Singer, J., 1961. The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. World Politics, 14(1), 77-92.
“In the vernacular of general systems theory, the observer is always confronted with a system, its sub-systems, and their respective environments, and while he may choose as his system any cluster of phenomena from the most minute organisms to the universe itself, such choice cannot be merely a function of whim or caprice, habit or familiarity. The responsible scholar must be prepared to evaluate the relative utility—conceptual and methodological—of the various alternatives open to him, and to appraise the manifold implications of the level of analysis family selected. So it is with international relations” (77).
Requirements of an Analytical Model:
That it is descriptive. If we distort reality, we must be explicit about what we are willing to distort. That it be explanatory. The biggest issue here is not the performance in prediction, but the “validity of explanation”. Thirdly, it must predict.
Singer than explores the traditional levels of analysis, starting with the international system.
“As to explanatory capability, the system-oriented model poses some genuine difficulties. In the first place, it tends to lead the observer into a position which exaggerates the impact of the system upon the national actors and, conversely, discounts the impact of the actors on the system…Secondly, this particular level of analysis almost inevitably requires that we postulate a high degree of uniformity in the foreign policy operational codes of our national actors” (80-1).
The National State as Level of Analysis:
This is, by no means, a panacea, but it does provide a different flavor of analysis from the international perspective. One does now see the diverse and diffuse motivations for state-based action, but one can also suffer from another problem: do we now overemphasize the differences between states? Also, one is pressed to answer questions about exactly where theorists will look: do we look at perception, for example?
“In terms of description, we find that the systemic level produces a more comprehensive and total picture of international relations than does the national or sub-systemic level. On the other hand, the atomized and less coherent image produced by the lower level of analysis is somewhat balanced by its richer detail, greater depth and more intensive portrayal. As to explanation, there seems little doubt that the sub-systemic or actor orientation is considerably more fruitful, permitting as it does a more thorough investigation of the process by which foreign policies are made” (89-90).
Monday, September 29, 2008
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Buzan: The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered
Buzan, B., 1995. The level of analysis problem in international relations reconsidered. In International relations theory today.
“This chapter surveys the level of analysis problem in international relations. It looks at how the issue came into the field, how it developed, why it generated disagreement and conflict, where the debate is, and where, in my view, it should be going…The argument is that although the concept of levels of analysis has done much to improve the rigor of theoretical thinking in international relations, too little attention has been paid to the idea itself. A central confusion in understanding what ‘levels’ refers to arises from a widespread failure to distinguish between sources of explanation and objects of analysis” (198).
The issue of Levels of Analysis can be traced back to a moment in the study of international relations theory. Waltz is typically seen as the first to bring these tools for assessing international politics to the discipline in his text Man, the State and War. In this text, Waltz dissects previous literature on the causes of war and claims that these can each be broken down into one of three “images”. Either they are rooted in the nature of individuals, the nature of states, or the level of international system.
According to Buzan, two main issues arose out of the work of Waltz (and Kaplan and Singer): how many levels should there be and of what should they consist? By what metric do we make this distinction?
The answer to the first question hinges to a large degree on whether or not the levels of analysis problem is being explored epistemologically or ontologically. “One (ontological) sees levels as being about ‘different units of analysis’, and the other (epistemological) sees them as being about ‘the types of variables that explain a particular unit’s behavior” (203).
If the “ontological question” is taken into consideration, it is not very difficult to explore. The claim is that these different levels exist in a hierarchy, as even the term “level” implies. The different levels would only have to be separated by their existence in different iterations of space/time.
“Waltz’s restriction of the levels of analysis debate to the confines of the reductionist/holist one thus had three distorting effects. First, it rammed the whole debate about levels into an inappropriate dyad, confining it to only two levels, and importing into the relationship between those two levels the oppositional qualities associated with reductionism versus holism. Second, it created a very narrow conception of holism/system, confining it to Waltz’s sparse definition of political structure. Third, it created a bloated and incoherent ‘unit’ level, to which Waltz paid relatively little attention” (208).
Buzan posits making a larger role for “interaction capacity”. This may help to clear up some of the problems presented by Waltz’s construction of levels of analysis. “Interaction capacity is about the technological capabilities, and the shared norms and organizations, on which the type and intensity of interaction between units in the system, or within a unit, depend…As new technologies of transportation and communication spread, they change the quality and character of the interactions among and within units in the system as a whole” (210). Also, process may be a way to get around part of the rigid focus on structure.
“This chapter surveys the level of analysis problem in international relations. It looks at how the issue came into the field, how it developed, why it generated disagreement and conflict, where the debate is, and where, in my view, it should be going…The argument is that although the concept of levels of analysis has done much to improve the rigor of theoretical thinking in international relations, too little attention has been paid to the idea itself. A central confusion in understanding what ‘levels’ refers to arises from a widespread failure to distinguish between sources of explanation and objects of analysis” (198).
The issue of Levels of Analysis can be traced back to a moment in the study of international relations theory. Waltz is typically seen as the first to bring these tools for assessing international politics to the discipline in his text Man, the State and War. In this text, Waltz dissects previous literature on the causes of war and claims that these can each be broken down into one of three “images”. Either they are rooted in the nature of individuals, the nature of states, or the level of international system.
According to Buzan, two main issues arose out of the work of Waltz (and Kaplan and Singer): how many levels should there be and of what should they consist? By what metric do we make this distinction?
The answer to the first question hinges to a large degree on whether or not the levels of analysis problem is being explored epistemologically or ontologically. “One (ontological) sees levels as being about ‘different units of analysis’, and the other (epistemological) sees them as being about ‘the types of variables that explain a particular unit’s behavior” (203).
If the “ontological question” is taken into consideration, it is not very difficult to explore. The claim is that these different levels exist in a hierarchy, as even the term “level” implies. The different levels would only have to be separated by their existence in different iterations of space/time.
“Waltz’s restriction of the levels of analysis debate to the confines of the reductionist/holist one thus had three distorting effects. First, it rammed the whole debate about levels into an inappropriate dyad, confining it to only two levels, and importing into the relationship between those two levels the oppositional qualities associated with reductionism versus holism. Second, it created a very narrow conception of holism/system, confining it to Waltz’s sparse definition of political structure. Third, it created a bloated and incoherent ‘unit’ level, to which Waltz paid relatively little attention” (208).
Buzan posits making a larger role for “interaction capacity”. This may help to clear up some of the problems presented by Waltz’s construction of levels of analysis. “Interaction capacity is about the technological capabilities, and the shared norms and organizations, on which the type and intensity of interaction between units in the system, or within a unit, depend…As new technologies of transportation and communication spread, they change the quality and character of the interactions among and within units in the system as a whole” (210). Also, process may be a way to get around part of the rigid focus on structure.
Jervis: System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life
Jervis, R., 1997. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton University Press.
“We are dealing with a system when (a) a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts” (6).
Jervis begins the book with a quote about double hulled ships, and a claim that this will surely decrease oil spills. He makes a general point that the results of double-hulling a ship are to some degree unknown (unknowable?). His point carries over to WWI and deals with causation: the reason countries engaged in war was not singly faceted but complex. “As these cases show, it is difficult to know what will happen in a system, but at minimum we can say that a change at one point will have wide ranging effects” (9).
“The phrase ‘The whole is greater than the sum of its parts; can call up images of metaphysical ‘holism’ and organic metaphors. That is not what I have in mind. If we are dealing with a system, the whole is different from, not greater than, the sum of the parts. Reductionism—seeking to understand the system by looking only at the units and their relations with one another—is not appropriate. Many academic disciplines have come to this conclusion, although often using different terminologies. Economics rests in part on an understanding of the ‘fallacy of composition.’ Biologists who study entire organisms see the world differently than their colleagues who work on the level of cells of molecules. Interactional psychology rests on the parallel sense that what seem to be immutable personality traits are in fact formed by the interaction between the individual and her surroundings, including, if she is in therapy, the behavior of the therapist, which in turn, is influenced by her” (13-4).
However, Jervis does not see emergence as representing the core of his analysis, but rather interconnection. Interconnection represents the overdetermined nature of the relationships between various variables at different levels of analysis. The interconnected nature of all variables in an open system makes it neigh impossible to forecast future events and the results of future interaction.
While this chapter read almost nihilistic/relativist in its approach to understanding the outcomes from these systems, this is clearly not the scope of the remainder of the book. The second chapter deals with system effects, something that I greatly need to read about, but not at this moment.
“We are dealing with a system when (a) a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts” (6).
Jervis begins the book with a quote about double hulled ships, and a claim that this will surely decrease oil spills. He makes a general point that the results of double-hulling a ship are to some degree unknown (unknowable?). His point carries over to WWI and deals with causation: the reason countries engaged in war was not singly faceted but complex. “As these cases show, it is difficult to know what will happen in a system, but at minimum we can say that a change at one point will have wide ranging effects” (9).
“The phrase ‘The whole is greater than the sum of its parts; can call up images of metaphysical ‘holism’ and organic metaphors. That is not what I have in mind. If we are dealing with a system, the whole is different from, not greater than, the sum of the parts. Reductionism—seeking to understand the system by looking only at the units and their relations with one another—is not appropriate. Many academic disciplines have come to this conclusion, although often using different terminologies. Economics rests in part on an understanding of the ‘fallacy of composition.’ Biologists who study entire organisms see the world differently than their colleagues who work on the level of cells of molecules. Interactional psychology rests on the parallel sense that what seem to be immutable personality traits are in fact formed by the interaction between the individual and her surroundings, including, if she is in therapy, the behavior of the therapist, which in turn, is influenced by her” (13-4).
However, Jervis does not see emergence as representing the core of his analysis, but rather interconnection. Interconnection represents the overdetermined nature of the relationships between various variables at different levels of analysis. The interconnected nature of all variables in an open system makes it neigh impossible to forecast future events and the results of future interaction.
While this chapter read almost nihilistic/relativist in its approach to understanding the outcomes from these systems, this is clearly not the scope of the remainder of the book. The second chapter deals with system effects, something that I greatly need to read about, but not at this moment.
Huntington: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
Huntington, S., 1993. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press.
Ch. 1: What?
“The transitions to democracy between 1974 and 1990 are the subject of this book” (5).
Huntington posits that the third wave of democratization began with the military take-over of the Portuguese Caetano dictatorship in 1974.
First off, Huntington must explain what he means by democracy, as many studies of, say, democratic peace suffer from an ambiguous or overly rigid metric. “Serious problems of ambiguity and imprecision arise when democracy is defined in terms of either source or authority or purposes, and a procedural definition is used in this study” (6). The core of democracies is the fact that leaders are selected not through means of heredity or power, but rather through competitive elections of the subjects who are to be ruled over. This procedural definition is not, however a panacea. There are many problems with its operationalization, though these may be less acute than other democracy definitions (such as those that rely on concepts of will, for example). The “minimal” definition of democracy used by Huntington is also not useful when exploring political stability or competence.
“A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave also usually involves liberalization or partial democratization of political systems that do not become fully democratic. Three waves of democratization have occurred in the modern world” (15).
The first wave of democratization described by Huntington occurred in the 1800s and lasted until the end of the first world war. This is described as a “long wave”. The reasons for this wave were increased voter participation, a decrease in restrictions to the ballot box and a general trend against monarchic rule. This wave was halted during the rise of the second World War, which saw a general rise in fascism and communism. The second wave of democratization occurred directly after the end of WWII. This represented a marked rise in democracies that were previously fascist during the war. Eastern European countries, however, remained clearly authoritarian. There were signs of democratic growth in Latin America. This all turned around in the “second reverse wave” which, according to Huntington, lasted from 1958-75. There was a increase in authoritarianism and military coups through Latin America and Africa. However, Huntington sees this as being turned around, as noted at the beginning of this abstract, with the overthrow of the Portuguese government in 1974. This brought about a third long-wave of democratization that involved anti-colonial democratic and anti-authoritarian democratic movements throughout the world, eventually bridging with the fall of the USSR and the increased democratization of many of the former Eastern Bloc states.
Ch. 1: What?
“The transitions to democracy between 1974 and 1990 are the subject of this book” (5).
Huntington posits that the third wave of democratization began with the military take-over of the Portuguese Caetano dictatorship in 1974.
First off, Huntington must explain what he means by democracy, as many studies of, say, democratic peace suffer from an ambiguous or overly rigid metric. “Serious problems of ambiguity and imprecision arise when democracy is defined in terms of either source or authority or purposes, and a procedural definition is used in this study” (6). The core of democracies is the fact that leaders are selected not through means of heredity or power, but rather through competitive elections of the subjects who are to be ruled over. This procedural definition is not, however a panacea. There are many problems with its operationalization, though these may be less acute than other democracy definitions (such as those that rely on concepts of will, for example). The “minimal” definition of democracy used by Huntington is also not useful when exploring political stability or competence.
“A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave also usually involves liberalization or partial democratization of political systems that do not become fully democratic. Three waves of democratization have occurred in the modern world” (15).
The first wave of democratization described by Huntington occurred in the 1800s and lasted until the end of the first world war. This is described as a “long wave”. The reasons for this wave were increased voter participation, a decrease in restrictions to the ballot box and a general trend against monarchic rule. This wave was halted during the rise of the second World War, which saw a general rise in fascism and communism. The second wave of democratization occurred directly after the end of WWII. This represented a marked rise in democracies that were previously fascist during the war. Eastern European countries, however, remained clearly authoritarian. There were signs of democratic growth in Latin America. This all turned around in the “second reverse wave” which, according to Huntington, lasted from 1958-75. There was a increase in authoritarianism and military coups through Latin America and Africa. However, Huntington sees this as being turned around, as noted at the beginning of this abstract, with the overthrow of the Portuguese government in 1974. This brought about a third long-wave of democratization that involved anti-colonial democratic and anti-authoritarian democratic movements throughout the world, eventually bridging with the fall of the USSR and the increased democratization of many of the former Eastern Bloc states.
Friday, September 26, 2008
Van Evera: The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War
Van Evera, S., 1984. The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War. International Security, 9(1), 58-107.
“This article will argue that the cult of the offensive was a principal cause of the First World war, creating or magnifying many of the dangers which historians blame for causing the July crisis and rendering it uncontrollable. The following section will first outline the growth of the cult of the offensive in Europe in the years before the war, and then sketch the consequences which international relations theory suggests should follow from it. The second section will outline consequences which the cult produced in 1914 and the final section will suggest conclusions and implications for current American policy” (58).
When offensive is prioritized in military strategy, this can be problematic it does not conform to events on the ground. In the advent to WWI, the prevailing thinking was that offensive fighting would win the day, and that any battle would be over quickly as the invention of more and more brutal means of killing people had created an irrational exuberance about their deployment. This proved to be catastrophic, as long, trench-based battles emerged. The predicted short slot turned quickly into a muddy quagmire.
The remainder of the article supports the notion that the “cult of the offensive” was a clear driver of the brutal nature of WWI, which is in line with Jervis’ formulation concerning offensively minded worlds being more dangerous.
“This article will argue that the cult of the offensive was a principal cause of the First World war, creating or magnifying many of the dangers which historians blame for causing the July crisis and rendering it uncontrollable. The following section will first outline the growth of the cult of the offensive in Europe in the years before the war, and then sketch the consequences which international relations theory suggests should follow from it. The second section will outline consequences which the cult produced in 1914 and the final section will suggest conclusions and implications for current American policy” (58).
When offensive is prioritized in military strategy, this can be problematic it does not conform to events on the ground. In the advent to WWI, the prevailing thinking was that offensive fighting would win the day, and that any battle would be over quickly as the invention of more and more brutal means of killing people had created an irrational exuberance about their deployment. This proved to be catastrophic, as long, trench-based battles emerged. The predicted short slot turned quickly into a muddy quagmire.
The remainder of the article supports the notion that the “cult of the offensive” was a clear driver of the brutal nature of WWI, which is in line with Jervis’ formulation concerning offensively minded worlds being more dangerous.
Mearsheimer: Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War
Mearsheimer, J., 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), 5-56.
“The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely viewed as harbingers of a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than four decades is lifting…This article assess this optimistic view by exploring in detail the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. Specifically, I examine the effects of a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end” (5).
“I argue that the p0rospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years” (6).
“Specifically, the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the Continent; the rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe…and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal” (6-7).
“Four principal scenarios are possible. Under the first scenario, Europe would become nuclear-free, thus eliminating a central pillar of order in the Cold War era. Under the second scenario, the European states do not expand their arsenals to compensate for the departure of the superpowers’ weapons. IN a third scenario, nuclear proliferation takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are taken to dampen the many dangers inherent in the proliferation process…In the fourth and least dangerous scenario, nuclear weapons proliferate in Europe, but the process is well-managed by the current nuclear powers. They take steps to deter preventative strikes on emerging nuclear powers, to set boundaries on the proliferation process…This outcome probably provides the best hope for maintaining peace in Europe” (8).
