: “human nature realism” (aka classical realism) through Morgenthau and defensive realism, through Waltz.
For Morgenthau, human nature instills a “limitless lust for power” and thus creates the international system in a certain kind of way (19).
For Waltz, states do not want power, but survival. “For Waltz, balancing checkmates offence” (20).
“Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want” (21).
“The key difference between the two perspectives [human nature realism and offensive realism] is that offensive realists reject Morgenthau’s claim that states are naturally endowed with Type A personalities. ON the contrary, they believe that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security” (21).
There is then a bizarre explanation of why Americans don’t like realism because it’s too negative and they’re all optimists.
Ch. 2: Anarchy and the Struggle for Power:
Great powers want to be the hegemon.
Five assumptions underly his view of the world:
1—anarchy is an ordering principle
2—great powers have some military capability
3—states can never be certain about other states’ intentions
4—states primarily want to survive
5—states are rational actors
“Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power” (35).
“A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system” (40).
“My argument, which I develop at length in subsequent chapters, is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony” (41).
“The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon” (41).
Saturday, July 19, 2008
Briscoe, et. al.: Metcalfe's Law is Wrong
Briscoe, B., Odlyzko, A. & Tilly, B., 2006. Metcalfe's law is wrong-communications networks increase in value as they add members-but by how much? Spectrum, IEEE, 43(7), 34-39.
This article discusses why its authors believe that Metcalfe’s Law is over stated and mathematically incorrect. They put forth a log-based account of the law instead of a quadratic account. “Simply put, it [Metcalfe’s Law] says that the value of a communications network is proportional to the square of the number of its users” (35).
The authors attribute the dot-com bubble to people making decisions based upon Metcalfe’s Law instead of a logged version of network analysis.
Sarnoff’s Law was named after an RCA television executive and it dealt with the number of viewers of broadcast networks. It grows linearly.
Their “valuation” can not be proven, oversimplifies the phenomena, and doesn’t make explicit any of the nuanced interactions (both positive and negative).
Their basic objection to Metcalfe’s law is that it values all connections equally when, in reality, many connections are not taken advantage of and are thus not valuable.
There is anecdotal evidence that the logged law is widely applicable.
There is a grand conflation of “value”.
This article discusses why its authors believe that Metcalfe’s Law is over stated and mathematically incorrect. They put forth a log-based account of the law instead of a quadratic account. “Simply put, it [Metcalfe’s Law] says that the value of a communications network is proportional to the square of the number of its users” (35).
The authors attribute the dot-com bubble to people making decisions based upon Metcalfe’s Law instead of a logged version of network analysis.
Sarnoff’s Law was named after an RCA television executive and it dealt with the number of viewers of broadcast networks. It grows linearly.
Their “valuation” can not be proven, oversimplifies the phenomena, and doesn’t make explicit any of the nuanced interactions (both positive and negative).
Their basic objection to Metcalfe’s law is that it values all connections equally when, in reality, many connections are not taken advantage of and are thus not valuable.
There is anecdotal evidence that the logged law is widely applicable.
There is a grand conflation of “value”.
Brynjolfsson: The Productivity Paradox of Information Technology
Brynjolfsson, E., 1993. The productivity paradox of information technology. Communications of the ACM, 36(12), 66-77.
Written in 1993, this article represents an important contribution to the exploration of ICT technology just at the beginning of the internet revolution. The article examines a potential paradox in the deployment of ICT and its expected benefits. Supposively, the increased use of ICT should improve productivity of workers. However, this was not the case in the US at the time of writing. There are four explanations that are given for this: “…outputs and inputs have been mismeasured, that learning and adjustment cause lags, that profits have been redistributed and dissipated, and that information and technology have been mismanaged…” (1).
“After reviewing and assessing the research to date, it appears that the shortfall of IT productivity is as much due to deficiencies in our measurement and methodological tool kit and as to mismanagement by developers and users of IT” (2).
Good review of the studies of productivity and ICT. “A possible explanation of poor measurement of productivity: For example, if a clothing manufacturer chooses to produce more colors and sizes of shirts, which may have value to consumers, existing productivity measures rarely account for such value and will typically show higher "productivity" in a firm that produces a single color and size. Higher prices in industries with increasing product diversity is likely to be attributed to inflation, despite the real increase in value provided to consumers” (8).
And:
“In services, the problem of unmeasured improvements can be even worse than in manufacturing. For instance, the convenience afforded by 24-hour automatic teller machines (ATMs) is a clear example of an unmeasured quality improvement. How much value has this contributed to banking customers? Government statistics implicitly assume it is all captured in the number of transaction, or worse, that output is a constant multiple of labor input!” (8).
Time lags: studies have shown that 2-3 years can be typical before large improvements are found.
Redistributional effects: ICT might not change the size “of the pie”, but it does redistribute the size of the slices.
Written in 1993, this article represents an important contribution to the exploration of ICT technology just at the beginning of the internet revolution. The article examines a potential paradox in the deployment of ICT and its expected benefits. Supposively, the increased use of ICT should improve productivity of workers. However, this was not the case in the US at the time of writing. There are four explanations that are given for this: “…outputs and inputs have been mismeasured, that learning and adjustment cause lags, that profits have been redistributed and dissipated, and that information and technology have been mismanaged…” (1).
“After reviewing and assessing the research to date, it appears that the shortfall of IT productivity is as much due to deficiencies in our measurement and methodological tool kit and as to mismanagement by developers and users of IT” (2).
Good review of the studies of productivity and ICT. “A possible explanation of poor measurement of productivity: For example, if a clothing manufacturer chooses to produce more colors and sizes of shirts, which may have value to consumers, existing productivity measures rarely account for such value and will typically show higher "productivity" in a firm that produces a single color and size. Higher prices in industries with increasing product diversity is likely to be attributed to inflation, despite the real increase in value provided to consumers” (8).
