Kirshner, J. 2008. Globalization, American Power, and International Security. Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 3: 363-389.
How will increasing globalization affect American security? "Switching from polo on horseback to water polo does not change the principals or the objectives, but the contest is still profoundly transformed by the change in setting. Some players, for example, might have been much better riders than they are swimmers" (363).
"This paper draws three principal conclusions: First, globalization, in aggregate and on average tends to reduce the autonomy and capacity of states, although in some ways states may find their powers enhanced. Second, because the processes of globalization affect various states (and their relative capacities) differently, globalization affects the balance of power between states. In particular, as the biggest fish in a more open pond, the United States emerges as relatively more powerful than other states. However, and third, the United States, nevertheless, finds its own autonomy and capacity encroached upon by the processes of globalization, and will attract both more violent resistance and political opposition to its international ambitions" (363).
Definition: "...an array of phenomena that derive from unorganized and stateless forces but that generate pressures that are felt by states" (364).
This paper argues that globalization is a contingent phenomena that is not unique to history in the broadest sense. However, while it may not be unique, that does not mean that it is not one of the most pressing issues of the day.
This article in an excellent overview of globalization and security issues, though it does not focus enough on what I am currently working. ABSOLUTELY read this if you are interested in globalization, conflict, balance of power, the US and the changing nature of power politics.
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Mantzavinos, North and Shariq: Learning, Institutions, and Economic Performance
Mantzavinos, C, DC North, and S Shariq. 2004. Learning, institutions, and economic performance. Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 01: 75-84.
"In this article, we provide a broad overview of the interplay among cognition, belief systems, and institutions, and how they affect economic performance. We argue that a deeper understanding of institutions' emergence, their working properties, and their effect on economic and political outcomes should begin from an analysis of cognitive processes. We explore the nature of individual and collective learning, stressing that the issue is not whether agents are perfectly or bounded rationally, but rather how human beings actually reason and choose, individually and in collective settings. We then tie the processes of learning to institutional analysis, providing arguments in favor of what can be characterized as 'cognitive institutionalism'" (from abstract).
"In this article, we provide a broad overview of the interplay among cognition, belief systems, and institutions, and how they affect economic performance. We argue that a deeper understanding of institutions' emergence, their working properties, and their effect on economic and political outcomes should begin from an analysis of cognitive processes. We explore the nature of individual and collective learning, stressing that the issue is not whether agents are perfectly or bounded rationally, but rather how human beings actually reason and choose, individually and in collective settings. We then tie the processes of learning to institutional analysis, providing arguments in favor of what can be characterized as 'cognitive institutionalism'" (from abstract).
Vaubel: A Public Choice Approach to International Organization
Vaubel, R. 1986. A public choice approach to international organization. Public Choice 51, no. 1: 39-57.
"Traditional" approaches to understanding the impact of international organizations rely on the following, according to the author: without IOs, international externalities would not be controlled, international economies of scale would not be exploited and typically a game theory assumption is used to show that something is needed to reduced the negative possibility of prisoners' dilemma. "These arguments are logically impeccable but misleading incomplete and often misapplied" (40).
Why these are lacking is explained.
All international organizations are staffed by bureaucrats who are interested in pursuing their own policies.
"The purpose of this paper has been to develop a positive theory of international organization which can supplement the conventional normative theory used as a positive theory" (52).
"It does not imply that international organization is generally undesirable. But it can be used to emphasize the advantages of decentralized policy making and to warn against a naive internationalism which welcomes international agreements for their own sake...International organization can be and is abused, and the cause is not any occasional lack of virtue among politics but a systematic built-in tendency towards collusion at the expense of the citizens" (53).
"Traditional" approaches to understanding the impact of international organizations rely on the following, according to the author: without IOs, international externalities would not be controlled, international economies of scale would not be exploited and typically a game theory assumption is used to show that something is needed to reduced the negative possibility of prisoners' dilemma. "These arguments are logically impeccable but misleading incomplete and often misapplied" (40).
Why these are lacking is explained.
All international organizations are staffed by bureaucrats who are interested in pursuing their own policies.
"The purpose of this paper has been to develop a positive theory of international organization which can supplement the conventional normative theory used as a positive theory" (52).
"It does not imply that international organization is generally undesirable. But it can be used to emphasize the advantages of decentralized policy making and to warn against a naive internationalism which welcomes international agreements for their own sake...International organization can be and is abused, and the cause is not any occasional lack of virtue among politics but a systematic built-in tendency towards collusion at the expense of the citizens" (53).
Stone: The Scope of IMF Conditionality
Stone, RW. 2008. The Scope of IMF Conditionality. International Organization 62, no. 04: 589-620.
Is the IMF autonomous, controlled by the hegemon, or something else?