He then highlights the possibility of three counter arguments being posited. The first is the standard liberal claim that economic interdependence will reduce conflict. The second is democratic peace considerations. The third involves a degree of collective self-awareness amongst Europeans. “But the theories behind these arguments are flawed, as I explain; hence their prediction of peace in a multipolar Europe is flawed as well” (8).
The pre-1945 Europe was quite violent because there were no nuclear weapons and there was a multipolar world. The post 45 world was more peaceful because of bipolarity. “A bipolar system is more peaceful for three main reasons. First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely” (14).
Mearsheimer supports these theses in the remainder of the text.
“The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely viewed as harbingers of a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than four decades is lifting…This article assess this optimistic view by exploring in detail the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. Specifically, I examine the effects of a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end” (5).
“I argue that the p0rospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years” (6).
“Specifically, the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the Continent; the rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe…and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal” (6-7).
“Four principal scenarios are possible. Under the first scenario, Europe would become nuclear-free, thus eliminating a central pillar of order in the Cold War era. Under the second scenario, the European states do not expand their arsenals to compensate for the departure of the superpowers’ weapons. IN a third scenario, nuclear proliferation takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are taken to dampen the many dangers inherent in the proliferation process…In the fourth and least dangerous scenario, nuclear weapons proliferate in Europe, but the process is well-managed by the current nuclear powers. They take steps to deter preventative strikes on emerging nuclear powers, to set boundaries on the proliferation process…This outcome probably provides the best hope for maintaining peace in Europe” (8).
He then highlights the possibility of three counter arguments being posited. The first is the standard liberal claim that economic interdependence will reduce conflict. The second is democratic peace considerations. The third involves a degree of collective self-awareness amongst Europeans. “But the theories behind these arguments are flawed, as I explain; hence their prediction of peace in a multipolar Europe is flawed as well” (8).
The pre-1945 Europe was quite violent because there were no nuclear weapons and there was a multipolar world. The post 45 world was more peaceful because of bipolarity. “A bipolar system is more peaceful for three main reasons. First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely” (14).
Mearsheimer supports these theses in the remainder of the text.
Mearsheimer and Walt: An Unnecessary War
Mearsheimer, J. & Walt, S., 2003. An Unnecessary War. Foreign Policy, 134(1), 2003.
*this was a word document version of the article, so pagination may be problematic
“In the full-court press for war with Iraq, the Bush administration deems Saddam Hussein reckless, ruthless, and not fully rational. Such a man, when mixed with nuclear weapons, is too unpredictable to be prevented from threatening the United States, the hawks say. But scrutiny of his past dealings with the world shows that Saddam, though cruel and calculating, is eminently deterrable” (1).
The main argument of those that support the preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003 was that Saddam could not be trusted with nuclear weapons and that, for this reason alone, he had to go. Even though proponents of the preemptive attack on Saddam acknowledged that the war could lead to a costly occupation, they believed that a nuclear armed Saddam was not tolerable.
Mearsheimer and Walt explore the notion that Saddam was a mad-man. They find that the Iran-Iraq war of the 80s was defensive, from the Iraqi perspective. The invasion of Kuwait can also be seen as being rational: Kuwait was being non-compliant and diplomatic alternatives were exhausted and the US seemed to signal that it would not involve itself in the matter. What about Saddam’s use of chemical and biological weapons on his own people? That calculation taken on the part of Saddam was also through a metric that didn’t see those people possibly responding in a way that would be damaging to Saddam’s critical interests. The calculation of using WMDs against Western targets would be radically different. Also, Saddam used these chemical and biological weapons at a time when we were, and remained, friends of him and Iraq. The US can contain Iraq, even a nuclear armed Iraq, as it did the Soviet Union.
What about the possibility of a “nuclear handoff”? (7). Firstly, Iraq and al Qaeda have no substantive proven connection. In fact, prior to 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq and al Qaeda were in a state of war as the former was a secular Arab nation and the later proponed theocracy. Secondly, if Iraq wanted to secretively transfer a nuke to a terrorist organization, it would be difficult to imagine that the weapon would not be ultimately traced back to Saddam.
“If the United States is, or soon will be, at war with Iraq, Americans should understand that a compelling strategic rationale is absent. This war would be one the Bush administration chose to fight but did not have to fight. Even if such a war goes well and has positive long-range consequences, it will still have been unnecessary. And if it goes badly—whether in the form of high U.S. casualties, significant civilian deaths, a heightened risk of terrorism, or increased hatred of the United States in the Arab and Islamic world—then its architects will have even more to answer for” (9).
*this was a word document version of the article, so pagination may be problematic
“In the full-court press for war with Iraq, the Bush administration deems Saddam Hussein reckless, ruthless, and not fully rational. Such a man, when mixed with nuclear weapons, is too unpredictable to be prevented from threatening the United States, the hawks say. But scrutiny of his past dealings with the world shows that Saddam, though cruel and calculating, is eminently deterrable” (1).
The main argument of those that support the preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003 was that Saddam could not be trusted with nuclear weapons and that, for this reason alone, he had to go. Even though proponents of the preemptive attack on Saddam acknowledged that the war could lead to a costly occupation, they believed that a nuclear armed Saddam was not tolerable.
Mearsheimer and Walt explore the notion that Saddam was a mad-man. They find that the Iran-Iraq war of the 80s was defensive, from the Iraqi perspective. The invasion of Kuwait can also be seen as being rational: Kuwait was being non-compliant and diplomatic alternatives were exhausted and the US seemed to signal that it would not involve itself in the matter. What about Saddam’s use of chemical and biological weapons on his own people? That calculation taken on the part of Saddam was also through a metric that didn’t see those people possibly responding in a way that would be damaging to Saddam’s critical interests. The calculation of using WMDs against Western targets would be radically different. Also, Saddam used these chemical and biological weapons at a time when we were, and remained, friends of him and Iraq. The US can contain Iraq, even a nuclear armed Iraq, as it did the Soviet Union.
What about the possibility of a “nuclear handoff”? (7). Firstly, Iraq and al Qaeda have no substantive proven connection. In fact, prior to 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq and al Qaeda were in a state of war as the former was a secular Arab nation and the later proponed theocracy. Secondly, if Iraq wanted to secretively transfer a nuke to a terrorist organization, it would be difficult to imagine that the weapon would not be ultimately traced back to Saddam.
“If the United States is, or soon will be, at war with Iraq, Americans should understand that a compelling strategic rationale is absent. This war would be one the Bush administration chose to fight but did not have to fight. Even if such a war goes well and has positive long-range consequences, it will still have been unnecessary. And if it goes badly—whether in the form of high U.S. casualties, significant civilian deaths, a heightened risk of terrorism, or increased hatred of the United States in the Arab and Islamic world—then its architects will have even more to answer for” (9).
Grieco: Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation
Grieco, J., 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization, 42(3), 485-507.
“For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions” (485).
The main response to realism has come from liberals and Grieco divides this into three types: early functionalist integration theory, later neofunctionalist regional integration theory and even later interdependence theory. These theories were then followed by liberal institutionalism, which argues that, while anarchy is an structuring variable, states are still able to find ways to cooperate at times.
“This essay’s principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences of actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory’s optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong” (487).
Much of this debate centers around conceptions of cooperation and the limits to cooperation. Institutionalists argue that states will be most concerned that the state that they are cooperating with will “cheat”, as there is no enforcement mechanism. Grieco argues that, yes, while cheating is crucial, one aspect of the formula is missing in the neoliberal institutionalist account: that states will seek both relative and absolute gains. The liberal focuses on the absolute gains to be taken by states in cooperation. The realist emphasizes the fear that states may have in cooperation: they do not want their counterpart to gain more than they gain. This logic is rooted in the assumption of state survival and rationality.
Five properties of realism: states are the actors, international structure penalizes states who are not exclusively looking out for their interest, anarchy is an organizing principle, states in such a situation are worried about security and power, and institutions only roughly affect the above equation.
Liberals have argued against the above assumptions for a variety of reasons. Earlier funcationalism argued against, for example, centering theories on the state. However, the later neoliberal institutionalism began to take on many of the assumptions of realism, though with clearly different consequences. Thus, you have scholars positing theories that begin with basically the same premise, rational states in anarchy, but finding ways for cooperation to emerge.
Grieco does not see this as being legitimate, as the kind of state the two schools of thought envisage are quite different. The liberal state is an atomistic, anthropormorphised actor who is, “only concerned with their self interest”. For the liberal, this equation eventually becomes cooperation, as states can find ways to work together in anarchy. For the liberal, the biggest problem is cheating. Realists reject this focus on cheating as missing the main point about anarchy as an organizing principle. Anarchy does not simply mean that there is no one to enforce treaties, etc. Anarchy means that there is no guarantee that another state will not try to kill you. This leads states to directly worry about relative gains in place of absolute gains.
“For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions” (485).
The main response to realism has come from liberals and Grieco divides this into three types: early functionalist integration theory, later neofunctionalist regional integration theory and even later interdependence theory. These theories were then followed by liberal institutionalism, which argues that, while anarchy is an structuring variable, states are still able to find ways to cooperate at times.
“This essay’s principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences of actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory’s optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong” (487).
Much of this debate centers around conceptions of cooperation and the limits to cooperation. Institutionalists argue that states will be most concerned that the state that they are cooperating with will “cheat”, as there is no enforcement mechanism. Grieco argues that, yes, while cheating is crucial, one aspect of the formula is missing in the neoliberal institutionalist account: that states will seek both relative and absolute gains. The liberal focuses on the absolute gains to be taken by states in cooperation. The realist emphasizes the fear that states may have in cooperation: they do not want their counterpart to gain more than they gain. This logic is rooted in the assumption of state survival and rationality.
Five properties of realism: states are the actors, international structure penalizes states who are not exclusively looking out for their interest, anarchy is an organizing principle, states in such a situation are worried about security and power, and institutions only roughly affect the above equation.
Liberals have argued against the above assumptions for a variety of reasons. Earlier funcationalism argued against, for example, centering theories on the state. However, the later neoliberal institutionalism began to take on many of the assumptions of realism, though with clearly different consequences. Thus, you have scholars positing theories that begin with basically the same premise, rational states in anarchy, but finding ways for cooperation to emerge.
Grieco does not see this as being legitimate, as the kind of state the two schools of thought envisage are quite different. The liberal state is an atomistic, anthropormorphised actor who is, “only concerned with their self interest”. For the liberal, this equation eventually becomes cooperation, as states can find ways to work together in anarchy. For the liberal, the biggest problem is cheating. Realists reject this focus on cheating as missing the main point about anarchy as an organizing principle. Anarchy does not simply mean that there is no one to enforce treaties, etc. Anarchy means that there is no guarantee that another state will not try to kill you. This leads states to directly worry about relative gains in place of absolute gains.
Levy: The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace
Levy, J., 1998. The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace. Annual Reviews in Political Science, 1(1), 139-165.
“I organize this review and assessment of the literature on the causes of war around a levels-of-analysis framework and focus primarily on balance of power theories, power transition theories, the relationship between economic interdependence and war, diversionary theories of conflict, domestic coalitional theories, and the nature of decision-making under risk and uncertainty” (139).
Dependent Variable: War: Large-scale violence between political units. “To differentiate war from lesser levels of violence, they generally follow the Correlates of War Project’s operational requirement of a minimum…of 1000 battle-related fatalities” (141).
System level explanations for war: Realism. The main division in realism is the debate between hegemonic theories and balance of power theories. Hegemonic theories downplay the role of anarchy and focus on power transition and allows for hierarchy. Liberalism: trade interdependence and peace.
Societal Level Theories: Democratic peace and its off-shoots, some Marxist examples, regime type and its comparison to propensity for war.
Individual Level Theories: “Individual-level theories assume (a) that external and internal structures and social forces are not translated directly into foreign policy choices; (b) that key decision-makers vary in their definitions of state interests, assessments of threats to those interests, and/or beliefs as to the optimum strategies to achieve those interests; and (c) that differences in the content of actors’ belief systems in the psychological processes through which they acquire information and make judgments and decisions and in their personalities and emotional states are important intervening variables in explaining observed variation in state behaviors with respect to issues of war and peace” (157).
In terms of general trends, there has been a move away from great power types of conflict, and a move towards small-scale conflicts. There is also an increase in research focused on “…rivalries, bargaining, territorial contiguity, trade…” (159).
“I organize this review and assessment of the literature on the causes of war around a levels-of-analysis framework and focus primarily on balance of power theories, power transition theories, the relationship between economic interdependence and war, diversionary theories of conflict, domestic coalitional theories, and the nature of decision-making under risk and uncertainty” (139).
Dependent Variable: War: Large-scale violence between political units. “To differentiate war from lesser levels of violence, they generally follow the Correlates of War Project’s operational requirement of a minimum…of 1000 battle-related fatalities” (141).
System level explanations for war: Realism. The main division in realism is the debate between hegemonic theories and balance of power theories. Hegemonic theories downplay the role of anarchy and focus on power transition and allows for hierarchy. Liberalism: trade interdependence and peace.
Societal Level Theories: Democratic peace and its off-shoots, some Marxist examples, regime type and its comparison to propensity for war.
Individual Level Theories: “Individual-level theories assume (a) that external and internal structures and social forces are not translated directly into foreign policy choices; (b) that key decision-makers vary in their definitions of state interests, assessments of threats to those interests, and/or beliefs as to the optimum strategies to achieve those interests; and (c) that differences in the content of actors’ belief systems in the psychological processes through which they acquire information and make judgments and decisions and in their personalities and emotional states are important intervening variables in explaining observed variation in state behaviors with respect to issues of war and peace” (157).
In terms of general trends, there has been a move away from great power types of conflict, and a move towards small-scale conflicts. There is also an increase in research focused on “…rivalries, bargaining, territorial contiguity, trade…” (159).
Jervis: Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace
Jervis, R., 2002. Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace. American Political Science Review, 96(1), 1-14.
“The motor of international politics has been war among the leading states” (1).
“But I would argue that war among the leading great powers…will not occur in the future, and indeed is no longer a source of concern for them” (1).
“Security communities are not unprecedented. But what is unprecedented is that the states that constitute this one are the leading members of the international system and so are natural rivals that in the past were central to the violent struggle for security, power, and contested values”
(1).
“Five questions arise. First, does the existence of the Community mean the end of security threats to its members and, more specifically, to the United States? Second, will the Community endure? Third, what are the causes of its construction and maintenance? Fourth, what are the implications of this transformation for the conduct of international affairs? Finally, what does this say about theories of the causes of war?” (2).
Does the Community mean the end of security threats? Of course not entirely, though they become quite unlikely among the Community.
Explanations for the origin and continuation of the Community: Constructivists: changing norms and identities; Liberals: increased information, the base of power is very broad, the public will suffer from war and they make the decisions, more likely to be linked via trade, international organization membership; Realists: American hegemony is what ties the Community together, nuclear weapons make war a “feckless option” (7).
“Whatever its explanation, the very existence of a security community among the leading powers refutes many theories of the causes of war or, at least, indicates that they are not universally valid. Thus human nature and the drive for dominance, honor and glory may exist and contribute to a wide variety of human behaviors, but they are not fated to lead to war” (11).
“For most scholars, the fundamental cause of war is international anarchy, compounded by the security dilemma…As we have seen, different schools of thought propose different explanations for the rise of the Community and so lead to somewhat different propositions about the conditions under which anarchy can be compatible with peace. But what is most important is that the Community constitutes a proof by existence of the possibility of uncoerced peace without central authority. Because these countries are the most powerful ones and particularly war-prone, the Community poses a fundamental challenge to our understanding of world politics and our expectations of future possibilities” (11).
“The motor of international politics has been war among the leading states” (1).
“But I would argue that war among the leading great powers…will not occur in the future, and indeed is no longer a source of concern for them” (1).
“Security communities are not unprecedented. But what is unprecedented is that the states that constitute this one are the leading members of the international system and so are natural rivals that in the past were central to the violent struggle for security, power, and contested values”
(1).
“Five questions arise. First, does the existence of the Community mean the end of security threats to its members and, more specifically, to the United States? Second, will the Community endure? Third, what are the causes of its construction and maintenance? Fourth, what are the implications of this transformation for the conduct of international affairs? Finally, what does this say about theories of the causes of war?” (2).
Does the Community mean the end of security threats? Of course not entirely, though they become quite unlikely among the Community.
Explanations for the origin and continuation of the Community: Constructivists: changing norms and identities; Liberals: increased information, the base of power is very broad, the public will suffer from war and they make the decisions, more likely to be linked via trade, international organization membership; Realists: American hegemony is what ties the Community together, nuclear weapons make war a “feckless option” (7).
“Whatever its explanation, the very existence of a security community among the leading powers refutes many theories of the causes of war or, at least, indicates that they are not universally valid. Thus human nature and the drive for dominance, honor and glory may exist and contribute to a wide variety of human behaviors, but they are not fated to lead to war” (11).
