Clemens, WC. 2002. “Complexity Theory as a Tool for Understanding and Coping with Ethnic Conflict and Development Issues in Post-Soviet Eurasia.” International Journal of Peace Studies 7(2): 1-16.
“This paper contends that movement toward or away from resolution of ethnic problems in newly independent states can be more fully explained [than does Snyder, 2000 and the focus on democratization] by concepts derived from complexity theory. These concepts do not contradict explanations rooted in democratization but enrich them and offer linkages to other fields of knowledge. They start with a wider lens than democratization but include it. The concept of societal fitness, a major concern of complexity theory, subsumes political, economic, and cultural strengths. The precise role played by each strength in shaping societal fitness becomes an important but secondary question” (2).
“Generated by scholars from various disciplines, complexity theory integrates concepts from many fields to produce a new slant on evolution. Its exponents seek a general theory able to explain many different types of phenomena” (2).
“The analysis here suggests that complexity theory can enhance our ability to describe and explain the past and present. But the theory has much less utility for projecting alternative futures or prescribing policy. Still, complexity theory can enlarge our vision and complement other approaches to social science” (2).
“Complexity theory is anchored in nine basic concepts: fitness, coevolution, emergence, agent-based systems, self-organization, self-organized criticality, punctuated equilibrium and fitness landscapes” (3).
Fitness: how well does a system deal with complexity? All systems are on a range from highly unstable to highly stable, where fitness is located in the middle.
Coevolution: Everything evolves together, and the more connections that there are, the more difficult it is to understand what is happening.
Emergence: Macro complexity arising from micro complexity.
Agent-Based Systems: Systems where emergence comes from the behavior of individual units.
Self-Organization: The system organizes to create fitness.
Self-Organized Criticality: Claimed to not be essential to complexity theory, but posits a system that exists directly between order and chaos, where it can slip into chaos quicly.
Punctuated Equilibrium: Tipping points, where extinctions happen, mutations etc.
Fitness Landscapes: Fitness of different groups as they coevolve. Thus, the fitness of one group can be negatively or positively impacted by actions taken by another group.
The paper argues that certain countries demonstrate high levels of fitness, as can be seen in HDI scores. Other countries had lower levels of fitness. These countries had different histories from the countries experiencing high levels of fitness, and dealt with minority groups less well. Self-organization takes in democratic politics, market economies and the media. Coevolution explains that countries close to the West evolve with them. Emergence is seen in agreements and regional groups. Agent-Based systems in the fit groups, agents are free. Self-organized Criticality: some countries might not be as stable as they appear! Punctuated equilibrium: don’t expect steady progress. Fitness Landscapes: it might be possible to say something here, maybe not.
“The fundamental insight of complexity theory is its prediction that fitness will be found along the middle range of a spectrum ranging from rigid order to the other extreme—chaos. This insight helps explain why Central Asia is frozen in time, why the Caucasus explodes and why Russia resorts to an iron fist to overcome chaos” (10).
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Easton: An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems
Easton, David. 1957. “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems.” World Politics 9(3) (April): 383-400.
List of attributes of a political system:
1. Properties of identification
a. Units of a political system
b. Boundaries: “Without pausing to argue the matter, I would suggest that it is useful to conceive of a political system as having a boundary in the same sense as a physical system. The boundary of a political system is defined by all those actions more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for a society; every social action that does not partake of this characteristic will be excluded from the system and thereby will automatically be viewed as an external variable in the environment” (385).
2. Inputs and outputs. “Presumably, if we select political systems for special study, we do so because we believe that they have characteristically important consequences for society, namely, authoritative decisions. These consequences I shall call the outputs” (385).
3. Differentiation within a system
4. Integration of a system
List of attributes of a political system:
1. Properties of identification
a. Units of a political system
b. Boundaries: “Without pausing to argue the matter, I would suggest that it is useful to conceive of a political system as having a boundary in the same sense as a physical system. The boundary of a political system is defined by all those actions more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for a society; every social action that does not partake of this characteristic will be excluded from the system and thereby will automatically be viewed as an external variable in the environment” (385).
2. Inputs and outputs. “Presumably, if we select political systems for special study, we do so because we believe that they have characteristically important consequences for society, namely, authoritative decisions. These consequences I shall call the outputs” (385).
