Ross, M., 2001. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53(3), 325-361.
As per the title of the article, Ross wonders whether or not reserves of natural resources, specifically oil, would act as an impediment to the democratic process. He explores this quantitatively. He asks three specific questions: is this phenomena real? How does this claim work along two axes: geographic and sectoral? And finally, what is the causal mechanism? For the last question, he tests three independent variables: the rentier effect, the repression effect and the modernization effect.
Ross tests this using the Regime variable from polity data as a dependent variable. The independent variables are both oil and mineral stores. Ross then controls for income, Islam, the OECD, the dependent variable lagged 5 years and incorporates a variety of dummy variables.
“These tests support both the validity and the generality of the oil-impedes-democracy claim. They suggest the following: that a state’s reliance on either oil or mineral exports tends to make it less democratic; that this effect Is not caused by other types of primary exports; that this is not limited to the Arabian Peninsula, to the middle east, or to sub-Saharan Africa, and that it is not limited to small states. These findings are generally consistent with the theory of the rentier state” (346).
Ross then tests the hypothesis that the rentier state is the deeper driver of the oil-impedes democracy thesis.
There are four items that Ross claims to have found in this article: oil does impede democracy. This effect is not limited to the Middle East. Additionally, mineral gluts also have the effect of slowing democracy. Finally, Ross finds some support for each of the three possible causal drivers: rentier effects, repression and modernization.
Friday, October 3, 2008
Barber: Jihad v McWorld
Barber, B., Jihad v McWorld. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199203/barber?ca=9B5pyrSUsZedqmnhhRKhf/BSnLWQXUfactosEkJZ21E%3D.
*Note: pagination from a word document
“Just beyond the horizon of current events lie two possible political futures—both bleak, neither democratic. The first is a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened Lebanonization of national states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe—a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality. The second is being borne in on us by the onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast food—with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce. The planet is falling precipitantly apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same moment” (1).
McWorld contains four imperatives: the market imperative, the resource imperative, the information-technology imperative and the ecological imperative. Each has a bearing on the changing nature of globalization.
Jihad is the other global power at work, and it represents a return to identity politics as can be seen in the myriad splinter-groups and break-away regions seeking independence.
Neither of these forces provides much room for democracy, as one is a totalizing and homogenizing power sweeping the world and the other is an authoritative, exclusive power rooted in identity politics.
*Note: pagination from a word document
“Just beyond the horizon of current events lie two possible political futures—both bleak, neither democratic. The first is a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened Lebanonization of national states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe—a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality. The second is being borne in on us by the onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast food—with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce. The planet is falling precipitantly apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same moment” (1).
McWorld contains four imperatives: the market imperative, the resource imperative, the information-technology imperative and the ecological imperative. Each has a bearing on the changing nature of globalization.
Jihad is the other global power at work, and it represents a return to identity politics as can be seen in the myriad splinter-groups and break-away regions seeking independence.
Neither of these forces provides much room for democracy, as one is a totalizing and homogenizing power sweeping the world and the other is an authoritative, exclusive power rooted in identity politics.
Kirshner: The Changing Calculus of Conflict?
Kirshner, J., 2007. The Changing Calculus of Conflict? Security Studies, 16(4), 583-597.
Kirshner addresses Brooks Producing Security text in four parts. Firstly, he looks at what the book has added to the field. Next, he critically evaluates those potential contributions. Thirdly, he questions the underlying theme of the book: that the globalization of production has altered the cost of conflict. His main contention is that the argument si oversold. Finally, Kirshner argues about how globalization may be possibly altering the changing nature of conflict.
Brooks argues that the globalization of production is fundamentally a more important and causal phenomena affecting the world today, more important, than, for example, international trade. “In particular, the fragmentation of the production process across some states is fundamentally different from simpler forms of transnational production (and an entirely different animal from overseas investments in extracting raw materials)” (584). Brooks also points out that the embellishment of truly autarchic defense production is now so costly as to be prohibitive. “Interdependence is not uniformly good or bad but influences international politics in different ways depending on its interactions with additional variables” (586).
Kirshner does not believe that Brooks is ultimately successful in explaining how much the calculus of conflict has changed in the face of globalization. While Brooks is clear that globalization of production does imply three problems: namely, the impossibility of fully autonomous defense production, reduced benefit economically for military adventure and deep regional economic integration, he doesn’t make the case for how strongly these three security questions may affect the changing calculus of conflict in globalization.
Kirshner addresses Brooks Producing Security text in four parts. Firstly, he looks at what the book has added to the field. Next, he critically evaluates those potential contributions. Thirdly, he questions the underlying theme of the book: that the globalization of production has altered the cost of conflict. His main contention is that the argument si oversold. Finally, Kirshner argues about how globalization may be possibly altering the changing nature of conflict.
Brooks argues that the globalization of production is fundamentally a more important and causal phenomena affecting the world today, more important, than, for example, international trade. “In particular, the fragmentation of the production process across some states is fundamentally different from simpler forms of transnational production (and an entirely different animal from overseas investments in extracting raw materials)” (584). Brooks also points out that the embellishment of truly autarchic defense production is now so costly as to be prohibitive. “Interdependence is not uniformly good or bad but influences international politics in different ways depending on its interactions with additional variables” (586).