“For most scholars, the fundamental cause of war is international anarchy, compounded by the security dilemma…As we have seen, different schools of thought propose different explanations for the rise of the Community and so lead to somewhat different propositions about the conditions under which anarchy can be compatible with peace. But what is most important is that the Community constitutes a proof by existence of the possibility of uncoerced peace without central authority. Because these countries are the most powerful ones and particularly war-prone, the Community poses a fundamental challenge to our understanding of world politics and our expectations of future possibilities” (11).
Waever: Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community
Waever, O., 1998. Insecurity, security and asecurity in the West European non-war community. In Security Communities. Cambridge University Press.
“Western Europe is a security community. In contrast to the expectations of most contemporary theorists of security communities, this has not been achieved by erecting common security structures or institutions, but primarily through a process of ‘desecuritization’, a progressive marginalization of mutual security concerns in favor of other issues” (69).
Waever claims that Europe went through a period of unsecurity to over security to desecuritization and then a potential situation in the 90s of resecuritization. Security communities, a concept that stems from Deutsch, are non-war communities. Thus, there can be security tensions that do not escalate to the level of war, but the community will not be tempted to militarize disputes. Waever also posits that other issues have become painted as security issues (economic, environmental, etc.), and that this has the possibility to raise tensions, but that these will not result in war, but may be discussed in terms of security.
Waever explores the Scandinavian security community, one that he claims would not be contested by many scholars as being a security community (Europe is likely to be contested, and the US-Canada relationship is likely not to be contested, though it is substantively different). He finds that this community has not always been, and has resulted from a long and bloody history between groups. However, this community emerged over 100 years ago and this can be identified by the peaceful resolution of tensions that would have been previously only solved militarily.
Waever then explores the emergence of the European security community from WWII to the late 90s.
“Western Europe is a security community. In contrast to the expectations of most contemporary theorists of security communities, this has not been achieved by erecting common security structures or institutions, but primarily through a process of ‘desecuritization’, a progressive marginalization of mutual security concerns in favor of other issues” (69).
Waever claims that Europe went through a period of unsecurity to over security to desecuritization and then a potential situation in the 90s of resecuritization. Security communities, a concept that stems from Deutsch, are non-war communities. Thus, there can be security tensions that do not escalate to the level of war, but the community will not be tempted to militarize disputes. Waever also posits that other issues have become painted as security issues (economic, environmental, etc.), and that this has the possibility to raise tensions, but that these will not result in war, but may be discussed in terms of security.
Waever explores the Scandinavian security community, one that he claims would not be contested by many scholars as being a security community (Europe is likely to be contested, and the US-Canada relationship is likely not to be contested, though it is substantively different). He finds that this community has not always been, and has resulted from a long and bloody history between groups. However, this community emerged over 100 years ago and this can be identified by the peaceful resolution of tensions that would have been previously only solved militarily.
Waever then explores the emergence of the European security community from WWII to the late 90s.
Fukuyama: Women and the Evolution of World Politics
Fukuyama, F., 1998. Women and the Evolution of World Politics. Foreign Affairs, 77(5), 24-40.
“In other words, female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik” (25).
While earlier civilizations were clearly distinct from our modern civilization, they were still brutally violent. Much of this violence was the act of males. While there are examples of female leadership, the core of aggression comes from men. “The line from chimp to modern man is continuous” (27).
As the world becomes more equally distributed vis-Ã -vis power and gender, there will be a move towards more passive, less aggressive policy. Also, there is a move to make men more feminine and less aggressive, but the author believes that this will run into limits as biological drivers will be impossible to fully surmount. Also, while feminists believe that aggression and war stem from patriarchical societies, the author contends that their origin is fully biological.
The historic turn to explain social events has been constructivist. Things are determined by context, social roles and norms. This leads to relativism, in our author’s view. Alternative drivers are becoming more important, such as biology. Our author claims that this does not lead necessarily to biological determinism, as there is a great variety in the ways in which biological differences are actually filtered by culture and context. For example, for him, racial differences are not taken into consideration because race is a recent evolutionary phenomenon. Sex, however, is different and is the defining characteristic of a species.
“The core of the feminist agenda for international politics seems fundamentally correct: the violent and aggressive tendencies of men have to be controlled, not simply by redirecting them to external aggression, but by constraining those impulses through a web of norms, laws, agreements, contracts, and the like” (34).
“In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability"
“In other words, female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik” (25).
While earlier civilizations were clearly distinct from our modern civilization, they were still brutally violent. Much of this violence was the act of males. While there are examples of female leadership, the core of aggression comes from men. “The line from chimp to modern man is continuous” (27).
As the world becomes more equally distributed vis-Ã -vis power and gender, there will be a move towards more passive, less aggressive policy. Also, there is a move to make men more feminine and less aggressive, but the author believes that this will run into limits as biological drivers will be impossible to fully surmount. Also, while feminists believe that aggression and war stem from patriarchical societies, the author contends that their origin is fully biological.
The historic turn to explain social events has been constructivist. Things are determined by context, social roles and norms. This leads to relativism, in our author’s view. Alternative drivers are becoming more important, such as biology. Our author claims that this does not lead necessarily to biological determinism, as there is a great variety in the ways in which biological differences are actually filtered by culture and context. For example, for him, racial differences are not taken into consideration because race is a recent evolutionary phenomenon. Sex, however, is different and is the defining characteristic of a species.
“The core of the feminist agenda for international politics seems fundamentally correct: the violent and aggressive tendencies of men have to be controlled, not simply by redirecting them to external aggression, but by constraining those impulses through a web of norms, laws, agreements, contracts, and the like” (34).
“In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability"
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Christensen and Snyder: Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks
Christensen, T. & Snyder, J., 1990. Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity. International Organization, 44(2), 137-168.
“Kenneth Waltz’s rigorous recasting of traditional balance-of-power theory has provided the intellectual foundation for much of the most fruitful recent work in the fields of international politics and national security. But there is a tension between Waltz’s theory and those who apply it in their practical research agendas. Waltz’s is a theory of international politics; it addresses properties of the international system, such as the recurrence of war and the recurrent formation of balances of power. Those who have applied Waltz’s ideas, however, have normally used them as a theory of foreign policy to make predictions about or prescriptions for the strategic choices of states” (137-8).
“In a nutshell, we argue that given Europe’s multipolar checkerboard geographically, the perception of offensive military advantages gave rise to alliance chain-ganging before 1914, whereas the perception of defensive advantages gave rise to buck-passing before 1939. These perceptions of the international conditions constraining strategic choice were, however, misperceptions, rooted in patterns of civil-military relations and the engrained lessons of formative experiences” (139).
“In multipolarity, the approximate equality of alliance partners leads to a high degree of security interdependence within an alliance. Given the anarchic setting and this relative equality, each state feels its own security is integrally intertwined with the security of its alliance partners. As a result, any nation that marches to war inexorably drags its alliance partners with it. No state can restrain a reckless ally by threatening to sit out the conflict, since the demise of its reckless ally would decisively cripple its own security” (140). See WWI, for example.
“To turn Waltz’s ideas into a theory of foreign policy that accurately explains alliance behavior before World Wars I and II, two complications must be introduced. First, the variable elements of international structure must be broadened to include not only polarity but also the security dilemma variables: technology and geography. Second, perception of the strategic incentives inherent in the systemic structure must be introduced as a potentially autonomous factor” (144).
Figure 1 (147)
“Kenneth Waltz’s rigorous recasting of traditional balance-of-power theory has provided the intellectual foundation for much of the most fruitful recent work in the fields of international politics and national security. But there is a tension between Waltz’s theory and those who apply it in their practical research agendas. Waltz’s is a theory of international politics; it addresses properties of the international system, such as the recurrence of war and the recurrent formation of balances of power. Those who have applied Waltz’s ideas, however, have normally used them as a theory of foreign policy to make predictions about or prescriptions for the strategic choices of states” (137-8).
“In a nutshell, we argue that given Europe’s multipolar checkerboard geographically, the perception of offensive military advantages gave rise to alliance chain-ganging before 1914, whereas the perception of defensive advantages gave rise to buck-passing before 1939. These perceptions of the international conditions constraining strategic choice were, however, misperceptions, rooted in patterns of civil-military relations and the engrained lessons of formative experiences” (139).
“In multipolarity, the approximate equality of alliance partners leads to a high degree of security interdependence within an alliance. Given the anarchic setting and this relative equality, each state feels its own security is integrally intertwined with the security of its alliance partners. As a result, any nation that marches to war inexorably drags its alliance partners with it. No state can restrain a reckless ally by threatening to sit out the conflict, since the demise of its reckless ally would decisively cripple its own security” (140). See WWI, for example.
“To turn Waltz’s ideas into a theory of foreign policy that accurately explains alliance behavior before World Wars I and II, two complications must be introduced. First, the variable elements of international structure must be broadened to include not only polarity but also the security dilemma variables: technology and geography. Second, perception of the strategic incentives inherent in the systemic structure must be introduced as a potentially autonomous factor” (144).
Figure 1 (147)
Walt: The Progressive Power of Realism
Walt, S., 1997. The Progressive Power of Realism. American Political Science Review, 91(4), 931-935.
This article is a response to an article written by Vasquez that compares Realism to a degenerative research program in contrast to a progressive research program. This concept stems from Lakatos.
“There are three main problems with Vasquez’s criticism. First, his reliance on Lakatos is problematic, both because that model of scientific progress is flawed and because Vasquez’s interpretation of it would justify abandoning most (if not all) social science theory. Second, Vasquez’s characterization of the realist tradition is misleading and understates its range and diversity. Third, Vasquez overlooks the progressive character of contemporary realist theorizing, in large part because he did not condiser all the relevant literature. In particular, his treatment of my own work is both inconsistent and demonstrably inaccurate” (931).
“The realist perspective offers a simple and powerful way to understand relations among political groups (including states) and offers compelling (albeit imperfect) accounts of a diverse array of international phenomena” (934).
This article is a response to an article written by Vasquez that compares Realism to a degenerative research program in contrast to a progressive research program. This concept stems from Lakatos.
“There are three main problems with Vasquez’s criticism. First, his reliance on Lakatos is problematic, both because that model of scientific progress is flawed and because Vasquez’s interpretation of it would justify abandoning most (if not all) social science theory. Second, Vasquez’s characterization of the realist tradition is misleading and understates its range and diversity. Third, Vasquez overlooks the progressive character of contemporary realist theorizing, in large part because he did not condiser all the relevant literature. In particular, his treatment of my own work is both inconsistent and demonstrably inaccurate” (931).
“The realist perspective offers a simple and powerful way to understand relations among political groups (including states) and offers compelling (albeit imperfect) accounts of a diverse array of international phenomena” (934).
Vasquez: The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Versus Progressive Research Programs
Vasquez, J., 1997. The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 91, 899-912.
“Several analysts argue that, despite anomalies, the realist paradigm is dominant because it si more fertile than its rivals While the ability of the realist paradigm to reformulate its theories in light of criticism accounts for its persistence, it is argued that the proliferation of emendations exposes a degenerating tendency in the paradigm’s research program” (899).
It is a degenerative program because: theoretical development is highly varied, its inability to identify the core of the discipline for falsification, an overuse of “auxiliary” positions to explain away shortcomings and a shortcoming of solid discoveries.
Lakatos argued that theories must be falsifiable, but that a school of thought, or paradigm, will never be falsified because auxiliary formulations will always be constructed to explain away anomalies (in line with Kuhn).
He examines the failures of realist theories partially through the lenses of balance of power and theorists’ attempts to alleviate some of Waltz’ earlier errors.
“Several analysts argue that, despite anomalies, the realist paradigm is dominant because it si more fertile than its rivals While the ability of the realist paradigm to reformulate its theories in light of criticism accounts for its persistence, it is argued that the proliferation of emendations exposes a degenerating tendency in the paradigm’s research program” (899).
It is a degenerative program because: theoretical development is highly varied, its inability to identify the core of the discipline for falsification, an overuse of “auxiliary” positions to explain away shortcomings and a shortcoming of solid discoveries.
Lakatos argued that theories must be falsifiable, but that a school of thought, or paradigm, will never be falsified because auxiliary formulations will always be constructed to explain away anomalies (in line with Kuhn).
He examines the failures of realist theories partially through the lenses of balance of power and theorists’ attempts to alleviate some of Waltz’ earlier errors.
Mansfield: Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power
Mansfield, E., 1993. Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power. International Studies Quarterly, 37, 105.
This article argues that a more helpful metric for measuring power in the international system is not polarity, but concentration. “The argument of this paper is that, for the purposes of explaining patterns of balancing behavior, the onset of war, and many aspects of the international political economy, scholars are likely to find it useful to analyze both features of the distribution of power that have been used repeatedly in studies of international relations: (1) polarity; and (2) concentration” (106).
“In this paper, I argue that, despite the fact that the use of polarity has enabled political scientists to make significant advances, it is also fraught with a number of limitations…These limitations can be redressed, in part, by focusing on concentration as well as on the number of poles in the global system. Concentration is entirely consistent with the microeconomic underpinnings of modern realist explanations of international relations. Unlike polarity, it also incorporates both the power inequalities among the major powers and the number of…major powers” (106).
Polarity is a problematic way to measure balance of power phenomena for a number of reasons. For example, even though Waltz said that anyone with “common sense” would be able to assert how many poles there were in the international system, it actually remains quite a contentious issue. Mansfield goes on to explain that IR should take an example from business literature, which measures the relative power of different firms using a more complex method.
Concentration is, “…a function of: (1) the number of major powers in the global system; and (2) the relative inequality of capabilities among the major powers” (111).
Mansfield then goes on to show how the concept of concentration can be helpfully applied to a debate about hegemonic stability theory. “By focusing on concentration, it is possible to assess empirically the influence of some aspect of the interaction between the number of major powers and the relative inequality of power among them on international economic outcomes” (121).
This article argues that a more helpful metric for measuring power in the international system is not polarity, but concentration. “The argument of this paper is that, for the purposes of explaining patterns of balancing behavior, the onset of war, and many aspects of the international political economy, scholars are likely to find it useful to analyze both features of the distribution of power that have been used repeatedly in studies of international relations: (1) polarity; and (2) concentration” (106).
“In this paper, I argue that, despite the fact that the use of polarity has enabled political scientists to make significant advances, it is also fraught with a number of limitations…These limitations can be redressed, in part, by focusing on concentration as well as on the number of poles in the global system. Concentration is entirely consistent with the microeconomic underpinnings of modern realist explanations of international relations. Unlike polarity, it also incorporates both the power inequalities among the major powers and the number of…major powers” (106).
Polarity is a problematic way to measure balance of power phenomena for a number of reasons. For example, even though Waltz said that anyone with “common sense” would be able to assert how many poles there were in the international system, it actually remains quite a contentious issue. Mansfield goes on to explain that IR should take an example from business literature, which measures the relative power of different firms using a more complex method.
Concentration is, “…a function of: (1) the number of major powers in the global system; and (2) the relative inequality of capabilities among the major powers” (111).
Mansfield then goes on to show how the concept of concentration can be helpfully applied to a debate about hegemonic stability theory. “By focusing on concentration, it is possible to assess empirically the influence of some aspect of the interaction between the number of major powers and the relative inequality of power among them on international economic outcomes” (121).
Deutsch and Singer: Multiple Power Systems and International Stability
Deutsch, K. & Singer, J., 1964. Multiple Power Systems and International Stability. World Politics, 16(3), 390-406.
“In the classical literature of diplomatic history, the balance-of-power concept occupies a central position.” (390) This article explores the IV of the number of independent actors in a system against the DV of system stability.
“Stability may, of course, be considered from the vantage point of both the total system and the individual states comprising it. From the broader, or systemic, point of view, we shall define stability as the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur. And from the more limited perspective of the individual nations, stability would refer to the probability of their continued political independence and territorial integrity without any significant probability of becoming engaged in a ‘war for survival.” (390-1)
There is a comparison between probabilistic concepts of stability and classical notions of stability, specifically that of Richardson. “Richardson’s stability referred simply to any set of conditions under which the system would return to its equilibrium state” (391). Kaplan’s definition of equilibrium is slightly different. In Richardson’s formulation, systems can be stable even if there is transition, like, for example, the increase of armament spending as a percentage of GDP as long as it’s consistent across countries. Kaplan is interested in being consistent with the variable that is the focus of the study.
The authors explore the amount of interactions that can possibly take place between different countries as the amount of poles increase in the international system. This obviously takes the form of an exponential growth curve.
Next, they explore the “Share of Attention” that can be offered by countries that is, “available for conflict” (396).
“Thus, if some minimum percentage of a nation’s external attention is required for that nation to engage in behavior tending toward armed conflict, and the increase in number of independent t actors diminishes that share that any nation can allocate to any other single actor, such an increase is likely to have a stabilizing effect upon the system” (400).