Two models are tested regarding IMF conditionality: A public-choice model and an informal governance model. "Public-choice critics argue that the Fund is an out-of-control agency that seeks to maximize its importance by imposing the highest levels of conditionality the market will bear. To the contrary, we find that the Fund has refrained from exploiting the vulnerability of particular countries to maximize the scope of conditionality. Alternatively, critics of major-power influence in the IMF claim that conditionality reflects the interests of the major shareholders rather than the needs of borrowing countries. We find evidence of US influence, which operates to constrain conditionality, but only in vulnerable countries that are important recipients of US aid. In ordinary countries under ordinary circumstances, broad authority is delegated to the Fund, which adjusts conditionality to accommodate local circumstances and domestic political opposition" (from abstract).
Some of the standard critiques of the IMF is that it is either a rogue institution imposing its will on sovereign states, or it is a tool of the most powerful states. Which of these is true, as they are mutually exclusive?
They don't find evidence for the rogue IO explanation, which are, "...derived from a public choice perspective" (1). "The puzzle that the power politics school is unable to explain is why weaker states participate in international organizations, if their policies simply reflect the preferences of the powerful. In order for institutions to be useful to powerful states, they must elicit voluntary participation, which means that there must be sufficient agreement about common purposes that weaker states can expect to benefit from cooperation" (1-2).
"We develop an alternative view, which we call informal governance. International organizations operate according to two parallel sets of rules: formal rules, which embody consensual procedures, and informal rules, which allow exceptional access for powerful countries. In this view, the danger embodies in delegation is not that the agency will run out of control, but that it will be captured by the most powerful state in the system" (2).
A history of IMF autonomy is covered.
"Our conclusions support our model of informal governance and are inconsistent with the public-choice inspired model of bureaucratic rent seeking" (41). The US is a major impact on IMF policies, especially when correlated with US aid giving.
Is the IMF autonomous, controlled by the hegemon, or something else?
Two models are tested regarding IMF conditionality: A public-choice model and an informal governance model. "Public-choice critics argue that the Fund is an out-of-control agency that seeks to maximize its importance by imposing the highest levels of conditionality the market will bear. To the contrary, we find that the Fund has refrained from exploiting the vulnerability of particular countries to maximize the scope of conditionality. Alternatively, critics of major-power influence in the IMF claim that conditionality reflects the interests of the major shareholders rather than the needs of borrowing countries. We find evidence of US influence, which operates to constrain conditionality, but only in vulnerable countries that are important recipients of US aid. In ordinary countries under ordinary circumstances, broad authority is delegated to the Fund, which adjusts conditionality to accommodate local circumstances and domestic political opposition" (from abstract).
Some of the standard critiques of the IMF is that it is either a rogue institution imposing its will on sovereign states, or it is a tool of the most powerful states. Which of these is true, as they are mutually exclusive?
They don't find evidence for the rogue IO explanation, which are, "...derived from a public choice perspective" (1). "The puzzle that the power politics school is unable to explain is why weaker states participate in international organizations, if their policies simply reflect the preferences of the powerful. In order for institutions to be useful to powerful states, they must elicit voluntary participation, which means that there must be sufficient agreement about common purposes that weaker states can expect to benefit from cooperation" (1-2).
"We develop an alternative view, which we call informal governance. International organizations operate according to two parallel sets of rules: formal rules, which embody consensual procedures, and informal rules, which allow exceptional access for powerful countries. In this view, the danger embodies in delegation is not that the agency will run out of control, but that it will be captured by the most powerful state in the system" (2).
A history of IMF autonomy is covered.
"Our conclusions support our model of informal governance and are inconsistent with the public-choice inspired model of bureaucratic rent seeking" (41). The US is a major impact on IMF policies, especially when correlated with US aid giving.
Steinwand and Stone: The International Monetary Fund: A Review of the Recent Evidence
Steinwand, MC, and RW Stone. 2008. The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence. The Review of International Organizations 3, no. 2: 123-149.
"We review studies of participation in IMF programs, design of IMF conditionality, implementation and enforcement of IMF conditions, conventional program effects and catalytic effects. At every stage, we find substantial evidence of the influence of major IMF shareholders, of the Fund's own organizational imperatives, and of domestic politics within borrowing countries. We conclude that very little is known with certainty about the effects of IMF lending, but that a great deal has been learned about the mechanics of IMF programs that will have to be taken into account in order to obtain unbiased estimates of those effects" (from abstract).
There is an overview of critics of the IMF on page 124.
"The functionalist perspective, which is the one most widely adopted in the IMF literature, emphasizes the element of common interest in cooperation [Keohane]...Institutions, in this perspective, arise as solutions to collective action problems..." (126). "In contrast, the structural approach emphasizes differences in national interests and the distribution of power [Krasner}...Structural explanations treat the existence of conflicts of interest as fundamental, although the particular reasons for conflict vary with the international context" (126). "The public choice framework [Vaubel]...emphasizes the perverse incentives created by principal-agent relationships under incomplete information. The objectives of international bureaucrats are to increase their power, prerequisites and organizational slack, and elected officials delegate authority to them in order to escape their own accountability to voters. It is often argued that the IMF is able to provide political cover for governments that want reform but face opposition at home [Puntnam, Haggard, Kaufman, Vreeland] (127).
There is a review of the variables covered in IMF analysis by a variety of authors.
Conclusion: selection effects in methodology are quite important. Further research topics are then posited.
