Raleigh, Clionadh, and Henrik Urdal. 2007. Climate change, environmental degradation and armed conflict. Political Geography 26, no. 6 (August): 674-694. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.005.
From Abstract: "Climate change is expected to bring about major change in freshwater availability, the productive capacity of soils, and in patterns of human settlement. However, considerable uncertainties exist with regard to the extent and geographical distribution of these changes...We argue that our best guess about the future has to be based on our knowledge about the relationship between demography, environment and violent conflict in the past...This article represents a new approach to assess the impact of environment on internal armed conflict by using georeferenced...data and small geographical, rather than political, units of analysis. It addresses some of the most important factors assumed to be strongly influenced by global warming: land degradation, freshwater availability, and population density and change. While population growth and density are associated with increased risks, the effects of land degradation and water scarcity are weak, negligible or insignificant. The results indicate that the effects of political and economic factors far outweigh those between local level demographic/environmental factors and conflict" (674).
"To address the issue of whether climate change poses a traditional security threat, we build on propositions from the environmental security literature, identifying potential links between natural resource scarcity and violent conflict. We combine these propositions with environmental change scenarios from...[IPCC]...and develop testable hypotheses about the expected relationships...If soil degradation, freshwater scarcity and population pressure have influenced the risk of conflict in the past, we assume that this may also inform us about likely security implications of climate change. Obvious limitations to such approach are the possibilities that climate change will bring about more severe and more abrupt forms of environmental change than we have experienced in the past" (675).
While the lion's share of studies on the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict focus on state-based units, this study will focus on 100 square kilometer blocks.
The existing literature on resource scarcity and conflict focuses on the following causal chains: "firstly, increasing temperatures, precipitation anomalies and extreme weather is expected to aggravate processes of resource degradation that is already underway" (676). "Secondly, significantly increasing sea levels as well as more extreme weather conditions will force millions of people to migrate, potentially leading to higher pressures on resources in areas of destination and subsequently to resource competition" (677).
Their soil data: "The measure of soil degradation throughout the world was commissioned by the International Soil Reference and Information Centre. The information...is based on questionnaire answers from numerous soil experts throughout the world" (683).
"It appears from this disaggregated analysis that demographic and environmental variables only have a very moderate effect on the risk of civil conflict" (689).
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Hendrix and Glaser: Trends and Triggers
Hendrix, Cullen S., and Sarah M. Glaser. 2007. Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political Geography 26, no. 6 (August): 695-715. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.006.
The Abstract: "The conventional discourse relating climate change to conflict focuses on long term trends in temperature and precipitation that define ecosystems and their subsequent impact on access to renewable resources. Because these changes occur over long time periods they may not capture the proximate factors that trigger conflict. We estimate the impact of both long term trends in climate and short term climatic triggers on civil conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that both operationalizations have a significant impact. Climates more suitable for Eurasian agriculture are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict, while freshwater resources per capita are positively associated with the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, positive changes in rainfall are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict in the following year. We also assess the outlook for the future by analyzing simulated changes in precipitation means and variability over the period 2000-2099. We find few statistically significant, positive trends in our measure of interannual variability, suggesting that it is unlikely to be affected dramatically by changes in climate" (695).
There has been much assumed about the link between climate change and conflict, though, "The causal link between climate change and threats to security...is not specified" (696).
One set of literature argues that a decrease in renewable resources will lead to conflict. Another argues that variation in climate will lead to conflict. "We investigate these arguments from two complementary perspectives. First, the effects of climate change on the onset of conflict must be conceived of as (1) long term trends that may lead to a higher baseline probability of conflict, and (2) short term triggers that affect the interannual variability in that probability" (696).
They explore changes in precipitation using the NCAR-PCM model.
"These findings point to two conclusions. The first is that the future for Africa is not necessarily one defined by increasing interannual variability in rainfall, the most significant climatic variable in our analysis of conflict onset. The second regards policy. Our findings suggest that reducing dependence on rainwater for agriculture may mitigate conflict, even as rainfall variability is not predicted to increase over time" (696-7).
Lit Review:
Good review of literature on water availability and conflict.