“In the long run, according to this model, even multi-polar systems operating under the rules of balance-of-power policies are shown to be self-destroying, but both in the short and the long run the instability of tight bipolar systems appears to be substantially greater. It seems plausible that, if the spread of nuclear weapons could be slowed down or controlled, a transition from the bipolar international system of the early 1950’s to an increasingly multipolar system in the 1960’s might by mankind some valuable time to seek some more dependable bases for world order” (406).
“In the classical literature of diplomatic history, the balance-of-power concept occupies a central position.” (390) This article explores the IV of the number of independent actors in a system against the DV of system stability.
“Stability may, of course, be considered from the vantage point of both the total system and the individual states comprising it. From the broader, or systemic, point of view, we shall define stability as the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur. And from the more limited perspective of the individual nations, stability would refer to the probability of their continued political independence and territorial integrity without any significant probability of becoming engaged in a ‘war for survival.” (390-1)
There is a comparison between probabilistic concepts of stability and classical notions of stability, specifically that of Richardson. “Richardson’s stability referred simply to any set of conditions under which the system would return to its equilibrium state” (391). Kaplan’s definition of equilibrium is slightly different. In Richardson’s formulation, systems can be stable even if there is transition, like, for example, the increase of armament spending as a percentage of GDP as long as it’s consistent across countries. Kaplan is interested in being consistent with the variable that is the focus of the study.
The authors explore the amount of interactions that can possibly take place between different countries as the amount of poles increase in the international system. This obviously takes the form of an exponential growth curve.
Next, they explore the “Share of Attention” that can be offered by countries that is, “available for conflict” (396).
“Thus, if some minimum percentage of a nation’s external attention is required for that nation to engage in behavior tending toward armed conflict, and the increase in number of independent t actors diminishes that share that any nation can allocate to any other single actor, such an increase is likely to have a stabilizing effect upon the system” (400).
“In the long run, according to this model, even multi-polar systems operating under the rules of balance-of-power policies are shown to be self-destroying, but both in the short and the long run the instability of tight bipolar systems appears to be substantially greater. It seems plausible that, if the spread of nuclear weapons could be slowed down or controlled, a transition from the bipolar international system of the early 1950’s to an increasingly multipolar system in the 1960’s might by mankind some valuable time to seek some more dependable bases for world order” (406).
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Gowa: Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade
Gowa, J., 1994. Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade, Princeton University Press.
“In this book, I develop what I hope is an intuitively appealing and analytically rigorous explanation of the impact of power politics on inter-state trade. In order to do so, I construct a very simple game-theoretic model to address the question of substantive importance.. That question is whether free trade is more likely within than across alliances. More precisely, I address this question: Under what, if any, conditions does it make sense for states to trad3e more freely with their allies than with their adversaries?” (5-6).
“…I analyze the impact of the anarchic structure of international politics on the exchange of goods and services among states. Prior to doing so, I argue that hegemonic stability theory, the preeminent system-level theory of the relationship between power politics and free trade, does not resolve the question of the political correlates of open international markets…Here, I* summarize the core argument of this book. I contend that the play of power politics is an inexorable element of any agreement to open international markets, because of the security externalities that trade produces. These externalities arise because the source of gains from trade is the increased efficiency with which domestic resources can be employed. As a consequence, trade frees economic resources for military uses. Thus, trade enhances the potential military power of any country that engages in it. The anarchic structure of the international system…compels its constitute states to attend closely to the military power and potential of both prospective and actual allies and adversaries. It does so because the absence of any supranational authority in the international system enables a state either to threaten or to actually resort to force at any time to achieve its goals. The probability that a state will do so depends in part upon its power. The latter, in turn, depends partially upon its real income. As a consequence, the real-income gains that motivate free trade are also the source of the security externalities that can either impede or facilitate trade: Trade with an adversary produces a security diseconomy; trade with an ally produces a positive externality. In either case, agreements to open international markets create a divergence between the private and social costs of trade…In other words, because trade generates security externalities adherence to a policy of free and non-discriminatory trade may not be optimal for states in an anarchic international system…I consider these external effects explicitly. Doing so leads me to two conclusions: (1) free trade is more likely within than across political-0miliitary alliances; and (2) the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary: those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions than are their mutipolar counterparts” (6-7).
Kindleberger is seen as the father of hegemonic stability theory, though he preferred to use the word “leader” to “hegemon”, as the later connoted control and coercion. The argument went something like this: international trade is a public good, and in order to have this public good be freely available, there had to be a hegemon to support its diffusion. Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable (the examples given by Gowa are nuclear deterrence and clean air). With public goods, there is obviously the problem of free riders in rationalist models.
Gowa then explores alliances from a rationalist perspective. He defines an alliance as, following Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan, “a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues” (32). Gowa points out three kinds of alliances: defense pacts, nonaggression pacts and ententes mandating cooperation in war (32). Alliances can make sense from a realist perspective when they successfully balance.
“Trade with an ally produces a positive externality; trade with an adversary creates a security diseconomy. A s a result, ceteris paribus, free trade is more likely within than across political-military alliances” (120).
“In this book, I develop what I hope is an intuitively appealing and analytically rigorous explanation of the impact of power politics on inter-state trade. In order to do so, I construct a very simple game-theoretic model to address the question of substantive importance.. That question is whether free trade is more likely within than across alliances. More precisely, I address this question: Under what, if any, conditions does it make sense for states to trad3e more freely with their allies than with their adversaries?” (5-6).
“…I analyze the impact of the anarchic structure of international politics on the exchange of goods and services among states. Prior to doing so, I argue that hegemonic stability theory, the preeminent system-level theory of the relationship between power politics and free trade, does not resolve the question of the political correlates of open international markets…Here, I* summarize the core argument of this book. I contend that the play of power politics is an inexorable element of any agreement to open international markets, because of the security externalities that trade produces. These externalities arise because the source of gains from trade is the increased efficiency with which domestic resources can be employed. As a consequence, trade frees economic resources for military uses. Thus, trade enhances the potential military power of any country that engages in it. The anarchic structure of the international system…compels its constitute states to attend closely to the military power and potential of both prospective and actual allies and adversaries. It does so because the absence of any supranational authority in the international system enables a state either to threaten or to actually resort to force at any time to achieve its goals. The probability that a state will do so depends in part upon its power. The latter, in turn, depends partially upon its real income. As a consequence, the real-income gains that motivate free trade are also the source of the security externalities that can either impede or facilitate trade: Trade with an adversary produces a security diseconomy; trade with an ally produces a positive externality. In either case, agreements to open international markets create a divergence between the private and social costs of trade…In other words, because trade generates security externalities adherence to a policy of free and non-discriminatory trade may not be optimal for states in an anarchic international system…I consider these external effects explicitly. Doing so leads me to two conclusions: (1) free trade is more likely within than across political-0miliitary alliances; and (2) the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary: those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions than are their mutipolar counterparts” (6-7).
Kindleberger is seen as the father of hegemonic stability theory, though he preferred to use the word “leader” to “hegemon”, as the later connoted control and coercion. The argument went something like this: international trade is a public good, and in order to have this public good be freely available, there had to be a hegemon to support its diffusion. Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable (the examples given by Gowa are nuclear deterrence and clean air). With public goods, there is obviously the problem of free riders in rationalist models.
Gowa then explores alliances from a rationalist perspective. He defines an alliance as, following Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan, “a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues” (32). Gowa points out three kinds of alliances: defense pacts, nonaggression pacts and ententes mandating cooperation in war (32). Alliances can make sense from a realist perspective when they successfully balance.
“Trade with an ally produces a positive externality; trade with an adversary creates a security diseconomy. A s a result, ceteris paribus, free trade is more likely within than across political-military alliances” (120).
Saturday, September 20, 2008
Niebuhr: Moral Man and Immoral Society
Niebuhr, R., 2001. Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, Westminster John Knox Press.
From the Introduction:
“The thesis to be elaborated in these pages is that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and of social groups, national, racial, and economic; and that this distinction justifies and necessitates political parties which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing” (xi).
“Individual men may be moral in the sense tha they are able to consider interests other than their own…But all these achievements are more difficult, if not impossible, for human societies and social groups. In every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse, less capiacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism…” (xi).
From the Introduction:
“The thesis to be elaborated in these pages is that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and of social groups, national, racial, and economic; and that this distinction justifies and necessitates political parties which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing” (xi).
“Individual men may be moral in the sense tha they are able to consider interests other than their own…But all these achievements are more difficult, if not impossible, for human societies and social groups. In every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse, less capiacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism…” (xi).
Waltz: Globalization and Governance
Waltz, K., 1999. Globalization and Governance. PS: Political Science and Politics, 32(4), 693-700.
Waltz begins by highlighting the “fad” of globalization and the literature surrounding it, specifically that of Friedman and the “electric herd”. He goes on to show that this era of globalization is not substantively different form earlier eras of globalization, and that there are a number of “fads” that emerge in different decades, but that quickly die away.
“In a system of balanced states, the domination of one or some of them is prevented by the reaction of others acting as counterweights…Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been alone in the world; no state or combination of states provides an effective counterweight…The present condition of international politics is unnatural. Both the predominance of America and, one may hope, the militarization of international affairs will diminish with time. Many globalizers believe that the world is increasingly ruled by markets. Looking at the state among states leads to a different conclusion. The main difference between international politics now and earlier is not found in the increased interdependence of states but in their growing inequality. With the end of bipolarity, the distribution of capabilities across states has become extremely lopsided. Rather than elevating economic forces and depressing political ones, the inequalities of international politics enhance the political role of one country. Politics, as usual, prevails over economics” (699-700).
Waltz begins by highlighting the “fad” of globalization and the literature surrounding it, specifically that of Friedman and the “electric herd”. He goes on to show that this era of globalization is not substantively different form earlier eras of globalization, and that there are a number of “fads” that emerge in different decades, but that quickly die away.
“In a system of balanced states, the domination of one or some of them is prevented by the reaction of others acting as counterweights…Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been alone in the world; no state or combination of states provides an effective counterweight…The present condition of international politics is unnatural. Both the predominance of America and, one may hope, the militarization of international affairs will diminish with time. Many globalizers believe that the world is increasingly ruled by markets. Looking at the state among states leads to a different conclusion. The main difference between international politics now and earlier is not found in the increased interdependence of states but in their growing inequality. With the end of bipolarity, the distribution of capabilities across states has become extremely lopsided. Rather than elevating economic forces and depressing political ones, the inequalities of international politics enhance the political role of one country. Politics, as usual, prevails over economics” (699-700).
Rowe: The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War
Rowe, D., 2005. The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War. Security Studies, 14(3), 407-447.
“Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace” (407). This study will use H-O models of trade to explore how increased economic interdependence does actually constrain the decision making capabilities of military. Also, it concludes that, far from being a driver of peace, liberalism was actually one of the main causes of WWI.
“This conclusion that globalization pacifies international relations is not just premature, it is wrong. It is premature because modern liberal scholarship suffers from two important shortcomings. First, the relationship between globalization…and international peace remains theoretically underdeveloped…Second, empirical studies of globalization and peace have been dominated by large-N statistical analysis. These analyses cannot, by themselves, establish causation. They need to be complemented by qualitative studies that trace the causal processes imputed by liberal theory to the outcomes it predicts. By and large, however, these qualitative studies have yet to be carried out” (408).
“Liberals identify at least three closely related means by which globalization pacifies society. First, globalization generates powerful new social classes with vested interests in peace…Second, globalization endows societies with pacific social and personal values that constrain the state’s ability to generate and wield military force…Third, globalization enhances the political importance of these pacific values by liberalizing and democratizing society” (410-1).
He draws from Rogowski’s Commerce and Coalitions, where an exploration of the relationship between domestic social groups and their response to changes in trade will depend on whether the country is more endowed with labor or land and whether it is capital rich or poor. “The more citizens can earn from using their resources elsewhere, the less willing they become to surrender these resources to the state; the greater their demands for compensation; and, by implication, the more constrained the state’s ability to generate force” (413). With more trade, people become more wealthy and expect higher returns on their work, and thus it is harder to generate an army. “Globalization will enhance the state’s ability to use the country’s scarce resources to build military power by lowering the domestic relative prices and incomes earned by the country’s scarce resources, but it will impede the state’s ability to use the country’s abundant resources to build military power by raising the domestic relative prices and incomes earned by the country’s abundant resources” (413).
The rest of the paper explores early 19th century globalization and how European governments were unduly constrained to build military forces and they should have to avoid the Great War.
“Liberalism’s logic linking globalization’s constraints against war to international peace suffers at least three significant flaws. First, it assumes that a state’s security is determined solely by its external environment…Second, the liberal argument implicitly assumes that constraining states from threatening or using military force always enhances international peace..Third, this article has thus far assumed that globalization constrains all states equally…however, these constraints should vary according to whether the state uses the country’s abundant or scarce economic resources to build military power…In sum, globalization’s tendency to generate systemic internal constraints on military force does not necessarily lead to a more stable and peaceful international system but can instead…generate systemic insecurity as all major powers become less able to mobilize their countries’ abundant resources…undermine the ability of powers to practice effective deterrence…magnify the importance of defensive alliances…magnify the threat posed by states that are at least constrained by deepening integration into the world economy” (431-3).
“Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace” (407). This study will use H-O models of trade to explore how increased economic interdependence does actually constrain the decision making capabilities of military. Also, it concludes that, far from being a driver of peace, liberalism was actually one of the main causes of WWI.
“This conclusion that globalization pacifies international relations is not just premature, it is wrong. It is premature because modern liberal scholarship suffers from two important shortcomings. First, the relationship between globalization…and international peace remains theoretically underdeveloped…Second, empirical studies of globalization and peace have been dominated by large-N statistical analysis. These analyses cannot, by themselves, establish causation. They need to be complemented by qualitative studies that trace the causal processes imputed by liberal theory to the outcomes it predicts. By and large, however, these qualitative studies have yet to be carried out” (408).
“Liberals identify at least three closely related means by which globalization pacifies society. First, globalization generates powerful new social classes with vested interests in peace…Second, globalization endows societies with pacific social and personal values that constrain the state’s ability to generate and wield military force…Third, globalization enhances the political importance of these pacific values by liberalizing and democratizing society” (410-1).
He draws from Rogowski’s Commerce and Coalitions, where an exploration of the relationship between domestic social groups and their response to changes in trade will depend on whether the country is more endowed with labor or land and whether it is capital rich or poor. “The more citizens can earn from using their resources elsewhere, the less willing they become to surrender these resources to the state; the greater their demands for compensation; and, by implication, the more constrained the state’s ability to generate force” (413). With more trade, people become more wealthy and expect higher returns on their work, and thus it is harder to generate an army. “Globalization will enhance the state’s ability to use the country’s scarce resources to build military power by lowering the domestic relative prices and incomes earned by the country’s scarce resources, but it will impede the state’s ability to use the country’s abundant resources to build military power by raising the domestic relative prices and incomes earned by the country’s abundant resources” (413).
The rest of the paper explores early 19th century globalization and how European governments were unduly constrained to build military forces and they should have to avoid the Great War.
“Liberalism’s logic linking globalization’s constraints against war to international peace suffers at least three significant flaws. First, it assumes that a state’s security is determined solely by its external environment…Second, the liberal argument implicitly assumes that constraining states from threatening or using military force always enhances international peace..Third, this article has thus far assumed that globalization constrains all states equally…however, these constraints should vary according to whether the state uses the country’s abundant or scarce economic resources to build military power…In sum, globalization’s tendency to generate systemic internal constraints on military force does not necessarily lead to a more stable and peaceful international system but can instead…generate systemic insecurity as all major powers become less able to mobilize their countries’ abundant resources…undermine the ability of powers to practice effective deterrence…magnify the importance of defensive alliances…magnify the threat posed by states that are at least constrained by deepening integration into the world economy” (431-3).
Friday, September 19, 2008
Wolf: Will the Nation-State Survive Globalizaiton
Wolf, Martin, 2001. Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization. Foreign Affairs, 80(1), 178-90.
“A specter is haunting the world’s governments—the specter of globalization” (178).
Wolf explores the concept of globalization historically. Comparing the same countries in 1910 and 1995 he notes that, “they seem more integrated for trade, at least in the high-income countries; no more integrated for capital—above all for long-term capital—despite important changes in the composition of capital flows; and much less integrated for labor” (181).
“So why do so many people believe that something unique is happening today? The answer lies with the two forces driving contemporary economic change: falling costs of transport and communications on the one hand and liberalizing economic policies on the other” (181).
“Ironically, the technology that is supposed to make globalization inevitable also makes increased surveillance by the state, particularly over people, easier than it would have been a century ago. Indeed, here is the world we not live in: one with fairly free movements of capital, continuing (though declining) restrictions on trade in goods and services, but quite tight control over the movement of people” (184).
Globalization does not decrease the state’s ability to increase taxes, as is seen most clearly in EU nations, though tax collection could become more problematic with the advent of certain technologies (ie., the Internet).