3. Differentiation within a system
4. Integration of a system
Thursday, February 18, 2010
Weltman: Systems Theory in International Relations
Weltman, John J. 1973. Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.
“The best-known application of this approach to international relations is embodies in Morton A. Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics. Building on Kaplan’s framework and modifying it to suit their own purposes, other authors have employed systems theory in many studies. …We propose to analyze in this work the utility of this body of thought as a vehicle by which knowledge relating to the field of international relations may be advanced” (1). Utility will be defined as the explanatory power of the theory.
Kaplan’s definition of systems approach to IR: “A system of action is a set of variables so related, in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of the variables to each other and the external relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables” (3).
“Through the use of this concept it is possible to describe the state of the system, and to delineate the requirements for its continue dexistance. Processes contributing to these requirements are functional. The system is by definition in equilibrium. The regularities observable in its operation provide the limits of the equilibrium. A disequilibrium indicates the dissolution of the system; with the ordered pattern of interaction previously defining it no longer operative, the system can no longer be distinguished from its environment” (3).
Discussion of feedback, a term drawn from cybernetics (4).
“Marion J. Levy’s definition of Structure, as cited in Weltman: “The term structure as used here means a pattern, i.e., an observable uniformity ,of action or operation” (4) The definition of function: “The term function…is defined here as a condition, or state of affairs, resultant from the operation…of a structure through time” (4).
Martindale quote on holism and elementarism in Weltman: “Holism is the view tha the basic social reality consists of interrelated wholes which are superior to the individual and his acts…One cannot of course have a whole without parts, but the whole is prior to the parts in the sense that its operations are irreducible to these parts and their properties. Elementarism is the view that the basic social reality is constituted by individuals and their acts. Social events consist solely in their interaction. Any notion that interaction possesses new or emergent properties such that some sort of whole with irreducible properties of its own arises is a pure product of reification” (5).
There is a discussion of “sociological functionalism” with many references to “self sufficiency” “system maintaining” “system determined” (6-7).
In summarizing Merton: “Function is defined as an equilibrium-conducing operation” (7).
“But precisely what is the nature of this system called political? Easton answers this question by referring to what can only be called the function of the political within the larger context of the social system or society. The political system stems from and fulfills a need of the social system. Without fulfillment of this function of ‘authoritative allocation of values,’ a society cannot exist” (9).
The discussion moves from sociological functional theories to general systems theory, its structure, and ability to produce hypotheses of use. General Systems Theory is an attempt to create the language of a methodological approach that can be used across scientific fields.
“The view of reality lying behind the more ambitious formulations of the utility of general systems theory can be neither proved nor disproved; it can only be stated. It is basically a metaphysical scheme which seeks to find in reality an ultimate orderliness above and beyond the ken of normal scientific methods of verification. Systems theory in the study of international relations is a mode of analysis growing out of, and conditioned by, two pervasive currents of thought—functional sociology and general systems theory. These modes of thought do exhibit certain points of common concern. They are both essentially holistic; each would find more in the whole than the sum of its parts. They approach this point of common concern, whoever, by different, and one might say complementary, routes. The functional sociologists are more concerned with activity than with the entity within which this activity occurs, to which it is related, and in terms of which it is assessed. The whole often appears as a residual, whose definition is important less for operational utility than for logical completeness. What is secondary for functional sociology is primary in general systems theory. The nature of the entity within which activity occurs is paramount, often to the exclusion of direct concern with the concrete activity itself” (14).
“Given the non-operational or tautological nature of the bulk of the ‘essential rules’ of his systems, it follows that Kaplan’s conclusions concerning systemic stability and transformation are not compelling. Too often these statements refer merely to end results of processes…We are left with little to enable us to predict in concrete circumstances which one among several possible transformations will occur…Conclusions as to stability or transformation—if they are not make indeterminate as above—turn on hypotheses as to international relations which are not made an explicit part of the systems analysis. It is possible to trace through Kaplan’s work a series of assumptions of this sort, which, rather than systemic analysis, provide the basis from which his conclusions follow. Thus Kaplan assumes rather than demonstrates a tendency toward instability as the state structure approaches bipolarity” (34).
The next book explored is Haas and Beyond the Nation-State. The same criterion are used to judge the use of the theory.