And:
“In services, the problem of unmeasured improvements can be even worse than in manufacturing. For instance, the convenience afforded by 24-hour automatic teller machines (ATMs) is a clear example of an unmeasured quality improvement. How much value has this contributed to banking customers? Government statistics implicitly assume it is all captured in the number of transaction, or worse, that output is a constant multiple of labor input!” (8).
Time lags: studies have shown that 2-3 years can be typical before large improvements are found.
Redistributional effects: ICT might not change the size “of the pie”, but it does redistribute the size of the slices.
O'Fallon: Linkages Between Infrastructure and Economic Growth
O’Fallon, C., 2003. Linkages Between Infrastructure And Economic Growth. unpublished paper prepared for the Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, New Zealand, December.
“Information and communication technology (ICT) is perhaps better thought of as a technological innovation that is “transforming” economic productivity by shifting economic growth onto a higher level, although the overall slope of the path is expected to remain the same. In some countries, the ICT producing sector has had an impact on the economy-wide average growth, influencing “capital deepening” (increased the intensity of physical capital per unit of labour) and assisting in more efficient work organisation outside of the ICT sector, creating “spillover” gains in productivity in these other sectors. The OECD is proposing to continue to monitor ICT development and its effects. The key action for governments in respect of ICT is to ensure that the macroeconomic policy climate is functioning well to encourage further investment and innovation” (2).
OECD study found that there was an improvement in the quality of labor per unit of capital with the imposition of ICT. Inadequate infrastructure was seen as being a key driver of inequalities in growth among OECD countries. The report also identifies “capital deepening” as being an additional benefit of ICT investment.
The report is a rich overview of infrastructure to economic growth/productivity literature and ICT only represented a small section.
“Information and communication technology (ICT) is perhaps better thought of as a technological innovation that is “transforming” economic productivity by shifting economic growth onto a higher level, although the overall slope of the path is expected to remain the same. In some countries, the ICT producing sector has had an impact on the economy-wide average growth, influencing “capital deepening” (increased the intensity of physical capital per unit of labour) and assisting in more efficient work organisation outside of the ICT sector, creating “spillover” gains in productivity in these other sectors. The OECD is proposing to continue to monitor ICT development and its effects. The key action for governments in respect of ICT is to ensure that the macroeconomic policy climate is functioning well to encourage further investment and innovation” (2).
OECD study found that there was an improvement in the quality of labor per unit of capital with the imposition of ICT. Inadequate infrastructure was seen as being a key driver of inequalities in growth among OECD countries. The report also identifies “capital deepening” as being an additional benefit of ICT investment.
The report is a rich overview of infrastructure to economic growth/productivity literature and ICT only represented a small section.
Bannister and Remenyi: The Societal Value of ICT
Bannister, F. & Remenyi, D., 2003. The Societal Value of ICT: First Steps Towards an Evaluation Framework. Electronic Journal of Information Systems Evaluation, 6(2), 197-206.
Finds a variety of benefits that arise from ICT: Economic (though there isn’t a consensus on this), educational (not just distance learning, but information access), convenience, entertainment, communication, access to information, political and democratic, reduction of risk, ecological, information ecology (203-4).
Then highlights “disbenefits”: information overload, unwanted information, information inaccuracy, new types of crime, collateral economic damage (where crime undermines something broader), vulnerability (society dependent on complex systems), disruption and displacement, destruction of social capital, increased economic competition, reduction or threats to civil liberties, globalization of culture, lower quality of employment and health risk (204-5).
“This paper has not provided definitive method with which to evaluate the information society. Its primary purpose was to explore the extent of the problems involved in this endeavour” (205).
Finds a variety of benefits that arise from ICT: Economic (though there isn’t a consensus on this), educational (not just distance learning, but information access), convenience, entertainment, communication, access to information, political and democratic, reduction of risk, ecological, information ecology (203-4).
Then highlights “disbenefits”: information overload, unwanted information, information inaccuracy, new types of crime, collateral economic damage (where crime undermines something broader), vulnerability (society dependent on complex systems), disruption and displacement, destruction of social capital, increased economic competition, reduction or threats to civil liberties, globalization of culture, lower quality of employment and health risk (204-5).
“This paper has not provided definitive method with which to evaluate the information society. Its primary purpose was to explore the extent of the problems involved in this endeavour” (205).
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
Guerrieri and Paodoan: Modelling ICT as a GPT
Guerrieri, Paolo, and Pier Carlo Paodoan. 2007. Modelling ICT as a General Purpose Technology: Evaluation Models and Tools for Assessment of Innovation and Sustainable Development at the EU Level. Collegium no. 35.
This report was done in an attempt to further the Lisbon Agenda, specifically emphasizing the improved usage of ICT. “Most of the existing models linking ICT to economic growth and employment, both at the macro and the micro level, do not provide a fully satisfactory analysis of the transmission mechanism of ICT to economic performance and do not take fully into account the response of different national systems of production and organization, including the role of business services, to the development and diffusion of the new technologies” (6).
“More progress is also needed in the analysis and empirical investigation of the determinants of ICT spending, which is largely if not completely determined by the private sector” (6).
“Finally, data limitations and the lack of appropriate sets of indicators have been a severe constraint in modeling the impact of ICT related policies” (7).
General Purpose Technologies are: pervasive, technologically dynamic, exponentially impacts productivity (7). ICTs are a GPT. Three ways that it impacts the economy: ICT production; ICT as capital input (importance of computers and information technology as an input in other industries); ICT as special capital input (positive externalities resulting form ICT investment) (8).
Many of the effects of ICT investment are indirect and long-term (8).
Data: Best source is EUROSTAT, especially for human capital information. Time series short. GGDC is a good source for ICT variables and indicators, come from national stats, etc. OECD data have many missing variables, data points.
A “Core Dataset” is then created using a hybrid of GGDC and STAN OECD numbers.
Use 8 CGE models to explore ICT. Find IFs to be quite useful, as it is the only model that explicitly incorporates an ICT sector.
“We have chosen the IFs model to perform simulation exercises, since it includes a specific ICT sector and it allows CIT to exert its impact on the economy via different channels, rather than being modeled as a simple input in a standard production function” (13). They consider a total of 6 different scenarios (13).