“Last but not least, some observers argue that globalization limits governments’ ability to run fiscal deficits and pursue inflationary monetary policy. But macroeconomic policy is always vulnerable to the reaction of the private sector, regardless of whether the capital market is internationally integrated” (188).
Increased economic interdependence does not mean t4hat governments lose their ability to act. Also, this increases governmental competition, thus holding governments more accountable.
“What…does globalization mean for states? First, policy ultimately determines the pace and depth of international economic integration…Second…the policy underpinnings of integration are less complete than they were a century ago. Third, countries choose integration because they see its benefits…Fourth, international economic integration magnifies the impact of the difference between good and bad states…Finally, as the world economy continues to integrate and cross-border flows become more important, global governance must be improved” (190).
“A specter is haunting the world’s governments—the specter of globalization” (178).
Wolf explores the concept of globalization historically. Comparing the same countries in 1910 and 1995 he notes that, “they seem more integrated for trade, at least in the high-income countries; no more integrated for capital—above all for long-term capital—despite important changes in the composition of capital flows; and much less integrated for labor” (181).
“So why do so many people believe that something unique is happening today? The answer lies with the two forces driving contemporary economic change: falling costs of transport and communications on the one hand and liberalizing economic policies on the other” (181).
“Ironically, the technology that is supposed to make globalization inevitable also makes increased surveillance by the state, particularly over people, easier than it would have been a century ago. Indeed, here is the world we not live in: one with fairly free movements of capital, continuing (though declining) restrictions on trade in goods and services, but quite tight control over the movement of people” (184).
Globalization does not decrease the state’s ability to increase taxes, as is seen most clearly in EU nations, though tax collection could become more problematic with the advent of certain technologies (ie., the Internet).
“Last but not least, some observers argue that globalization limits governments’ ability to run fiscal deficits and pursue inflationary monetary policy. But macroeconomic policy is always vulnerable to the reaction of the private sector, regardless of whether the capital market is internationally integrated” (188).
Increased economic interdependence does not mean t4hat governments lose their ability to act. Also, this increases governmental competition, thus holding governments more accountable.
“What…does globalization mean for states? First, policy ultimately determines the pace and depth of international economic integration…Second…the policy underpinnings of integration are less complete than they were a century ago. Third, countries choose integration because they see its benefits…Fourth, international economic integration magnifies the impact of the difference between good and bad states…Finally, as the world economy continues to integrate and cross-border flows become more important, global governance must be improved” (190).
Rosenberg: Globalizaiton Theory: A Post Mortem
Rosenberg, J., 2005. Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem. International Politics, 42, 2-74.
Globalization was the catch phrase of the 90’s. It does not seem to be as applicable in the early 21st century. Why is this the case? “This article argues that ‘Globalization Theory’ always suffered from basic flaws: as a general social theory; as a historical sociological argument about the nature of modern international relations; and as a guide to the interpretations of empirical events…it also offers an alternative, ‘conjunctural analysis’ of the 1990’s, in order both to explain the rise and fall of ‘globalization’ itself, and to illustrate the enduring potential for International Relations of those classical approaches which Globalization Theory had sought to displace” (2).
While it appeared as if the liberalization and interconnection experienced in the 90’s would continue, the stagnation of a variety of international agreements, for example, highlight the lack of continuity in globalization’s spread.
“How then are these tasks taken up in the pages that follow?...The movement of the argument traces a line from social theory through historical sociology and into the historical analysis of the 1990s. At each level, in successive sections of the article, a different aspect of Globalization Theory is subjected to critique: first its methodological foregrounding of space and time; then its substantive belief in the signi8ficance of transnational relations for the transformation of sovereignty; and finally, its particular reading of the 1990s in the light of that belief. This three part movement from the abstract to the concrete is also designed to facilitate a cumulative refinement of the diagnosis: from an initial, general designation of ‘globalization’ as a Zeitgeist (rather than a plausible social scientific concept); through the identification of its symptomatic affinities with the experience of capitalist development; and into the pin-pointing of its concrete production and dissolution in the unique international conjuncture of the 1990s” (9).
“The ‘double post mortem’ proposed near the start of this article has turned out in fact to have three parts, corresponding to three interdependent levels of abstraction at which social enquiry may be pursued: general social theory, historical sociological identification of social structures and tendencies and empirically orientated, conjunctural analysis of dynamic sequences of historical events…The first level gave us the most general formula of the problem. To posit ‘globalization’ as an explanatory category must, the further it is pushed, lead to a conceptual inflation of space; the reificatory consequences of this can be avoided only be explicit qualification, to the point of implicit retraction…At the second level, the historical sociological, we found the intellectual ambition of Globalization Theory translated into an empirical expectation…of a fundamental transformation in the nature of international relations…Finally, at the conjunctural historical level we reconsidered some of the main empirical events and processes that provided the historical context for the rise and fall of Globalization Theory. We found that during the 1990s a longer-term decomposition of the postwar settlement, domestic and international, intersected with the collapse of the Soviet Union to trigger a major and rapid restructuring of the international system” (63-4).
Globalization was the catch phrase of the 90’s. It does not seem to be as applicable in the early 21st century. Why is this the case? “This article argues that ‘Globalization Theory’ always suffered from basic flaws: as a general social theory; as a historical sociological argument about the nature of modern international relations; and as a guide to the interpretations of empirical events…it also offers an alternative, ‘conjunctural analysis’ of the 1990’s, in order both to explain the rise and fall of ‘globalization’ itself, and to illustrate the enduring potential for International Relations of those classical approaches which Globalization Theory had sought to displace” (2).
While it appeared as if the liberalization and interconnection experienced in the 90’s would continue, the stagnation of a variety of international agreements, for example, highlight the lack of continuity in globalization’s spread.
“How then are these tasks taken up in the pages that follow?...The movement of the argument traces a line from social theory through historical sociology and into the historical analysis of the 1990s. At each level, in successive sections of the article, a different aspect of Globalization Theory is subjected to critique: first its methodological foregrounding of space and time; then its substantive belief in the signi8ficance of transnational relations for the transformation of sovereignty; and finally, its particular reading of the 1990s in the light of that belief. This three part movement from the abstract to the concrete is also designed to facilitate a cumulative refinement of the diagnosis: from an initial, general designation of ‘globalization’ as a Zeitgeist (rather than a plausible social scientific concept); through the identification of its symptomatic affinities with the experience of capitalist development; and into the pin-pointing of its concrete production and dissolution in the unique international conjuncture of the 1990s” (9).
“The ‘double post mortem’ proposed near the start of this article has turned out in fact to have three parts, corresponding to three interdependent levels of abstraction at which social enquiry may be pursued: general social theory, historical sociological identification of social structures and tendencies and empirically orientated, conjunctural analysis of dynamic sequences of historical events…The first level gave us the most general formula of the problem. To posit ‘globalization’ as an explanatory category must, the further it is pushed, lead to a conceptual inflation of space; the reificatory consequences of this can be avoided only be explicit qualification, to the point of implicit retraction…At the second level, the historical sociological, we found the intellectual ambition of Globalization Theory translated into an empirical expectation…of a fundamental transformation in the nature of international relations…Finally, at the conjunctural historical level we reconsidered some of the main empirical events and processes that provided the historical context for the rise and fall of Globalization Theory. We found that during the 1990s a longer-term decomposition of the postwar settlement, domestic and international, intersected with the collapse of the Soviet Union to trigger a major and rapid restructuring of the international system” (63-4).
Rodrik: Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate
Rodrik, D., 2000. Sense and nonsense in the globalization debate. International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, 461-473.
The globalization debate is highly polarized. Economists and policy makers believe that it is beneficial, environmentalists, unions and other groups find it problematic.
“The postwar period has witnessed two apparently contradictory trends: the growth of trade and the growth of government” (25). The paper argues that the relationship between social spending and trade is logarithmic. “International economic integration thus poses a serious dilemma: globalization increases the demand for social insurance while simultaneously constraining the ability of governments to respond effectively to that demand” (26).
“The question…is how the tension between globalization and the pressure to mitigate risks can be eased. If the vital role that social insurance played in enabling the postwar expansion of trade is neglected and social safety nets are allowed to dwindle, the domestic consensus in favor of open markets will be eroded seriously, and protectionist pressures will soar” (27).
Many of the concerns that have arisen regarding trade should be explored thoughtfully, though a more rigorous debate is needed. For example, in discussions of the “race to the bottom”, low-wages are seen as the driving force of globalization. If this were the case, Rodrik points out, Bangladesh would be one of the world’s leading exporters. Instead, productivity is much more closely tied with capital investment.
“One need not be alarmed by globalization, but neither should one take a Panglossian view of it. Globalization greatly enhances the opportunities available to those who have the skills and mobility to flourish in world markets. It can help poor countries to escape poverty. It does not constrain national autonomy nearly as much as popular discussions assume. At the same time, globalization does exert downward pressure on the wages of underskilled workers in industrialized countries, exacerbate economic insecurity, call into question accepted social arrangements, and weaken social safety nets” (33).
Globalization could lead to more protectionism. It could also lead to two global classes emerging: those that benefit and those that do not. “A reorientation of public resources away from pensions and toward labor-market and antipoverty programs would be a more appropriate way to address the challenges of globalization” (35).
The globalization debate is highly polarized. Economists and policy makers believe that it is beneficial, environmentalists, unions and other groups find it problematic.
“The postwar period has witnessed two apparently contradictory trends: the growth of trade and the growth of government” (25). The paper argues that the relationship between social spending and trade is logarithmic. “International economic integration thus poses a serious dilemma: globalization increases the demand for social insurance while simultaneously constraining the ability of governments to respond effectively to that demand” (26).
“The question…is how the tension between globalization and the pressure to mitigate risks can be eased. If the vital role that social insurance played in enabling the postwar expansion of trade is neglected and social safety nets are allowed to dwindle, the domestic consensus in favor of open markets will be eroded seriously, and protectionist pressures will soar” (27).
Many of the concerns that have arisen regarding trade should be explored thoughtfully, though a more rigorous debate is needed. For example, in discussions of the “race to the bottom”, low-wages are seen as the driving force of globalization. If this were the case, Rodrik points out, Bangladesh would be one of the world’s leading exporters. Instead, productivity is much more closely tied with capital investment.
“One need not be alarmed by globalization, but neither should one take a Panglossian view of it. Globalization greatly enhances the opportunities available to those who have the skills and mobility to flourish in world markets. It can help poor countries to escape poverty. It does not constrain national autonomy nearly as much as popular discussions assume. At the same time, globalization does exert downward pressure on the wages of underskilled workers in industrialized countries, exacerbate economic insecurity, call into question accepted social arrangements, and weaken social safety nets” (33).
Globalization could lead to more protectionism. It could also lead to two global classes emerging: those that benefit and those that do not. “A reorientation of public resources away from pensions and toward labor-market and antipoverty programs would be a more appropriate way to address the challenges of globalization” (35).
Thursday, September 18, 2008
Wendt: The State as Person in International Theory
Wendt, A., 2004. The state as person in international theory. Review of International Studies, 30(02), 289-316.
“To say that states are ‘actors’ or ‘persons’ is to attribute to them properties we associate first with human beings—rationality, identities, interests, beliefs, and so on. Such attributions pervade social science and International Relations (IR) scholarship in particular…all this discussion assumes that the idea of state personhood is meaningful and at some fundamental level makes sense. In a field in which almost everything is contested, this seems to be one thing on which almost all of us agree” (289).
“My objectives are threefold…the first is simply to distinguish several questions one might ask about it and to identify some scholarship that bears on them…My second purpose is to expand on my earlier realist argument that ‘states are people too’…Finally, I explore how far a realist view of state persons might be pushed, even if this means leaving physicalims behind” (291).
One way of exploring this question is by looking at what constitutes a person. A person can be seen as being constituted both from the inside and the outside. There were times when people were internally people but not recognized externally (slavery, etc.). There were also times where animals were internally not persons but were externally recognized as such (Wendt cites an article about animal trials in the middle ages, really an interesting read in footnote 16).
States as well have the internal recognition and the external recognition issues to deal with. Internally, states have legitimate right to the use of force. Externally, they are recognized as being sovereign. This, however, is not the case as Wendt highlights Taiwan as being internally but not externally a state and Somalia as being externally but not internally a state.
Wendt then goes on to claim that we need to highlight different kinds of “state”. These are psychological persons, legal persons and moral persons. “In modern societies infants are legal persons but not psychological or moral ones; women are psychological persons, but historically often not legal or moral ones; corporations can be morel persons even if they are not psychological ones; and so on” (294).
“In sum, how we address whether states are people too will depend on two choices—whether to focus on their legal, moral, or psychological personhood, and on their inside or outside constitution. For the first…here I shall deal with states only as psychological persons, since this is how they are treated in most IR scholarship…For the second, I shall explore only the inside constitution of state persons, since this is the hard case of the realist view” (295).
Wendt then points out the rationalist perspective on persons: there are four properties. First, identity is static. Second, persons have opinions about their surroundings. Thirdly, they are motivated by “transitive” desires. Finally, they act rationally, defined as utility maximization. The rationalists get it right when they talk about intentionality, but they miss out on the requirements of a person being both an organism and having consciousness.
Reductionism, supervenience and emergence are discussed.
Then there is a discussion that “deepens” the understanding of state as organism or superorganism.
“To say that states are ‘actors’ or ‘persons’ is to attribute to them properties we associate first with human beings—rationality, identities, interests, beliefs, and so on. Such attributions pervade social science and International Relations (IR) scholarship in particular…all this discussion assumes that the idea of state personhood is meaningful and at some fundamental level makes sense. In a field in which almost everything is contested, this seems to be one thing on which almost all of us agree” (289).
“My objectives are threefold…the first is simply to distinguish several questions one might ask about it and to identify some scholarship that bears on them…My second purpose is to expand on my earlier realist argument that ‘states are people too’…Finally, I explore how far a realist view of state persons might be pushed, even if this means leaving physicalims behind” (291).
One way of exploring this question is by looking at what constitutes a person. A person can be seen as being constituted both from the inside and the outside. There were times when people were internally people but not recognized externally (slavery, etc.). There were also times where animals were internally not persons but were externally recognized as such (Wendt cites an article about animal trials in the middle ages, really an interesting read in footnote 16).
States as well have the internal recognition and the external recognition issues to deal with. Internally, states have legitimate right to the use of force. Externally, they are recognized as being sovereign. This, however, is not the case as Wendt highlights Taiwan as being internally but not externally a state and Somalia as being externally but not internally a state.
Wendt then goes on to claim that we need to highlight different kinds of “state”. These are psychological persons, legal persons and moral persons. “In modern societies infants are legal persons but not psychological or moral ones; women are psychological persons, but historically often not legal or moral ones; corporations can be morel persons even if they are not psychological ones; and so on” (294).
“In sum, how we address whether states are people too will depend on two choices—whether to focus on their legal, moral, or psychological personhood, and on their inside or outside constitution. For the first…here I shall deal with states only as psychological persons, since this is how they are treated in most IR scholarship…For the second, I shall explore only the inside constitution of state persons, since this is the hard case of the realist view” (295).
Wendt then points out the rationalist perspective on persons: there are four properties. First, identity is static. Second, persons have opinions about their surroundings. Thirdly, they are motivated by “transitive” desires. Finally, they act rationally, defined as utility maximization. The rationalists get it right when they talk about intentionality, but they miss out on the requirements of a person being both an organism and having consciousness.
Reductionism, supervenience and emergence are discussed.
Then there is a discussion that “deepens” the understanding of state as organism or superorganism.
Monday, September 8, 2008
Donnelly: Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy
Donnelly, J., 2006. Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society. European Journal Of International Relations, 12(2), 139-170.
“Is America an empire in fact or in the making? This article attempts to elaborate the conceptual resources required to answer such questions. I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality—concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical or even dismiss as self-contradictory” (139).
Empire in history: began through Roman usage, taken from a Greek word approximating rule. Adapted in the middle ages to create a separation between the power of the pope and the king. Empire: “…an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140).
Donnelly’s focus is highlighting traditional core-periphery polities, not exploring the more distinct and recent discussion of empire, for example, that of Hardt and Negri.
Hierarchy in Anarchy:
Waltz presents hierarchy and anarchy as dichotomous. “Rather than thinking of anarchy or hierarchy we should attend instead to hierarchy in anarchy” (141).
Figure 1: (143).
All quadrants except the bottom right are in anarchy.
“Confusion over hierarchy is exacerbated by the common association of anarchy with sovereign equality. As Waltz puts it, ‘formally, each is the equal of all others’ (1979: 88). Even David Lake, who is particularly sensitive to elements o hierarchy in international relations, equates anarchy with sovereign equality, describing ‘anarchic institutions’ as ‘those premised upon the full sovereignty of all members’ (2001: 130)” (144).