"Thus framed, we address two open questions in the literature. The first is how to combine stationary trend measures with temporally variant trigger measures in order to model the environmental conditions that lead to conflict. The second regards the neo-Malthusian tendency to assume (a) that resources are dwindling and (b) that fewer resources lead inexorably to conflict" (698).
"...we can generate hypotheses regarding the effects of land degradation, climatic conditions, and freshwater abundance on the likelihood of conflict. Land degradation refers to processes that negatively affect land productivity. If productivity is defined as the expected benefit per unit of effort, then we expect higher levels of land degradation to be associated with lower returns to agriculture and therefore to higher likelihood of conflict, ceterus paribus" (699).
They use PRIO/Uppsala data for their dependent variable.
"Land degradation is defined as the temporary or permanent reduction in the reproductive capacity of land as a result of human action" (701)
"Our findings suggest that interannual variability in rainfall is a more significant determinant of conflict than our measures of climate, land degradation, and freshwater resources. Admittedly, these results may be biased due to stationary in the trend measures, a problem addressed critically in section two but which ultimately proves insurmountable in our analysis due to constraints on available data" (710).
The authors find that the future of Sub-Saharan stability vis-à-vis climate change is relatively positive, as the forecasts to not show large amounts of variability interannual pattern changes. They argue that this is due to a regional bias.
One key take-away from my perspective is that we need to look at interannual variability in forecasts of precipitation.
The Abstract: "The conventional discourse relating climate change to conflict focuses on long term trends in temperature and precipitation that define ecosystems and their subsequent impact on access to renewable resources. Because these changes occur over long time periods they may not capture the proximate factors that trigger conflict. We estimate the impact of both long term trends in climate and short term climatic triggers on civil conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that both operationalizations have a significant impact. Climates more suitable for Eurasian agriculture are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict, while freshwater resources per capita are positively associated with the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, positive changes in rainfall are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict in the following year. We also assess the outlook for the future by analyzing simulated changes in precipitation means and variability over the period 2000-2099. We find few statistically significant, positive trends in our measure of interannual variability, suggesting that it is unlikely to be affected dramatically by changes in climate" (695).
There has been much assumed about the link between climate change and conflict, though, "The causal link between climate change and threats to security...is not specified" (696).
One set of literature argues that a decrease in renewable resources will lead to conflict. Another argues that variation in climate will lead to conflict. "We investigate these arguments from two complementary perspectives. First, the effects of climate change on the onset of conflict must be conceived of as (1) long term trends that may lead to a higher baseline probability of conflict, and (2) short term triggers that affect the interannual variability in that probability" (696).
They explore changes in precipitation using the NCAR-PCM model.
"These findings point to two conclusions. The first is that the future for Africa is not necessarily one defined by increasing interannual variability in rainfall, the most significant climatic variable in our analysis of conflict onset. The second regards policy. Our findings suggest that reducing dependence on rainwater for agriculture may mitigate conflict, even as rainfall variability is not predicted to increase over time" (696-7).
Lit Review:
Good review of literature on water availability and conflict.
"Thus framed, we address two open questions in the literature. The first is how to combine stationary trend measures with temporally variant trigger measures in order to model the environmental conditions that lead to conflict. The second regards the neo-Malthusian tendency to assume (a) that resources are dwindling and (b) that fewer resources lead inexorably to conflict" (698).
"...we can generate hypotheses regarding the effects of land degradation, climatic conditions, and freshwater abundance on the likelihood of conflict. Land degradation refers to processes that negatively affect land productivity. If productivity is defined as the expected benefit per unit of effort, then we expect higher levels of land degradation to be associated with lower returns to agriculture and therefore to higher likelihood of conflict, ceterus paribus" (699).
They use PRIO/Uppsala data for their dependent variable.
"Land degradation is defined as the temporary or permanent reduction in the reproductive capacity of land as a result of human action" (701)
"Our findings suggest that interannual variability in rainfall is a more significant determinant of conflict than our measures of climate, land degradation, and freshwater resources. Admittedly, these results may be biased due to stationary in the trend measures, a problem addressed critically in section two but which ultimately proves insurmountable in our analysis due to constraints on available data" (710).