A list of their results can be found (i-vi) on p. 14.
“A report by Indepen (2005) underlined that simply increasing total investment in ICT will, in itself, not deliver improvements in productivity and economic growth. To be productive, this investment also requires complementary changes in the way organizations are structured and function as well as in human capital” (15). There is a list of 5 of these different catalyzing factors on page 15.
“Modelling ICT as a GPT requires a multi step procedure” (19):
-when related to TFP, relationship between GPT and ICT; relationship between ICT and economic structure and relationship between ICT and facilitating environment/structure
-these elements interact in a virtuous cycle
Ch. II: ICT as a General Purpose Technology
This chapter is a literature review that situates ICT within the GPT literature, as well as presenting a framework for thinking about a modified production function with a ICT spill-over effects being represented.
“One of the fundamental insights provided by Schumpter (1939) is that technological innovations are not evenly distributed over countries, industries and time” (22). This is then deployed by Perez (mostly) and Freeman to explain techno-economic paradigms. This is explained in depth on 23-4.
GPT: “GPTs are radical new ideas or techniques that have the potential for important impacts on many industries in an economy” (24).
Techno-economic paradigms are compared to GPTs by Helpman (1998). Helpman concludes that, “…the concept of TEP is much broader than that of GPT since it covers the entire economic system surrounding any set of pervasive technologies actually in use” (24).
ICT -> economic production: “…innovation is a complex phenomenon that goes beyond an increase in R&D expenditures and whose impact cannot be understood in the framework of a production function” (25).
A neoclassical aggregate production function is compared with a Structuralist-Evolutionary (S-E) decomposition. The later incorporates a more nuanced and structural account of technology mediated through policy environment affecting productivity and altering performance (26).
“In particular our aim is to shed some light into the black box of the production function and to capture the interactions between ICT, the facilitating structure, public policy and performance” (29). Their assumptions: ICT impact depends on nature of environment; facilitating structure comprised of human capital, regulation and sectoral composition of an economy; certain economic sectors have more impact; R&D is crucial; and ICTs are pervasive technologies (29).
ICT affects production, according to Schreyer (2000) in three ways: production, capital input and special input. The most important influenced occurs through spill-over effects. These effects the authors attempt to replicate through a production function. “In fact spillover…effects of ICT on GDP have been shown to be larger than direct effects” (39).
Ch. III: Information Society and E-Inclusion: Data and Indicators
The goal of this chapter is to overview different data sources and create a core dataset. “Another goal is to explore available data in order to asses which type of information can be ‘consistently’ used in the implementation of multivariate studies on ICT diffusion” (40).
”In the literature on economic growth three effects of ICT on productivity and growth are distinguished. First, ICT investment contributes to overall capital depending thus helping to raise labour productivity. Second, fast technological progress in the production of ICT goods and services may contribute to more rapid multifactor productivity (MFP)_ growth in the ICT producing sector. Third, larger use of ICT may help firms increase their overall efficiency and thus raise MFP” (41).
The following data bases were screened: “…Total Economy Growth Accounting and the 60-inidustry database of the Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC); the OECT STAN database for Industrial Analysis and the OECT Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI); EUROSTAT, R&D and National Accounts database…In principle, the best coverage in terms of variables/ indicators and countries is given by EUROSTAT data. Time-series length however is too often below 10 years…” (43).
Data sources evaluated on 44: the best overall source is EUROSTAT, especially for human capital and policy variables, however, time series are too short; GGDC is the best for ICT variables and indicators; OECT data have many holes, but are good and straight forward (44).
The authors then develop a “Core Data Set” which is a combination of both OECD and GGDC numbers.
There is some statistical analysis of the Core Data Set, and one of the main findings is a strong relationship between IT expenditures and regulations. More detailed analysis of the results on page 56.
A discussion of e-inclusions follows, with its definition and the reason that it is an important factor for European development. These discussions revolve around the literature on the digital divide. This then moves into discussions of digital literacy, how e-inclusion motivates and empowers, ehealth, egovernment, e-everything.
E-inclusion variables are listed in a table on 75-78.
Ch IV: Technology and Performance
“The purpose of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, the evaluation will be used to choose the CGE model to be employed for simulation exercises of the impact of ICT on economic performance; on the other hand it will help identifying [sic] possible ways of introducing ICT in several CGE models…” (83).
Heavy focus on how ICT can be modeled through endogenous productivity in a CGE with an emphasis on spill-over effects. Definition of ICT: “…the OECD provides an official definition of ICT, and ICT goods and services are evaluated taking into account their ‘intrinsic‘ quality” (84). The authors also defined productivity as relating to TFP contributions by the ICT sectors. They explain that it is easier to identify positive productivity contributions made by ICT in the production sector, but much more difficult in the service sector. They also identify different types of time lag patterns associated with different structural factors within countries that make them more or less likely to reap the rewards of improved and increased use of ICT.
They then compare 8 models: NEMISIS; MULTIMOD; WORLDSCAN; QUEST; NiGEM; IFs; Oxford World Macroeconomic Model and GEM E-3. They felt like IFs was quite suitable for their purposes because it has a thick endogenous technology model as well as an explicit ICT sector, as well as an ability to alter productivity through R&D spending.
They also claim that IFs does not take into consideration technological spillover effects (102).
They then run simulations with many of the models and explore the various assumptions of each model.
Ch V: ICT as a General Purpose Technology
“The existing CGE models with endogenous technical change cannot fully capture tehh complex mechanisms through which ICT influences economic performance….can be improved in three ways…First, the list of endogenous variables that are affected by ICT could be extended by including employment and international competitiveness. Second, the interaction between ICT and other variables affecting the overall business environment (such as regulation, sectoral composition, and human capital) could be taken into account. Third, the uneven impact of ICT across sectors could be considered as well” (115). Also, claim that a higher degree of sectoral disaggregating would make it easier to model the effects of ICT.
They want to explore a variety of variables relating to ICT and see how this effects productivity differently. They run scenarios with IFs that firstly look at variables that more directly drive production, and then at diffusion effects (119).