“It should of course be obvious that this analysis too could easily be formulated without the intrusion of the concepts of systems theory…That third parties find their positions enhanced by the occurrence of conflict between others is a commonplace of the folk wisdom of political thought…Haas has attempted to rework the systems approach so as to eliminate the occurrence of causal statements purporting to explain phenomena by reference to an attribute of the system. This he has attempted to do by introducing his ‘concrete, actor-oriented’ system. Unfortunately, by doing away with the type of explanation mentioned, he has left us with little but an undifferentiated mass of data. It is only by introducing criteria of importance and behavioral assumptions which are systemic and autonomous that this data can be made to yield explanations and interpretations. At best the conceptualizations of systems theory become simply redundant in this process. At worst the approach can serve to absolutize arbitrary interpretations by concealing their origins, and to lend seeming objectivity to mere value preferences. Furthermore, Haas is unable to demonstrate the necessity of the systems approach in arriving at his substantive conclusions or in making predictions” (47-8).
Next is Rosecrance and his Action and Reaction in World Politics. “Rosecrance’s analysis falls into three parts. First there is a series of historical essays describing nine periods of international politics…Next, these nine periods are translated into nine international systems. On the basis of this systemic analysis Rosecrance then explains the mutations of international politics in terms of the interactions of four factors whose influence in the present day he assesses” (49).
“The conclusions Rosecrance derives, supposedly through the vehicle of systemic analysis, are simply the themes of his historical analysis in slightly different form…Thus, the distinction between stable and unstable historical periods is correlated in most instances simply with the presence or absence of international war; and historical analyses in terms of a regulative mechanism often strike the reader as serving no useful purpose furthering explanation of the materials at hand” (60).
Chapter 6 is highly germane for my work. It is on balance of power in the international system and the stability.
“It may be that systems theory should not be regarded as an explanatory scheme, but only as a suggestive device. It does not serve to verify hypotheses, but merely to provide them. It should be understood, then, primarily as a sort of bank of ideas and novel interpretations” (79). However, we have plenty of hypotheses, and what we need is a way to solve them. “The systems approach, then, seems to ahev little utility either as an explanatory scheme or a suggestive device” (79).
“The best-known application of this approach to international relations is embodies in Morton A. Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics. Building on Kaplan’s framework and modifying it to suit their own purposes, other authors have employed systems theory in many studies. …We propose to analyze in this work the utility of this body of thought as a vehicle by which knowledge relating to the field of international relations may be advanced” (1). Utility will be defined as the explanatory power of the theory.
Kaplan’s definition of systems approach to IR: “A system of action is a set of variables so related, in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of the variables to each other and the external relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables” (3).
“Through the use of this concept it is possible to describe the state of the system, and to delineate the requirements for its continue dexistance. Processes contributing to these requirements are functional. The system is by definition in equilibrium. The regularities observable in its operation provide the limits of the equilibrium. A disequilibrium indicates the dissolution of the system; with the ordered pattern of interaction previously defining it no longer operative, the system can no longer be distinguished from its environment” (3).
Discussion of feedback, a term drawn from cybernetics (4).
“Marion J. Levy’s definition of Structure, as cited in Weltman: “The term structure as used here means a pattern, i.e., an observable uniformity ,of action or operation” (4) The definition of function: “The term function…is defined here as a condition, or state of affairs, resultant from the operation…of a structure through time” (4).
Martindale quote on holism and elementarism in Weltman: “Holism is the view tha the basic social reality consists of interrelated wholes which are superior to the individual and his acts…One cannot of course have a whole without parts, but the whole is prior to the parts in the sense that its operations are irreducible to these parts and their properties. Elementarism is the view that the basic social reality is constituted by individuals and their acts. Social events consist solely in their interaction. Any notion that interaction possesses new or emergent properties such that some sort of whole with irreducible properties of its own arises is a pure product of reification” (5).
There is a discussion of “sociological functionalism” with many references to “self sufficiency” “system maintaining” “system determined” (6-7).
In summarizing Merton: “Function is defined as an equilibrium-conducing operation” (7).
“But precisely what is the nature of this system called political? Easton answers this question by referring to what can only be called the function of the political within the larger context of the social system or society. The political system stems from and fulfills a need of the social system. Without fulfillment of this function of ‘authoritative allocation of values,’ a society cannot exist” (9).
The discussion moves from sociological functional theories to general systems theory, its structure, and ability to produce hypotheses of use. General Systems Theory is an attempt to create the language of a methodological approach that can be used across scientific fields.