Historical account of the transformation and growth of sovereignty. Practices such as outlaw states, semi-sovereignty (servitudes, imperfect unions, financial controls, etc.) formal and informal inequalities, etc.
10 models of hierarchy in anarchy: balance of power, protection/guarantee, concert, collective security, hegemony, dominion, empire, pluralistic security, common security and amalgamated security (See Figure 2) (154).
“Contemporary America is indeed something of a colossus…It is not, however an empire” (157).
“Iraq can be read as a fairly conventional exercise in Quadrant III unipolar balance of power politics; self-help by the biggest ‘self’ on the block, without any special (formal or informal) rights” (159). “…consider the controversy over Guantanamo, which has appeared prominently in many arguments of American imperialism. In fact, it shows Quadrant III unipolar unilateralism. Empires set the rules. They do not need to assert awkward, implausible and almost universally rejected expectations for themselves. A state that cannot obtain widespread endorsement of its preferred international norms ins not an empire. A state that can’t even get grudging acquiescence by its leading ‘allies’ is not even much of a hegemon” (160).
“Is America an empire in fact or in the making? This article attempts to elaborate the conceptual resources required to answer such questions. I focus on multiple forms of hierarchy in anarchy and diverse practices of sovereign inequality—concepts that most mainstream perspectives ignore, find paradoxical or even dismiss as self-contradictory” (139).
Empire in history: began through Roman usage, taken from a Greek word approximating rule. Adapted in the middle ages to create a separation between the power of the pope and the king. Empire: “…an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (140).
Donnelly’s focus is highlighting traditional core-periphery polities, not exploring the more distinct and recent discussion of empire, for example, that of Hardt and Negri.
Hierarchy in Anarchy:
Waltz presents hierarchy and anarchy as dichotomous. “Rather than thinking of anarchy or hierarchy we should attend instead to hierarchy in anarchy” (141).
Figure 1: (143).
All quadrants except the bottom right are in anarchy.
“Confusion over hierarchy is exacerbated by the common association of anarchy with sovereign equality. As Waltz puts it, ‘formally, each is the equal of all others’ (1979: 88). Even David Lake, who is particularly sensitive to elements o hierarchy in international relations, equates anarchy with sovereign equality, describing ‘anarchic institutions’ as ‘those premised upon the full sovereignty of all members’ (2001: 130)” (144).
Historical account of the transformation and growth of sovereignty. Practices such as outlaw states, semi-sovereignty (servitudes, imperfect unions, financial controls, etc.) formal and informal inequalities, etc.
10 models of hierarchy in anarchy: balance of power, protection/guarantee, concert, collective security, hegemony, dominion, empire, pluralistic security, common security and amalgamated security (See Figure 2) (154).
“Contemporary America is indeed something of a colossus…It is not, however an empire” (157).
“Iraq can be read as a fairly conventional exercise in Quadrant III unipolar balance of power politics; self-help by the biggest ‘self’ on the block, without any special (formal or informal) rights” (159). “…consider the controversy over Guantanamo, which has appeared prominently in many arguments of American imperialism. In fact, it shows Quadrant III unipolar unilateralism. Empires set the rules. They do not need to assert awkward, implausible and almost universally rejected expectations for themselves. A state that cannot obtain widespread endorsement of its preferred international norms ins not an empire. A state that can’t even get grudging acquiescence by its leading ‘allies’ is not even much of a hegemon” (160).
Milner: The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory
Milner, H., 1991. The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique. Review of International Studies, 17(1), 67-85.
“In much current theorizing, anarchy has once again been declared to be the fundamental assumption about international politics” (67).
“First, I examine various concepts of ‘anarchy’ employed in the international relations literature. Second, I probe the sharp dichotomy between domestic and international politics that is associated with this assumption. As other have, I question the validity and utility of such a dichotomy. Finally, this article suggests that a more fruitful way to understand the international system is one that combines anarchy and interdependence” (67).
“It is once again time for a reminder that anarchy is an ambiguous concept and that dangers exist when it is exaggeratedly seen as the central fact of world politics” (67).
“Anarchy ahs at least two meanings. The first meaning that anarchy carries is a lack of order. IT implies chaos or disorder…But are chaos, lack of order and constant threat of war what scholars mean by the anarchic nature of the system? It does not seem to be. Persistent elements of order in international politics have been noted by many” (69). “The second definition of anarchy is the lack of government. It is the first meaning of anarchy given in the Oxford English Dictionary and is common among political scientists” (70). The distinction drawn by those who highlight the a-governmental nature of international society tends to breakdown into the understanding of government as being a monopoly, the legitimate use of force or a conflation of domestic and international policies.
Government then gets represented distinctly whether it is domestic or international. Domestic government is highlighted by hierarchy. International government is primarily dominated by concepts of anarchy.
Milner argues that this dichotomy is false and that there are different degrees of hierarchy in domestic and international politics.
“Overall, the sharp distinction between the two realms are difficult to maintain empirically. More importantly, any dichotomous treatment of domestic and international politics may have heuristic disadvantages. First, the isolation of international politics as a realm of anarchy with nothing in common with other types of politics is a step backward conceptually…A second and related heuristic problem is the tendency implicit in this separation of the two fields to view all states as being the same…” (80-1).
The Assumption of Interdependence: “As other scholars have points out, such reductionism overlooks another central fact about international politics, namely the interdependence of the actors” (81-2).
“There are two related notions of interdependence. First, the notion of ‘strategic interdependence’; implies…a situation in which ‘the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make’…Interdependence is not the opposite of anarchy…this definition of interdependence also does not imply either that the actors’ interests are in harmony or that power relations are unimportant…if the international system is viewed as characterized by structural interdependence, then the mechanisms of the system look different from those in the neo-realist model” (82-4).
“In much current theorizing, anarchy has once again been declared to be the fundamental assumption about international politics” (67).
“First, I examine various concepts of ‘anarchy’ employed in the international relations literature. Second, I probe the sharp dichotomy between domestic and international politics that is associated with this assumption. As other have, I question the validity and utility of such a dichotomy. Finally, this article suggests that a more fruitful way to understand the international system is one that combines anarchy and interdependence” (67).
“It is once again time for a reminder that anarchy is an ambiguous concept and that dangers exist when it is exaggeratedly seen as the central fact of world politics” (67).
“Anarchy ahs at least two meanings. The first meaning that anarchy carries is a lack of order. IT implies chaos or disorder…But are chaos, lack of order and constant threat of war what scholars mean by the anarchic nature of the system? It does not seem to be. Persistent elements of order in international politics have been noted by many” (69). “The second definition of anarchy is the lack of government. It is the first meaning of anarchy given in the Oxford English Dictionary and is common among political scientists” (70). The distinction drawn by those who highlight the a-governmental nature of international society tends to breakdown into the understanding of government as being a monopoly, the legitimate use of force or a conflation of domestic and international policies.
Government then gets represented distinctly whether it is domestic or international. Domestic government is highlighted by hierarchy. International government is primarily dominated by concepts of anarchy.
Milner argues that this dichotomy is false and that there are different degrees of hierarchy in domestic and international politics.
“Overall, the sharp distinction between the two realms are difficult to maintain empirically. More importantly, any dichotomous treatment of domestic and international politics may have heuristic disadvantages. First, the isolation of international politics as a realm of anarchy with nothing in common with other types of politics is a step backward conceptually…A second and related heuristic problem is the tendency implicit in this separation of the two fields to view all states as being the same…” (80-1).
The Assumption of Interdependence: “As other scholars have points out, such reductionism overlooks another central fact about international politics, namely the interdependence of the actors” (81-2).
“There are two related notions of interdependence. First, the notion of ‘strategic interdependence’; implies…a situation in which ‘the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make’…Interdependence is not the opposite of anarchy…this definition of interdependence also does not imply either that the actors’ interests are in harmony or that power relations are unimportant…if the international system is viewed as characterized by structural interdependence, then the mechanisms of the system look different from those in the neo-realist model” (82-4).
Adler: The Spread of Security Communities
Adler, E., 2008. The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post--Cold War Transformation. European Journal of International Relations, 14(2), 195.
“This article invokes a combination of analytical and normative arguments that highlight the leading role of practices in explaining the expansion of security communities” (195).
Adler begins by exploring different reasons where by international institutions spread. He highlights explanations including, the rhetorical, normative imitation, socialization, persuasion. “While these theories are not mutually exclusive and while the different mechanisms are important at particular stages, they may not be sufficient because they do not make practices a central focus or let them carry the major causal and constitutive weight in the explanation” (196). “…security communities…spread by the co-evolution of background knowledge and subjectivities of self-restraint. The combined effect of communities of practice and the institutionalization of self-restraint accounts both for the social construction of rationality, in the sense that cooperative-security practices related to self-restraint help constitute dependable expectations of peaceful change, and for normative evolution, in the sense that self-restraint brings about security through cooperation” (196).
Illustrates this argument by exploring NATO expansion.
“Practices are knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that structure experience” (198).
Communities of practice are the nexus between agent and structure. These communities shape the identities of their members, facilitate learning, socialize, etc. They grow and change through “cognitive evolution”. Some communities of practice can become self-restraint communities. Violence becomes unnecessary amongst these communities for resolving conflict.
Much on NATO and how NATO is an example of communities of practice.
“This article invokes a combination of analytical and normative arguments that highlight the leading role of practices in explaining the expansion of security communities” (195).
Adler begins by exploring different reasons where by international institutions spread. He highlights explanations including, the rhetorical, normative imitation, socialization, persuasion. “While these theories are not mutually exclusive and while the different mechanisms are important at particular stages, they may not be sufficient because they do not make practices a central focus or let them carry the major causal and constitutive weight in the explanation” (196). “…security communities…spread by the co-evolution of background knowledge and subjectivities of self-restraint. The combined effect of communities of practice and the institutionalization of self-restraint accounts both for the social construction of rationality, in the sense that cooperative-security practices related to self-restraint help constitute dependable expectations of peaceful change, and for normative evolution, in the sense that self-restraint brings about security through cooperation” (196).
Illustrates this argument by exploring NATO expansion.
“Practices are knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that structure experience” (198).
Communities of practice are the nexus between agent and structure. These communities shape the identities of their members, facilitate learning, socialize, etc. They grow and change through “cognitive evolution”. Some communities of practice can become self-restraint communities. Violence becomes unnecessary amongst these communities for resolving conflict.
Much on NATO and how NATO is an example of communities of practice.
Saturday, September 6, 2008
Legro and Moravcsik: Is Anyone Still a Realist?
Legro, J. & Moravcsik, A., 1999. Is anyone still a realist? International Security, 24(2), 55-106.
Realism is in trouble. “The central problem is instead that the theoretical core of the realist approach has been undermined by its own defenders—in particular so-called defensive and neoclassical realists—who seek to address anomalies by recasting realism in forms that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent and less distinctive to realism” (6).
New versions of realism try to take into consideration what earlier realists had tried to argue against, like economic interdependence, etc. It would be a great boon to realism if it could be shown that, from Machiavelli to Morgenthau the structural pushes and pulls were the same. For example, minimalist realism only retains anarchy and rationality as assumptions and thus waters down the school of thought beyond recognition.
“We begin by elaborating the desirable qualities of a theoretical paradigm in international relations and, guided by these criteria, propose a formulation of realism that we believe captures its enduring essence. We then document the theoretical degeneration of recent ‘minimalist realist’ theory. We conclude by highlighting the practical advantages for theoretical debate and empirical research of consistently adhering to a narrower and more rigorous reformulation of the realist paradigm” (8-9).
Realism as a Theoretical Paradigm: realism is a paradigm because it is coherent and distinct. There are four paradigms in IR: realism, institutionalism, liberalism and the epistemic paradigm.
Three core assumptions of realism:
1-the nature of the actors: rational, unitary political units in anarchy (13)
2-the nature of state preferences: fixed and uniformly conflictual goals (14)
3-international structure: the primacy of material capabilities (16)
Minimalist realists only keep anarchy and rationality. Power can be assumed to be fluid, thus also undermining realist assumptions.
Snyder and Grieco are bad realists, among others.
Realism is in trouble. “The central problem is instead that the theoretical core of the realist approach has been undermined by its own defenders—in particular so-called defensive and neoclassical realists—who seek to address anomalies by recasting realism in forms that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent and less distinctive to realism” (6).
New versions of realism try to take into consideration what earlier realists had tried to argue against, like economic interdependence, etc. It would be a great boon to realism if it could be shown that, from Machiavelli to Morgenthau the structural pushes and pulls were the same. For example, minimalist realism only retains anarchy and rationality as assumptions and thus waters down the school of thought beyond recognition.
“We begin by elaborating the desirable qualities of a theoretical paradigm in international relations and, guided by these criteria, propose a formulation of realism that we believe captures its enduring essence. We then document the theoretical degeneration of recent ‘minimalist realist’ theory. We conclude by highlighting the practical advantages for theoretical debate and empirical research of consistently adhering to a narrower and more rigorous reformulation of the realist paradigm” (8-9).
Realism as a Theoretical Paradigm: realism is a paradigm because it is coherent and distinct. There are four paradigms in IR: realism, institutionalism, liberalism and the epistemic paradigm.
Three core assumptions of realism:
1-the nature of the actors: rational, unitary political units in anarchy (13)
2-the nature of state preferences: fixed and uniformly conflictual goals (14)
3-international structure: the primacy of material capabilities (16)
Minimalist realists only keep anarchy and rationality. Power can be assumed to be fluid, thus also undermining realist assumptions.
Snyder and Grieco are bad realists, among others.
Snyder: Process Variables in Neorealist Theory
Snyder, G., 1996. Process variables in neorealist theory. Security Studies, 5(3), 167-192.
“For any single theory, it is enough that it highlight ‘a small number of big and important things’; and that is all that Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealism, claims for his theory” (167).
“He [Waltz] treats only peripherally the process by which structural and unit influences are transmitted onto behavior and outcomes. It is this later area that could well be developed further without undue sacrifice of parsimony” (168). Snyder’s goal is to increase the ability of neorealism to explain things, while not doing too much damage to the parsimony promoted by Waltz.
Structural Modifiers: “First, it is necessary to take account of certain variables which have sometimes been called process but which I would exclude from that category” (168). Nye points out two variables that do not seem to fit within Waltz’s framework. These are “(1) non-power incentives; and (2) the ability to communicate and cooperate” (168). Nye calls these “Systemic Process”. Snyder doesn’t believe that these are process, though he agrees with Nye that they are not unit-based. Snyder on process: “That term ought to be reserved for the political relations and interactions that occur between sovereign states” (168). Snyder would classify Nye’s two points above in a category called “structural modifiers”. Institutions, norms and military technology (nuclear weapons, for example) are also structural modifiers.
Relationships: “Interaction is behavior” (171). “Relations or relationships are not behavior itself, but the situational context of behavior…Relationships lie between structure and interaction; they are the conduit through which structural effects are transmitted to behavior” (172). Relationships can be added to the structural realist account to make it more nuanced. Relationships also can provide the framework for analyzing “structural change”, a common critique of realist theory. For example, WWI could be explained through the deep interconnection through treaties of different countries that compelled them to go to war when it might not have been in their interest vis-Ã -vis relative power gains.
Figure 1: (174)
Process variables include alignments, conflicts, capabilities and interdependence. Interaction Arenas can also form process or relationship variables. Interaction can take place through preparedness, diplomacy and action.
“For any single theory, it is enough that it highlight ‘a small number of big and important things’; and that is all that Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealism, claims for his theory” (167).
“He [Waltz] treats only peripherally the process by which structural and unit influences are transmitted onto behavior and outcomes. It is this later area that could well be developed further without undue sacrifice of parsimony” (168). Snyder’s goal is to increase the ability of neorealism to explain things, while not doing too much damage to the parsimony promoted by Waltz.
Structural Modifiers: “First, it is necessary to take account of certain variables which have sometimes been called process but which I would exclude from that category” (168). Nye points out two variables that do not seem to fit within Waltz’s framework. These are “(1) non-power incentives; and (2) the ability to communicate and cooperate” (168). Nye calls these “Systemic Process”. Snyder doesn’t believe that these are process, though he agrees with Nye that they are not unit-based. Snyder on process: “That term ought to be reserved for the political relations and interactions that occur between sovereign states” (168). Snyder would classify Nye’s two points above in a category called “structural modifiers”. Institutions, norms and military technology (nuclear weapons, for example) are also structural modifiers.
Relationships: “Interaction is behavior” (171). “Relations or relationships are not behavior itself, but the situational context of behavior…Relationships lie between structure and interaction; they are the conduit through which structural effects are transmitted to behavior” (172). Relationships can be added to the structural realist account to make it more nuanced. Relationships also can provide the framework for analyzing “structural change”, a common critique of realist theory. For example, WWI could be explained through the deep interconnection through treaties of different countries that compelled them to go to war when it might not have been in their interest vis-Ã -vis relative power gains.