There is a review of the structure of the IFs model generally, with a focus on the drivers of MFP.
Scenario A: The role of capital accumulation in the ICT sector. “This scenario aims at understanding the effect of a more productive capital factor in the ICT sector” (124). Conclusion: there is a long time lag.
Scenario B: The diffusion process of ICT best practices across sectors. “The scenario tries to evaluate the impact of a more rapid rate of adoption and diffusion of ICT through the service sector, which is typically a large user of ICT” (128).
Scenario C: The diffusion of ICT across countries. “In this scenario we assume different regimes for the MFP of the ICT sector for technological leaders, in order to evaluate the diffusion of different technological frontiers reached by a country which is assumed to be a system leader” (132).
Scenario D: The effects of past adoptions of ICT. “In this scenario we simulate different regimes regarding the adoption of ICT technologies in the economic system” (137). This scenario focuses heavily on the number of networked people variable in IFs.
Scenario E: The role of institutional setup I. “..effects of a change in the elasticity of the multifactor productivity of the ICT sector to the level of network infrastructure in the economic system” (141).
Scenario F: The role of institutional setup II. “…change the value of the elasticity of MFP of the ICT sector to the infrastructures in communication technology” (143).
Ch. VI: Endogenizing ICT
Exploration of the digital divide and literature explaining the phenomena with different drivers highlighted: Income? Human Capital? Regulation? Demographics? Economic Freedom? Service/Agriculture sectors of the economy? Price index?
“Our empirical results are in line with the literature on the digital divide…Human capital, and investments in R&D are factors that increase ICT investments, while burdensome regulation tends to depress them. Furthermore, the structure of the economy turns out to be a relevant factor to understand the different rate of investment in ICT; in particular, countries with a higher share of the service sector usually display hither ICT investment” (156).
This report was done in an attempt to further the Lisbon Agenda, specifically emphasizing the improved usage of ICT. “Most of the existing models linking ICT to economic growth and employment, both at the macro and the micro level, do not provide a fully satisfactory analysis of the transmission mechanism of ICT to economic performance and do not take fully into account the response of different national systems of production and organization, including the role of business services, to the development and diffusion of the new technologies” (6).
“More progress is also needed in the analysis and empirical investigation of the determinants of ICT spending, which is largely if not completely determined by the private sector” (6).
“Finally, data limitations and the lack of appropriate sets of indicators have been a severe constraint in modeling the impact of ICT related policies” (7).
General Purpose Technologies are: pervasive, technologically dynamic, exponentially impacts productivity (7). ICTs are a GPT. Three ways that it impacts the economy: ICT production; ICT as capital input (importance of computers and information technology as an input in other industries); ICT as special capital input (positive externalities resulting form ICT investment) (8).
Many of the effects of ICT investment are indirect and long-term (8).
Data: Best source is EUROSTAT, especially for human capital information. Time series short. GGDC is a good source for ICT variables and indicators, come from national stats, etc. OECD data have many missing variables, data points.
A “Core Dataset” is then created using a hybrid of GGDC and STAN OECD numbers.
Use 8 CGE models to explore ICT. Find IFs to be quite useful, as it is the only model that explicitly incorporates an ICT sector.
“We have chosen the IFs model to perform simulation exercises, since it includes a specific ICT sector and it allows CIT to exert its impact on the economy via different channels, rather than being modeled as a simple input in a standard production function” (13). They consider a total of 6 different scenarios (13).
A list of their results can be found (i-vi) on p. 14.
“A report by Indepen (2005) underlined that simply increasing total investment in ICT will, in itself, not deliver improvements in productivity and economic growth. To be productive, this investment also requires complementary changes in the way organizations are structured and function as well as in human capital” (15). There is a list of 5 of these different catalyzing factors on page 15.
“Modelling ICT as a GPT requires a multi step procedure” (19):
-when related to TFP, relationship between GPT and ICT; relationship between ICT and economic structure and relationship between ICT and facilitating environment/structure
-these elements interact in a virtuous cycle
Ch. II: ICT as a General Purpose Technology
This chapter is a literature review that situates ICT within the GPT literature, as well as presenting a framework for thinking about a modified production function with a ICT spill-over effects being represented.
“One of the fundamental insights provided by Schumpter (1939) is that technological innovations are not evenly distributed over countries, industries and time” (22). This is then deployed by Perez (mostly) and Freeman to explain techno-economic paradigms. This is explained in depth on 23-4.
GPT: “GPTs are radical new ideas or techniques that have the potential for important impacts on many industries in an economy” (24).
Techno-economic paradigms are compared to GPTs by Helpman (1998). Helpman concludes that, “…the concept of TEP is much broader than that of GPT since it covers the entire economic system surrounding any set of pervasive technologies actually in use” (24).
ICT -> economic production: “…innovation is a complex phenomenon that goes beyond an increase in R&D expenditures and whose impact cannot be understood in the framework of a production function” (25).
A neoclassical aggregate production function is compared with a Structuralist-Evolutionary (S-E) decomposition. The later incorporates a more nuanced and structural account of technology mediated through policy environment affecting productivity and altering performance (26).
“In particular our aim is to shed some light into the black box of the production function and to capture the interactions between ICT, the facilitating structure, public policy and performance” (29). Their assumptions: ICT impact depends on nature of environment; facilitating structure comprised of human capital, regulation and sectoral composition of an economy; certain economic sectors have more impact; R&D is crucial; and ICTs are pervasive technologies (29).
ICT affects production, according to Schreyer (2000) in three ways: production, capital input and special input. The most important influenced occurs through spill-over effects. These effects the authors attempt to replicate through a production function. “In fact spillover…effects of ICT on GDP have been shown to be larger than direct effects” (39).
Ch. III: Information Society and E-Inclusion: Data and Indicators
The goal of this chapter is to overview different data sources and create a core dataset. “Another goal is to explore available data in order to asses which type of information can be ‘consistently’ used in the implementation of multivariate studies on ICT diffusion” (40).