“The view of reality lying behind the more ambitious formulations of the utility of general systems theory can be neither proved nor disproved; it can only be stated. It is basically a metaphysical scheme which seeks to find in reality an ultimate orderliness above and beyond the ken of normal scientific methods of verification. Systems theory in the study of international relations is a mode of analysis growing out of, and conditioned by, two pervasive currents of thought—functional sociology and general systems theory. These modes of thought do exhibit certain points of common concern. They are both essentially holistic; each would find more in the whole than the sum of its parts. They approach this point of common concern, whoever, by different, and one might say complementary, routes. The functional sociologists are more concerned with activity than with the entity within which this activity occurs, to which it is related, and in terms of which it is assessed. The whole often appears as a residual, whose definition is important less for operational utility than for logical completeness. What is secondary for functional sociology is primary in general systems theory. The nature of the entity within which activity occurs is paramount, often to the exclusion of direct concern with the concrete activity itself” (14).
“Given the non-operational or tautological nature of the bulk of the ‘essential rules’ of his systems, it follows that Kaplan’s conclusions concerning systemic stability and transformation are not compelling. Too often these statements refer merely to end results of processes…We are left with little to enable us to predict in concrete circumstances which one among several possible transformations will occur…Conclusions as to stability or transformation—if they are not make indeterminate as above—turn on hypotheses as to international relations which are not made an explicit part of the systems analysis. It is possible to trace through Kaplan’s work a series of assumptions of this sort, which, rather than systemic analysis, provide the basis from which his conclusions follow. Thus Kaplan assumes rather than demonstrates a tendency toward instability as the state structure approaches bipolarity” (34).
The next book explored is Haas and Beyond the Nation-State. The same criterion are used to judge the use of the theory.
“It should of course be obvious that this analysis too could easily be formulated without the intrusion of the concepts of systems theory…That third parties find their positions enhanced by the occurrence of conflict between others is a commonplace of the folk wisdom of political thought…Haas has attempted to rework the systems approach so as to eliminate the occurrence of causal statements purporting to explain phenomena by reference to an attribute of the system. This he has attempted to do by introducing his ‘concrete, actor-oriented’ system. Unfortunately, by doing away with the type of explanation mentioned, he has left us with little but an undifferentiated mass of data. It is only by introducing criteria of importance and behavioral assumptions which are systemic and autonomous that this data can be made to yield explanations and interpretations. At best the conceptualizations of systems theory become simply redundant in this process. At worst the approach can serve to absolutize arbitrary interpretations by concealing their origins, and to lend seeming objectivity to mere value preferences. Furthermore, Haas is unable to demonstrate the necessity of the systems approach in arriving at his substantive conclusions or in making predictions” (47-8).
Next is Rosecrance and his Action and Reaction in World Politics. “Rosecrance’s analysis falls into three parts. First there is a series of historical essays describing nine periods of international politics…Next, these nine periods are translated into nine international systems. On the basis of this systemic analysis Rosecrance then explains the mutations of international politics in terms of the interactions of four factors whose influence in the present day he assesses” (49).
“The conclusions Rosecrance derives, supposedly through the vehicle of systemic analysis, are simply the themes of his historical analysis in slightly different form…Thus, the distinction between stable and unstable historical periods is correlated in most instances simply with the presence or absence of international war; and historical analyses in terms of a regulative mechanism often strike the reader as serving no useful purpose furthering explanation of the materials at hand” (60).
Chapter 6 is highly germane for my work. It is on balance of power in the international system and the stability.
“It may be that systems theory should not be regarded as an explanatory scheme, but only as a suggestive device. It does not serve to verify hypotheses, but merely to provide them. It should be understood, then, primarily as a sort of bank of ideas and novel interpretations” (79). However, we have plenty of hypotheses, and what we need is a way to solve them. “The systems approach, then, seems to ahev little utility either as an explanatory scheme or a suggestive device” (79).
Monday, January 25, 2010
Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict
Anon. 1999. Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict. London: Zed Books.
Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict
Lots of good things, especially chapter 5.
Chapter 1:
The standard account of conflict in Africa can be broken down into arguments about either blood or babies. By that, the author indicates conflict over either resources or ethnic tensions;. The author believes that these explanations are not as adequately descriptive as they could be. These explanations are not nuance3d, and much more is brought to bear on the cause of African conflict.
