Sen, Amartya K. (1992). Inequality Reexamined: Harvard University Press.
Chapter 1: Equality of What?
We have to address two questions if we are going to deal with issues of equality: firstly, we must ask, “Why equality?” and secondly, we must ask, “Equality of what?” Sen wonders whether or not we need to answer the first question if we have already argued in favor of the later. He claims that, “…question (1) in this analysis looks very much like the poor man’s question (2)” (12).
Sen then explores different normative theories, and finds that they each have an egalitarian core: it is less a question of why equality and more a question of equality of what that is answered by these philosophers. For example, even those who are seen as being critics of equality eventually settle in an are of equal treatment. For example, if a theorist posits that people are inherently unequal in their abilities, they should be equally supported in light of the beginning inequality. Even Nozick believes that people’s property rights should be equally treated. Sen wonders, must all ethical theories have a character of equality in order to be valid?
We are all fundamentally unequal. We are born with different endowments, different situational opportunities and different constraints. Thus, in constructing an ethical theory, we must be concerned with determining a space where we can all achieve equality. We must prune certain mutually exclusive opportunities to identify equality in the interest of promoting one of these branches of equal opportunity. We must choose one item on that we can be equal at the expense of the consequences of this decision, which is the inequality of individuals in a different realm.
Also, liberty and equality can find places in that they butt heads. Sen points to Nozick as being an ethical theorist who is routinely identified as being anti-egalitarian. This is because he is so heavily focused on the promotion of ideals of liberty. Sen believes that this logic is, “…altogether faulty” (22). It is not that liberty and equality stand in juxtaposition with one another, but rather that liberty is one of the goods that can be equally distributed, like income or justice.
This brings into question the very nature of the use of equality in the determination of ethical standards. “If equality can possibly speak with so many voices, can we take any of its demands seriously?” (23). The answer is yes. Sen goes on to claim that, “…the need to value equality in some space that is seen to be particularly important is not an empty demand” (24). He also claims that, “…equality can be a particularly powerful and exacting demand” (24). Finally, he explains that equality in so many different realms doesn’t at all lessen the powerful effect of equality, but rather is indicative of the difficulty of individuals to come together to agree on what should be valued.
In fact, the plurality of these different focuses can actually help to construct an ethical argument. Sen explores Rawl’s theory of fairness and finds that there is a plurality of foci: there is a focus on primary good equality on one side and freedom or well-being on the other provides for an interesting approach to ethical reasoning. “The plurality of focal variables can make a great difference precisely because of the diversity of human beings” (28).
Sen ends the chapter by evaluating a standard measure of equality: income. He finds it to be wholly lacking. Income equality is a rough measure that goes a long way to obscuring other important metrics of inequality and equality because it is so analytically elegant and relatively easy to apply. Because these approaches are so widely used and easily deployed, they go a long way to obscuring other ways of measuring equality. Other important measures of inequality, like freedom and well-being, can be affected in many different ways by different levels of income; the two variables do not move together in lock-step.
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