”In the literature on economic growth three effects of ICT on productivity and growth are distinguished. First, ICT investment contributes to overall capital depending thus helping to raise labour productivity. Second, fast technological progress in the production of ICT goods and services may contribute to more rapid multifactor productivity (MFP)_ growth in the ICT producing sector. Third, larger use of ICT may help firms increase their overall efficiency and thus raise MFP” (41).
The following data bases were screened: “…Total Economy Growth Accounting and the 60-inidustry database of the Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC); the OECT STAN database for Industrial Analysis and the OECT Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI); EUROSTAT, R&D and National Accounts database…In principle, the best coverage in terms of variables/ indicators and countries is given by EUROSTAT data. Time-series length however is too often below 10 years…” (43).
Data sources evaluated on 44: the best overall source is EUROSTAT, especially for human capital and policy variables, however, time series are too short; GGDC is the best for ICT variables and indicators; OECT data have many holes, but are good and straight forward (44).
The authors then develop a “Core Data Set” which is a combination of both OECD and GGDC numbers.
There is some statistical analysis of the Core Data Set, and one of the main findings is a strong relationship between IT expenditures and regulations. More detailed analysis of the results on page 56.
A discussion of e-inclusions follows, with its definition and the reason that it is an important factor for European development. These discussions revolve around the literature on the digital divide. This then moves into discussions of digital literacy, how e-inclusion motivates and empowers, ehealth, egovernment, e-everything.
E-inclusion variables are listed in a table on 75-78.
Ch IV: Technology and Performance
“The purpose of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, the evaluation will be used to choose the CGE model to be employed for simulation exercises of the impact of ICT on economic performance; on the other hand it will help identifying [sic] possible ways of introducing ICT in several CGE models…” (83).
Heavy focus on how ICT can be modeled through endogenous productivity in a CGE with an emphasis on spill-over effects. Definition of ICT: “…the OECD provides an official definition of ICT, and ICT goods and services are evaluated taking into account their ‘intrinsic‘ quality” (84). The authors also defined productivity as relating to TFP contributions by the ICT sectors. They explain that it is easier to identify positive productivity contributions made by ICT in the production sector, but much more difficult in the service sector. They also identify different types of time lag patterns associated with different structural factors within countries that make them more or less likely to reap the rewards of improved and increased use of ICT.
They then compare 8 models: NEMISIS; MULTIMOD; WORLDSCAN; QUEST; NiGEM; IFs; Oxford World Macroeconomic Model and GEM E-3. They felt like IFs was quite suitable for their purposes because it has a thick endogenous technology model as well as an explicit ICT sector, as well as an ability to alter productivity through R&D spending.
They also claim that IFs does not take into consideration technological spillover effects (102).
They then run simulations with many of the models and explore the various assumptions of each model.
Ch V: ICT as a General Purpose Technology
“The existing CGE models with endogenous technical change cannot fully capture tehh complex mechanisms through which ICT influences economic performance….can be improved in three ways…First, the list of endogenous variables that are affected by ICT could be extended by including employment and international competitiveness. Second, the interaction between ICT and other variables affecting the overall business environment (such as regulation, sectoral composition, and human capital) could be taken into account. Third, the uneven impact of ICT across sectors could be considered as well” (115). Also, claim that a higher degree of sectoral disaggregating would make it easier to model the effects of ICT.
They want to explore a variety of variables relating to ICT and see how this effects productivity differently. They run scenarios with IFs that firstly look at variables that more directly drive production, and then at diffusion effects (119).
There is a review of the structure of the IFs model generally, with a focus on the drivers of MFP.
Scenario A: The role of capital accumulation in the ICT sector. “This scenario aims at understanding the effect of a more productive capital factor in the ICT sector” (124). Conclusion: there is a long time lag.
Scenario B: The diffusion process of ICT best practices across sectors. “The scenario tries to evaluate the impact of a more rapid rate of adoption and diffusion of ICT through the service sector, which is typically a large user of ICT” (128).
Scenario C: The diffusion of ICT across countries. “In this scenario we assume different regimes for the MFP of the ICT sector for technological leaders, in order to evaluate the diffusion of different technological frontiers reached by a country which is assumed to be a system leader” (132).
Scenario D: The effects of past adoptions of ICT. “In this scenario we simulate different regimes regarding the adoption of ICT technologies in the economic system” (137). This scenario focuses heavily on the number of networked people variable in IFs.
Scenario E: The role of institutional setup I. “..effects of a change in the elasticity of the multifactor productivity of the ICT sector to the level of network infrastructure in the economic system” (141).
Scenario F: The role of institutional setup II. “…change the value of the elasticity of MFP of the ICT sector to the infrastructures in communication technology” (143).
Ch. VI: Endogenizing ICT
Exploration of the digital divide and literature explaining the phenomena with different drivers highlighted: Income? Human Capital? Regulation? Demographics? Economic Freedom? Service/Agriculture sectors of the economy? Price index?
“Our empirical results are in line with the literature on the digital divide…Human capital, and investments in R&D are factors that increase ICT investments, while burdensome regulation tends to depress them. Furthermore, the structure of the economy turns out to be a relevant factor to understand the different rate of investment in ICT; in particular, countries with a higher share of the service sector usually display hither ICT investment” (156).
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
O'Brien: Anticipating the Good, the Bad and the Ugly
O'Brien, S., 2002. Anticipating the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Early Warning Approach to Conflict and Instability Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(6), 791.
This study uses a statistical technique called fuzzy analysis of statistical evidence (FASE) to determine whether or not there are country-level, “macrostructural factors that can contribute to different kinds and levels of intensity of conflict and country instabilities” (791). O’Brien concludes that his method can forecast both the occurrence and intensity of conflicts for the following 5 years with 80% accuracy.
The paper begins by exploring the need for policy relevant scholarship, especially that exploring early-warning systems. The paper highlights a variety of studies that attempt to provide such scholarship. It then explores the State Failure Task Force (SFTF) and their four types of state failure: genocides/politicides, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and adverse/disruptive regime transitions (792).