There is a very good overview of the history of the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis. The origins of this conflict is largely related to political situations (Belgium initially preferred the Tutsis, as they were more “European” looking, then preferred the Hutus. The Hutus then gained power, and, when there was the potential for power sharing situations, they quickly took out their frustrations on the Tutsis, eventually leading to genocide when the Hutu president’s plane was shot down.)
Models of agricultural production are also not adequately nuanced and do not take into perspective other options for production, such as organic production that does not overly rely on pesticides, etc. The future needs of global agricultural production are typically prescribed technocratic, top-down solutions, which are not sustainable.
Chapter 2:
There is a typology for African conflict:
1. Banditry
2. National conflict over Political Power
3. Regional conflict over domestic political power
4. Local conflict over renewable resources
The causes of increased violence in Africa are mai8nly Western. Tradi8tional differences between ethnic groups involved violent conflict, but not on the scale that mo9der weaponry affords. . Other causes include the lack of specialization within African countries relating to agricultural or economic production; the economies need to be3 more diversified. Explanations for the cause of conflict typically involve crass claims about e3thnic groups, and do not fully deal with the importance of resources.
Chapter 5:
“A basic assumption of this chapter is that under certain conditions environmental degradation may cause violent conflict or war” (76).
“It is important to note the twin biases in the debate on environmental conflicts among scholars and experts. The first I call ‘the discovery of a new issue’ bias: whenever a new issue emerges, there is a tendency to ignore history. This leads to rather alarming statements about future events such as ‘water wars…The second bias is ‘environmental determinism’, which tends to overestimate the significance of geographical structures, demographic data and resource dependence at the expense of cultural, socioeconomic and political capacities or shortcomings, respectively, in order to deal with environmental degradation as well as discrimination…This chapter does not set out to provide an exhaustive survey of the growing literature dealing with environmental security in one form or another…It concentrates instead on: (1) an early contribution that conceptualized well the interrelationship between environmental transformation, underdevelopment and socio-political conflict…; (2) recent studies which focus on resource scarcity and environmental degradation as a major security issue or as a trigger of various types of serious conflicts” (77).
Then reviews different paths to conflict through environmental scarcity. Of particular use would be the review of three authors and their takes on the link (88). Wallensteen (92), Homer-Dixon (91, 94) and Baechler et al (96) are explored.
Overall, a very useful chapter.
Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict
Lots of good things, especially chapter 5.
Chapter 1:
The standard account of conflict in Africa can be broken down into arguments about either blood or babies. By that, the author indicates conflict over either resources or ethnic tensions;. The author believes that these explanations are not as adequately descriptive as they could be. These explanations are not nuance3d, and much more is brought to bear on the cause of African conflict.
There is a very good overview of the history of the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis. The origins of this conflict is largely related to political situations (Belgium initially preferred the Tutsis, as they were more “European” looking, then preferred the Hutus. The Hutus then gained power, and, when there was the potential for power sharing situations, they quickly took out their frustrations on the Tutsis, eventually leading to genocide when the Hutu president’s plane was shot down.)
Models of agricultural production are also not adequately nuanced and do not take into perspective other options for production, such as organic production that does not overly rely on pesticides, etc. The future needs of global agricultural production are typically prescribed technocratic, top-down solutions, which are not sustainable.
Chapter 2:
There is a typology for African conflict:
1. Banditry
2. National conflict over Political Power
3. Regional conflict over domestic political power
4. Local conflict over renewable resources
The causes of increased violence in Africa are mai8nly Western. Tradi8tional differences between ethnic groups involved violent conflict, but not on the scale that mo9der weaponry affords. . Other causes include the lack of specialization within African countries relating to agricultural or economic production; the economies need to be3 more diversified. Explanations for the cause of conflict typically involve crass claims about e3thnic groups, and do not fully deal with the importance of resources.
Chapter 5:
“A basic assumption of this chapter is that under certain conditions environmental degradation may cause violent conflict or war” (76).