Figure 1: (174)
Process variables include alignments, conflicts, capabilities and interdependence. Interaction Arenas can also form process or relationship variables. Interaction can take place through preparedness, diplomacy and action.
Cohn: Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals
Cohn, C., 1987. Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals. Signs, 12(4), 687-718.
Author interested in how think-tank types can “think that way”, ie., be so cavalier about statements about nuclear attacks, etc. Calls the logic technostrategic.
The language used by these technocrats is comprised generally of euphemisms. These metaphors build a narrative that promotes a certain kind of thought pattern that can rationally explore the possibility of the destruction of millions of people as being the most positive outcome in a given scenario.
This kind of thinking, in the eyes of Cohn, is transformative, and that is caused by the kinds of language that is used.
Overall, a very fun read.
Author interested in how think-tank types can “think that way”, ie., be so cavalier about statements about nuclear attacks, etc. Calls the logic technostrategic.
The language used by these technocrats is comprised generally of euphemisms. These metaphors build a narrative that promotes a certain kind of thought pattern that can rationally explore the possibility of the destruction of millions of people as being the most positive outcome in a given scenario.
This kind of thinking, in the eyes of Cohn, is transformative, and that is caused by the kinds of language that is used.
Overall, a very fun read.
Friday, September 5, 2008
Keohane: International Institutions: Two Approaches
Keohane, R., 1988. International Institutions: Two Approaches. International Studies Quarterly, 32(4), 379-396.
“To understand international cooperation and discord, it is necessary to develop a knowledge of how international institutions work, and how they change” (380).
Starts out with the claim that general theories of IR are not plausible or probably possible.
“’Cooperation’ is a contested term. As I use it, it is sharply distinguished from both harmony and discord. When harmony prevails, actors’ policies automatically facilitate the attainment of others’ goals. When there is discord, actors’ policies hinder the realization of others’ goals and are not adjusted to make them more compatible. IN both harmony and discord, neither actor has an incentive to change his or her behavior. Cooperation, however, ‘requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations’…be brought into conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination’” (380). Cooperation and discord stand in a dialectical relationship; to see one you have to see the other. Cooperation doesn’t necessarily have to happen because of altruism, etc. Also, while order is a value, it is not the only value in international relations (see Bull and order/justice discussions).
Institutions are overdetermined. There is an odd dialogue between rationalism and post-rationalism discourses. He’s committed to the former, but also keen on the later (calls them interpretive scholars).
“My chief argument in this essay is that students of international institutions should direct their attention to the relative merits of two approaches, the rationalistic and the reflective. Until we understand the strengths and weaknesses of each, we will be unable to design research strategies that are sufficiently multifaceted to encompass our subject-matter, and our empirical work will suffer accordingly” (383).
There is then a discussion of the diverse kind of usages for the term institution. It can be seen as a kind of pattern, ala sovereignty. It can be more specific, like the UN.
Rationalist approaches are good for doing certain things, but they do not endogenously treat interest: preferences are exogenous and fixed. “Reflective” theory can be used to explore preferences. We need a theory that can at least partially help us understand how interests change.
“…the greatest weakness of the reflective school lies not in deficiencies in their critical arguments but in the lack of a clear reflective research program that could be employed by students of world politics” (393).
“To understand international cooperation and discord, it is necessary to develop a knowledge of how international institutions work, and how they change” (380).
Starts out with the claim that general theories of IR are not plausible or probably possible.
“’Cooperation’ is a contested term. As I use it, it is sharply distinguished from both harmony and discord. When harmony prevails, actors’ policies automatically facilitate the attainment of others’ goals. When there is discord, actors’ policies hinder the realization of others’ goals and are not adjusted to make them more compatible. IN both harmony and discord, neither actor has an incentive to change his or her behavior. Cooperation, however, ‘requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations’…be brought into conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination’” (380). Cooperation and discord stand in a dialectical relationship; to see one you have to see the other. Cooperation doesn’t necessarily have to happen because of altruism, etc. Also, while order is a value, it is not the only value in international relations (see Bull and order/justice discussions).
Institutions are overdetermined. There is an odd dialogue between rationalism and post-rationalism discourses. He’s committed to the former, but also keen on the later (calls them interpretive scholars).
“My chief argument in this essay is that students of international institutions should direct their attention to the relative merits of two approaches, the rationalistic and the reflective. Until we understand the strengths and weaknesses of each, we will be unable to design research strategies that are sufficiently multifaceted to encompass our subject-matter, and our empirical work will suffer accordingly” (383).
There is then a discussion of the diverse kind of usages for the term institution. It can be seen as a kind of pattern, ala sovereignty. It can be more specific, like the UN.
Rationalist approaches are good for doing certain things, but they do not endogenously treat interest: preferences are exogenous and fixed. “Reflective” theory can be used to explore preferences. We need a theory that can at least partially help us understand how interests change.
“…the greatest weakness of the reflective school lies not in deficiencies in their critical arguments but in the lack of a clear reflective research program that could be employed by students of world politics” (393).
Keohane: The Demand for International Regimes
Keohane, R., 1982. The Demand for International Regimes. International Organization, 36(2), 332-355.
“We study international regimes because we are interested in understanding order in world politics. Conflict may be the rule; if so, institutionalized patterns of cooperation are particularly in need of explanation” (325).
“I explore why self-interested actors in world politics should seek, under certain circumstances, to establish international regimes through mutual agreement; and how we can account for fluctuations over time in the number, extent, and strength of international regimes, on the basis of rational calculations under varying circumstances” (325-6).
This article explores cooperation from the perspective of correcting standard hegemonic stability theory. Hegemonic stability theory posits that if there is a large power creating stability in the system, then this will allow for the rise of more stable international institutions. This article takes a more microeconomic approach to answering these questions, and sees hegemonic stability theory as being more supply-side in its orientation: “The theory of hegemonic stability can be viewed as focusing only on the supply of international regimes: according to the theory, the more concentrated power is in an international system, the greater the supply of international regimes at any level of demand” (327).
“The argument developed here is deliberately limited to the systemic level of analysis. In a systemic theory, the actors’ characteristics are given by assumption, rather than treated as variables; changes in outcomes are explained not on the basis of variations in these actors characteristics, but on the basis of changes in the attributes of the system itself” (327).
“This insight is the basis of the major ‘supply-side’ argument about international regimes, epitomized by the theory of hegemonic stability. According to this line of argument, hegemonic international systems should be characterized by levels of public goods production higher than in fragmented systems; and, if international regimes provide public goods, by stronger and more extensive international regimes” (333).
“This argument…ignores what I have called the ‘demand’ side of the problem of international regimes: why should governments desire to institute international regimes in the first place, and who much will they be willing to contribute to maintain them?” (333).
“Regimes are developed in part because actors in world politics believe that with such arrangements they will be able to make mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to attain. In other words, regimes are valuable to governments where, in their absence, certain mutually beneficial agreements would be impossible to consummate” (334).
But, why would states go to the trouble of making regimes if they could just agree with other states on an ad hoc basis? There must be some added value to regimes. Keohane points to market failures as an analogy: when markets do not “work”, ie., when they do not incentivize people to make decisions that would be mutually beneficial, other mechanisms are needed to move these inefficient processes forward.
Why is their demand for international regimes?
Asymmetric Information
Moral Hazard
Deception and Irresponsibility (344-5)
Regimes are not simply agreements.
There may be demand if the situation can be improved, and if the situation is sufficiently crappy: is there lack of clear legal frameworks? Lack of good information? Lack of beneficial transaction costs?
We expect to see regimes where “issue density” is sufficiently thick to warrant them.
“…the optimal size of a regime will increase if there are increasing rather than diminishing returns to regime-scale…or if the marginal costs of organization decline as regime size grows” (341).
Final Argument: (354)
1. Int’l regimes are devices to facilitate agreement in IR
2. Public goods problems, “…affect the supply of international regimes, as the ‘theory of hegemonic stability’ suggests” (354).
3. Increased issue density and regime effectiveness will affect adoption
4. The “constraint-choice” approach is novel and helps explore previously underemphasized behavior
5. Several parts of structural theory are now problematic. Hegemony is not necessarily required for regime promotion.
6. Distinction between control regimes and insurance regimes presents IR in a more nuanced way
“We study international regimes because we are interested in understanding order in world politics. Conflict may be the rule; if so, institutionalized patterns of cooperation are particularly in need of explanation” (325).
“I explore why self-interested actors in world politics should seek, under certain circumstances, to establish international regimes through mutual agreement; and how we can account for fluctuations over time in the number, extent, and strength of international regimes, on the basis of rational calculations under varying circumstances” (325-6).
This article explores cooperation from the perspective of correcting standard hegemonic stability theory. Hegemonic stability theory posits that if there is a large power creating stability in the system, then this will allow for the rise of more stable international institutions. This article takes a more microeconomic approach to answering these questions, and sees hegemonic stability theory as being more supply-side in its orientation: “The theory of hegemonic stability can be viewed as focusing only on the supply of international regimes: according to the theory, the more concentrated power is in an international system, the greater the supply of international regimes at any level of demand” (327).
“The argument developed here is deliberately limited to the systemic level of analysis. In a systemic theory, the actors’ characteristics are given by assumption, rather than treated as variables; changes in outcomes are explained not on the basis of variations in these actors characteristics, but on the basis of changes in the attributes of the system itself” (327).
“This insight is the basis of the major ‘supply-side’ argument about international regimes, epitomized by the theory of hegemonic stability. According to this line of argument, hegemonic international systems should be characterized by levels of public goods production higher than in fragmented systems; and, if international regimes provide public goods, by stronger and more extensive international regimes” (333).
“This argument…ignores what I have called the ‘demand’ side of the problem of international regimes: why should governments desire to institute international regimes in the first place, and who much will they be willing to contribute to maintain them?” (333).
“Regimes are developed in part because actors in world politics believe that with such arrangements they will be able to make mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to attain. In other words, regimes are valuable to governments where, in their absence, certain mutually beneficial agreements would be impossible to consummate” (334).
But, why would states go to the trouble of making regimes if they could just agree with other states on an ad hoc basis? There must be some added value to regimes. Keohane points to market failures as an analogy: when markets do not “work”, ie., when they do not incentivize people to make decisions that would be mutually beneficial, other mechanisms are needed to move these inefficient processes forward.
Why is their demand for international regimes?
Asymmetric Information
Moral Hazard
Deception and Irresponsibility (344-5)
Regimes are not simply agreements.
There may be demand if the situation can be improved, and if the situation is sufficiently crappy: is there lack of clear legal frameworks? Lack of good information? Lack of beneficial transaction costs?
We expect to see regimes where “issue density” is sufficiently thick to warrant them.
“…the optimal size of a regime will increase if there are increasing rather than diminishing returns to regime-scale…or if the marginal costs of organization decline as regime size grows” (341).
Final Argument: (354)
1. Int’l regimes are devices to facilitate agreement in IR
2. Public goods problems, “…affect the supply of international regimes, as the ‘theory of hegemonic stability’ suggests” (354).
3. Increased issue density and regime effectiveness will affect adoption
4. The “constraint-choice” approach is novel and helps explore previously underemphasized behavior
5. Several parts of structural theory are now problematic. Hegemony is not necessarily required for regime promotion.
6. Distinction between control regimes and insurance regimes presents IR in a more nuanced way
Axelrod and Keohane: Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy
Axelrod, R. & Keohane, R., 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. World Politics, 38(1), 226-254.
“Achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics” (226).
Cooperation is not the same as harmony. Harmony means that interests align. For Axelrod and Keohane, anarchy means the absence of a common government in international relations. “To say that world politics is anarchic does not imply that it entirely lacks organization” (226).
It is often noted that security relationships seems to conform more closely to the standard predictions of what will happen in anarchy than do political or economic relations. Specifically, Lipson noted that the later relationships are clearly more internationally institutionalized.
The Effects of Structure on Cooperation: Three factors can lead to cooperation in the international system. These are mutuality of interests (issue linkage), the shadow of the future, and the number of players (in a game theory situation).
Points to Jervis’ work on cooperation and game theory, which shows that cooperation is differently possible with different kinds of interactions among actors.
Stag hunt is less conflictual than prisoner’s dilemma. The difference in the two is the relative actor perception of interests. These game theory presentations are done using a metric of payoff structure, which is a way of determining or describing the results of the cost/benefit analysis. The payoff structure can be used to analyze both political/economic and military/security situations and international relations.
Oye talks about blackmailing and backscratching as being techniques to increase cooperation.
Axelrod and Keohane conclude this piece by focusing on the importance of actor perception. Also, the importance of institutions and reciprocity: institutions do not substitute for reciprocity, but they institutionalize it.
“Achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics” (226).
Cooperation is not the same as harmony. Harmony means that interests align. For Axelrod and Keohane, anarchy means the absence of a common government in international relations. “To say that world politics is anarchic does not imply that it entirely lacks organization” (226).
It is often noted that security relationships seems to conform more closely to the standard predictions of what will happen in anarchy than do political or economic relations. Specifically, Lipson noted that the later relationships are clearly more internationally institutionalized.
The Effects of Structure on Cooperation: Three factors can lead to cooperation in the international system. These are mutuality of interests (issue linkage), the shadow of the future, and the number of players (in a game theory situation).
Points to Jervis’ work on cooperation and game theory, which shows that cooperation is differently possible with different kinds of interactions among actors.
Stag hunt is less conflictual than prisoner’s dilemma. The difference in the two is the relative actor perception of interests. These game theory presentations are done using a metric of payoff structure, which is a way of determining or describing the results of the cost/benefit analysis. The payoff structure can be used to analyze both political/economic and military/security situations and international relations.
Oye talks about blackmailing and backscratching as being techniques to increase cooperation.
Axelrod and Keohane conclude this piece by focusing on the importance of actor perception. Also, the importance of institutions and reciprocity: institutions do not substitute for reciprocity, but they institutionalize it.
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
Solow: Reflections on Growth Theory
Solow, R., 2005. Reflections on growth theory. In Handbook of Economic Growth. Aghion, P, Durlauf.
Solow’s introduction to the Handbook emphasized a couple of direction that growth models have failed to head. One of those is making the models multi-sectoral. “…Leif Johansen had an early book, orientated toward planning. Luigi Pasinetti has written extensively on the sorts of structural changes to be expected along a trajectory, arising from such inevitable factors as differing income elasticities of demand for different goods. In a very different vein, there was a whole literature stemming from the von Neumann model, which now seems to have gone out of favor. Xavier Sala-i-Martin’s chapter in the Handbook reviews some worthwhile developments and promises others” (4).
There was work on two sector models, but this didn’t last as long as it possibly should have. “I have the feeling that too much in those models turned out to depend on differences in factor intensity between the sectors. We have very little in the way of facts or intuition about that issue, and there was no reason to expect or postulate any systematic pattern that could lead to exciting results” (4).
Endogenizing technology and human capital: “I can now turn from the things that growth theory has not accomplished to the things that it has done, in particular the way it has expanded outside the confines of a narrow model. The main effort has quite properly gone into the endogenization of changes in technology…and changes in the stock of human capital” (6).
Solow’s introduction to the Handbook emphasized a couple of direction that growth models have failed to head. One of those is making the models multi-sectoral. “…Leif Johansen had an early book, orientated toward planning. Luigi Pasinetti has written extensively on the sorts of structural changes to be expected along a trajectory, arising from such inevitable factors as differing income elasticities of demand for different goods. In a very different vein, there was a whole literature stemming from the von Neumann model, which now seems to have gone out of favor. Xavier Sala-i-Martin’s chapter in the Handbook reviews some worthwhile developments and promises others” (4).
There was work on two sector models, but this didn’t last as long as it possibly should have. “I have the feeling that too much in those models turned out to depend on differences in factor intensity between the sectors. We have very little in the way of facts or intuition about that issue, and there was no reason to expect or postulate any systematic pattern that could lead to exciting results” (4).
Endogenizing technology and human capital: “I can now turn from the things that growth theory has not accomplished to the things that it has done, in particular the way it has expanded outside the confines of a narrow model. The main effort has quite properly gone into the endogenization of changes in technology…and changes in the stock of human capital” (6).
Monday, September 1, 2008
Jones: Introduction to Economic Growth
Jones, C., 1998. Introduction to Economic Growth. New York.
Why are we so rich and they are so poor? That is a fundamental question driving theories of economic growth. This was famously explored by Smith in The Wealth of Nations. More recently, this was explored by Solow. “Solow’s theories helped to clarify the role of the accumulation of physical capital and emphasized the importance of technological progress as the ultimate driving force behind sustained economic growth” (2). This work continued apace throughout the 60s and 70s, eventually building to contributions made by Romer and Lucas. These authors focused on human capital and the importance of ideas for economic growth. Barro quantified many of these ideas.
The book is an exploration of economic growth theory from the perspective of the relationship between observation and theory. The author uses the analogy of astronomy in the hard sciences.