"We review studies of participation in IMF programs, design of IMF conditionality, implementation and enforcement of IMF conditions, conventional program effects and catalytic effects. At every stage, we find substantial evidence of the influence of major IMF shareholders, of the Fund's own organizational imperatives, and of domestic politics within borrowing countries. We conclude that very little is known with certainty about the effects of IMF lending, but that a great deal has been learned about the mechanics of IMF programs that will have to be taken into account in order to obtain unbiased estimates of those effects" (from abstract).
There is an overview of critics of the IMF on page 124.
"The functionalist perspective, which is the one most widely adopted in the IMF literature, emphasizes the element of common interest in cooperation [Keohane]...Institutions, in this perspective, arise as solutions to collective action problems..." (126). "In contrast, the structural approach emphasizes differences in national interests and the distribution of power [Krasner}...Structural explanations treat the existence of conflicts of interest as fundamental, although the particular reasons for conflict vary with the international context" (126). "The public choice framework [Vaubel]...emphasizes the perverse incentives created by principal-agent relationships under incomplete information. The objectives of international bureaucrats are to increase their power, prerequisites and organizational slack, and elected officials delegate authority to them in order to escape their own accountability to voters. It is often argued that the IMF is able to provide political cover for governments that want reform but face opposition at home [Puntnam, Haggard, Kaufman, Vreeland] (127).
There is a review of the variables covered in IMF analysis by a variety of authors.
Conclusion: selection effects in methodology are quite important. Further research topics are then posited.
Grabel: Policy Coherence or Conformance?
Grabel, I. 2007. Policy Coherence or Conformance? The New World Bank International Monetary Fund World Trade Organization Rhetoric on Trade and Investment in Developing Countries. Review of Radical Political Economics 39, no. 3: 335.
Policy coherence is explored in this article. It is argued that the term has been abused, and that much of what it is referred to would be better suited by the term "conformance".
"This article has three objectives: (a) to define the concept of coherence and trace its usage in policy debates historically and up to the present; (b) to explore how the concept is being institutionalized or codified through cooperation among the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade organization...and through recent bi-and multilateral trade agreements; and (c) to offer the beginnings of a critique of what I see as the use and abuse of the concept. I will argue that the concept of coherence today is code for another and altogether different goal: policy conformance" (336).
These three institutions have worked together to promote trade liberalization in such a coherent way that they may end up working against their original mandates. This is completed partially through the at least tacit, if not explicit, approval of the US.
Coherence should be a concept with no explicit telos, but the policies implemented by these institutions have all ended up moving in a very explicitly direction. "Properly understood, policy coherence should entail an understanding of the uniqueness of diverse national contexts; of path dependence, institutional embeddedness, and stickiness; recognition that there exists multiple paths to development; and respect for national policy space" (340).
Policy coherence is explored in this article. It is argued that the term has been abused, and that much of what it is referred to would be better suited by the term "conformance".
"This article has three objectives: (a) to define the concept of coherence and trace its usage in policy debates historically and up to the present; (b) to explore how the concept is being institutionalized or codified through cooperation among the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade organization...and through recent bi-and multilateral trade agreements; and (c) to offer the beginnings of a critique of what I see as the use and abuse of the concept. I will argue that the concept of coherence today is code for another and altogether different goal: policy conformance" (336).
These three institutions have worked together to promote trade liberalization in such a coherent way that they may end up working against their original mandates. This is completed partially through the at least tacit, if not explicit, approval of the US.
Coherence should be a concept with no explicit telos, but the policies implemented by these institutions have all ended up moving in a very explicitly direction. "Properly understood, policy coherence should entail an understanding of the uniqueness of diverse national contexts; of path dependence, institutional embeddedness, and stickiness; recognition that there exists multiple paths to development; and respect for national policy space" (340).
Rose: Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?
Rose, AK. 2004. Do we really know that the WTO increases trade? American Economic Review 94, no. 1: 98-114.
This paper explores whether a handful of global trade regimes actually has an impact on international trade flows. "An extensive search reveals little evidence that countries joining or belonging to the GATT/WTO have different trade patterns than outsiders. The GSP [Generalized System of Preferences] does seem to have a strong effect, and is associated with an approximate doubling of trade" (from abstract).
"While theory, causal empiricism, and strong statements abound, there is, to my knowledge, no compelling empirical evidence showing that the GATT/WTO has actually encouraged trade" (1).
"To summarize, I have been unable to find evidence that membership in the GATT/WTO has a strong positive effect on international trade" (12).
This paper explores whether a handful of global trade regimes actually has an impact on international trade flows. "An extensive search reveals little evidence that countries joining or belonging to the GATT/WTO have different trade patterns than outsiders. The GSP [Generalized System of Preferences] does seem to have a strong effect, and is associated with an approximate doubling of trade" (from abstract).
"While theory, causal empiricism, and strong statements abound, there is, to my knowledge, no compelling empirical evidence showing that the GATT/WTO has actually encouraged trade" (1).
"To summarize, I have been unable to find evidence that membership in the GATT/WTO has a strong positive effect on international trade" (12).
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