The authors find that the future of Sub-Saharan stability vis-à-vis climate change is relatively positive, as the forecasts to not show large amounts of variability interannual pattern changes. They argue that this is due to a regional bias.
One key take-away from my perspective is that we need to look at interannual variability in forecasts of precipitation.
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Nordas and Gleditsch: Climate Change and Conflict
Nordås, Ragnhild, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2007. Climate change and conflict. Political Geography 26, no. 6 (August): 627-638. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.003.
There is a widening consensus that the impacts of climate change will change the terrain of conflict. This article begins by noting IPCC reports, along with governmental reports issued by US, German, NGO and IO sources.
The authors then review the academic literature on climate change and conflict. They find it generally wanting, as many sources are not peer-reviewed and the total scope of work is sparse. Additionally, much of the literature that does exist is contentious: do nations cooperate around water resource issues, or come to blows?
The authors highlight five articles that help to form a backbone of the study of the relationship between climate change and conflict.
"This literature outlines several possible causal chains from climate change to conflict. The starting-point for most of these is that climate change results in a reduction of essential resources for livelihood, such as food or water, which can have one of two consequences: those affected by the increasing scarcity may start fighting over the remaining resources. Alternatively, people may be forced to leave the area, adding to the number of international refugees or internally displaced persons. Fleeing environmental destruction is at the outset a less violent response to adverse conditions than armed conflict or genocide. But when the migrants encroach on the territory of other people who may also be resource-constrained, the potential for violence arises" (631).
Drivers from climate change of conflict include changes in the availability of resources (food, fuel or water), forced migration, dramatic weather events, moves away from fossil fuels quickly, thus radically changing the price of oil and impacting dependent countries, or reduced economic output as a result of attempts to reduce carbon emissions.
They end with a focus on five points to improve analysis of this relationship: 1. conflict models and climate change models need to be synthesized; 2. what kinds of violence do we expect to emerge from climate change?; 3. there needs to be an accounting of both the positive and negative impacts of climate change; 4. the impacts of climate change need to be increasingly disaggregated; and 5. consequences should not focus on rich countries alone, but the globe.
There is a widening consensus that the impacts of climate change will change the terrain of conflict. This article begins by noting IPCC reports, along with governmental reports issued by US, German, NGO and IO sources.
The authors then review the academic literature on climate change and conflict. They find it generally wanting, as many sources are not peer-reviewed and the total scope of work is sparse. Additionally, much of the literature that does exist is contentious: do nations cooperate around water resource issues, or come to blows?
The authors highlight five articles that help to form a backbone of the study of the relationship between climate change and conflict.
"This literature outlines several possible causal chains from climate change to conflict. The starting-point for most of these is that climate change results in a reduction of essential resources for livelihood, such as food or water, which can have one of two consequences: those affected by the increasing scarcity may start fighting over the remaining resources. Alternatively, people may be forced to leave the area, adding to the number of international refugees or internally displaced persons. Fleeing environmental destruction is at the outset a less violent response to adverse conditions than armed conflict or genocide. But when the migrants encroach on the territory of other people who may also be resource-constrained, the potential for violence arises" (631).
Drivers from climate change of conflict include changes in the availability of resources (food, fuel or water), forced migration, dramatic weather events, moves away from fossil fuels quickly, thus radically changing the price of oil and impacting dependent countries, or reduced economic output as a result of attempts to reduce carbon emissions.
They end with a focus on five points to improve analysis of this relationship: 1. conflict models and climate change models need to be synthesized; 2. what kinds of violence do we expect to emerge from climate change?; 3. there needs to be an accounting of both the positive and negative impacts of climate change; 4. the impacts of climate change need to be increasingly disaggregated; and 5. consequences should not focus on rich countries alone, but the globe.
Monday, December 28, 2009
Lee: Climate Change and Armed Conflict
Lee, James R. 2009. Climate Change and Armed Conflict: Hot and Cold Wars. Routledge studies in peace and conflict resolution. London: Routledge.