The SFTF used a variety of methodological tools, including logistic regressions, neural networks and genetic algorithms to look at patterns in structural data. They found that their best model included only three variables: level of democracy, trade openness and infant mortality rate (793). They were about 66% effective with these variables historically. King and Zeng outperform the SFTF model by including legislative effectiveness and fraction of population in the military.
This study attempts to expand upon these earlier approaches.
He uses KOSIMO data
TRUNCATED HERE
This study uses a statistical technique called fuzzy analysis of statistical evidence (FASE) to determine whether or not there are country-level, “macrostructural factors that can contribute to different kinds and levels of intensity of conflict and country instabilities” (791). O’Brien concludes that his method can forecast both the occurrence and intensity of conflicts for the following 5 years with 80% accuracy.
The paper begins by exploring the need for policy relevant scholarship, especially that exploring early-warning systems. The paper highlights a variety of studies that attempt to provide such scholarship. It then explores the State Failure Task Force (SFTF) and their four types of state failure: genocides/politicides, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and adverse/disruptive regime transitions (792).
The SFTF used a variety of methodological tools, including logistic regressions, neural networks and genetic algorithms to look at patterns in structural data. They found that their best model included only three variables: level of democracy, trade openness and infant mortality rate (793). They were about 66% effective with these variables historically. King and Zeng outperform the SFTF model by including legislative effectiveness and fraction of population in the military.
This study attempts to expand upon these earlier approaches.
He uses KOSIMO data
TRUNCATED HERE
Campbell: Writing Security
Campbell, D., 1998. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, University of Minnesota Press.
Ch 1: Provocations of Our Time
“The demise of the cold war has been much heralded. But the causzes, meaning, and implications of this political rupture (assuming its veracity) are much debated” (15).
“To proclaim the end of the cold war assumes that we know what the cold war was” (15).
“The interpretive approach…sees theory as practice: the theory of international relations is one instance of the pervasive cultural practices that serve to discipline ambiguity” (17).
He defines the “late modern period” as one of “the globalization of contingency, the, “increasing tendencies toward ambiguity, indeterminacy, and uncertainty on our horizon” (17). These are not just from the outside in, but they also come from within (or most importantly come from within?). “This globalization of contingency…renders problematic the discursive practices that have made those spatializations of power possible…The irruption of contingency opens up the possibility of observing that foundational discourses…work to constitute the identities in whose name they operate” (18).
The key to understanding “what was at stake” in the cold war is through the analysis of discourse. Other attempts to flesh out the subject-object continuum are less than helpful. “…if we accept that there is nothing possible outside of discourse…the way is open to reconsider what was at stake in the cold war” (22).
Examines some of the important national security documents that have been declassified and speeches given by leaders. There is a constant reiteration of the themes of the state, the moral justification for action, and the desire to fill an international void with order. There is a constant reminder of the dangers of global communism and their intention for global expansion. However, this threat is not the full reason that the US undertook certain aggressive policies; the desire to become a great power, an international leader, was a crucial aspect of foreign policy. The author argues that the “cold war” is much more than what it is traditionally thought to be, and the same mentality continues to prevail.
Ch 2: Rethinking Foreign Policy
The chapter begins by exploring questions of identity and difference. Firstly, it explores questions posed to immigrants to the US that are concerned with, “…the elimination of that which is alien, foreign, and perceived as a threat to a secure state” (36). “Does the inside of a state exist in marked contrast to the outside? What is at stake in the attempt to screen the strange, the unfamiliar, and the threatening associated with the outside from the familiar and safe, which are linked to the inside?” (36).
The etymology of foreign is explored. “How is it that we…came to understand foreign policy as the external deployment of instrumental reason on behalf of an unproblematic internal identity situated in an anarchic realm of necessity?” (37). “Thus, if one were operating in terms of the ‘levels-of-analysis’ metaphor found in traditional international relations literature, the argument here would need to be regarded at a level beyond that associated with either the state or the international system. The argument here is concerned with the representation of history that allows us to talk in terms of ‘the state’ and ‘the international system,’ and the impact that problematization has had on our understanding of foreign policy” (37). “[I]t is about how the conventional understanding of foreign policy was made possible via a discursive economy that gave value to representational practices associated with a particular problematization” (37-8).
He then explores the traditional IR definition and approach to thinking about the state and the international system. The traditional rupture between the early authority of the church that was said to transition to the state after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is used as a foundation for conceptualizing foreign policy today. Campbell claims that a (re)writing of history would provide space for possibly a new interpretation of foreign policy can emerge.
On Westphalia: “For international relations, this rendering of the We4stphalian moment constitutes the conditions of possibility for the discipline. IT establishes the point of origin necessary to suggest that, in contrast to the religious and political structures of the preceding millennia, the history of modern Europe since the Peace of Westphalia has been a history of sovereign states acting in a multistate system” (41).
Extensive discussion of Christianity as it relates to the traditional narrative of IR.
“To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and threats that about in it is thus not to offer a simple ethnographic description of our condition; it is to invoke a discourse of danger through which the incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the insistence of identity. Danger might therefore be thought of as the new god for the modern world of states, not because it is peculiar to our time, but because it replaces the logic of Christendom’s evangelism of fear” (50). Foreign policy disciplines the state. The state acts out of fear of violent death.
Ch 1: Provocations of Our Time
“The demise of the cold war has been much heralded. But the causzes, meaning, and implications of this political rupture (assuming its veracity) are much debated” (15).
“To proclaim the end of the cold war assumes that we know what the cold war was” (15).
“The interpretive approach…sees theory as practice: the theory of international relations is one instance of the pervasive cultural practices that serve to discipline ambiguity” (17).
He defines the “late modern period” as one of “the globalization of contingency, the, “increasing tendencies toward ambiguity, indeterminacy, and uncertainty on our horizon” (17). These are not just from the outside in, but they also come from within (or most importantly come from within?). “This globalization of contingency…renders problematic the discursive practices that have made those spatializations of power possible…The irruption of contingency opens up the possibility of observing that foundational discourses…work to constitute the identities in whose name they operate” (18).