1: Per-capita income varies between countries
2: Economic growth rates vary from country to country
3: Growth not entirely consistent over time
4: Countries can become wealthy or poor
5: US has seen steady growth
“Facts” about the US over the last century: Kaldor: “…economic theorists should begin with a summary of the ‘stylized’ facts a theory was supposed to explain” (14). First fact: “…the rate of return to capital is roughly constant…” (14). Secondly: the labor share has been mostly constant across history, looking specifically at the US. The combination of stylized fact one and two is that the ratio of K/Y is relatively stable. The third stylized fact alters one of Kaldor’s facts: there is relative consistent growth in economic growth.
6: Growth in output and trade are related (15)
7: Skilled and unskilled workers show a tendency to move from poor to rich countries
Three questions explored here: Why are some rich and some poor? What drives economic growth? And finally: how do some countries transition so quickly to becoming rich?
Solow’s Model:
Assumptions: world comprised of countries producing a single good. No international trade because there is only one good. Consumers have a percentage that they save for future consumption and a percentage that they use for consumption.
The model is constructed around two equations: production function and capital accumulation.
The production function acts as a saturating curve with respect to increases in capital relative to workers: there are diminishing returns on investment. Secondly, capital accumulation change is equal to the amount of investment minus the amount of depreciation.
Consumers save a portion of their income, which is invested, or rented, for use in production.
Capital accumulation per worker is determined by three things. It is increased with investment in workers, it is decreased with depreciation and the new term is change in the size of labor relative to capital.
A basic Solow diagram is shown that compares two plotted equations. One is a saturating curve that represents the amount of investment per person. The second curve is a line that represents the amount of new capital investment required per person required to keep the ratio of capital to worker consistent. Both equations begin at 0,0. When capital growth occurs per worker, capital deepening takes place. When per worker change is not taking place but capital grows, capital widening takes place. The amount of capital per worker constantly tries to approach the point where both lines intersect.
What happens if there is an increase in the investment rate? The saturating curve that represents the amount of investment per person shifts up. This starts a process of capital deepening.
What happens if there is an increase in the population growth? That shifts the degree of the relationship between the amount of capital investment required to keep the amount of capital per worker constant. “Investment per worker is now no longer high enough to keep the capital-labor ratio constant in the face of the rising population. Therefore, the capital-labor ratio begins to fall…At this point, the economy has less capital per worker than it began with and is therefore poorer: per capita output is ultimately lower after the increase in population growth…” (31-2).
The Steady State: “By definition, the steady-state quantity of capital per worker is determined by the condition that…” capital change is equal to zero (32).
“This equation reveals the Solow model’s answer to the question ‘Why are we so rich and they so poor?’ Countries that have higher savings/investment rates will tend to be richer…” (32). More capital/worker equals more output/worker. If you have high population growth, you will have lower production because you will have lower capital/worker: ie, these countries will focus on just trying to keep the capital/labor ratio stable and will have to emphasize capital widening with less of an opportunity to explore capital deepening.
These effects are then explored vis-Ã -vis empirical evidence: real GDP is compared to savings rate and real GDP is compared to population growth rates. There is seen to be a correlation (though the later graph, figure 2.7, doesn’t appear to display this correlation as well as claimed).
This model fails to describe increased per capital growth because output per unit of labor, and thus per person, is constant.
“To generate sustained growth in per capita income in this model, we must follow Solow and introduce technological progress to the model” (36). This is done through the variable a which increases labor’s productivity. This technology assumption is exogenously imposed.
“A situation in which capital, output, consumption, and population are growing at constant rates is called balanced growth path” (37).
“If the economy begins with a capital-technology ratio that is below its steady-state level…the capital-technology ratio {k~=K/AL} will rise gradually over time. Why? Because the amount of investment being undertaken exceeds the amount needed to keep the capital-technology ratio constant” (39).
“This exercise {Figure 2.10} illustrates two important points. First, policy changes in the Solow model increase growth rates, but only temporarily along the transition to the new steady state. That is, policy changes have no long-run growth effect. Second, policy changes can have level effects. That is, a permanent policy change can permanently raise (or lower) the level of per capita output” (41-3).
Some key aspects of the Solow Model: per capita growth happens because of exogenously imposed technology variables. Also, the reason some countries are better off than others is because they save and invest more, and thus increase the amount of capital per worker which makes them more efficient. There is also a more subtle explanation of why some countries grow more quickly than others: if their capital technology ratio (k~) is below the steady-state level for the long run, it will climb back quickly to that level. This might be an explanation for why Germany and Japan built back up their capital stocks so quickly after WWII. “Or it may explain why an economy that increases its investment rate will grow rapidly as it makes the transition to a higher output-technology ratio” (44-5). This may be applicable in situations like South Korea, for example.
Exploring output: as a stylized fact, output per person decreased after 1973. This was the case throughout the advanced countries. It remained relatively low into the end of the 1990s. Some thought that high energy prices could be the culprit, but this is improbable as real energy prices in the late 80s were lower than they were before the shock. Another thought is that the decreased productivity has to do with a transition from a manufacturing economy to a service economy. Another explanation blames a slow-down in funding for R&D in the late 1960’s. Alternatively, growth may have been artificially high in the 50s and 60s because of the rebuilding efforts after WWII.
The “New Economy” saw productivity increase in the late 1990s. This can be partially attributed to the increased use of information technology. Also, some posit that ICT can explain the slow-down in growth and the later improvement: the time-lag associated with diffusing new technologies in the early 1970s created productivity slowdowns that were only circumvented over 20 years later.
Ch. 3:
An influential paper by Mankiw, Romer and Weil put the Solow model to an empirical test, found that it was quite good, but added human capital to make it better. This extends the Solow model to include different levels of education and skills.
H, or the degree to that labor is skilled, is calculated based upon investment in education which rises at a relatively constant rate. For example, if someone invests one extra year on education, wages are expected to rise by about 10% for a life-time (Bils and Klenow (2000)). The amount that individuals invest in education is given exogenously.
K is also gathered by investing some output instead of consuming everything.
“Countries are rich because they have high investment rates in physical capital, spend a large fraction of time accumulating skills…, have low population growth rates, and have high levels of technology” (57).
An additional discussion about convergence and differences in growth rates. A piece by Gerschenkron (1952) and “backward” economies and how they grow faster to catch up is sited, as well as a piece by Abramovitz (1986).
Technology transfer may be a plausible cause of convergence, but the neoclassical model provides other explanations. “Why…do we see convergence among some sets of countries but a lack of convergence among the countries of the world as a whole? The neoclassical growth model suggests an important explanation for these findings” (66). “Among countries that have the same steady state, the convergence hypothesis should hold: poor countries should grow faster on average than rich countries” (68). This explains why there is convergence in some areas, but not all areas, as not every country has the same steady state, but countries who do have the same steady state are incentivized by structural forces to converge technologically.
There is then a brief discussion of income distribution, historical trends and future possible developments.
Ch. 4:
Neoclassical growth models explore the accumulation of physical and human capital in relation to labor stocks and technology, which is determined exogenously. Endogenous technological determination is crucial for the further establishment of economic growth models.
Romer writes about ideas. Ideas are nonrivalrous. Most goods are rivalrous, as my use of it excludes your use of it. Not ideas. An additional distinction made by Romer is that of excludability and non-excludability. “…the economics of ‘ideas’ is intimately tied to the presence of increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition” (83). Increasing returns to scale is seen in the initial costs of the development of an idea: these costs are fixed and may be large. Therefore, companies must charge a price that is above their marginal costs in order to recoup these fixed costs.
Authors like North (1981) see the imposition of intellectual property rights regimes as being crucial for the establishment of sustained economic growth because this incentivized innovation.
Ch. 5:
Endogenous technological change is explored through the lenses of Romer’s model. “The Romer model endogenizes technological progress by introducing the search for new ideas by researches interested in profiting from their inventions” (97).
As was the case with the Solow model, there are two main elements in the Romer model of endogenous technological change: an equation describing the production function and a set of equations describing how the inputs for the production function evolve over time” (98). “The Romer economy consists of three sectors: a final-goods sector, an intermediate-goods sector, and a research sector” (111).
The book continues and lays out different approaches to exploring technology endogenously and technology transfer issues.
Why are we so rich and they are so poor? That is a fundamental question driving theories of economic growth. This was famously explored by Smith in The Wealth of Nations. More recently, this was explored by Solow. “Solow’s theories helped to clarify the role of the accumulation of physical capital and emphasized the importance of technological progress as the ultimate driving force behind sustained economic growth” (2). This work continued apace throughout the 60s and 70s, eventually building to contributions made by Romer and Lucas. These authors focused on human capital and the importance of ideas for economic growth. Barro quantified many of these ideas.
The book is an exploration of economic growth theory from the perspective of the relationship between observation and theory. The author uses the analogy of astronomy in the hard sciences.
1: Per-capita income varies between countries
2: Economic growth rates vary from country to country
3: Growth not entirely consistent over time
4: Countries can become wealthy or poor
5: US has seen steady growth
“Facts” about the US over the last century: Kaldor: “…economic theorists should begin with a summary of the ‘stylized’ facts a theory was supposed to explain” (14). First fact: “…the rate of return to capital is roughly constant…” (14). Secondly: the labor share has been mostly constant across history, looking specifically at the US. The combination of stylized fact one and two is that the ratio of K/Y is relatively stable. The third stylized fact alters one of Kaldor’s facts: there is relative consistent growth in economic growth.
6: Growth in output and trade are related (15)
7: Skilled and unskilled workers show a tendency to move from poor to rich countries
Three questions explored here: Why are some rich and some poor? What drives economic growth? And finally: how do some countries transition so quickly to becoming rich?
Solow’s Model:
Assumptions: world comprised of countries producing a single good. No international trade because there is only one good. Consumers have a percentage that they save for future consumption and a percentage that they use for consumption.
The model is constructed around two equations: production function and capital accumulation.
The production function acts as a saturating curve with respect to increases in capital relative to workers: there are diminishing returns on investment. Secondly, capital accumulation change is equal to the amount of investment minus the amount of depreciation.
Consumers save a portion of their income, which is invested, or rented, for use in production.
Capital accumulation per worker is determined by three things. It is increased with investment in workers, it is decreased with depreciation and the new term is change in the size of labor relative to capital.
A basic Solow diagram is shown that compares two plotted equations. One is a saturating curve that represents the amount of investment per person. The second curve is a line that represents the amount of new capital investment required per person required to keep the ratio of capital to worker consistent. Both equations begin at 0,0. When capital growth occurs per worker, capital deepening takes place. When per worker change is not taking place but capital grows, capital widening takes place. The amount of capital per worker constantly tries to approach the point where both lines intersect.
What happens if there is an increase in the investment rate? The saturating curve that represents the amount of investment per person shifts up. This starts a process of capital deepening.
What happens if there is an increase in the population growth? That shifts the degree of the relationship between the amount of capital investment required to keep the amount of capital per worker constant. “Investment per worker is now no longer high enough to keep the capital-labor ratio constant in the face of the rising population. Therefore, the capital-labor ratio begins to fall…At this point, the economy has less capital per worker than it began with and is therefore poorer: per capita output is ultimately lower after the increase in population growth…” (31-2).
The Steady State: “By definition, the steady-state quantity of capital per worker is determined by the condition that…” capital change is equal to zero (32).
“This equation reveals the Solow model’s answer to the question ‘Why are we so rich and they so poor?’ Countries that have higher savings/investment rates will tend to be richer…” (32). More capital/worker equals more output/worker. If you have high population growth, you will have lower production because you will have lower capital/worker: ie, these countries will focus on just trying to keep the capital/labor ratio stable and will have to emphasize capital widening with less of an opportunity to explore capital deepening.
These effects are then explored vis-Ã -vis empirical evidence: real GDP is compared to savings rate and real GDP is compared to population growth rates. There is seen to be a correlation (though the later graph, figure 2.7, doesn’t appear to display this correlation as well as claimed).
This model fails to describe increased per capital growth because output per unit of labor, and thus per person, is constant.
“To generate sustained growth in per capita income in this model, we must follow Solow and introduce technological progress to the model” (36). This is done through the variable a which increases labor’s productivity. This technology assumption is exogenously imposed.
“A situation in which capital, output, consumption, and population are growing at constant rates is called balanced growth path” (37).
“If the economy begins with a capital-technology ratio that is below its steady-state level…the capital-technology ratio {k~=K/AL} will rise gradually over time. Why? Because the amount of investment being undertaken exceeds the amount needed to keep the capital-technology ratio constant” (39).
“This exercise {Figure 2.10} illustrates two important points. First, policy changes in the Solow model increase growth rates, but only temporarily along the transition to the new steady state. That is, policy changes have no long-run growth effect. Second, policy changes can have level effects. That is, a permanent policy change can permanently raise (or lower) the level of per capita output” (41-3).
Some key aspects of the Solow Model: per capita growth happens because of exogenously imposed technology variables. Also, the reason some countries are better off than others is because they save and invest more, and thus increase the amount of capital per worker which makes them more efficient. There is also a more subtle explanation of why some countries grow more quickly than others: if their capital technology ratio (k~) is below the steady-state level for the long run, it will climb back quickly to that level. This might be an explanation for why Germany and Japan built back up their capital stocks so quickly after WWII. “Or it may explain why an economy that increases its investment rate will grow rapidly as it makes the transition to a higher output-technology ratio” (44-5). This may be applicable in situations like South Korea, for example.
Exploring output: as a stylized fact, output per person decreased after 1973. This was the case throughout the advanced countries. It remained relatively low into the end of the 1990s. Some thought that high energy prices could be the culprit, but this is improbable as real energy prices in the late 80s were lower than they were before the shock. Another thought is that the decreased productivity has to do with a transition from a manufacturing economy to a service economy. Another explanation blames a slow-down in funding for R&D in the late 1960’s. Alternatively, growth may have been artificially high in the 50s and 60s because of the rebuilding efforts after WWII.
The “New Economy” saw productivity increase in the late 1990s. This can be partially attributed to the increased use of information technology. Also, some posit that ICT can explain the slow-down in growth and the later improvement: the time-lag associated with diffusing new technologies in the early 1970s created productivity slowdowns that were only circumvented over 20 years later.
Ch. 3:
An influential paper by Mankiw, Romer and Weil put the Solow model to an empirical test, found that it was quite good, but added human capital to make it better. This extends the Solow model to include different levels of education and skills.
H, or the degree to that labor is skilled, is calculated based upon investment in education which rises at a relatively constant rate. For example, if someone invests one extra year on education, wages are expected to rise by about 10% for a life-time (Bils and Klenow (2000)). The amount that individuals invest in education is given exogenously.
K is also gathered by investing some output instead of consuming everything.
“Countries are rich because they have high investment rates in physical capital, spend a large fraction of time accumulating skills…, have low population growth rates, and have high levels of technology” (57).
An additional discussion about convergence and differences in growth rates. A piece by Gerschenkron (1952) and “backward” economies and how they grow faster to catch up is sited, as well as a piece by Abramovitz (1986).
Technology transfer may be a plausible cause of convergence, but the neoclassical model provides other explanations. “Why…do we see convergence among some sets of countries but a lack of convergence among the countries of the world as a whole? The neoclassical growth model suggests an important explanation for these findings” (66). “Among countries that have the same steady state, the convergence hypothesis should hold: poor countries should grow faster on average than rich countries” (68). This explains why there is convergence in some areas, but not all areas, as not every country has the same steady state, but countries who do have the same steady state are incentivized by structural forces to converge technologically.
There is then a brief discussion of income distribution, historical trends and future possible developments.
Ch. 4:
Neoclassical growth models explore the accumulation of physical and human capital in relation to labor stocks and technology, which is determined exogenously. Endogenous technological determination is crucial for the further establishment of economic growth models.
Romer writes about ideas. Ideas are nonrivalrous. Most goods are rivalrous, as my use of it excludes your use of it. Not ideas. An additional distinction made by Romer is that of excludability and non-excludability. “…the economics of ‘ideas’ is intimately tied to the presence of increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition” (83). Increasing returns to scale is seen in the initial costs of the development of an idea: these costs are fixed and may be large. Therefore, companies must charge a price that is above their marginal costs in order to recoup these fixed costs.
Authors like North (1981) see the imposition of intellectual property rights regimes as being crucial for the establishment of sustained economic growth because this incentivized innovation.
Ch. 5:
Endogenous technological change is explored through the lenses of Romer’s model. “The Romer model endogenizes technological progress by introducing the search for new ideas by researches interested in profiting from their inventions” (97).
As was the case with the Solow model, there are two main elements in the Romer model of endogenous technological change: an equation describing the production function and a set of equations describing how the inputs for the production function evolve over time” (98). “The Romer economy consists of three sectors: a final-goods sector, an intermediate-goods sector, and a research sector” (111).
The book continues and lays out different approaches to exploring technology endogenously and technology transfer issues.
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