Killick, Tony. (1996). Principals, Agents and the Limitations of BWI Conditionality (Vol. 19, 211-229).
Killick identifies a paradox in BWI conditionality: "the evidence on the specific economic consequences of SAPs…does not point to strong results. Assessment of the impact of SAPs is fraught with difficulty, particularly because we can do no more than simulate the counterfactual" (212). "The following generalizations are among the principal results of the empirical literature on the consequences of BWI adjustment programmes [sic]" (212): Programmes [sic] have limited revealed ability to achieve their own objectives; Programmes [sic] have high mortality or interruption rates; There is little evidence of a strong connection between SAPs and implementation of policy reforms; Programmes [sic] have only modest impact on key policy variables and even less on institutions (213-4).
He then points out that the relatively weak interaction between SAPs and their chances of achieving their goals: "the BWI's over-reliance on conditionality as a means of inducing policy change" (215). "As practiced by the BWIs, the conditionality attached to SAPs is of three different levels of obligation. In diminishing order of commitment, these are (a) preconditions…reforms that must be taken before a BWI is willing to approve a negotiated loan; (b) performance criteria…actions that must be undertaken for governments to be allowed to continue to draw down the agreed loan; and (c) other actions which are less binding in nature" (215).
Recipients of BWI action and conditionality agreements tend to not feel a sense of ownership in the prescriptions that are put forth. Additionally, the punitive measures that are advanced by BWI interests are not always credibly followed. “To sum up, while a good many factors contribute to the paradox of good policies producing weak effects, the BWIs’ over-reliance on conditionality is surely one of the most important” (225).
The future of these programs depend on much, though Killick promotes a few ways in which they may be able to produce more robust results. One thing that can happen, is that BWIs can refuse to help countries who do not appear to be sufficiently interested. Additionally, recipient governments could draft letters of intent that would allow them to show to the BWIs that they are sufficiently interested in making macro-economic policy changes. Also, through the drafting of letters of intent, recipient countries could also begin to