The key to understanding “what was at stake” in the cold war is through the analysis of discourse. Other attempts to flesh out the subject-object continuum are less than helpful. “…if we accept that there is nothing possible outside of discourse…the way is open to reconsider what was at stake in the cold war” (22).
Examines some of the important national security documents that have been declassified and speeches given by leaders. There is a constant reiteration of the themes of the state, the moral justification for action, and the desire to fill an international void with order. There is a constant reminder of the dangers of global communism and their intention for global expansion. However, this threat is not the full reason that the US undertook certain aggressive policies; the desire to become a great power, an international leader, was a crucial aspect of foreign policy. The author argues that the “cold war” is much more than what it is traditionally thought to be, and the same mentality continues to prevail.
Ch 2: Rethinking Foreign Policy
The chapter begins by exploring questions of identity and difference. Firstly, it explores questions posed to immigrants to the US that are concerned with, “…the elimination of that which is alien, foreign, and perceived as a threat to a secure state” (36). “Does the inside of a state exist in marked contrast to the outside? What is at stake in the attempt to screen the strange, the unfamiliar, and the threatening associated with the outside from the familiar and safe, which are linked to the inside?” (36).
The etymology of foreign is explored. “How is it that we…came to understand foreign policy as the external deployment of instrumental reason on behalf of an unproblematic internal identity situated in an anarchic realm of necessity?” (37). “Thus, if one were operating in terms of the ‘levels-of-analysis’ metaphor found in traditional international relations literature, the argument here would need to be regarded at a level beyond that associated with either the state or the international system. The argument here is concerned with the representation of history that allows us to talk in terms of ‘the state’ and ‘the international system,’ and the impact that problematization has had on our understanding of foreign policy” (37). “[I]t is about how the conventional understanding of foreign policy was made possible via a discursive economy that gave value to representational practices associated with a particular problematization” (37-8).
He then explores the traditional IR definition and approach to thinking about the state and the international system. The traditional rupture between the early authority of the church that was said to transition to the state after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is used as a foundation for conceptualizing foreign policy today. Campbell claims that a (re)writing of history would provide space for possibly a new interpretation of foreign policy can emerge.
On Westphalia: “For international relations, this rendering of the We4stphalian moment constitutes the conditions of possibility for the discipline. IT establishes the point of origin necessary to suggest that, in contrast to the religious and political structures of the preceding millennia, the history of modern Europe since the Peace of Westphalia has been a history of sovereign states acting in a multistate system” (41).
Extensive discussion of Christianity as it relates to the traditional narrative of IR.
“To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and threats that about in it is thus not to offer a simple ethnographic description of our condition; it is to invoke a discourse of danger through which the incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the insistence of identity. Danger might therefore be thought of as the new god for the modern world of states, not because it is peculiar to our time, but because it replaces the logic of Christendom’s evangelism of fear” (50). Foreign policy disciplines the state. The state acts out of fear of violent death.
Monday, July 14, 2008
Keohane: Neorealism and Its Critics
Keohane, R., 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press.
Ch 3: Reductionist and Systemic Theories
“A reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts” (47).
“Analysts who confine their attention to interacting units, without recognizing that systemic causes are in play, compensate for the omissions by assigning such causes arbitrarily to the level of interacting units and parceling them out among actors” (49).
Looks at inside-out theories of international politics that attempt to explain system level behavior by looking at the activities occurring within a unit. “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states” (52).
“The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent. Why then do we find such a persistent pull toward reduction [specifically citing Morgenthau, Kissinger and Levy]? The answer is that usually reduction results not from a scholar’s intent but from his errors” (53).
Changes in structure can be separated from changes in units (55).
“From the first part of this article, we know that the theory we want to construct has to be a systemic one” (56).
“What do I mean by explain? I mean explain in these senses: to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to say why patterns of behavior recur; to say why events repeat themselves, including events that none or few of the actors may like” (57).
“A theory has explanatory and predictive power. A theory also has elegance. Elegance in social-science theories means that explanations and predictions will be general” (57).
“Structures, moreover, may suddenly change. A structural change is a revolution, whether or not violently produced, and it is so because it gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the system varied with changes in structure. Across systems, a theory explains change. A theory of international politics can succeed only if political structures are defined in ways that identify their causal effects and show how those effects vary as structural changes” (58).
“In a systems theory, some part of the explanation of behaviors and outcomes is found in the system’s structure. A political structure is akin to a field of forces in physics interactions within a field have properties as the field affects the objects, so the objects affect the field” (62).
Structure: will unify outputs with a variety of inputs; also, “…a set of constraining conditions” (62). “Agents and agencies act; systems as a whole do not” (63).
“The first way in which structures work their effects is through a process of socialization that limits and molds behavior” (65).
“Order may prevail without an borderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator. The mayor of New York City does not phone the gardeners of southern New Jersey and tell them to grow more tomatoes next year because too few were recently supplied” (67).
Ch 4: Political Structures
“A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” (70).
“’Relation’ is used to mean both the interaction of units and the positions they occupy vis-à-vis each other…To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system” (71).
“A structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting parts” (72).
“Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system. Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them” (73). There is an exploration of the structure of domestic politics to juxtapose with international politics. “A domestic political structure is thus defined, first, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second, by specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units” (74).
“Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long as a strubu8re endures…Structure operates as a cause, but it is not the only cause in play” (80).
“I defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capabilities across units” (81).
Ordering Principles:
“Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic” (81). Whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability” (81-2).
“If structure is an organizational concept, the terms ‘structure’ and ‘anarchy’ seem to be in contradiction. If international politics is ‘politics in the absence of government,’ what are we in the presence of? In looking for international structure, one is brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable position to be in. The problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking” (82). Draws parallels w/ microeconomic theory.
“International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units” (84).
“I assume that states seek to ensure their survival” (85).