“It is important to note the twin biases in the debate on environmental conflicts among scholars and experts. The first I call ‘the discovery of a new issue’ bias: whenever a new issue emerges, there is a tendency to ignore history. This leads to rather alarming statements about future events such as ‘water wars…The second bias is ‘environmental determinism’, which tends to overestimate the significance of geographical structures, demographic data and resource dependence at the expense of cultural, socioeconomic and political capacities or shortcomings, respectively, in order to deal with environmental degradation as well as discrimination…This chapter does not set out to provide an exhaustive survey of the growing literature dealing with environmental security in one form or another…It concentrates instead on: (1) an early contribution that conceptualized well the interrelationship between environmental transformation, underdevelopment and socio-political conflict…; (2) recent studies which focus on resource scarcity and environmental degradation as a major security issue or as a trigger of various types of serious conflicts” (77).
Then reviews different paths to conflict through environmental scarcity. Of particular use would be the review of three authors and their takes on the link (88). Wallensteen (92), Homer-Dixon (91, 94) and Baechler et al (96) are explored.
Overall, a very useful chapter.
Climate Change and Energy Insecurity
Anon. 2009. Climate Change and Energy Insecurity: The Challenge for Peace, Security and Development. London: Earthscan.
Edited volume of short chapters dealing with many aspects of climate change, clearly not just with energy insecurity.
Some chapters that may have limited use:
Oil: How Can Europe Kick the Habit of Dependence?
Derek Osborn
“Two critical factors will shape the future of oil production and consumption over the next decades. The first is accelerating climate change. The second is the increasing difficulty in finding secure sources of oil in the world. The interaction of these two factors is currently leading the world into a more and more unstable position” (18).
Localized Energy Conflicts in the Oil Sector
Nniimmo Bassey
Oil corrupts already corrupted states. Energy conflicts are not local, but are global (50). What about national peak oils, not just global peak oil (51).
Climate of Fear: Environment, Migration and Security
Devyani Gupta
This is a problem.
Edited volume of short chapters dealing with many aspects of climate change, clearly not just with energy insecurity.
Some chapters that may have limited use:
Oil: How Can Europe Kick the Habit of Dependence?
Derek Osborn
“Two critical factors will shape the future of oil production and consumption over the next decades. The first is accelerating climate change. The second is the increasing difficulty in finding secure sources of oil in the world. The interaction of these two factors is currently leading the world into a more and more unstable position” (18).
Localized Energy Conflicts in the Oil Sector
Nniimmo Bassey
Oil corrupts already corrupted states. Energy conflicts are not local, but are global (50). What about national peak oils, not just global peak oil (51).
Climate of Fear: Environment, Migration and Security
Devyani Gupta
This is a problem.
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Stott: Climate Change, Poverty and War
Stott, R. 2007. “Climate change, poverty and war.” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 100(9) (9): 399-402. doi:10.1258/jrsm.100.9.399.
This article looks at the Global Commons Institute policy prescription for mitigating the impacts of climate change, referred to as Contraction and Convergence. There is little about the link between climate change and conflict, though there are three citations that indicate that climate change will exacerbate the drivers of conflict.
This article looks at the Global Commons Institute policy prescription for mitigating the impacts of climate change, referred to as Contraction and Convergence. There is little about the link between climate change and conflict, though there are three citations that indicate that climate change will exacerbate the drivers of conflict.
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
OECD: Infrastructure to 2030
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2006. Infrastructure to 2030. Paris: OECD.
”Tomorrow’s infrastructure will demand a much lower spend than today’s fixed line and cellular mobile and will be much quicker to roll out” (53).
“Often overestimated in the past, telecommunications will nevertheless increasingly be viewed as a potential substitute for travel. This could reduce dependencies on vehicles and their fuels and ameliorate the effects of pollution” (54).
“This section briefly reviews the telecommunication infrastructure developments of the past 25 years by examining gfour areas of trends in infrastructure investment:
-past demand and the main drivers
-current state of the infrastructure
-whether past developments in demand will continue
-which trends seem clearly unsustainable” (61).
The publication presents a table over viewing the main drivers of telecommunication demand. Under the “main drivers” of broadband (long-distance, not local loop) demand are “cost and technical (ease of upgrading capacity) for growing international data traffic, especially Internet users after 1996/7 as World Wide Web interface made the Internet popular” (62). It is clear that the roll-out of broadband is very heavily driven by consumer demand.
“The major point here is that there is an underlying force behind the successful developments of recent times. Liberalization has been a significant driver of infrastructure development over the past 25 years since it has allowed the door to open to a new era of multiple infrastructures. Demand-side forces, especially the power of consumers acting on the political balance in government, have produced a revolution in the three key infrastructure drivers of telecommunications:
-…deregulation…
-competition of all kinds…
-new technology…” (64).