Kirshner does not believe that Brooks is ultimately successful in explaining how much the calculus of conflict has changed in the face of globalization. While Brooks is clear that globalization of production does imply three problems: namely, the impossibility of fully autonomous defense production, reduced benefit economically for military adventure and deep regional economic integration, he doesn’t make the case for how strongly these three security questions may affect the changing calculus of conflict in globalization.
Huntington: Clash of Civilizations
Huntington, S., 1992. Clash of Civilizations, The. Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49.
“It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural…The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (22).
“What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity” (23-4).
The overall quantity of distinct civilizations have decreased over time. Huntington identifies 7-8 civilizations which remain and which will be in conflict in the future. This is because, firstly, these distinct groups of people have fundamental differences about key questions, like the relationship between god and man, or the relationship between the individual and the group. Secondly, our collective space is shrinking through improved interaction capacity. These technological pressures are also putting pressure on people to reject their local identities, which may have a back-lash effect. Fourthly, the hegemonic position of the West may also provide for a backlash of identity. Additionally, characteristics of civilization are much more difficult to strip away; one can become a democrat after they were a communist, but they will retain their ethnic heritage. Finally, the world is becoming increasingly defined by economic regionalism.
Huntington then explores fault lines between civilizations and the potential role that will be played by the West.
“It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural…The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (22).
“What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity” (23-4).
The overall quantity of distinct civilizations have decreased over time. Huntington identifies 7-8 civilizations which remain and which will be in conflict in the future. This is because, firstly, these distinct groups of people have fundamental differences about key questions, like the relationship between god and man, or the relationship between the individual and the group. Secondly, our collective space is shrinking through improved interaction capacity. These technological pressures are also putting pressure on people to reject their local identities, which may have a back-lash effect. Fourthly, the hegemonic position of the West may also provide for a backlash of identity. Additionally, characteristics of civilization are much more difficult to strip away; one can become a democrat after they were a communist, but they will retain their ethnic heritage. Finally, the world is becoming increasingly defined by economic regionalism.
Huntington then explores fault lines between civilizations and the potential role that will be played by the West.
Maoz and Russett: Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace
Maoz, Z. & Russett, B., 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624-638.
“Democratic states are in general about as conflict—and war—prone as non-democracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other…” (624). They find that democracy has a mitigating effect on conflict, that both of their models support this causally and that the normative model is more robust.
Normative Model:
Two assumptions: “States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and instiotutions” and “The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former” (625).
Structural Model:
Two assumptions: “International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action” and “Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies” (626).
They also explore other possible explanations for the observed peace between certain countries. It could be determined by relative wealth. It could also have to do with alliances since WWII. These are taken into consideration in their statistical model.
They then explore the IV of democracy using Polity IV numbers and the DV of war using COW numbers. They find that their three hypotheses stand up to scrutiny (H1: general Dem Peace, H2: Norm model, H3: Structure model) and that the normative model is more robust than the structural model.
“Democratic states are in general about as conflict—and war—prone as non-democracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other…” (624). They find that democracy has a mitigating effect on conflict, that both of their models support this causally and that the normative model is more robust.
Normative Model:
Two assumptions: “States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and instiotutions” and “The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former” (625).
Structural Model:
Two assumptions: “International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action” and “Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies” (626).
They also explore other possible explanations for the observed peace between certain countries. It could be determined by relative wealth. It could also have to do with alliances since WWII. These are taken into consideration in their statistical model.
They then explore the IV of democracy using Polity IV numbers and the DV of war using COW numbers. They find that their three hypotheses stand up to scrutiny (H1: general Dem Peace, H2: Norm model, H3: Structure model) and that the normative model is more robust than the structural model.
Mansfield: The Distribution of Wars Over Time
Mansfield, E., 1988. The Distribution of Wars Over Time. World Politics.
“Political scientists and other scholars have displayed a lively interest in the distribution of wars over time. A variety of research has been conducted on the subject, and the implications of these studies are important: only through empirical research can we hope to identify patterns, trends, and possible causes of warfare…In this paper, I shall try to determine the extent to which various well-known empirical findings concerning the distribution of war over time are sensitive to the particular data set employed. I then will present preliminary tests of some additional hypotheses concerning the factors influencing the probability of war, and ascertain whether—and, if so, how—the results depend on the inclusion of all wars or only of wars involving major powers” (21).
Mansfield makes the point that different data sets about war come to different conclusions about the causes of war and the conditions of peace based on what is coded as being a war and what is not coded as being a war. This clearly affects the results of different statistical analyses. The causes for this discrepancies lies with three things: how to define war, the level at which war is analyzed and finally how wars are dated (27-8).
He fits the data of the various authors to a Poisson distribution and finds that they mostly fit nicely, though de Mesquita’s did not.