The Character of the Units:
“The second term in the definition of domestic political structure specifies the functions performed by differentiated units. Hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation…The second term is not needed in defining international-political structure, because so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units. International structures vary only through a change of organizing principle, or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units” (87).
“Just as economists define markets in terms of firms, so I define international-political structures in terms of states” (88).
The units are all sovereign; the units tend not to die; the units vary widely in terms of power, etc.
Distribution of Capabilities:
“The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks” (92).
“I have not defined the two essential elements of a systems theory of international politics—the structure of the system and its interacting units” (94).
“Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered…second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units… third, by the distribution of capabilities across units” (96).
Ch 5: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power
“The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (98).
“The distinction between international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or the nonuse of force but in their different structures” (99).
“Differences between national and international structures are reflected in the ways the units of each system define their ends and develop the means for reaching them” (100).
“Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities” (101).
“The structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states in two ways” (101). “In a self-help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others” (101). “A state also worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. That is the second way in whi8ch the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states” (103).
Discussion of emergent phenomena, insecurity and freedom, organization costs in anarchy…
“National politcs is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation” (111).
“I have described anarchies and hierarchies as though every political order were of one type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write of structures allow for a greater, and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types” (112).
“Increasing the number of categories would bring the classification of societies closer to reality. But that would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy. One who wishes to explain rather than to describe should resist moving in that direction if resistance is reasonable” (113).
Realpolitik: “The ruler’s, and later the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; success is the ultimate test of policy; and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state” (115-6).
“A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: they are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (117).
States use means available to them: internal and external (117).
If one state is successful, others will emulate. The structure of the international system is the driver of balances of power recurring.
Ch 3: Reductionist and Systemic Theories
“A reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts” (47).
“Analysts who confine their attention to interacting units, without recognizing that systemic causes are in play, compensate for the omissions by assigning such causes arbitrarily to the level of interacting units and parceling them out among actors” (49).
Looks at inside-out theories of international politics that attempt to explain system level behavior by looking at the activities occurring within a unit. “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states” (52).
“The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent. Why then do we find such a persistent pull toward reduction [specifically citing Morgenthau, Kissinger and Levy]? The answer is that usually reduction results not from a scholar’s intent but from his errors” (53).
Changes in structure can be separated from changes in units (55).
“From the first part of this article, we know that the theory we want to construct has to be a systemic one” (56).
“What do I mean by explain? I mean explain in these senses: to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to say why patterns of behavior recur; to say why events repeat themselves, including events that none or few of the actors may like” (57).
“A theory has explanatory and predictive power. A theory also has elegance. Elegance in social-science theories means that explanations and predictions will be general” (57).
“Structures, moreover, may suddenly change. A structural change is a revolution, whether or not violently produced, and it is so because it gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the system varied with changes in structure. Across systems, a theory explains change. A theory of international politics can succeed only if political structures are defined in ways that identify their causal effects and show how those effects vary as structural changes” (58).
“In a systems theory, some part of the explanation of behaviors and outcomes is found in the system’s structure. A political structure is akin to a field of forces in physics interactions within a field have properties as the field affects the objects, so the objects affect the field” (62).
Structure: will unify outputs with a variety of inputs; also, “…a set of constraining conditions” (62). “Agents and agencies act; systems as a whole do not” (63).
“The first way in which structures work their effects is through a process of socialization that limits and molds behavior” (65).
“Order may prevail without an borderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator. The mayor of New York City does not phone the gardeners of southern New Jersey and tell them to grow more tomatoes next year because too few were recently supplied” (67).
Ch 4: Political Structures
“A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” (70).
“’Relation’ is used to mean both the interaction of units and the positions they occupy vis-à-vis each other…To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system” (71).
“A structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting parts” (72).
“Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system. Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them” (73). There is an exploration of the structure of domestic politics to juxtapose with international politics. “A domestic political structure is thus defined, first, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second, by specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units” (74).
“Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long as a strubu8re endures…Structure operates as a cause, but it is not the only cause in play” (80).
“I defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capabilities across units” (81).
Ordering Principles:
“Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic” (81). Whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability” (81-2).
“If structure is an organizational concept, the terms ‘structure’ and ‘anarchy’ seem to be in contradiction. If international politics is ‘politics in the absence of government,’ what are we in the presence of? In looking for international structure, one is brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable position to be in. The problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking” (82). Draws parallels w/ microeconomic theory.
“International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units” (84).
“I assume that states seek to ensure their survival” (85).
The Character of the Units:
“The second term in the definition of domestic political structure specifies the functions performed by differentiated units. Hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation…The second term is not needed in defining international-political structure, because so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units. International structures vary only through a change of organizing principle, or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units” (87).
“Just as economists define markets in terms of firms, so I define international-political structures in terms of states” (88).
The units are all sovereign; the units tend not to die; the units vary widely in terms of power, etc.
Distribution of Capabilities:
“The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks” (92).
“I have not defined the two essential elements of a systems theory of international politics—the structure of the system and its interacting units” (94).
“Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered…second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units… third, by the distribution of capabilities across units” (96).
Ch 5: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power
“The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (98).
“The distinction between international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or the nonuse of force but in their different structures” (99).
“Differences between national and international structures are reflected in the ways the units of each system define their ends and develop the means for reaching them” (100).
“Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities” (101).
“The structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states in two ways” (101). “In a self-help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others” (101). “A state also worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. That is the second way in whi8ch the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states” (103).
Discussion of emergent phenomena, insecurity and freedom, organization costs in anarchy…
“National politcs is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation” (111).
“I have described anarchies and hierarchies as though every political order were of one type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write of structures allow for a greater, and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types” (112).
“Increasing the number of categories would bring the classification of societies closer to reality. But that would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy. One who wishes to explain rather than to describe should resist moving in that direction if resistance is reasonable” (113).
Realpolitik: “The ruler’s, and later the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; success is the ultimate test of policy; and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state” (115-6).
“A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: they are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (117).
States use means available to them: internal and external (117).
If one state is successful, others will emulate. The structure of the international system is the driver of balances of power recurring.
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