What about the future of telecom demand? “With the growing importance of the knowledge-based economy, the demand for telecommunications and its infrastructure will continue to expand well beyond 2030” (68).
“Key factors driving future demand and infrastructure investment” (70).
“-geopolitics;
-security;
-macroeconomy;
-finance;
-demography;
-environment;
-technology;
-governance;
-telecommunications pricing;
-microeconomics—primary consumer basics inflation” (70).
“Projected trends in demand for telecoms and investment to 2030” (78).
“Accessibility = control of access + cost of access + ease of access + ubiquity + speed of rollout” (79).
“In general we can say that the main trend in demand for telecommunications that will drive infrastructure is a massive expansion of demand globally from developin countries, firstly as incomes increase to around the USD 3 000 level. Secondly we can expect take-up for those below this income level, as prices fall” (82).
“In later years, beyond 2015, an increasing component of traffic is expected to be machine-to-machine communications and transactions over the Internet, especially in industrial applications such as supply chain, process control and also in financial transactions for person to machine. An ‘Internet of things’ will grow up. Machine-to-machine communications for industrial and consumer functions and person-to-machine, for instance to make purchases, will be increasingly an everyday event. The impact on infrastructure will be to increase not only the traffic, but the address space required for all the new respondents” (84).
“The telecommunications industry has been notoriously poor at forecasting the take-up of new technologies and services, largely because market forecasts have often been supply driven and technocentric and do not focus on understanding consumers; behavior and their needs—and what they will pay for…A better approach to forecasting is to identify and understand the underlying trends and their drivers, and to take a demand-driven approach. Firstly a more global view of the market is not essential. This perspective provides an understanding that the overall telecommunications market has the potential to grow to three or four times its current size in terms of the number of consumers, by expansion outside the OECD group. This pricing is important and this will be the key stimulant for consumer take-up. A second key finding is that ‘content is not king’; instead it is connectivity that consumers will pay for as their primary m0otivation as this new market opens…Third, wireless technologies are developing rapidly and allowing infrastructure to be rolled out more cost effectively than ever before, offering the promise of connectivity anytime, anywhere, and at even lower prices…” (85).
The issue of infrastructure investment is then explored. It is highlighted that telecom investment, as a percentage of total infrastructure investment, has found its share steadily growing (86).
Private v public investment: “Private sector-led growth in infrastructure investment has revolutionzed access to telecommunications services around the world over the past ten years. For the OECD community we see that deregulation has allowed new pricing regimes, not controlled by the incumbents, and specifically the VoIP market to take off, despite attempts to ban or restrict it in some countries” (88).
“The key growth regions for telecommunications infrastructure, as outlined above, are in developing countries” (88).
There is a discussion of the future mix of technology, and how this relates to current infrastructure constraints (the local loop, for example).
“In consequence it is possible to see the progressive arrival of a new model of infrastructure, heavily influenced by the requirements of the low-cost demands, from developing countries seeking more ‘bits per buck’ for their billions of people in the under USD 3 000 per year income bracket” (101).
“The result may be parallel operation of two infrastructure models globally for at least a decade: a previous OECD model of mixed long distance carrier standards for trunk networking with a legacy of wireline in broadband DSL and CATV cable in the local loop, and at the same time, the simpler two level radio access/fibre long distance model slowly spreading across the world” (103). The mix of this parallel development is explored for different key regions on 110-1.
Cross-infrastructure impacts on transport are explored on 122-5. On health and medicine on 128-9. On the elderly on 130-1. On education on 131-3. On crime on 133-4.
The chapter ends with policy recommendations.
”Tomorrow’s infrastructure will demand a much lower spend than today’s fixed line and cellular mobile and will be much quicker to roll out” (53).
“Often overestimated in the past, telecommunications will nevertheless increasingly be viewed as a potential substitute for travel. This could reduce dependencies on vehicles and their fuels and ameliorate the effects of pollution” (54).
“This section briefly reviews the telecommunication infrastructure developments of the past 25 years by examining gfour areas of trends in infrastructure investment:
-past demand and the main drivers
-current state of the infrastructure
-whether past developments in demand will continue
-which trends seem clearly unsustainable” (61).