There are two areas where conflict arising from climate change is likely: the Equatorial Tension Belt and the Polar Tension Belt. The ETB represents conflicts that will arise from the following causes: the age of the society and the overall environmental impact; the size of populations and the resource pressures implied; the kind of environment-desert or tropics-lend themselves to increased impact from climate change; historical legacy; and resource distribution (9-10). In the PTB, conflict will arise over the need to extract resources that become available due to receding ice stocks.
“Climate change will tend to make the existing Equatorial Tension Belt hotter and drier, and these twin conditions are likely to lead to greater conflict. Forecasts suggest that problems will intensify as demographic and socio-economic factors add further pressures on resources” (10).
The conceptualization of the relationship between climate change and conflict involves a framing of perspectives on the future: some are optimists, some are pessimists. These can be generally grouped into idealist and realist camps.
Some argue that climate change is not going to create substantial impetus for conflict. Others argue that conflict will emerge in certain zones, and not in others. These are referred to as “tame” zones and “untamed” zones (22).
The first tame zone is those that are interdependent because of trade. The second tame zone involve those who are democratic.
Chapter 2 reviews some historic instances of climate change and conflict.
Chapter 3 looks out at forecasts of climate change and conflict.
The beginning focuses on an overview of IPCC reports and findings.
Compares ACTOR forecasts for conflict with historic prevalence of conflict (from Uppsala) and then juxtaposes this with IPCC forecasts for low, intermediate and high temperature change. Again, forecasts of climate change are compared with Fund for Peace forecasts of state failure. IPCC regions are then each specifically explored.
Six scenarios are then deployed.
There are two areas where conflict arising from climate change is likely: the Equatorial Tension Belt and the Polar Tension Belt. The ETB represents conflicts that will arise from the following causes: the age of the society and the overall environmental impact; the size of populations and the resource pressures implied; the kind of environment-desert or tropics-lend themselves to increased impact from climate change; historical legacy; and resource distribution (9-10). In the PTB, conflict will arise over the need to extract resources that become available due to receding ice stocks.
“Climate change will tend to make the existing Equatorial Tension Belt hotter and drier, and these twin conditions are likely to lead to greater conflict. Forecasts suggest that problems will intensify as demographic and socio-economic factors add further pressures on resources” (10).
The conceptualization of the relationship between climate change and conflict involves a framing of perspectives on the future: some are optimists, some are pessimists. These can be generally grouped into idealist and realist camps.
Some argue that climate change is not going to create substantial impetus for conflict. Others argue that conflict will emerge in certain zones, and not in others. These are referred to as “tame” zones and “untamed” zones (22).
The first tame zone is those that are interdependent because of trade. The second tame zone involve those who are democratic.
Chapter 2 reviews some historic instances of climate change and conflict.
Chapter 3 looks out at forecasts of climate change and conflict.
The beginning focuses on an overview of IPCC reports and findings.
Compares ACTOR forecasts for conflict with historic prevalence of conflict (from Uppsala) and then juxtaposes this with IPCC forecasts for low, intermediate and high temperature change. Again, forecasts of climate change are compared with Fund for Peace forecasts of state failure. IPCC regions are then each specifically explored.
Six scenarios are then deployed.
Monday, December 7, 2009
Dupuy: Understanding War
Trevor N Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (New York: Paragon House, 1987).
“Students of military art and military science have long sought fundamental laws or theories that would explain the interactions of military forces in combat and the outcomes of battles” (xxi). This book attempts to highlight these patterns, as the authors believe that they occur regularly. The focus of the study is military history.
“Although no one can possibly know now what the next war will really be like, there can be no question that the emotional, conceptual and intellectual aspects of combat through the ages are basically the same in war after war…Over the past twenty-five years I have, I believe, identified thirteen unchanging operational features or concepts, which I call “The Timeless Verities of Combat” (1).
“Students of military art and military science have long sought fundamental laws or theories that would explain the interactions of military forces in combat and the outcomes of battles” (xxi). This book attempts to highlight these patterns, as the authors believe that they occur regularly. The focus of the study is military history.
“Although no one can possibly know now what the next war will really be like, there can be no question that the emotional, conceptual and intellectual aspects of combat through the ages are basically the same in war after war…Over the past twenty-five years I have, I believe, identified thirteen unchanging operational features or concepts, which I call “The Timeless Verities of Combat” (1).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