Mansfield also compares Kondratieff cycles and the onset of great-power wars. Goldstein argues that there is no correlation between either upswings or downswings in the economy and the onset of war. Other authors disagree and argue that there is a correlation between upswings and war. Mansfield argues (briefly) that there is a correlation between long-range economic cycles and wars.
He tests the relationship between trade interdependence and war. Mansfield finds that there is an increased likelihood of war when a country moves either from being more open vis-à-vis trade or less open and conflict.
He tests the relationship between hegemony and war and finds that there is a correlation between the existence of a hegemon and the increased likelihood of war, though his overall finding is that this is not significant and that the existence of a hegemon nether necessitates peace or war.
“Political scientists and other scholars have displayed a lively interest in the distribution of wars over time. A variety of research has been conducted on the subject, and the implications of these studies are important: only through empirical research can we hope to identify patterns, trends, and possible causes of warfare…In this paper, I shall try to determine the extent to which various well-known empirical findings concerning the distribution of war over time are sensitive to the particular data set employed. I then will present preliminary tests of some additional hypotheses concerning the factors influencing the probability of war, and ascertain whether—and, if so, how—the results depend on the inclusion of all wars or only of wars involving major powers” (21).
Mansfield makes the point that different data sets about war come to different conclusions about the causes of war and the conditions of peace based on what is coded as being a war and what is not coded as being a war. This clearly affects the results of different statistical analyses. The causes for this discrepancies lies with three things: how to define war, the level at which war is analyzed and finally how wars are dated (27-8).
He fits the data of the various authors to a Poisson distribution and finds that they mostly fit nicely, though de Mesquita’s did not.
Mansfield also compares Kondratieff cycles and the onset of great-power wars. Goldstein argues that there is no correlation between either upswings or downswings in the economy and the onset of war. Other authors disagree and argue that there is a correlation between upswings and war. Mansfield argues (briefly) that there is a correlation between long-range economic cycles and wars.
He tests the relationship between trade interdependence and war. Mansfield finds that there is an increased likelihood of war when a country moves either from being more open vis-à-vis trade or less open and conflict.
He tests the relationship between hegemony and war and finds that there is a correlation between the existence of a hegemon and the increased likelihood of war, though his overall finding is that this is not significant and that the existence of a hegemon nether necessitates peace or war.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Spiro: The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace
Spiro, D., 1994. The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 19, 50.
“Ever since Michael Doyle’s 1983 essay pointed out that no liberal democracy has ever fought a war with another liberal democracy, scholars have treated pacifism between democracies as ‘the closest thing we have to a law in international politics…The purpose of this article is to raise critical questions about newly rediscovered law of peace among democracies” (50).
“I will argue that the absence of wars between liberal democracies is not, in fact, as significant pattern for most of the past two centuries. Studies that do claim significance for the absence of wars between democracies are based on analyses that are highly sensitive to the ways that they select definitions of the key terms of democracy and war, and to the methods they choose for statistical analysis. I argue that much of the quantitative literature on democracy and war has little to do with the theories it seeks to confirm, and that the results rest on methods and operationalization of variables that undergo contortions before they yield apparently significant results” (51).
Spiro argues that “democracy” is a term that is difficult to measure, and those who try to create a taxonomy of democratic countries eventually end up with conflictual lists. This is the same for war, as Mansfield argued in 1988.
Spiro then examines the statistical significance of zero, by that, the author means to question the significance of only exploring dyadic groupings that are not at war. Because dyadic war is such a rare occurance in the international system, it is not unexpected to not find war between countries labeled as democratic. He finds a generally that, through random probabilities, and because the cases of international war are so slim, the odds of two states randomly not going to war are great, barring some historical outliers (WWI, WWI, etc.).
There is also a specific critique of Maoz and Russett.
“Ever since Michael Doyle’s 1983 essay pointed out that no liberal democracy has ever fought a war with another liberal democracy, scholars have treated pacifism between democracies as ‘the closest thing we have to a law in international politics…The purpose of this article is to raise critical questions about newly rediscovered law of peace among democracies” (50).
“I will argue that the absence of wars between liberal democracies is not, in fact, as significant pattern for most of the past two centuries. Studies that do claim significance for the absence of wars between democracies are based on analyses that are highly sensitive to the ways that they select definitions of the key terms of democracy and war, and to the methods they choose for statistical analysis. I argue that much of the quantitative literature on democracy and war has little to do with the theories it seeks to confirm, and that the results rest on methods and operationalization of variables that undergo contortions before they yield apparently significant results” (51).
Spiro argues that “democracy” is a term that is difficult to measure, and those who try to create a taxonomy of democratic countries eventually end up with conflictual lists. This is the same for war, as Mansfield argued in 1988.
Spiro then examines the statistical significance of zero, by that, the author means to question the significance of only exploring dyadic groupings that are not at war. Because dyadic war is such a rare occurance in the international system, it is not unexpected to not find war between countries labeled as democratic. He finds a generally that, through random probabilities, and because the cases of international war are so slim, the odds of two states randomly not going to war are great, barring some historical outliers (WWI, WWI, etc.).
There is also a specific critique of Maoz and Russett.
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