The publication presents a table over viewing the main drivers of telecommunication demand. Under the “main drivers” of broadband (long-distance, not local loop) demand are “cost and technical (ease of upgrading capacity) for growing international data traffic, especially Internet users after 1996/7 as World Wide Web interface made the Internet popular” (62). It is clear that the roll-out of broadband is very heavily driven by consumer demand.
“The major point here is that there is an underlying force behind the successful developments of recent times. Liberalization has been a significant driver of infrastructure development over the past 25 years since it has allowed the door to open to a new era of multiple infrastructures. Demand-side forces, especially the power of consumers acting on the political balance in government, have produced a revolution in the three key infrastructure drivers of telecommunications:
-…deregulation…
-competition of all kinds…
-new technology…” (64).
What about the future of telecom demand? “With the growing importance of the knowledge-based economy, the demand for telecommunications and its infrastructure will continue to expand well beyond 2030” (68).
“Key factors driving future demand and infrastructure investment” (70).
“-geopolitics;
-security;
-macroeconomy;
-finance;
-demography;
-environment;
-technology;
-governance;
-telecommunications pricing;
-microeconomics—primary consumer basics inflation” (70).
“Projected trends in demand for telecoms and investment to 2030” (78).
“Accessibility = control of access + cost of access + ease of access + ubiquity + speed of rollout” (79).
“In general we can say that the main trend in demand for telecommunications that will drive infrastructure is a massive expansion of demand globally from developin countries, firstly as incomes increase to around the USD 3 000 level. Secondly we can expect take-up for those below this income level, as prices fall” (82).
“In later years, beyond 2015, an increasing component of traffic is expected to be machine-to-machine communications and transactions over the Internet, especially in industrial applications such as supply chain, process control and also in financial transactions for person to machine. An ‘Internet of things’ will grow up. Machine-to-machine communications for industrial and consumer functions and person-to-machine, for instance to make purchases, will be increasingly an everyday event. The impact on infrastructure will be to increase not only the traffic, but the address space required for all the new respondents” (84).
“The telecommunications industry has been notoriously poor at forecasting the take-up of new technologies and services, largely because market forecasts have often been supply driven and technocentric and do not focus on understanding consumers; behavior and their needs—and what they will pay for…A better approach to forecasting is to identify and understand the underlying trends and their drivers, and to take a demand-driven approach. Firstly a more global view of the market is not essential. This perspective provides an understanding that the overall telecommunications market has the potential to grow to three or four times its current size in terms of the number of consumers, by expansion outside the OECD group. This pricing is important and this will be the key stimulant for consumer take-up. A second key finding is that ‘content is not king’; instead it is connectivity that consumers will pay for as their primary m0otivation as this new market opens…Third, wireless technologies are developing rapidly and allowing infrastructure to be rolled out more cost effectively than ever before, offering the promise of connectivity anytime, anywhere, and at even lower prices…” (85).
The issue of infrastructure investment is then explored. It is highlighted that telecom investment, as a percentage of total infrastructure investment, has found its share steadily growing (86).
Private v public investment: “Private sector-led growth in infrastructure investment has revolutionzed access to telecommunications services around the world over the past ten years. For the OECD community we see that deregulation has allowed new pricing regimes, not controlled by the incumbents, and specifically the VoIP market to take off, despite attempts to ban or restrict it in some countries” (88).
“The key growth regions for telecommunications infrastructure, as outlined above, are in developing countries” (88).
There is a discussion of the future mix of technology, and how this relates to current infrastructure constraints (the local loop, for example).
“In consequence it is possible to see the progressive arrival of a new model of infrastructure, heavily influenced by the requirements of the low-cost demands, from developing countries seeking more ‘bits per buck’ for their billions of people in the under USD 3 000 per year income bracket” (101).
“The result may be parallel operation of two infrastructure models globally for at least a decade: a previous OECD model of mixed long distance carrier standards for trunk networking with a legacy of wireline in broadband DSL and CATV cable in the local loop, and at the same time, the simpler two level radio access/fibre long distance model slowly spreading across the world” (103). The mix of this parallel development is explored for different key regions on 110-1.
Cross-infrastructure impacts on transport are explored on 122-5. On health and medicine on 128-9. On the elderly on 130-1. On education on 131-3. On crime on 133-4.
The chapter ends with policy recommendations.
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